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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the pre-negotiation stage of the negotiation process in South 
Africa leading to the first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic of South Africa 
on 20 December 1991. The pre-negotiation stage was that period in the South African 
conflict when negotiated solutions were considered, and negotiation towards a political 
settlement was adopted as an option by the major parties, namely the National Party South 
African government and the African National Congress. 
 
The central question this dissertation asks is why did the South African multiparty 
negotiations begin? This question is important; De Klerk’s seminal address to the Tricameral 
Parliament on 2 February 1990, and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela on 11 
February 1990, is often considered as the beginning of the negotiation process in South 
Africa. This however is not true. Negotiations did take place before this date and they were 
crucial in shaping the path towards multiparty negotiations. The important question therefore 
is what prepared the ground for 2 February 1990, and the resulting political process that led 
to multiparty negotiations. The dissertation thus has two sub-questions: (1) why negotiations 
in South Africa occurred at all; and (2) why the South African government ended up 
negotiating with the ANC. To answer these questions, the dissertation will use I. William 
Zartman’s theory of ripeness as a guide, and Brian Tomlin’s five-staged model of pre-
negotiation as an analytical framework. In this respect, the dissertation is a theoretical single-
case study. 
 
The dissertation argues that multiparty negotiations in South Africa began because the South 
African government and the African National Congress reached a shared understanding that 
the South African conflict could be solved through a negotiated solution, produced a 
commitment to a negotiated solution, and in the process, overcame the problem of 
preconditions as a barrier to the opening of multiparty negotiations.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
On 2 February 1990, President Frederik Willem (FW) de Klerk announced a series of 
immediate, short, and long term initiatives in his annual address to the Tricameral Parliament 
that profoundly changed the course of South African history.  
 
In the immediate measures, the prohibitions placed on the African National Congress (ANC), 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and a 
number of subsidiary organisations were rescinded. Political activists who were serving 
prison sentences for membership of the above resistance organisations, or who had 
committed offenses because a ban on these organisations was in place, would be identified 
and released. These decisions, De Klerk argued, were in accordance with the South African 
government’s intention to liberalise the political process in South Africa. 
 
The short-term measures included the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela. Mandela, De 
Klerk stated, could make a constructive contribution to a peaceful political process in South 
Africa.  
 
The long-term measures included a request to the South African Law Commission to 
examine suitable constitutional models for a new South Africa that could safeguard the 
government’s mix of individual and minority rights.1 
 
Almost two years later, on 20 December 1991, 238 delegates representing 19 political parties 
and organisations, gathered for the first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic 
                                                          
1
 F.W. De Klerk’s speech at the opening of Parliament 2 February 1990. Document 16 in Hassen Ebrahim, The 
Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998), 470 
2 
 
South Africa (CODESA). Chaired by Justices Ismail Mohamed and Piet Schabort, three 
important outcomes defined this historic roundtable.  
 
First, through a Declaration of Intent, representatives of all the gathered parties
2
 declared 
their commitment to “bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a 
common citizenship”, to establish “a free and open society based on democratic values”, to 
ensure “equal opportunities and social justice for all”, to create a climate conducive to 
peaceful constitutional change, and to set in motion the process of drawing up and 
establishing a constitution.
3
  
 
Second, five working groups were formed to negotiate broad sets of issues such as the 
principles and structures of a new constitution, the creation of a climate conducive for 
peaceful political participation, the form of transitional or interim government and the future 
path of the political transition, the constitutional future of the four homeland governments 
that had accepted nominal independence, and the implementation of agreements.
4
  
 
Third, the National Party (NP) government made an important concession. De Klerk 
proposed a compromise to bridge the differences between the ANC position that the new 
constitution be drawn up by an elected constitutional assembly, and the NP government 
position that it be written by a multiparty constitutional convention.
5
  De Klerk proposed 
 
                                                          
2
 All the parties present endorsed the Declaration except for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Homeland 
governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. The IFP believed that the use of the words ‘undivided South 
Africa’ precluded them from raising the federal option during the constitution-making process.  However, after 
an amendment was secured confirming that the offending term ‘undivided’ did not commit CODESA to a 
unitary state, both the IFP and the Ciskei government signed.  As for the government of Bophuthatswana, its 
leader, Lucas Mangope, argued that CODESA could not enter into any agreements affecting its territory without 
the formal agreement of the government of Bophuthatswana. 
3
  CODESA 1 – Declaration of Intent, 21 December 1991. Document 22 in Hassen Ebrahim, The Soul of a 
Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998), 529  
4
 Timothy Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 205 
5
 Frederik Willem de Klerk, The Last Trek – A New Beginning: The Autobiography (London: MacMillan, 1998), 
222  
3 
 
“[A] two-phased process of constitutional writing: a new interim constitution would be drafted by the CODESA 
process, in terms of which the first fully representative Parliament would be elected, which would in turn draft 
and adopt the final constitution… The negotiating parties would reach agreement on an interim constitution 
which would be adopted by the Tricameral Parliament, with its National Party majority. A new fully 
representative Parliament would be elected under the new constitution, which would also act as a constitutional 
assembly. It would write and adopt a final constitution that would have to comply with pre-agreed immutable 
constitutional principles. Before the final constitution could come into effect a new Constitutional Court would 
have to certify that it complied with the constitutional principles. During this period the country would be ruled 
by an elected transitional multiparty government under the interim constitution.”6    
 
The first plenary of CODESA was the first multiparty session of negotiations towards the 
settlement of the South African conflict.
7
 CODESA signalled the end of the pre-negotiation 
stage of the negotiation process, where parties established whether negotiations were 
worthwhile, and the beginning of the formula stage, where parties began to negotiate the 
basic principles of a negotiated settlement.
8
    
 
1.1.The Research Question 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the pre-negotiation stage of the negotiation process in South 
Africa i.e. that period in the South African conflict when negotiated solutions were 
considered, and negotiation towards a political settlement was adopted as an option by the 
South African government and the ANC. While the CODESA process included other 
political organisations, the South African government and the ANC were central to the pre-
negotiation process leading up to CODESA. During this period, the respective parties 
explored the possibility of negotiated solutions, reached a common understanding on the 
important issues in the South African conflict, developed a commitment to a negotiated 
settlement, and chose to negotiate a formula for a political settlement. 
 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Justice Richard Goldstone, “The South African Bill of Rights”, Texas International Law Journal 32 (1997), 
453 
8
 I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982) 
4 
 
 
The research question asks:  
 
Why did the South African multiparty negotiations begin? 
 
This is an important question; De Klerk’s seminal address to the Tricameral Parliament in 2 
February 1990, and the subsequent release of Mandela on 11 February 1990, is often taken by 
scholars as the beginning of the first stage of the negotiation process.
9
 This, however, cannot 
be true. The most reliable scholarship agrees that negotiations did take place before this date 
and that they were crucial.
10
 The importance of 2 February 1990 is that it was a turning point 
marking the end of confidential pre-negotiations and the beginning of overt or public pre-
negotiations. The important question is what prepared the ground for this event, and the 
resulting political process that led to the first multiparty session of negotiations towards the 
settlement of the South African conflict? 
 
The research question therefore has two sub-questions: 
 
                                                          
9
 Important scholarship in this regard include Hermann Giliomee, “Democratisation in South Africa” Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol.110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 83-104; Elisabeth Wood, Forging Democracy from 
Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
Martin Murray, The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa. (London: Verso, 
1994); Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster, “Challenging Transition Theory: The Labour Movement, Radical 
Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa”, Politics and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1995), 75-
106; James Barber, Forging the New South Africa (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994); John 
Daniel, “A Response to Guelke: The Cold War Factor in South Africa’s Transition”, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1996), 101-104; Timothy Sisk, Democratisation in South Africa: The Elusive 
Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert The Quest for 
Democracy: South Africa in Transition (London: Penguin, 1992); David Ginsburg, “The Democratisation of 
South Africa: Transition Theory Tested”, Transformation 29 (1996), pp. 74-102; David Howarth, “Paradigms 
Gained? A Critique of Theories and Explanations of Democratic Transition in South Africa” in David Howarth 
and Aletta J. Norval, South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives. (New York: Macmillan Press, 
1998); David Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball, 2009). While Sisk and Welsh 
do refer to this period, they do not attach great importance.   
10
 See Vladimir Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow. (Belville: Mayibuye, 1999); Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is 
Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution (Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 
1994); Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid (New York: Norton, 1997); Willie 
Esterhuyse, Endgame: Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012) 
5 
 
i. Why did the South African government and the ANC negotiate at all? 
ii. Why did the South African government end up negotiating with the ANC? 
 
What can assist in addressing these questions? Theoretically, the period before 2 February 
1990, and between 2 February 1990 and 20 December 1991, can be classified as the ‘pre-
negotiation’ stage of the negotiation process.  
 
Pre-negotiation theorising has developed into a sophisticated, but by no means entirely 
unproblematic, body of scholarship. The towering figure of this scholarship is I William 
Zartman whose seminal work on the negotiation process highlights the importance of the pre-
negotiation stage and its appropriate contextual conditions – the notion of ripeness.11  
 
This notion of ripeness argues that negotiations begin when adversaries perceive themselves 
in a mutually hurting stalemate, wherein both parties realise they cannot escalate their way to 
victory. Additional preconditions of ripeness are the emergence of a perceived way out, and 
the emergence of valid spokespersons on both sides. 
 
The concepts of ‘ripeness’ and ‘pre-negotiation’ are central to addressing the research 
question.  
 
First, given the central question asked, ripeness theory will be used to help answer the 
research question. But as will be explained in Chapter Three, ripeness theory is also a 
criticised theory with limitations. I use ripeness theory both because it is the most fitting but 
also by no means a complete theory. The dissertation thus also wants to improve the most 
fitting and relevant theory.  
 
                                                          
11
I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989)  
6 
 
Second, in examining the South African pre-negotiation process and the role of ripeness 
within it, the dissertation will use Brian Tomlin’s stage-model on pre-negotiations as an 
analytical framework.
12
 Tomlin uses Daniel Druckman’s threshold-adjustment model to 
describe the pre-negotiation process.
13
 This framework provides for an organising set of 
concepts for the examination of the pre-negotiation process, highlighting important stages 
and events indicating behavioural patterns.
14
 This will provide for a comprehensive and 
systematic description of the South African pre-negotiation process.    
 
This theoretical case study intends to make a contribution to negotiation theory’s pre-
negotiation stage, and the concept of ripeness. 
 
1.2. Research Method 
 
Three conditions determine the most appropriate use of a research method: the type of 
research question posed; the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural 
events; and the degree of focus on contemporary or historical events.
15
 The most important is 
the research question; the direction and design of a study is derived wholly from research 
questions and the articulation of the theoretical propositions related to these questions.
16
  
 
Research questions can either ask “who”, “what”, “where”, “how”, and “why” questions. For 
research questions asking “what” questions, two possibilities arise.  
 
                                                          
12
 Brian Tomlin, “The Stages of Pre-negotiation: The Decision to Negotiate North American Free Trade Janice 
Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenegotiation (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1989)  
13
 Daniel Druckman, “Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights, Spain and the 
United States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1986), 327-60 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods Fourth Edition (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009), 8 
16
 Robert Yin, “The Abridged Version of Case Study Research: Design and Method” in Leonard Bickman and 
Debra Rog (eds.), Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods (Thousand Oakes: Sage, 1998), 233 
7 
 
First, either such questions can be exploratory i.e. the goal being “to develop pertinent 
hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry.”17 From this sense, any of the major research 
methods is appropriate i.e. experiments, surveys, archival analyses, histories, or case studies. 
Alternatively, the research goal can be to describe the incidence of prevalence of a 
phenomenon or to be predictive about certain outcomes.
18
 The investigation of prevalent 
political attitudes, where a poll would be appropriate, or the spread of a disease, where an 
epidemiological analysis of statistics would be appropriate, would be examples.
19
  
 
By contrast, research questions focusing in “how” and “why” are more explanatory and 
“likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the preferred research 
methods.”20 This is because they deal with operational links that need to be traced over time 
rather than frequencies or incidence.  
 
The research question in this dissertation is “why did the South African multiparty 
negotiations begin?” Consequently, the method favoured is the case-study method. The case 
study method is used to understand real-life phenomenon in depth, but such understanding 
encompasses important contextual conditions because they are pertinent to the phenomenon 
of study.
21
 The case studies unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence 
i.e. documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations.  
 
Case study research includes both single and multiple case studies. The case study type in this 
dissertation is the single-case study. The single-case study is an intensive study of one unit 
“for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.”22 A unit “connotes a 
spatially-bound phenomenon – e.g. a nation-state, revolution, election or person – observed at 
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 Yin, Case Study Research, 9 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Robert Yin and Darnella Davis, “Adding New Dimensions to Case Study Evaluations: The Case of 
Evaluating Comprehensive Reforms” in George Julnes and Debra Rog (eds.) Informing Federal Policies for 
Evaluation Methodology (San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007) 
22
 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is it Good for?”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
98, No. 2 (May 2004), 342 
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a single point in time or over some delimited period of time.”23 A single-case study can be 
considered comparative if it uses concepts applicable to other countries, develops concepts 
applicable to other countries, and/or seeks to make larger inferences.
24
 
 
Single-case studies are appropriate under several circumstances.  
 
First, a single-case study is appropriate when it represents the critical case in testing a well 
formulated theory. If a theory has specified a clear set of propositions, as well as the 
circumstances which such propositions are believed to be true, then a single-case study, 
meeting the conditions for testing the theory, can either confirm, challenge or extend the 
theory.
25
 The single-case can then be used to “determine whether a theory’s propositions are 
correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant.”26  
 
The second rationale is where the case represents a unique case. In this sense, the issues 
involved may be so rare that the single case is worth documenting and analysing. Third, the 
case may be representative or typical. The objective here would be to capture the 
circumstances and conditions of an everyday or common situation.
27
 Fourth, the case may be 
revelatory in that the investigator observes and analyses a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible. And fifth, a case may be longitudinal i.e. studying the same case at two or more 
different points in time. The aim here would be to specify how certain conditions change over 
time. 
 
There are some important critiques of the single-case study method. Gary King, Robert 
Koehane and Sidney Verba’s classic Designing Social Inquiry discourages research designs 
in which there is no variance on the dependent variable, and criticises “single observation” 
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research designs.
28
 They argue that studies involving only a single observation run the risk of 
indeterminacy in the face of more than one explanation, and they can “lead to incorrect 
inferences if there is measurement error.”29 However, they also note that a single case can 
involve many observations and this can greatly reduce these problems.
30
   
 
Arend Lijphart compiles a useful list of six single-case study approaches: atheoretical, 
interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming, and deviant.
31
 
Atheoretical case studies are traditional single-country analyses, are entirely descriptive, and 
move in a theoretical vacuum; “they are neither guided by established or hypothesised 
generalisations nor motivated by a desire to formulate general hypotheses.”32 Interpretative 
case studies resemble atheoretical case studies in the sense that they are selected for analysis 
based in the interest of the case as opposed to an interest in the formulation of general 
theory.
33
 Where they differ is that they make an explicit use of established theoretical 
propositions.
34
 
 
The final four approaches are used primarily for theory-building and theory-testing. 
Hypothesis-generating case studies develop theoretical generalisations in areas where no 
theory exists. Theory-confirming and theory-infirming case studies analyse single cases 
“within the framework of established generalisations.”35 These case studies are a test of 
theoretical propositions which may be confirmed or infirmed. Theory-confirming case studies 
strengthen the theoretical propositions in question and theory-infirming case studies weaken 
the generalisations marginally. Deviant case studies are studies of single cases that are known 
to deviate from established generalisations; “they are selected in order to reveal why the cases 
                                                          
28
 Gary King, Robert Koehane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 208-211 
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30
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are deviant – that is, to uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered 
previously, or to refine the (operational) definitions or some or all of the variables.”36 
 
The dissertation will use ripeness theory to assist in answering “why did the South African 
multiparty negotiations begin?” In this respect, the dissertation employs a theoretical single-
case study method of the theory-confirming type. The dissertation will apply an established 
theory to a case and examine its utility. It thus seeks to improve ripeness theory on the basis 
of its application to the South African case, and use the ripeness theoretical guidelines to 
better understand the South African case. The dissertation is therefore a theory-testing 
exercise. The goal is to improve ripeness theory by identifying how its properties can be 
expanded or narrowed (where relevant) using the South African pre-negotiations. 
 
A final matter that must be attended to is the issue of generalizing from a single-case study. 
Single-case studies can enable researchers to generalize to other cases that represent similar 
theoretical conditions.
37
 The importance of single-case studies is in their broad implications 
or generalizability i.e. “generalizing from case studies is not a matter of statistical 
generalization (generalizing from a sample to universe) but a matter of analytic generalization 
(using single or multiple cases to illustrate, represent or generalize to a theory).”38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
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1.3. Basic Concepts and Definitions 
 
Three concepts are at the centre of this dissertation: negotiation, pre-negotiation and ripeness.  
 
1.3.1. Negotiation  
 
There is no universally utilized definition of negotiation. Rather, four ways of thinking about 
the concept have become the dominant frameworks in the literature: negotiation as puzzle-
solving; negotiation as bargaining; negotiation as a two-level game; and negotiation as 
diplomacy.
39
 
 
Theorists who view negotiation as puzzle-solving investigate how people make optimal 
choices when these choices are contingent on what other people do.
40
 The most prominent 
puzzle for game theorists is the prisoner’s dilemma game that is used to model behavior in a 
variety of strategic situations.
41
 
 
A second approach views negotiation as a bargaining game in which opponents exchange 
concessions influenced by the situation in which it takes place. Negotiation is thus a process 
where parties gradually move from their own positions towards the position of others.
42
 
 
Theorists who view negotiation as a two-level game view it as a process of building 
consensus among diverse constituencies with stakes in the outcome i.e. a dynamic process 
                                                          
39
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that consists of multi-way communication among negotiators, constituents and principals, 
where intra-party and inter-party negotiation occur simultaneously.
43
    
 
Negotiation as diplomatic politics views the process as a microcosm of international relations 
where parallel interactions among many types of diplomatic activities occur, each influencing 
each other.
44
  
 
These approaches have developed into distinct frameworks, whose researchers have 
developed specialties in the fields of game theory, social psychology, and international 
relations.
45
 
 
Drawing on these approaches, the dissertation defines negotiation: 
 
Negotiation is a process involving discussions between officially designated representatives 
that are designed to achieve the formal agreement of their governments or organizations on 
an issue or a problem in their relations.
46
  
 
The literature on negotiation divides the negotiation process into three distinct stages: the pre-
negotiation (or diagnostic) stage, the formula stage, and the details stage. The first stage (pre-
negotiation) is the process where parties define their situation and decide on negotiated 
solutions. In the second stage (formula stage), parties negotiate a formula for the resolution of 
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the conflict. In the third stage (details stage), parties negotiate the details to implement the 
formula.
47
  
 
It is important to point out that the notion of sequential ‘stages’ of the negotiation process is 
more conceptual than real; in real negotiations these stages are rarely isolated and often have 
shady and overlapping borders.      
 
1.3.2. Pre-negotiation  
 
The most prominent definition of pre-negotiation was developed in 1989 by Zartman and 
served the basis of what has since been the most authoritative book on the topic.
48
 According 
to Zartman, pre-negotiation begins when “one or more parties considers negotiation as a 
policy option and communicates this intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree 
to formal negotiations [i.e. negotiations over formula] … or when one party abandons the 
consideration of negotiation as an option.”49   
 
Theorists have expanded on Zartman’s definition, focusing on the structure, and the functions 
of pre-negotiation.
50
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The dissertation defines pre-negotiation:   
 
Pre-negotiation begins with changes in at least one of the parties’ perception of the conflict 
where negotiation is considered as an option and an alternative to the unilateral track. 
Parties subsequently convey the messages of their intentions to each other. The pre-
negotiation stage ends when parties agree to begin negotiating a formula for the resolution 
of their conflict, or when one party abandons this option altogether.  
 
In the process, parties establish whether negotiations are worthwhile and if so, agree on the 
agenda and the necessary procedure for negotiating a formula for the resolution of their 
conflict. Pre-negotiations can either be informal and confidential, or they can be formal and 
well-advertised. However, whether they are formal or informal, public or confidential, pre-
negotiations are often more important and far more difficult than is usually supposed. 
 
1.3.3. Ripeness  
 
The concept of ripeness explains why parties to a conflict transform the conflict toward 
resolution through negotiation. A conflict is held to be ripe for a negotiated resolution only 
when the appropriate set of circumstances arrives i.e. when the adversaries jointly confront a 
costly impasse.  
 
The condition of ripeness has three components:  
- Perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (deadlock) or an imminent catastrophe 
(deadline), wherein parties realize they can no longer escalate their way to victory; 
- The emergence of a perceived way-out; and 
- Valid spokespersons emerge on both sides.  
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1.3.3.1. Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
 
The mutually hurting stalemate suggests that extended pain is the most effective thing that 
will make belligerent parties consider alternative ways of achieving goals in conflict. It 
implies that political leaders and their supporters change their perceptions towards negotiated 
solutions only through experiencing the pain of loss and damage. Zartman points out that it is 
not just a stalemate i.e. a situation in which neither side can win, but neither side wants to 
back down or accept loss either. Rather, it is a hurting stalemate i.e. parties will seek 
alternative ways of achieving their goals.
51
  
 
The dissertation defines mutually hurting stalemate as: 
 
That period in a conflict when one side perceives that it is unable to achieve its aims, to 
resolve the problem, or to win the conflict by itself, and the other side arrives at a similar 
perception. Each party recognizes its opponent’s strength and its own inability to overcome 
it. Each party’s unilateral policy option is perceived as a more expensive and less likely way 
of achieving a possible, acceptable outcome than the policy of negotiation. 
 
The hurting stalemate is as a matter of perception.  
 
1.3.3.2. Perceived Way-Out 
 
The other element necessary for a ripe moment is a perceived way out. The importance is that 
without a sense of a way out, the push associated with a mutually hurting stalemate leaves the 
parties with nowhere to go. Zartman points out that “if parties’ subjective expressions of pain 
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related to objective evidence of stalemate can be found, along with expressions of a sense of 
a way out, ripeness exists.”52      
 
A perceived way-out is defined as: 
 
That period in a conflict where one side perceives that a negotiated solution (but not 
necessarily a specific outcome) is possible for the searching, and the other party shares that 
perception and the willingness to search. 
 
If two parties perceive themselves in a hurting stalemate and perceived way out, the conflict 
is ripe for resolution. 
 
1.3.3.3. Valid Spokespersons 
 
The question of whose perception is relevant consequently emerges. ‘Valid spokespersons’ 
are crucial for the initiation of negotiations, and the ripeness literature acknowledges this. A 
key assumption of ripeness is leaders’ perceptions of conditions and the decision-making 
process that determine whether a ripe moment will be seized. 
 
Valid spokespersons are defined as: 
 
People with the ability to commit enough segments of the political spectrum on their side so 
as to make the search for negotiated possibilities will be possible.  
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This agency component is crucial as the belief of one side that it is dealing with valid 
representatives of the other side imbues the process with legitimacy, and is indeed a 
prerequisite for productive or successful negotiations.   
 
1.4. Sources of Evidence  
 
An important element for doing case studies is the ability to handle a variety of evidence 
derived from diverse data collection techniques. Six types of evidence are most commonly 
used in case study research: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation and physical artifacts. Given that the dissertation analyses a political 
process historic in nature, the dissertation uses books, journal articles, official documentation, 
policy analyses and statements, minutes of meetings, speeches, unpublished papers, a variety 
of archival records, transcripts of interviews and newspaper articles.  
 
This dissertation used primary documentation (official documents, minutes of meetings, 
transcripts of interviews, and other archival records) both as background research material 
and directly in the construction of the argument. The main difficulty with the primary 
documentation on the case study is that the records are scattered nationally, with the main 
locations being the University of Cape Town, the University of Fort Hare, the University of 
the Free State, the University of the Western Cape, and the University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
Consequently, the dissertation was strategic in its use of these records. For research on the 
period up to 1990, evidence on the ANC was sourced from the South African Political 
Materials at the Historical Papers Archive at the University of the Witwatersrand, the 
Historical Papers Archive at the University of the Western Cape, the Manuscripts and 
Archives Department at the University of Cape Town, and the Padraig O’Malley Archival 
Collection located in a website sourced by the Nelson Mandela Centre for Memory. 
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At the South African Political Materials archival repository at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, the dissertation primarily relied on the Karis-Gerhart Collection. These 
historic materials were assembled in the process of writing volumes 5, 6, and 7 of From 
Protest to Challenge: a Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1990, 
published by Indiana University Press in the United States and the University of South Africa 
Press in South Africa. With several hundred primary source documents, the greatest strength 
of the collection is that it draws together in one place a wealth of materials on certain 
centrally important political organizations in the 1964-1990 periods such as the ANC, the 
PAC, Inkatha, the black consciousness organizations, and the UDF. 
 
The dissertation corroborated this evidence with materials from the Jack Simons Papers 
(African National Congress) at the Manuscripts and Archives Department at the University of 
Cape Town. This invaluable and extensive repository contains official and unofficial 
correspondence between ANC exile functionaries, memoranda, official statements and 
speeches, minutes of meetings and notes taken in meetings, and reports of meetings with 
various individuals. The dissertation also consulted the Historical Papers archive at the 
Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape for research on this period. This 
archive includes more than three hundred collections of personal and organizational 
documents.  
 
Evidence on the South African government during this period was primarily sourced from the 
Hermann Giliomee Papers at the Manuscripts and Archives Department at the University of 
Cape Town. These papers contain important transcripts of interviews conducted by Patti 
Waldmeir in the process of writing her book, Anatomy of a Miracle published by Penguin 
Books. The dissertation also used the Padraig O’Malley Archival Collection which is an 
extensive collection of Padraig O'Malley’s interviews conducted between 1985 and 2005 
with many key personalities, who influenced South Africa's transition to democracy.  
 
The use of transcripts of interviews was not without its problems. In the later ex post-facto 
interviews i.e. interviews conducted after a considerable amount of time had lapsed from the 
pre-negotiations, actors were usually deterministic in their recollection of events and in their 
19 
 
thoughts, motives and strategies. This determinism was absent in earlier interviews conducted 
during and immediately after pre-negotiations. In these earlier transcripts, actors were openly 
anxious about pre-negotiations, and were less certain about the outcome. Further, political 
events, processes, strategies and allies that were identified as important in the earlier 
interviews were downplayed in later interviews, and vice versa. This highlights the 
problematic status of ex post-facto interviews, especially if the actors in question are still 
actively involved politically. It also highlights the importance of the O’Malley Archives as it 
interviews the same principal actors over a specified length of time.  
 
Despite these challenges, actors’ accounts were invaluable and the dissertation was able to 
corroborate views expressed with other types of evidence, particularly other primary 
documentation found in the abovementioned archival repositories and academic analyses. 
 
For research on the period between 1990 and 1991, in addition to archival material sourced 
from the repositories above, the dissertation used the extensive secondary literature available 
on the South African transition to democracy, which includes books, journal articles, 
newspaper articles, policy analyses, newsletters, unpublished papers, doctoral dissertations, 
and autobiographies, authorized and unauthorized biographies. The dissertation also used 
additional primary material not sourced from the abovementioned archival repositories such 
as internal organizational discussion documents, official papers, official reports and 
statements, official agreements, speeches, and memoranda.          
 
1.5. Chapter Outline 
 
The dissertation is organized into ten chapters. Chapter Two locates this study within the 
general secondary literature on the beginning of multiparty negotiations in South Africa. This 
chapter will argue that the existing literature on the subject does not provide a good 
explanation of why negotiations begin. The dissertation intends to fill this gap.  
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Chapter Three provides an illustration of Zartman’s explanation of ripeness. The chapter 
reviews the literature, and the different interpretations, of ripeness, particularly from the 
perspectives of practitioners and diplomats directly involved in conflict resolution, and from 
scholars who have critiqued the concept for some of its limitations. The chapter then suggests 
ways in which the concept can be refined in such a way that it deals with some of these 
limitations.  
 
The chapter also introduces the concept of pre-negotiation, introducing the analytical 
framework within which the concept of ripeness and South African case study will be 
examined. The dissertation will use Brian Tomlin’s model on the stages of pre-negotiations in 
order to gain a clear understanding of the process, and the role that the ripeness concept plays 
in it. Tomlin uses Daniel Druckman’s threshold-adjustment model to describe the pre-
negotiation process. This model conceives negotiation in terms of patterns of responsiveness 
between parties. The actual process is described as an unfolding set of stages in which turning 
points and crises mark passage from one stage to another. The process is described in terms 
of four concepts: stages, turning points, crises and activities. 
 
Chapter Four is a background to the case study and provides a historical analysis of the 
central issues in the South African conflict up until the beginning of the pre-negotiation 
process. The chapter pays attention to the history of the NP government and the ANC. 
 
Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight provide a detailed examination of the pre-negotiation 
process in South Africa. The chapters use Brian Tomlin’s five-stage model of pre-
negotiation.  
 
Chapter Five discusses the process by which the ANC added negotiation to their range of 
policy options, and chose negotiation as their preferred and necessary policy alternative. The 
chapter discusses the conditions within which the ANC’s policy shift should be understood, 
the ANC’s public and official diplomatic activity, and the secret semi-official diplomacy 
conducted by ANC diplomats and academics with links to the government. 
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Chapter Six discusses the process by which the government added negotiation to their range 
of policy options, and chose negotiation as their preferred and necessary policy alternative. 
The chapter discusses the government’s motivations in seeking accommodation with the 
ANC, the central issues involved in the secret talks between Nelson Mandela and the 
government in prison, and the final section discusses the first official-level meeting between 
the government and the ANC.    
 
Chapter Seven discusses the third and public stage of pre-negotiation. During this stage, the 
parties focused on the security dimensions of the conflict that posed a threat to their interests, 
specifically the preconditions for substantive talks. The progression and sustainability of this 
public phase of pre-negotiation occurred through a series of interim procedural arrangements. 
This process of pact-making established important rules of interaction, defined the incentive 
structure for violence and peace, and locked the parties into an interdependent bargaining 
relationship. This process was designed to identify and eliminate preconditions to settlement 
negotiations.    
 
Chapter Eight discusses how the problem of preconditions were overcome, leading to the 
fourth and fifth stages of pre-negotiation. The chapter examines the conditions that led to the 
turning point that facilitated the process of overcoming the problem of preconditions, and 
how the government’s crisis of legitimacy led to a process of convergence between the 
government and the ANC. The chapter concludes by discussing the issues and politics 
involved in the preparations for the CODESA process.  
 
Chapter Nine explores the implications of the ripeness concept in light of the South African 
pre-negotiation process, and Chapter Ten concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Literature Review   
Explaining Negotiations in South Africa 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the scholarship about why multiparty negotiations began in 
South Africa. This consists of literature about (a) why the parties negotiated at all, and (b) why 
the NP government ended up negotiating with the ANC.  
 
The chapter will organise this literature into four broad categories
53
: multivariable explanations, 
dominant variable explanations, single-variable explanations and theoretical explanations. The 
chapter will show that while the literature has provided invaluable insights on the complex 
process ending apartheid, it has not adequately addressed why negotiations began in South 
Africa, particularly why the NP government ended up negotiating with the ANC. 
 
2.1. Multivariable Explanations  
 
Multivariable explanations are multi-causal explanations and hold that a combination of factors 
brought about negotiations in South Africa. The argument is that multiple pressures, internal and 
external, of great intensity were brought to bear on the apartheid state until such time that the 
pressures became too great, leading to the beginning of negotiations. Multi-causal explanations 
vary in their selection of pressures, usually listing broad headings and highlighting different 
factors. A key distinction in this approach is whether the beginning of negotiations was an elite 
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response to pressure, or an elite initiative in anticipation of changing circumstances. Three 
seminal texts are important in this regard: Robert Price’s The Apartheid State in Crisis54, Herman 
Giliomee’s Democratisation in South Africa55, and Elisabeth Wood’s Forging Democracy from 
Below
56
. 
 
Robert Price writes that the policy of apartheid was at the centre of the South African conflict. 
Apartheid has its origins as an ideology of race relations that took hold within the Afrikaner 
intellectual and political elite in the mid-1940s. Price identifies the NP as the most important 
organisation for the development of apartheid; after its 1948 electoral victory, apartheid ideology 
evolved and was implemented through an elaborate system of laws and administrative 
regulations.  
 
Through the introduction of apartheid, the NP sought three objectives. The first was to create a 
completely segregated society. The second was to secure white political supremacy and its 
resultant economic privileges from potential internal (primarily from the black African majority) 
and external (from the international community) threats. The third was to move the Afrikaner 
community into a position of social and economic parity with the English-speaking community 
“which had dominated the modern economy and urban sector since the dawn of capitalist 
economic development in South Africa.”57  
 
Price identifies the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC as the important 
resistance organisations to apartheid during the early years. The SACP attracted an important 
group of professionals, intellectuals and trade union leaders. The ANC underwent a 
transformation from a small African middle class oriented organisation, working within the 
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restrictive South African legal order, into a mass organisation dedicated to militant collective 
action. Their resistance to apartheid policies in the 1940s and 1950s strengthened their political 
alliance to the extent that they jointly formed and shared a military organisation, Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK).  
 
Price identifies political change in South Africa as beginning in 1970. Three factors are 
important. First, the growth and maturity of the South African economy created structural 
constraints for apartheid. By the mid-1960s, the manufacturing sector’s contribution to gross 
domestic product (GDP) exceeded that of mining and agriculture combined, making 
manufacturing the dominant sector of the economy. By 1970, manufacturing “employed more 
people than any other sector.”58 The emergence of manufacturing had important implications; “it 
undermined the apartheid goal of preventing the development of a large and permanent 
population of African city dwellers.”59 The pull of job in the urban manufacturing sector and the 
push of poverty in the Homelands more than tripled the size of the black African population 
living in urban areas.  
 
Second, a military coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974 precipitated a series of events that 
profoundly changed the political landscape of southern Africa. Before the coup, the four 
territories of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia were each ruled by a white minority 
government, had a longstanding working relationship with the South African government, and 
constituted a buffer zone between South Africa and the forces of African nationalism across the 
Zambezi River. When the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship, this 
buffer zone collapsed. The new Marxist government in Portugal dismantled its African colonial 
empire. By the end of 1975, Mozambique and Angola had been granted independence and were 
controlled by political parties that professed a commitment to Marxist-Leninism, had a history of 
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opposition to apartheid, had close fraternal ties with the ANC, and received substantial assistance 
from the Soviet Union.
60
   
 
The third was the revival of black popular protest. This happened in two waves. The first wave 
begins in 1973 when a wave of strikes by African workers swept across South Africa. Although 
legally constrained from forming trade unions and organising strikes, “tens of thousands of black 
workers put down their tools in a disciplined and ultimately successful effort to improve their 
wages.”61 The second wave begins on 16 June 1976 in Soweto when school children protested 
the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in secondary school courses. Students 
were met by a detachment of police who opened fire killing several. This series of events 
touched off a revolt against the apartheid system “that was unprecedented in its scope and 
endurance.”62   The revolt, and its suppression, galvanised the attention of the international 
public and “emphasised anew the pariah status that South Africa’s domestic arrangements 
conferred upon it within the international community.”63 It revived the issue of the international 
acceptability of apartheid and subjected South Africa to international pressure.  
 
These three “shocks” can be thought of as “producing fissures in the Apartheid edifice”, had a 
synergising effect and reinforced each other.
64
  
 
For Price the beginning of negotiations was an elite response to economic change, a fragmenting 
regional security framework, and black popular struggles which from the early 1970s eroded the 
foundations on which the apartheid political order rested. By the late 1980s these “shocks” had 
produced such a political transformation that the government was forced to embark on a path 
towards negotiations with the anti-apartheid organisations in order to replace minority rule with a 
more representative form of government.  
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Price uses Theda Skocpol’s analytical framework65 to advance two theses.  
 
First, since the mid-1970s, the dialectic of government reform and growing black resistance 
undermined the “substructure of domination” i.e. the “social interactions, cultural norms, 
economic activities, and informal power relationships that create the basis for compliance with 
the prescriptions of the ruling group.”66  
 
Second, the stagnant economy and political insurrection of the 1980s set the stage for a 
negotiated resolution of the South African conflict. International pressure together with internal 
resistance led to the breakdown of the regime, and the ruling elite began to see negotiation as a 
viable alternative. 
 
While Herman Giliomee agrees on the importance of political changes in the 1970s, he disagrees 
with Price’s argument on the beginning of negotiations, making the point that “no convincing 
case can be made that the regime at the end of the 1980s was forced to embark on substantial 
negotiations with leaders of the extra-parliamentary movement for an inclusive democracy.”67 
While conceding that the government was under pressure, Giliomee states that the government of 
President Pieter Willem (PW) Botha remained stable, the coercive organisations remained 
coherent and effective, there was no serious division within the ruling elite, and that De Klerk 
was a centrist in the party who “easily managed to straddle the not too serious divisions between 
reformists and stand-patters in his party.”68 
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Giliomee identifies De Klerk as the central actor arguing that his initiative to unban the 
resistance organisations on 2 February 1990 was made possible by the context within which he 
operated: 
 
“De Klerk’s fundamental shift to unban the liberation organisations and negotiate an inclusive democracy was the 
product of Afrikaner group debate of the late 1980s in which political, bureaucratic, cultural, and economic elites 
considered the forces impacting upon the projects for survival of Afrikaner and the larger white community in the 
1990s and beyond.”69 
 
For Giliomee, three issues deserve special attention: a weakening white demographic base that 
necessitated the development of a new political strategy to ensure stability and Afrikaner and 
larger white survival; a dramatically different internal and external environment that witnessed 
the resolution of the Angolan war, collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and changes 
in the Dutch Reformed Church over apartheid
70
; and economic stagnation with the consequences 
of disinvestment, trade restrictions, and bans on long-term loans.   
 
Giliomee discusses a variety of factors with regard to the changing external environment. He 
argues that the weakening of the Soviet Union played an important part: 
 
“… De Klerk would not have moved toward negotiations with the ANC as long as it was strongly backed by the 
Soviet Union. As late as September 1989, de Klerk sent word to his brother to stop talking to the ANC. In his view, 
this movement could never have a role in negotiations… In the last months of 1989, the external environment 
improved dramatically from the government’s point of view. For the first time it considered negotiations a viable 
option. The crucial development was the severe internal troubles experienced by the Soviet Union. Moscow told the 
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ANC that it was up to the South Africans themselves to reach a political accommodation. At the same time Pretoria 
believed that without Soviet backing it had a much better chance to contain a legalised ANC.”71 
 
Giliomee further argued that this changing international environment was decisive for the ANC: 
 
“For the ANC the late 1980s also represented a watershed. It had long favoured the nationalisation of large sectors 
of the economy, but it was now confronted with mounting evidence of the malperformance of economies under 
centralised control in Eastern Europe and Africa. With the South African economy already in trouble, the leadership 
saw the need for negotiating functional political and economic structures that could deliver on the greatly raised 
expectations of its followers. Even more important in its decision to begin negotiations were two major setbacks it 
received in the form of the New York Accords of 1988 (i.e. the resolution of the Angolan Civil War) and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.”72  
 
For De Klerk, the choice lay between “being driven back into a corner over the next ten or 
fifteen years, and staging an outflanking movement that could yield to him and his party a 
strategic position in a democratic government.”73 De Klerk knew that “the Afrikaners and the 
larger white group had a much better chance of striking a bargain now than if they waited a 
further ten years.”74 As de Klerk put it shortly after legalising the ANC, SACP and other 
liberation movements: 
 
“We have not waited until the position of power dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement. The initiative is in our hands. We have the means to ensure that the process develops peacefully 
and in an orderly way.”75 
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For Giliomee, the negotiations were an elite initiative from a position of strength, in anticipation 
of changing political circumstances.  
 
Elisabeth Wood places emphasis on the agency of the alliance of militant workers and the urban 
poor, but like Price, maintains that the negotiations were a response to crises. According to 
Wood, the South African conflict was a class-based conflict where race and class coincided to a 
remarkable degree. Apartheid South Africa is described as an oligarchic society where economic 
elites relied on extra-economic coercion, or political rather than market forms, of labour control 
for the realisation of their income.
76
 This lead to an alliance where economic elites supported 
authoritarian political structures that secured the extra-economic coercion of labour on which 
their economic position depends.
77
 As a result, they were able to generate much higher profits 
than would have been possible under liberal market forms. It also led them “to oppose with 
particular virulence and brutality attempts to liberalise and democratise as these would have 
challenged the labour-repressive system on which they relied and which created an economic 
interdependence between them and the workers and urban poor they exploited.”78  
 
It is only when the workers and urban poor mobilised politically to challenge to this economic 
interdependence were economic elites able to force regime elites to negotiate. Wood stresses this 
point: 
 
“Along the insurgent path to democracy, popular mobilisation is sustained long enough to create the structural 
conditions for the resolution of conflict: insurgency reshapes the economic interests and opportunities of the 
economic elites (and perhaps some of the regime elites) sufficiently for them to judge the foreseeable returns to 
continued recalcitrance as less than the returns to compromise with the insurgents. In oligarchic societies, this 
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eventual willingness of economic elites to compromise is particularly consequential: the unprecedented break in 
oligarchic alliance makes possible the split within the regime between regime hardliners and reformists that 
culminates eventually in a negotiated transition to an inclusive regime.”79 
   
In explaining the beginning of negotiations, Wood argues that decades-long political 
mobilisation by black workers and the unemployed demanding political rights and economic 
resources forced economic and regime elites to negotiations in order to end civil strife.  
 
Wood also identifies political change as beginning in the 1970s: “A wave of unprecedented 
strikes by black workers in the early 1970s and the spread of protest by township residents after 
the shooting of schoolchildren in Soweto 1976 had been met with repression as well as measures 
to reform Apartheid without extending universal suffrage.”80 Trade unionists exploited the 
reform process and built a trade union movement that would lead to the formation of the militant 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985, demanding political emancipation 
and economic concessions.  
 
After the formation of an alliance of anti-apartheid urban-based civic organisations in 1983, the 
United Democratic Front (UDF), the townships again erupted in a wave of protest beginning in 
late 1984. Only the imposition of a state of emergency in 1986 and the arrest of tens of thousands 
of UDF activists quelled the protests. Unable to adequately address the crisis, “growing numbers 
of business executives and Afrikaner intellectuals initiated contact with the ANC to discuss 
transition scenarios.”81  
 
Therefore, it was not that the apartheid model had become costly, as suggested by Price, or 
undesirable, as suggested by Giliomee; mass rebellion by the exploited ruptured it and made it 
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unworkable. Wood places COSATU and the UDF in the centre of the South African drama and 
locates their success in the structural features of the social relations of production under 
apartheid. She emphasises the role of class actors, the nature of the antecedent regime, and the 
potential for cross-class opposition coalitions, and addresses how political mobilisation brought 
about negotiations. She stresses how working class unrest destabilised the apartheid regime, 
initiating processes eventually leading to negotiations.       
 
2.2. Dominant-Variable Explanations  
 
Dominant-variable approaches agree with some of the main points raised by multivariable 
explanations, particularly regarding the importance of political changes in the 1970s. Dominant 
variable approaches however acknowledge many factors as important subsidiary pressures, yet 
highlight one variable as crucial.  
 
The approach in Martin Murray’s interrelated books82 is a good example of this. It is important 
to consider both books as offering an explanation. Time of Agony, Time of Destiny explains the 
1984-1986 insurrection. This is a contemporary political history of black civic and labour 
struggles, which are seen as bringing South African society to a virtually undeclared civil war by 
May 1985. Building on various arguments made by John Saul and Stephen Gelb
83
, the book 
points out that the apartheid system in the 1980s entered into a period of ‘organic crises’ as the 
post-war ‘regime of accumulation’ came to an end. A revolutionary situation was created as the 
state appeared in danger of losing control of events, with violence being routinized into the South 
African system. 
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Murray provides a rich account of the popular resistance that had qualitatively changed from the 
era of student-led radicalism following the June 16 uprisings. By the mid-1980s the uprising 
drew in “broader layers of the oppressed black masses with a wider spectrum of ideological 
perspectives.”84 It also led to a much harsher state response, though fewer people were detained 
than in the 1960 State of Emergency.  
 
The Revolution Deferred is a powerful sequel to Time of Agony, Time of Destiny and Murray 
builds on this analysis to develop an analytical approach to the study of negotiation in South 
Africa. Murray provides a detailed account of the social movement dynamics during the terminal 
years of apartheid. Beginning on 2 February 1990, Murray’s portrait is a messy negotiation 
process, where the state used and provoked political violence, funding rogue clients and then 
finding new allies when earlier dealings were revealed.
85
 Murray also reminds the reader of the 
excesses and brutality of the ANC, despite the image of its leadership
86
, and concludes that there 
was nothing pretty, neat or miraculous about the years of negotiation, notwithstanding its 
romantic images. 
 
Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster also point out that civil society and social movements, 
especially trade unions, were at the heart of political change.
87
 Adler and Webster however move 
further and challenge the contemporary literature on democratic transitions which argues that 
negotiations are simply the result of pacts between the reformers in the ruling regime and 
moderates in the opposition. These emphases on elites, they point out, misunderstand the role of 
popular movements and struggle in the origin of negotiated transitions
88
: 
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“By undervaluing the capacity for innovation and the strategic use of power by social movements, the literature 
overlooks actors with extremely important influence over the transition. The crucial consequence of this approach is 
an inappropriate narrowing of possible outcomes.”89 
 
The argument is that the South African labour movement played a central role in the beginning 
of negotiations through a variety of interventions driven by ‘the strategy of radical reform.’90 It is 
this centrality in pre-negotiations that alerts them to a gap in contemporary analyses of transition: 
 
“Not only have writers such a Przeworski generally ignored the role played by labour movements, but where they 
have given consideration to labour, its role has been misunderstood as little more than one of mobilising or 
restraining its members as dictated by the pace of negotiations over an elite pact. This is not merely an empirical 
lapse or failure to pay attention to particular facts but suggests problems in the conceptualisation of transitions 
themselves, which have prescriptive implications. Such arguments may have the practical effects of delegitimizing 
political projects with the potential to realise a fuller measure of democracy.”91 
 
For the authors, the South African case encourages advocates of progressive transition not only 
to reassess transitions to account more fully for the role of popular movements but “to explore 
current cases to identify progressive potentials that have been either overlooked or declared 
impossible by transitional theorists.”92  
 
2.3. Single-Variable Explanations 
 
Single-variable approaches analyse a particular factor; but that factor is not necessarily claimed 
to be the most important. These approaches analyse the role of one factor for the beginning of 
negotiations in South Africa, and seek not to replace other explanations but rather to complement 
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them by giving proper weight to a particular factor. In the literature, such accounts have 
examined a variety of factors, such as military
93
 and secret talks
94
, and have also included 
narrative approaches.
95
 Single-variable explanations that examine the beginning of negotiations 
tend to highlight the role of international political forces, in particular the impact of the end of 
the cold war, and the role of secret talks. 
 
Kathryn Manzo argues that the demise of communism in Eastern Europe had profound global 
implications.
96
 For South Africa, the consequences that came with the fall of the Soviet empire 
led to a drying up of the ANC’s military support: 
 
“Pressure for the ANC for a negotiated settlement has been reinforced by the revolutions in Eastern Europe, from 
whence a good deal of support came. East Germany, once the major military supplier of Umkhonto (the armed wing 
of the ANC), ceased supplying aid even before the reunification of East and West Germany; since then all military 
aid has come to a halt.”97 
 
These international political developments weakened the ANC’s position: 
 
“The ANC will almost certainly figure largely at the negotiating table, but unless it can harness the enormous stock 
of support that it still enjoys at the grass roots level, it will be forced to enter negotiations from an enviable position 
– that of a junior and weak partner to the National Party.”98 
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Other authors have also taken up this line of argument. In his 1994 Chatham House discussion 
paper, Forging the New South Africa, James Barber made the point that the collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe was one of the three factors that determined the timing of De 
Klerk’s 2 February announcements that began the process of liberalisation.99 Giliomee’s multi-
causal explanation (discussed above) also makes this point: 
 
“Yet De Klerk would not have moved toward negotiations with the ANC as long as it was strongly backed by the 
Soviet Union. As late as September 1989, De Klerk sent word to his brother to stop talking to the ANC. In his view, 
this movement could never have a role in negotiations… In the last months of 1989, the external environment 
improved dramatically from the government’s point of view. For the first time it considered negotiations a viable 
option. The crucial development was the severe internal troubles experienced by the Soviet Union. Moscow told the 
ANC that it was up to the South Africans themselves to reach a political accommodation. At the same time, Pretoria 
believed that without Soviet backing it had a much better chance to contain a legalised ANC.”100    
 
John Daniel disputes this argument pointing out that it attaches too great a significance to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall itself and in so doing, “neglect[s] the role of the United States in the events 
leading up to the transition.”101 Daniel argues that “it was the US response to the changing 
international realities of the late 1980s – and the very specific impact that had on its strategic 
thinking on South and southern Africa – that was the decisive international factor in the South 
African transition.”102 While not completely discounting the accession to power of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Daniel identifies the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in October 
1986 as the beginning of the end: 
 
“While the primary focus of that meeting was an arms control agreement, the key bargain struck amounted to a 
redefinition of spheres of interest in the world, including southern Africa. At Reykjavik, the United States agreed to 
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a non-interventionist role in Eastern Europe, Nicaragua and Afghanistan in return for which the Soviet Union ceded 
Africa to the United States – specifically the Horn of Africa and southern Africa.”103 
     
From late 1986, the US was given carte blanche to shape events in southern Africa, which 
included getting the Cubans out of Angola, the South Africans out of Namibia
104
 and the launch 
of a negotiation process involving the ANC and a freed Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Thus, 
the signing of the New York Accords on Namibia and Angola in 1988 “cleared the way for the 
heat to be turned on Pretoria.”105 In addition to this, developments within Namibia, where 
elements of South African intelligence realised the counter-productivity of a military solution, 
and events in Cuito Cuanavale, which discredited the hard-line thinking of the cold war warriors 
in Botha’s cabinet, produced a power shift in the NP political establishment and a realisation that 
a solution to the South African crisis could only be obtained through negotiations involving the 
ANC. All these events occurred prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 
 
Three important books highlight the significance of secret talks for the beginning of negotiations: 
Tomorrow is Another Country by Allister Sparks
106
, Anatomy of a Miracle by Patti Waldmeir
107
, 
and Endgame by Willie Esterhuyse
108
. These accounts of the negotiations present the process as 
bilateral deal-making between the NP government and the ANC. Their selling point is their 
privilege access to significant behind the scenes exchanges between the ANC and government 
officials or individuals with access to the NP government.  
 
Sparks does not set out to write an academic treatise, but one which would appeal to a general 
readership. Sparks documents the secret pre-negotiations between ANC officials and NP 
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government officials and individuals with access to the government that began in Cape Town 
prisons and hospitals, Swiss hotels, African venues and English corporate estates until open 
negotiations after 1990. Sparks writes that these secret talks were driven by the mutual interests 
of ANC and NP elites; NP government reforms had failed to provide the legitimacy the 
government needed and the armed struggle had always been one among many sources of 
pressure on the government. Sparks argues that chance encounters and nascent bonds between 
the ANC and NP elites facilitated the beginning of negotiations and saved and sustained the 
process at critical moments.  
 
Waldmeir writes a similar book to Sparks and also highlights the importance of pre-negotiation. 
She interviews more key players than Sparks and thus has a wider research base and focus. She 
covers much of the same ground as Sparks i.e. anecdotes of encounters between members of the 
ANC in exile and intermediaries and officials of the South African government beginning in the 
mid-1980s. She identifies the most important meetings as being the encounters between ANC 
officials headed by Thabo Mbeki and members of the Afrikaner elite, headed by Professor Willie 
Esterhuyse, at Mells Park House, a Consolidated Gold Fields estate in England. These took place 
between November 1987 and May 1990.  
 
Waldmeir’s key question on the negotiations is why the NP government “gave it all away”?109 
She sees her book as “a study in the psychology of capitulation.”110 Christopher Saunders, 
however, writes that Waldmeir takes it for granted that there was a capitulation – the apartheid 
state was far from being defeated by the end of 1989. Her key questions are why De Klerk began 
the process of negotiation, and why he allowed it to continue until the NP lost political power?
111
 
On the one hand, Waldmeir admires De Klerk’s courage, and on the other, she suggests that he 
and his government were “seduced by men of great charm.”112  
                                                          
109
 See p. x, the title of chapter 6 and p. 233 
110
 Waldmeir, 2 
111
 Christopher Saunders, “Why did ‘The Boers Give it All Away’?” South African Historical Journal Vol. 38, No. 
1 (1998), 214-221 
112
 Saunders, 219 
38 
 
 
Endgame is Esterhuyse’s first-hand account of the full story of the secret meetings between ANC 
leaders and a select few Afrikaners in the 1980s (the subject of Sparks and Waldmeir’s books). 
Esterhuyse’s involvement in these talks began in 1987 when contacted by Fleur de Villiers, who 
asked him to talk to the ANC in exile. Esterhuyse states that the idea of informal and unofficial 
talks between the ANC and influential Afrikaners arose from what became known as the 
Consgold project. De Villiers initiated the first contact with the Afrikaners, while Michael 
Young approached the ANC. Having accepted the challenge to become part of these talks, 
Esterhuyse was regularly and intensively briefed by the South African intelligence services, the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS).  
 
Esterhuyse also acknowledges the importance of pre-negotiation and argues that significant 
political change towards negotiation began after PW Botha’s infamous Rubicon Speech in 1985:  
 
“It had two consequences: on the one hand, the paradigm shift in international circles and among many verligte [i.e. 
reformist] Afrikaners that the [reform] from-within strategy was no longer adequate or even untenable; on the other 
hand, the view among those associated with the United Democratic Front (UDF)… that pressure on the Botha 
government had to be intensified, and also could be intensified in light of the international reaction to the Rubicon 
debacle.”113 
 
Thus key Afrikaner leaders withdrew their support for the notion that apartheid could be changed 
from within and began to explore options with the ANC.  
 
Esterhuyse identifies Thabo Mbeki as the central actor in the evolution of the secret talks and the 
close friendship that developed with him gives Esterhuyse important insights into the issues 
involved. Esterhuyse provides a rich anecdotal account of the secret talks, and acknowledges the 
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importance of the UDF for the political changes in the 1980s. Esterhuyse’s explanation is also an 
important improvement and addition to the work of Sparks and Waldmeir.   
 
2.4. Theoretical Explanations 
 
Theoretical explanations use sociological and political theories to explain the beginning of 
negotiations. The important accounts use institutional rational choice theory
114
; draw on 
comparative studies of democratisation in Latin America and Southern Europe in search of a 
coherent South African model of democratic transition
115
; and use Marxist approaches
116
 to 
explain the beginning of negotiations. 
 
Timothy Sisk’s institutional rational choice model places emphasis on the changing interests and 
preferences of rational actors involved in the process of negotiating new, institutional structures. 
In explaining the beginning of negotiations, Sisk’s account consists of two interrelated 
arguments.  
 
First, he emphasises an important shift in perception among the major political actors in South 
Africa from a zero-sum to a positive-sum game. This was the consequence of the growing 
awareness of a ‘shared destiny’, the ‘recognition of interdependence’, and a mutually hurting 
stalemate: 
 
                                                          
114
 Timothy Sisk, Democratisation in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995) 
115
 Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition (London: Penguin, 1992); David 
Ginsburg, “The Democratisation of South Africa: Transition Theory Tested”, Transformation 29 (1996), pp. 74-102; 
Andre du Toit, “South Africa as Another Case of Transition from Authoritarian Rule”, in Andre du Toit (ed.) 
Towards Democracy: Building a Culture of Accountability in South Africa. (Cape Town: IDASA, 1991) 
116
 John Saul Recolonisation and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993); 
John Saul, “South Africa: Between Barbarism and Structural Reform”, New Left Review, no. 188 (1991), pp3-44; 
Hein Marais, South Africa, Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition. (Kenwyn: University of Cape 
Town Press, 1998) 
40 
 
“As the old order suffered its demise, the realisation set in among the major actors who perceived themselves to be 
in the condition of a mutually hurting stalemate that the benefits of a positive-sum outcome to the conflict – the 
creation of a jointly determined set of institutions to govern a future, common society – were greater than the costs 
of continued confrontation in an environment ungoverned by common rules. Once this realisation was made, 
convergence on exactly what kinds of rules should replace the old order evolved as a result of the interaction among 
political parties that sought a negotiated settlement. This evolution was guided by institutional choice.”117   
 
Thus, the South African conflict moved from a zero-sum to a positive-sum perception when the 
“balance of power between the white minority and the increasingly empowered black majority 
reached a level of approximate parity.”118 The “recognition of a shared or common destiny is a 
recognition of interdependence [and] the interdependent relationship is heightened when there is 
a perceived balance of power among actors.”119  
 
Sisk identifies Nelson Mandela’s memorandum to PW Botha in 1989 as an important 
precipitating event which provided the opposing groups with an opportunity to seize the moment 
and break the stalemate. Sisk thus identifies the turning point of seriousness as beginning in late 
1989 and early 1990. 
 
Second, Sisk discusses the important period of uncertainty between de Klerk’s 2 February 1990 
speech and the first plenary of CODESA. He argues that the formation of pacts between the 
ANC and the South African government were important in maintaining the negotiation process, 
reduced uncertainty about a return to zero-sum politics, and provided minority forces with 
incentives not to exclude themselves from negotiations. Consequently, once multiparty 
negotiations began, the uncertainty about respective parties’ core interests ceased to be a strain 
on negotiations.  
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Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert argues that in order to analyse the beginning of negotiations, there is a 
need to focus on “the critical role of key political actors and their strategic choices concerning 
democracy, democratisation and each other.” The next task, he further states, is to “locate these 
choices within the context of opportunities and obstacles that have to be exploited or overcome; 
and then plot a probable outcome to the process.” In this way:  
 
“[S]tructural factors are seen as interacting with strategic choices of key actors rather than predetermining them, 
which provides a more reliable picture of the dynamics of the transition.”120  
 
The explanation of the beginning of negotiations thus hinges on the strategic interactions of four 
main actors involved: ‘reformers’ and ‘hardliners’ in the regime, and the ‘moderates’ and 
‘radicals’ in the pro-democracy camp. If reformers and moderates are able to create and 
institutionalise founding pacts, in opposition to the other actors, then it is more likely that 
political democracy can begin.
121
  
 
The Marxist perspective widens the scope of analysis further by bringing into play the material 
conditions and socio-economic factors which shaped the causes and logic of negotiation. John 
Saul’s account of political transition in the collection of articles in Recolonisation and Resistance 
in Southern Africa in the 1990s continues the materialist analysis of South African politics. 
Marxist perspectives are concerned with the structured context of constraints within which 
decisions to negotiate are taken. Saul, and later Hein Marais, for instance argues that the social 
actors who formulate strategies and take decisions are historical artefacts, and not de-
contextualised abstractions, in which case their decisions are constrained by the context in which 
they function, and by their previous historical and political constitution.
122
 Saul argues that 
during ‘organic crisis’ of apartheid in the post Soweto uprising period, racial domination and 
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capitalism were pulling apart in various critical ways.
123
 This facilitated attempts by business 
elites and liberal factions of the NP to reform apartheid and deracialise South Africa. From this 
perspective, De Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech was the attempt to break up this growing 
political stalemate created by the organic crisis, while simultaneously destabilising the ANC, and 
preparing a favourable ground upon which to negotiate the end of apartheid. 
 
2.5. Strength and Weaknesses of Existing Literature  
 
The seminal literature that explains the beginning of negotiation in South Africa has important 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
The strength of this literature is that it provides invaluable insights on the complexity of the end 
of apartheid. Multivariable analyses highlight the importance of macro-political and macro-
economic factors. The argument is that multiple pressures of great intensity were brought to bear 
on the apartheid state until such time that the pressures became too great, leading to the 
beginning of negotiations. The start of negotiations is either seen as an elite response to pressure 
or an elite initiative in anticipation of changing circumstances.  
 
Dominant-variable approaches acknowledge many factors as important subsidiary pressures, but 
highlight one variable as crucial. Important works that fall into this category emphasise the role 
played by the civil society and social movements, especially trade union, arguing that they were 
at the heart of the political changes that led to the beginning of negotiations. 
 
Single variable approaches analyse a particular factor; but that factor is not necessarily claimed 
to be the most important. They seek not to replace other explanations but rather compliment 
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them by giving weight to one factor. For the beginning of negotiations, literature tends to 
highlight the impact of the end of the cold war, and the role of secret talks.  
 
Theoretical explanations use political and sociological theories to explain the beginning of 
negotiations. Important accounts use institutional rational choice theory, draw on comparative 
studies of democratisation in Latin America and Southern Europe, and use Marxist analysis to 
explain the beginning of negotiation.  
 
The literature has some shortcomings.  
 
First, the literature dates the beginning of negotiation as 2 February 1990 and identifies De Klerk 
as the central actor for the beginning of the process. While the literature acknowledges the 
importance of political changes and events in the 1970s and 1980s, the important pre-
negotiations that happen during this period are not sufficiently discussed. 
 
Second, the literature on ‘why negotiate at all’ is stronger than the literature on ‘why did the NP 
government end up negotiating with the ANC’. In answering ‘why negotiate at all’, multivariable 
approaches highlight the role of macro-processes. Dominant-variable approaches emphasise the 
role of the trade union movement in applying pressure. Single-variable approaches identify the 
end of the cold war and the role of secret talks, and theoretical approaches use political and 
sociological theories.  
 
In order to deal with these shortcomings, the dissertation will draw attention to the nature and 
importance of pre-negotiation. It will examine the conditions conducive for the beginning of pre-
negotiation and outline the different stages and functions. In the process, the dissertation will use 
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ripeness theory to help answer the central question on why did negotiations begin in South 
Africa.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the scholarship about why multiparty negotiations began in South Africa. 
This consists of literature about (a) why the parties negotiated at all, and (b) why the NP 
government ended up negotiating with the ANC. The chapter showed that while the literature has 
provided invaluable insights on the complex process ending apartheid, it has not adequately 
addressed why negotiations began in South Africa, particularly why the NP government ended 
up negotiating with the ANC.  In order to fill the gap in the literature, the dissertation will draw 
attention to the nature and importance of pre-negotiation. In the process, the dissertation will use 
ripeness theory to help answer the central question on why did negotiations begin in South 
Africa. 
45 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Pre-negotiation Stage: The Issue of Ripeness 
 
This chapter will examine theorising about the pre-negotiation phase. The chapter is divided 
into four sections. The first section locates the pre-negotiation phase in the general theorising 
about negotiations. I pay close attention to Zartman’s explanation of ripeness, showing the 
different ways in which the concept has evolved. The second section reviews the literature, 
and the different interpretations, of ripeness. The third section suggests ways in which the 
concept can be refined so that it deals with some of its important limitations.  
 
The fourth section introduces the concept of pre-negotiation. The dissertation will use Brian 
Tomlin’s model on stages of pre-negotiation to structure the South African discussion. To get 
maximum theoretical value from the case study, the chapter will conclude by presenting a set 
of general questions to ask of each stage of pre-negotiation in South Africa.  
 
3.1. Zartman, Objective Ripeness and the Mutually Hurting Stalemate  
 
3.1.1 Regional Conflicts and Ripe Moments 
 
The concept of ripeness was pioneered by I. William Zartman in his seminal work, Ripe for 
Resolution, to explain how internal and international wars move towards negotiation and as a 
practical guide to assist mediators in timing their entry into such conflicts. Zartman was 
concerned with local sources of conflict in Africa, particularly with external powers’ 
interventions for the resolution of these conflicts. In the process, Zartman developed some 
policy guidelines for positive intervention, and the notion of the ‘ripe moment’ was central to 
its success. 
46 
 
 
Ripeness is a time-oriented view of conflict that posits the idea that at any moment policies 
are chosen among desirable goals on the basis of comparative costs and benefits. Since these 
policies may be altered depending on the external context and interaction of parties, some 
moments are better than others for managing and resolving conflict.
124
  
 
Zartman argued that conflict resolution and the beginning of negotiation depends on the 
identification of a ripe moment.
125
 Metaphorically, the point when conflict is ripe for 
resolution is associated with two types of intensity called ‘plateaus’ and ‘precipice’, which 
produce two types of pressure respectively called ‘deadlocks’ and ‘deadlines’.126 A ‘plateau’ 
and a ‘deadlock’ is a stalemate and begin when “one side is unable to achieve its aims, to 
resolve the problem, or to win the conflict by itself, and is completed when the other side 
arrives at a similar perception.” A plateau must be perceived as a hurting stalemate i.e. “a flat, 
unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive 
escalation of for graceful escape.”127  
 
Zartman views perceptions of an intolerable situation as important for conflict resolution. In 
this regard, the role of the mediator is essential: “…the conciliator must persuade the parties 
that escalation to break out of deadlock is impossible. Indeed, the conciliator may even be 
required to make it impossible, if necessary.”128 
 
The deadlock is not a temporary stalemate; “each party must recognise its opponent’s 
strength and its own inability to overcome it.” Each party’s unilateral policy option “must be 
seen as a more expensive and less likely way of achieving a possible, acceptable outcome 
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than the policy of negotiation.”129  Mediation is critical to the stalemate: “for the conciliator 
this means emphasising the dangers of deadlock as each party comes to recognise the other’s 
strength… Successful conciliation produces a shift from a winning mentality to a conciliating 
mentality on the part of both sides.”130 This hurting stalemate is as much a matter of 
perception as of reality for the warring parties, and as much a subject of persuasion as of 
timing for the mediator.  
 
A precipice and a deadline represent a catastrophe i.e. a realisation by both sides that matters 
will get worse if they have not gotten better in ways that negotiation seeks to define. A 
catastrophe “threatens the mutual checks that parties impose on each other.”131 The 
catastrophe can either be impending, narrowly encountered or just avoided. It may also have 
just occurred or one in which parties is sinking deeper into. The ripe moment frequently 
comes after a crisis has just occurred, with losses on both sides that has left a conflict 
unresolved.
132
  
 
The second dimension of a ripe moment concerns policy tracks and alternatives. The task of 
the mediator is to deflect the parties from competing attempts to impose unilateral solutions 
and into a joint search for a bilateral solution. 
 
The proper moment for mediation occurs when the power relations in the parties’ positions 
become symmetrical i.e. “when the upper hand starts slipping and the underdog starts 
rising.”133  
 
Zartman’s argument therefore is that the success of mediation in conflict is tied to the 
perception and creation of a ripe moment. The basic component of a ripe moment is a 
mutually hurting stalemate. In order to be effective, it needs to be riveted to the parties’ 
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perception through a recent or looming catastrophe that acts as a deadline, or remembered as 
a warning, that threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs of high magnitude. 
Further, there must be a formula for a way out and an indication that the parties are willing in 
principle to choose it if it is attractive enough and that they will respond positively to the 
others moves in that direction. 
 
 3.1.2. Civil Wars and Ripe Moments 
 
Zartman subsequently improved the ripeness concept. This is evident in the application of 
ripeness to the resolution of civil wars. Zartman argues that the nature of civil war works 
against the component conditions for a ripe moment. The mutually hurting stalemate i.e. the 
prerequisite for negotiation or mediation is absent, yet neither side has the power to 
completely dislodge the other.
134
 Rather, fluctuating stalemate becomes the essence of civil 
war: “…stalemate is stable and supportable, an acceptable alternative to losing for both sides, 
a compromise already favourable to the rebellion rather than a costly deadlock driving parties 
to negotiate.”135  
 
When stalemate does settle it produces polarisation not pacification.
136
 Sunk costs on the 
government side, and true belief and commitment on the rebellions’ side, reinforce each 
party’s source of power and their desire to dig in and hold out.137 Rather than seeing a 
stalemate as an indication of the maximum each side can achieve and then negotiate, “parties 
retrench on their element of strength and harden their positions.”138 Therefore, a stalemate in 
a civil war does not produce a necessary shift in perception that is needed for negotiation; it 
reinforces the unilateral perspective that makes negotiation impossible. The basic conditions 
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of insurgency lie at the root of this paradox: “it is possible to take refuge in a winning 
mentality because the likeliness of losing hides the impossibility of winning.”139 
 
The elusiveness of the stalemate is a function of the structure of civil war. The most striking 
characteristic is its asymmetry: the government is strong and the insurgents are weak.
140
 The 
government has legitimacy, sovereignty, international allies, armies and access to resources 
while the rebels have to fight for all of these.
141
 Government strength is also reinforced by 
other variables: 
 
“[The] government determines and has the right to determine the rules of the game for the rebellion’s struggle. 
If the rebellion’s cause is one of regional rights, government sets both the conditions for petition and expectation 
and for its own response. If the rebellion’s cause is a contest for national leadership, government sets the rules 
for conducting that competition and then runs its own race. It is both participant and empire.”
142
 
 
The rebels are thus totally fixed on the conflict, which involves its very existence whereas the 
government has many interests; “rebellion is only a worrisome distraction from the pursuit of 
other goals.”143 The rebels address this asymmetry by opposing the government’s capabilities 
with their own commitment; “to overcome their weakness in means, rebels over invest in 
their attachment to ends.”144 The stakes are unequal; “insurgents seek to make the 
government negotiate (implying recognition) whereas the government seeks to make the 
insurgents surrender.”145 The asymmetries in power and commitment become a trap for 
belligerents, preventing negotiation.  
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For the emergence of a ripe moment, Zartman turns to agency and the parties’ internal 
dynamics: the issue of ‘valid spokespersons’ becomes a precondition for negotiation.146 Once 
valid spokespersons emerge, the important step towards moving to negotiation begins.
147
 
Civil war negotiations require recognised leaders on each side who are “capable of making 
and holding an agreement and also capable of taking both forward to each other and 
backward to their followers.”148 For the rebels, this means that “spokespersons must be in 
tune with shifts in the evolution of the insurgent movement so that they are not turning right 
when the movement is turning left.”149  
 
Ripe moments in civil war are thus composed of three elements: a structural element (a soft, 
stable and supportable stalemate), a party element (the presence of valid spokespersons) and a 
potential alternative outcome (a formula for a way out). The dynamic of the stalemate is still 
as relevant as in the original formulation. However, the structural features of internal conflict 
i.e. power asymmetry, means that agency becomes a significant variable in the determination 
of the ripe moment.   
 
In summary, ripeness offers a metaphor for understanding disputant motivation to resolve 
conflict that centres on an image of ‘ripe moments’ for negotiation. The concept is 
parsimonious, elegant and grounded in case material. This concept centres on the construct of 
ripeness – a necessary but insufficient condition that is directly linked to the decision to 
negotiate with an opponent in conflict. This condition is brought about by the perception of 
two essential elements: a mutually hurting stalemate between the parties, coupled with a 
formula for a way out.  
 
The concept proposes that when parties find themselves on a ‘pain-producing path’, they 
begin to look for negotiated alternatives that are less painful and more advantageous.
150
 
Ripeness is based on two core motives and elements: pain and opportunities to escape from 
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pain. It is portrayed as a state that may or may not exist objectively, but that must be 
perceived to mutually exist by parties in order for it to motivate. This can occur either 
naturally, as the result of external events, or be induced, as by active intervention from parties 
or third parties. 
 
3.2. Perspectives on Ripeness 
 
A number of studies have used and tested the notion of ripeness in regard to negotiations in 
Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Iraq-Iran, the Philippines, 
Israel-Palestine, El Salvador, Ecuador, Mozambique and so on.
151
 The reaction to the concept 
by these studies has been mixed, with some authors finding the concept useful as an 
explanation, some viewing it as inapplicable, others proposing refinements, and others calling 
for a complete reconceptualization. One can divide the literature between explanations of 
ripeness offered by practitioners, and those offered by scholars. 
 
3.2.1 Practitioner Perspectives on Ripeness  
 
Practitioner perspectives on ripeness are located in the diplomatic memoirs of actors with 
direct involvement in the resolution of conflicts. Such memoirs refer to ripeness by its 
mutually hurting stalemate, and identify the mediator as the central political actor who 
produces the ripe moment in the absence of objective conditions, or strategically intervenes in 
an impasse when all indications are that of a stalemate. These perspectives read like policy 
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prescriptions that advise potential mediators “to wait until the parties are sufficiently 
‘exhausted’ on the battlefield to push for a negotiated settlement.”152  
 
Practitioner perspectives argue that ripeness has its greatest utility in “setting up benchmarks 
and signposts that help mediators calibrate their strategies to ripen the conflict.”153 Parties 
have to be coaxed or cajoled to the negotiating table through a combination of carrots and 
sticks, and skilled mediators should use a variety of ‘ripening’ agents: “coaching, 
discrediting, legitimising, become indispensable, leaning and shifting weight, exploiting 
changes in military balance, exploiting changes in party leadership, as well as promises of 
resources or threats of withdrawal.”154  
 
Ripeness is thus as much a cultivated condition as an inherited one and mediators can deploy 
a variety of techniques and measures to foster the ripening process in order to move parties 
from a hurting stalemate to a negotiated settlement. Various diplomatic memoirs have used 
ripeness in their recollection of conflict negotiation and bargaining.
155
 Practitioners in general 
do not have a difficulty identifying the existence or importance of a mutually hurting 
stalemate for the opening of negotiations. The most prominent illustrations of the practitioner 
perspectives are provided by Chester Crocker
156
 and Alvaro de Soto’s157 diplomatic memoirs 
on mediation in the Angolan and El Salvador conflicts respectively. 
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The most important practitioner critique on ripeness is provided by John Lederach, who has 
worked extensively in mediation processes in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. 
Lederach proposes a “reorientation of the practice of developing negotiated peace processes 
with particular reference to time periods prior to and following the opening of formal 
talks.”158 Lederach’s critique puts forward three limitations of the ripeness concept for 
practice.  
 
First, ripeness is only useful in retrospect – “as we look back we can account for things in our 
interpretation of the history” – and therefore lacks a reliable and predictive capacity. As a 
result, ripeness is more like “a review mirror than a windscreen.” Lederach writes that his 
experiences of peace building and negotiation “have not entailed a ‘ripeness’ process where 
[he] has watched the process develop, like the seasonal maturation of an apple moving from 
blossom to red, juicy and ready-to-eat fruit.”159 The opposite has been true; the moments with 
the greatest potential for progress towards negotiation were stagnant and counterproductive. 
Conflict, he writes, does not move along a linear-like path akin to the predictable 
development of a fruit; it is more akin to dynamic, nearly amoeba-like spaces.  
 
Second, ripeness is located in the eyes of the beholder, “perceived by outsiders with the 
luxury of dispassionate facts and factors.” In the midst of day-to-day crises and emergencies, 
people rarely see their situation as ripe for resolution. Lederach’s argues that in conflicts with 
long histories, the external attention is fixed on the immediate crisis, and impending disaster. 
This is accompanied by the understanding that “once the crisis is dealt with we can move 
onto the deeper and longer-range concerns and needs.”160 Therefore, the situation is 
considered not ripe because the immediate situation is not dealt with. As a result, ripeness 
becomes less about the conflict and more about the crisis, and consequently fails to make the 
deeper connection with the conflict.  
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Third, ripeness emphasises the role of mediation as cherry picking. In this context, ripeness 
presents two key assumptions about mediation that are limiting.  
 
First, ripeness assumes that mediation lies primarily in the person and personality of the 
mediator “as-the-actor” rather than the mediator “as-process” with “multiple roles, functions, 
and activities carried out by a wide array of people.”161 Ripeness stresses the idea that the 
mediator comes from outside the setting and outside the relationships in conflict and is 
therefore neutral. Ripeness is therefore oriented towards providing terms of reference for 
these kinds of actions. What the ripeness concept does not provide “is a sense of the long-
term nature of the process, the building and sustaining of relationships, nor the multiplicity of 
roles, activities and functions that may be necessary to make a sustained dialogue and change 
in the relationships possible.”162   
 
Second, ripeness suggests that the cherry i.e. the written negotiated document, is the 
agreement and that picking the cherry “is like a mediation harvest.” Ripeness is based on the 
belief that “the success of mediation is primarily judged by whether it produced an agreement 
rather than whether it helped create a space for constructive change in people, perceptions 
and relationships that are not always captured in the confines of a written negotiated 
document.” Ripeness is thus not a metaphor that provides “vision of cultivating the soil, 
planting the seeds, or nourishing the seedlings in the face of winds, burning sun or icy storms, 
all of which speak to process, relationships and sustainability rather than a momentary 
action.”163  
 
Therefore, ripeness overemphasises content and agreement in conflict resolution at the 
expense of the building of relationships and process. It consequently places greater emphasis 
on the mediators and belligerent’s actions and perceptions rather than on mediation and 
conflict resolution as a political process with multiple sets of actions and people. It therefore 
tends to have a “shorter-term view of action in mind aimed at intense action in specific time 
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frames … but not necessarily the slower and painstaking process of preparing and sustaining 
process.”164 
 
3.2.2. Scholarly Perspectives on Ripeness in Southern Africa 
 
Most scholarly perspectives on ripeness are critical of the concept and use empirical evidence 
to test the explanatory power of ripeness.
165
 The most important refinements of ripeness have 
sort to investigate the effects of each side’s pluralized politics on both the perception and uses 
of ripeness. Two studies are important: Stephen Stedman’s case study on the Rhodesian 
negotiations for independence as Zimbabwe
166; and Daniel Lieberfeld’s comparative analysis 
on the factors that led to negotiated agreements between the NP government and the ANC in 
South Africa in 1990, and between Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) in 1993.
167
 
 
Stephen Stedman challenges the ripeness conception of the main antagonists as unitary 
actors.
168
 Stedman argues that shifts in the dominant coalitions in each contending side may 
be as important to the ultimate success of negotiations as the objective conditions of a 
particular struggle. Internal conflict may be more susceptible to negotiation because of the 
lack of consensus among the revolutionary leadership.
169
 The factors that are critical to the 
success of any attempted negotiated settlement include: shifts in the composition of the 
dominant groups within the government and insurgent movement; the extent to which the 
interests of these dominant groups coincide with possible outcomes of negotiations; and the 
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ability of third party mediators to link up those ‘parts’ of the contending alliances that have 
the greatest commitment to settlement and to isolate those with the least commitment.
170
 
 
Combatants therefore consist of many coalitions, factions and individuals. This polycentric 
view of actors in conflict leads to a different assumption on ripeness: it becomes a function of 
internal political changes such as internal political competition between rival factions and 
coalitions, the rise of new leaders, the emergence of a divided leadership, or a split in a 
government or insurgent movement previously unified in its war aims.  
 
Stedman improves the concept on the basis of three assumptions: first, parties are not unitary 
rational actors and therefore the perception of an ‘objective’ mutually hurting stalemate is 
political and depends on bargaining within parties
171
; second, it is better for mediators to 
assist those factions within parties who favour settlement, and strengthen their hand in 
negotiation; and third, mediators are seldom unitary actors yet it is crucial they speak with 
one voice.
172
  
  
Stedman’s study has three important differences with Zartman.  
 
First, it is not necessary for the principle actors to simultaneously perceive the hurting 
stalemate.  
 
Second, ripeness is not a product of actors believing that their most preferred unilateral 
outcome has been foreclosed. Rather, ripeness can come from the paradoxical situation in 
which both sides believe that a settlement will produce a victory for them.
173
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Third, it is necessary for the military wings of both sides to support negotiation. The military 
is the swing vote in the negotiation process. 
 
Daniel Lieberfeld develops Stedman’s generalizations further by highlighting the role of 
perceptual shifts regarding the possibility of negotiation.
174
 He identifies five such perceptual 
shifts that led the main adversaries in South Africa and Israel/Palestine to negotiation:  
 
“Each side concluded that the opponent cannot be coerced into giving up its national goals; each side assessed 
that the status quo was untenable; each side perceived enhanced possibilities for negotiation with the adversary; 
leadership change on the government side brought security-minded pragmatists to power; government leaders 
found that they had no alternative patterns with whom to bypass the primary adversary.”175  
 
These shifts reflected leaders’ estimates of the feasibility of different policy options, and each 
step was necessary but not in itself sufficient to bring about negotiation.
176
  
 
Lieberfeld’s analysis identifies the centrality of perceptual shifts in relative power in shaping 
negotiation decision-making, but with important qualifications.  
 
The comparative analysis upholds Stedman’s contention that “the mere fact of leadership 
change or strife adds fluidity to what may have been a log-jammed conflict … [New] leaders 
who are confident of support and consolidated in their hold over their movements make 
compromise more likely.”177 The analysis also suggests that political polarization among the 
constituents of one or both sides may create incentives to negotiate.
178
 This is in agreement 
with Stedman’s proposition that “leadership change can lead to settlement if such a 
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settlement is in the practical political interest of the new leader.”179 Such practical political 
interests stem from the centrality of a policy of coercion in domestic political competition and 
from eroding support of the traditional dominant party. Therefore, in the context of increasing 
societal support for a settlement, polarization required the governing parties to initiate 
negotiation in order to retain their dominant positions.
180
  
 
Lieberfeld’s cases complicate the notion of domestic unity as a precondition for a negotiated 
agreement and suggest that “leaderships facing a salient threat from local political rivals may 
be more motivated to negotiate an end to protracted conflicts than ones without such 
domestic challenges.”181 This possibility suggests the usefulness of analyses that highlight 
changes in leaders’ perceptions of threats from both internal and external sources, rather than 
a cost-benefit model that overlooks internal competition in the decision-making calculus of 
rational actors.
182
  
 
Each of these authors has placed primary importance upon political conditions, even if 
explained as perceptual political conditions that frame ripeness as an external and objective 
condition necessary for negotiations.  
 
Other scholars have sort to enhance ripeness. Richard Haass considers a conflict ripe when 
four prerequisites are met: “a shared perception of the desirability of a compromise; the 
ability of political leaders to agree to a desirable accord; formulas or agreements must be 
based on a sufficiently rich compromise, in order to allow leaders on both sides to persuade 
their constituencies that the national interest has been protected; disputants must agree on an 
acceptable procedure to further deal with their conflict.”183 Haass, like Zartman and others, 
believes that ripeness is an essential ingredient for a successful negotiation. However, 
Haass’s departure from Zartman is based on the same premise as Stedman and Lieberfeld: he 
identifies ripeness as an internal political issue rather than as an inter-party perception. He 
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manages to capture an important property in political negotiation i.e. each side is made up of 
different factions, but implicitly ignores some of the inter-party perceptual dimensions 
captured by Zartman and others.  
 
From micro-level of analysis, Peter Coleman defines ripeness as an individual level 
“commitment to change the direction of the normative social processes of the relations 
towards de-escalation.”184 Coleman’s develops a more definitive perspective on the 
“construct of ripeness”, looking at ripeness from a motivational rather than an objective view 
point. Coleman introduces a multimodal framework for the analysis of conflict processes, 
where the motivation to achieve ripeness is explained through the use of Pruitt and Olczak’s 
multimodal MACBE model.
185
  
 
Through this model, Coleman puts forward three propositions on the creation of ripeness.  
 
First, in violent protracted conflict, destructive behaviour becomes a normal process. Second, 
as a result, the reversal of these conflicts towards de-escalation requires a significant change 
in the individual, and that change in behaviour must be preceded by a change in the 
individuals’ motivation and view of the conflict. Third, ripeness, in this context, is located 
“beyond the neighbourhood range of unripeness, at the point where the individual makes a 
commitment to change the direction of the normative social processes of the relationship 
towards de-escalation.” The individual’s motivation to make such a commitment may be 
influenced by various affective, cognitive, behavioural and environmental factors.
186
 
 
In contrast, Marieke Kleiboer forgoes the term ripeness and puts forward the idea of 
willingness. In her view, ripeness appeals to the willingness of the main parties and factions 
within parties, especially their powerful leaders. Ripeness is equated to willingness: 
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“A certain moment when all important parties are willing to search for a peaceful settlement. Willingness is thus 
a minimal requirement for a settlement or a resolution to come about – however, even when all parties are 
willing it is not a sine qua non that this indeed will happen.”
187
 
 
Dean Pruitt also attempts to enhance the concept.
188
 He does this in two ways. First, he 
investigates the “motives and perceptions that make up ripeness on each side separately 
rather than focusing attention on joint states of mind such as a mutually hurting stalemate.” 
Second, he treats those psychological antecedents as variables.
189
 The result is ‘readiness 
theory’ which is a modification of ripeness theory.190 Readiness is the extent to which an 
individual disputant is “interested in negotiation” and negotiation, from this perspective, will 
only start if there is some degree of readiness on both side.
191
 
 
Readiness theory holds that two psychological variables encourage a party to be ready for 
negotiation: “the motivation to end conflict and optimism that the success of negotiation, or 
simply ‘optimism’.”192 The motivation to end conflict either results from a perception that the 
conflict is dysfunctional (i.e. a perception that the conflict is not being won or that it is being 
lost; the perceived costs of the conflicts; and the perceived risk of continuing the conflict) or 
from third party pressure. Optimism is a sense that it will be possible to locate a mutually 
acceptable agreement. 
 
Therefore, scholarship that has sought to enhance ripeness have identified ripeness as an 
internal political issue rather than an inter-party perception; looked at ripeness from a 
‘motivational’ rather than an objective view point; added the notions of willingness and 
readiness to the concept; and located ripeness at the intersection of power and legitimacy.  
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3.3. Developing Ripeness Theory 
 
For the purposes of the question raised in this dissertation, and the theoretical contribution it 
intends to make, there are two important limitations of ripeness. Ripeness is not clear about 
(1) the dependent variable, and (2) the role and significance of the major actors in bringing 
about negotiations. 
 
3.3.1. The Dependent Variable: The Beginning of Negotiations 
 
Ripeness theory is unclear about the dependent variable. On the one hand, ripeness is implied 
to be a condition for successful negotiation. On the other hand, the literature explains this as a 
condition for the initiation of negotiations. For example, Zartman, Mooradian and Druckman, 
Haas, Stedman, and Lieberfeld explain ripeness in terms of the beginning of negotiations, and 
in so doing, conflate the decision to negotiate with the outcome i.e. if negotiations begin, a 
ripe moment was present by definition; if negotiations did not begin a ripe moment was not 
present or not perceived. By contrast, Crocker, De Soto and Lederach explain ripeness as key 
to a settlement with an already established ‘negotiation process’. And Bercovitch explains 
ripeness in terms of the sustainability of a mediation effort in an already established 
negotiation process. 
 
This is an important lack of consensus in the literature as the process of bringing about 
negotiations presents one sets of variables, conditions and strategies, whereas the successful 
conclusion of a negotiations process presents a different type of endeavour.
193
 In the attempt 
to improve ripeness theory, the dissertation focuses exclusively on the role of ripeness in the 
beginning of negotiations; the pre-negotiation stage. Two features characterise this stage: 
opposing parties agree that they need a negotiated solution, and their decision on a negotiated 
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solution must be unanimous. The two go together: “We had to get together on a new 
solution,” and “A solution had to be found that we could all accept”.”194   
 
Zartman and Berman write that adversaries explore the possibility of negotiations when they 
“see that a problem can only be resolved jointly and when they have the will to end an 
existing situation that they consider unacceptable, while admitting the other party’s or 
parties’ claim to participate in that solution.”195 The core variables are perception, will and 
equality, but will is all important; “without the will to reach agreement there will be none, 
even if the other party’s claim to participate in a solution is admitted.”196 Will, perception and 
equality apply to a number of specific elements “such as the unacceptability of the situation, 
inability to improve the situation alone, and acceptance of the other party.”197  
 
These items are related and can be sequential. They also place emphasis on the composition, 
role, and significance of major actors in the conflict; the second issue that ripeness theory is 
unclear about.       
 
3.3.2. Major Actors: Parties in the Conflict and Mediators 
 
Since ripeness exists when it is perceived, the important question is ‘who perceives the 
ripeness process and acts according to this perception’? Kriesberg writes that it is possible for 
many different actors to be identified in the process: “processes fostering de-escalation occur 
within each adversary, in the relations between the adversaries, and also among other parties 
in the social environment.”198 Thus it is both the parties themselves as well as parties with 
interests in the conflict i.e. third parties who have the potential to take an effective role. It is 
important to consider these. 
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3.3.2.1. Parties in the Conflict 
 
When looking at parties in conflict, two groups can be identified: constituencies and 
representatives i.e. valid spokespersons. Representatives are those who authoritatively 
negotiate, make decisions, and secure implementation agreements.  
 
Margaret Hermann provides a useful way of classifying these representatives or valid 
spokespersons in political decision-making units that can enhance our ability to account for 
governments’ and political organisations’ behaviour in diplomacy and negotiation. 
Hermann’s classifications are helpful in understanding the character and composition of 
major actors involved in bringing about negotiations.  
 
She writes that at the apex of foreign policy decision-making in all governments or ruling 
parties is a group of actors – the authoritative decision unit – who, if they agree, have both the 
ability to commit resources of the government or ruling party in diplomacy and the power to 
prevent other entities in the government or ruling party from overtly reversing their 
position.
199
 The point is that for most diplomacy-related problems and occasions for decision, 
“some person or collection of persons come together to authorise a decision and constitute for 
that issue at that point in time the authoritative decision unit.”200  
 
There are three possible types of authoritative decision units: a predominant leader, a single 
group or a coalition of autonomous actors.  
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A predominant leader refers to a single individual “who has the ability to stifle all opposition 
and dissent as well as the power to make a decision alone if necessary.”201 The decision unit 
is likely to be a predominant leader if a government or organisation has one individual within 
its leadership who is vested with the authority to commit resources to policy issues, or 
alternatively, if the government or organisation is organisationally structured hierarchically 
“with one person located at the top of the hierarchy who is ultimately accountable for any 
decisions that are made.”202  
 
A single group refers to “a set of individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, who 
collectively select a course of action in consultation with each other.”203 To be considered a 
single group, “there need to be two or more people who interact directly with each other and 
collectively reach a decision. All persons necessary to committing the resources of the 
government [or organisation] with regard to the particular occasion for decision must be 
members of the group for us to have a single group as the authoritative decision unit.”204  
 
A coalition of autonomous actors consists of actors who are separate individuals, groups, or 
representatives of institutions who can act for the government [or organisation], but no one of 
which by itself has the ability to decide and force compliance on others; moreover, no 
overarching authoritative body exists in which all these actors are members.”205 Thus 
coalitions exist when two or more entities i.e. individual leaders, groups of policymakers, 
bureaucratic agencies, interest groups “have the power to commit of withhold the resources 
of the government [or organisation] and none can allocate such resources without the 
concurrence of others.”206 The entities comprising the multiple independent actors can also be 
form outside the government or organisation as well as from within. 
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Hermann considers this categorisation both mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and that the 
actors who make authoritative decisions for governments and political organisations in the 
foreign policy arena should correspond to one of these three configurations.
207
  
 
Hermann however points out that experience in determining the nature of the authoritative 
decision unit poses some classification issues that fall at the boundaries of the definitions.  
 
When the occasion for decision is under purview of a predominant leader, who has brought in 
a set of advisors, and those advisors are used as consultants to provide him or her with 
information and expertise, but the leader reserves the right to make the decision, then it is a 
predominant leader decision unit.
208
 However, if the leader sees advisors as forming a team 
with him or her to make decisions, then it is a single group with a dominant leader. On the 
other hand, a coalition cabinet is a single group “if the dynamics and structures of the parties 
represented in the coalition do not intrude into the decision-making process.”  
 
A coalition cabinet is functioning as multiple autonomous actors “when members of the 
cabinet generally participate in a two-level process in which there is interaction with the 
leadership of the parties as well as with other members in the cabinet.”209  
 
3.3.2.2. Third Parties 
 
Third parties are usually external mediators, and can include a variety of actors such as 
superpowers, organs of the United Nations, agencies of a regional security regime, regional 
organisations or leading individuals and neighbours. It is possible to conceive of their 
activities along a continuum of roles derived from the parties’ needs. Listed in order of the 
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mediator’s degree of involvement, they are mediation as communication, as formulation and 
as manipulation.
210
  
 
The mediator as communicator “addresses the conflict as a breakdown in the ability of the 
parties to communicate with each other.” In this situation, mediators act as telephone wires, 
“establishing contacts and carrying messages.” This role is procedural, “with no substantive 
contribution by the mediator, and completely passive, only involving carrying out the parties’ 
orders for delivery of messages.” Mediators may be the target of concessions when parties 
cannot communicate and the receiver of concessions when parties cannot give in to each 
other. As a result, their importance is that they may “pull concessions together into a package 
to present to the parties.”211 
 
The mediator as formulator plays a more substantive role. Such mediators are usually 
innovative thinkers who work out ways to get around the parties’ constraining commitments. 
They not only suggest but persuade; “persuasion is a form of power, requiring greater 
involvement from the mediator than mere communication.”212 Formulation helps parties see a 
way out of their conflict and consequently helps put into place the final elements of the ripe 
moment. It must therefore be performed by a mediator who “has the confidence of the parties 
and the imagination to see solutions that they cannot see.”213 
 
The mediator as manipulator is the maximum involvement of a mediator making them a party 
in the solution if not the dispute. The mediator “is required to use his power to bring the 
parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from the conflict and into 
resolution.” The mediator must promote their formula for a solution and take measures to 
make the solution attractive, “enhancing its value by adding benefits to its outcome and 
distributing them in order to overcome imbalances that may have prevented one party or 
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another from subscribing to it.”214 Not only must the mediator help improve the attractiveness 
of a solution but may even have to increase the unattractiveness of continued conflict, an 
involvement that may mean “shoring up one side or condemning another and further straining 
the appearances of neutrality.”215 
 
A mediator has four sources of leverage: “the ability to portray an alternative future as more 
favourable than the continuing conflict; the ability to produce an attractive position from the 
other side; the availability of resources that the mediator can withhold from one side in the 
conflict or shift to the other; and the availability of resources that the mediator can add to the 
outcome.” The first pair relate to formulation, and the second pair to manipulation.216 
 
The dissertation will develop ripeness in terms of the process of pre-negotiation i.e. the 
beginning of negotiations. The dissertation will argue that ripeness as a function of pre-
negotiation considerably enhances the explanatory power of the concept in explaining the 
beginning of negotiations. The remainder of the chapter draws attention to the importance of 
the pre-negotiation process – the framework within which the beginning of negotiations in 
South Africa will be analysed. 
 
3.4. The Theoretical Contribution: The Pre-negotiation Phase 
 
In the small literature on pre-negotiation, there are two contending definitions of the process. 
 
The first position locates pre-negotiation as part of the whole negotiation process. Harold 
Saunders, Jay Rothman and I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman view pre-negotiation 
as the first stage of the negotiation process where opposing parties jointly frame their issues 
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of conflict, generate various options for handling them cooperatively, and interactively 
structure the substance and process for the second stage of negotiations.
217
  
 
The second position, put forward by Janice Gross Stein, makes a distinction between pre-
negotiation and ‘official’ negotiation.218 Official negotiations are understood as the formula 
stage of the negotiation process. They are usually marked by limited time frames and 
pressure for instant decision-making in the process of reaching a negotiated settlement. By 
contrast, pre-negotiation is understood as a separate process that structures ‘official’ 
negotiations.  
 
According to Stein, pre-negotiation therefore begins when one or more parties consider 
negotiation as a policy option and communicate this intention to other parties.  Pre-
negotiation ends when these parties agree to official negotiation or when one party abandons 
the consideration of negotiation as a policy option.
219
 Stein points out that pre-negotiation 
frames official negotiation; it is characterised by important structuring activity, it sets broad 
boundaries, identifies key participants and specifies the agenda for the negotiation process. 
 
Despite Stein’s attempt to delimit the boundaries between pre-negotiation and official 
negotiation, it is difficult to distinguish the key functions of pre-negotiation from a broader 
negotiation process. The functions of pre-negotiation are an integral part of preparations for 
official negotiation, and thus a necessary prerequisite of an entire negotiation process.  
 
From this perspective, the negotiation process should be understood as a three-staged process 
involving discussions between designated representatives that are designed to achieve the 
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formal agreement of their governments and/or organisations on an issue or problem that has 
come up in their relations.
220
 
 
Pre-negotiations are the first stage of the negotiation process. Their job is to establish whether 
negotiated solutions to a problem are worthwhile, and then to agree the agenda and necessary 
procedures for tackling them. These discussions can both be informal and well out of the 
public gaze or they can be formal and well-advertised. However, whether formal or informal, 
public or confidential, pre-negotiations are often far more important and far more difficult 
than is usually supposed.
221
    
 
Once pre-negotiation is concluded and parties agree that negotiated solutions are worthwhile, 
the negotiation process moves to the second stage where the task is to negotiate the basic 
principles of a settlement (the formula stage). If the basic principles and a formula are agreed, 
the final stage involves fleshing out the details (the details stage). 
 
Pre-negotiations should therefore be placed within the negotiation process, while 
acknowledging Stein’s point that it has distinct features. Pre-negotiation is therefore that 
period in relations between parties when negotiated solutions are considered and adopted. 
The phase is marked by a turning point in relations between parties. This turning point 
prompts a reassessment of policy preferences and parties add a negotiated solution to the 
range of options under consideration. Pre-negotiation is marked by turning points that move 
the parties through various stages and ends when parties agree to pursue negotiated solutions, 
and begin to negotiate the basic principles or formula of a settlement. 
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3.4.1. Framework for Analysis: Stages of Pre-negotiation 
 
Scholarship on negotiation processes has sought to determine whether a distinctive pattern 
characterises most negotiation processes. This has produced a debate about stages of the 
negotiation process. Scholars have subsequently analysed transitions from one stage to 
another in terms of turning points and have been interested in identifying the occurrence of 
these turning points and the circumstances that bring them about.
222
  
 
The stage concept is a useful device for scholars to chart progress, identify disjuncture in the 
process, and provide a recognised pattern of expectations and behaviour. The most important 
scholar in this regard is Daniel Druckman, who in a seminal article developed an analytical 
framework based on bilateral negotiations between Spain and the United States over military 
base rights. Druckman conceives negotiation in terms of patterns of delayed mutual 
responsiveness between parties. The negotiation process is understood as an unfolding set of 
stages in which turning points and crises mark passage from one stage to another.
223
 Four 
concepts characterise the process: stages, turning points, crises and activities.  
 
Stages are one element of the framework that “capture an ‘ebb and flow’ marked by key 
events and depicted as trends.”224 Turning points are events or processes that mark the 
passage from one stage to another, signifying progress from earlier to later stages.
225
 There 
are two types of turning points; those that occur after a period of no progress (impasse) and 
those that occur after a threat to the sustenance of talks (crisis). Both types of turning points 
are “inflections in a trend, or ‘upturns’ that represent either sudden progress or a return to a 
period of stability.”226 The progress that occurs after an impasse “signals passage to a new 
stage of the negotiation.” And the recovery that follows a crisis or threatened breakdown 
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“does not signal a new stage. The new stage occurs during the period of stability after the 
recovery.”227  
 
Druckman argues that the concept of turning points is similar to that of ripeness. The 
similarities are that both refer to changes in the course of a process or relationship, occur as a 
result of an impasse, and are known better in retrospect through analysis than in prospect 
during an on-going process.
228
 However, there are important differences: turning points are 
part of negotiations rather than conditions for them; they are indicated by changes that occur 
during the process rather than conditions that lead to change; they are less dependent on 
perceiving or seizing the opportunity; and are indicative of downturns as well as upturns in 
the process.
229
  
 
As negotiations proceed through the turning points, negotiators engage in two important 
types of activities; monitoring and strategizing. Monitoring “consists of determining the 
extent to which various parties maintain an interest in the negotiation process.”230 
Strategizing involves the use of tactics in moving the negotiations along.
231
 These consist of 
actions taken to influence the course, including tabling a position, decomposing and 
aggregating relevant information, packaging issues, deciding on the order of discussion of 
issues, and proceeding point by point to reconcile the different positions of the parties.”232 
         
With regard to the pre-negotiation stage, only two scholars have provided a stage-analysis of 
the process; Harold Saunders and Brian Tomlin. Saunders identified three stages of pre-
negotiation: a shared definition of a problem, a commitment to a negotiated settlement, and 
the arranging of the negotiation.
233
 Tomlin suggested that there are in fact five stages 
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consisting of: problem identification, search for options, commitment to negotiate, agreement 
to negotiate, and setting the parameters.
234
   
 
These two analyses are in content similar. The difference is that Tomlin’s model breaks it 
down into more detail and stages and is thus more useful as an analytical framework. Tomlin 
also uses Druckman’s stage model to describe pre-negotiation. Because of this usefulness, the 
dissertation will use Tomlin’s model as a framework for analysing the South African case.  
 
Tomlin conceives pre-negotiation as that period when negotiation is considered, and then 
adopted, as a behavioural policy by either some or all of the parties.
235
 The onset is “marked 
by a turning point in relations between the parties, an event or change in conditions that 
prompts a reassessment of alternatives and adds negotiation to the range of options being 
considered.”236 The pre-negotiation process is marked by turning points that move the parties 
through various stages of pre-negotiation, and concludes with the start of negotiations over 
the principles of a settlement.  
 
Tomlin identifies five stages.   
 
3.4.1.1. Stage 1: Problem Identification  
 
The onset of the first stage is brought about by an event or change in conditions that “causes a 
restructuring of values attached to alternative outcomes by one or more parties in a 
relationship and results in the addition of a negotiated solution to the array of outcomes under 
consideration by at least one of the parties.”  
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The stage is “characterised by an assessment of the problem produced by changing conditions 
and a preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that may or may not add negotiation to 
the range of policy options.”237 A turning point is reached if the addition does occur, and the 
process moves to the second stage. 
 
3.4.1.2. Stage 2: Search for Options   
 
In the second stage, parties actively consider a negotiated solution to the problem. If the 
possibility for negotiation is a subject of controversy, “then this stage might be characterised 
as ‘thinking the unthinkable’ as some parties attempt to come to terms with the need to 
negotiate.”238  
 
Another turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as the preferred and necessary policy 
alternative, moving the process to the third stage. 
 
3.4.1.3. Stage 3: Commitment to Negotiate  
 
The third stage is the transition from ‘whether’ to negotiate to ‘what’ will be negotiated. The 
policy focus is initially inner-directed as parties consider alternative negotiating scenarios, 
reflecting varying degrees of scope for the potential negotiation, and successive steps towards 
increasing commitment toward a negotiated solution.  
 
It is in this stage that the focus of policy makers becomes outer-directed “as the 
preoccupation with internal decision dynamics gives way to increased concern for the other 
parties to the problem.” Druckman’s framework emphasised the monitoring activity 
undertaken, involving determining the interests of various parties. Thus, there is a point in 
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stage three when attention shifts to a consideration of the interests of other parties, mainly 
because the desire to undertake negotiation is likely to be communicated at this stage. Stage 
three thus also represents a ‘turning point of seriousness’ i.e. “the perception by each side that 
the other is serious about finding a negotiated solution.”239  
 
The communication of a desire to negotiate from one party to another is the turning point to 
stage four.
240
  
 
3.4.1.4. Stage 4: Agreement to Negotiate  
 
In the fourth stage, the parties agree to pursue a negotiated solution to the problem. The focus 
is outer-directed as they “come to terms on the desirability of negotiation as an approach to 
the problem while reserving any commitment as to the scope of the negotiation itself.”241  
 
The achievement of an agreement to negotiate a settlement marks the turning point to the 
final stage of the pre-negotiation process. 
 
3.4.1.5. Stage 5: Setting the Parameters 
 
In the final stage, parties define the scope of negotiating the basic principles of a settlement 
and establish parameters for these discussions. This stage provides parties with an important 
opportunity to assess the extent of congruence in their perspective agendas prior to 
negotiating the principles of a settlement. Even though parties may not reach an agreement on 
appropriate parameters, their agreement to proceed with settlement talks will mean that this 
final stage of the pre-negotiation phase imply merges into the formula stage. 
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An analysis of the pre-negotiation process using stages and turning points permits a 
reconstruction of the sequence of decisions and interactions that lead parties to negotiate joint 
solutions on a set of issues.
242
 This framework provides for an organising set of concepts for 
the examination of the pre-negotiation process, highlighting important stages and events 
indicating behavioural patterns.
243
 The application of the framework to the South African pre-
negotiation process will permit the superimposition of these general concepts on the case-
specific details. The result will provide for a comprehensive and systematic description of the 
processes and behaviour of the government and ANC actors during the pre-negotiation 
process as well as the pattern of relations between the two. 
 
3.4.2. Structuring Activity: Semi-Official Diplomacy and Pact-Making  
 
In Druckman’s model of negotiation, parties engage in patterns of mutual responsiveness to 
move negotiation through turning points. Tomlin defines this behaviour as ‘structuring 
activity’ in which parties “attempt to establish or alter the parameters within which the 
exchange and convergence process that characterises negotiations will occur.”244 In pre-
negotiations, parties attempt to position themselves for an advantageous start; they intend to 
influence the scope and agenda for settlement talks.  
 
Two-dimensional activity characterises the process: semi-official diplomacy and pact-
making. 
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3.4.2.1. Semi-Official Diplomacy 
 
‘Semi-official’ diplomacy is related to the idea of ‘unofficial diplomacy’. Unofficial 
diplomacy refers to the activities of non-state actors or private citizens from adversarial sides 
which are aimed at “developing strategies, influencing public opinions, and organising 
human and material resources in ways that might help resolve conflict.”245 David and 
Montville coined the term ‘track-two diplomacy’ to explain ‘unofficial diplomacy’; it 
included a broad range of unofficial contacts and activities “from the most apolitical cultural 
exchanges to psychologically focused political problem-solving meetings.”246 
 
Over time the theory of unofficial diplomacy went through a period of specification and 
extension in order to contain the diversity of actions taking place in unofficial diplomatic 
channels.
247
 Terms such as ‘multi-track diplomacy’248, ‘track one-and-a-half diplomacy’249 
and ‘track-three diplomacy’250 developed to describe different aspects of unofficial 
diplomacy involving different sectors and role players.  
 
Amira Schiff writes that the unofficial diplomacy approach upholds four basic assumptions.  
 
First, unofficial diplomacy focuses on improving relationships between adversaries through 
communication and understanding, by mitigating anger, anxiety and misunderstanding.
251
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The assumption is that “if conflicting parties overcome their psychological obstacles to 
negotiation, they will conduct such negotiations on the basis of shared interests.”252  
 
Second, the unofficial nature of the process “allows parties to raise and explore ideas and 
reactions concerning alternative solutions and approaches in a non-obligatory framework.”  
 
Third, formal and informal diplomatic methods occur alongside each other, in a 
complementary and integrated manner. And fourth, third parties in these processes are more 
facilitative and educational in nature.
253
 
 
The distinctive feature of this type of diplomacy is the status of the core actors, along with 
their explicit pre-negotiation agenda.
254
 Typically, one side consists of officials, whereas the 
other consists of private citizens. There is a continuous nucleus of participants who report 
back to their political principals, and provide continuity from one meeting to the next.
255
  
 
Semi-official diplomacy also contains a pragmatic and problem-solving orientation; “each 
delegation seeks answers to specific questions that help the political leadership evaluate the 
conflict-settlement potential of official talks.”256 Lines of transfer i.e. from unofficial talks to 
official level decision-making are more evident and direct; “because transfer to official 
policy-makers is the ‘raison d’être’ of semi-official talks, officials or authorised non-officials 
are included to ensure that the meetings’ contents will be reported to the relevant decision-
makers on each side.”257  
 
                                                          
252
 Ibid. 
253
 Ibid., 95-96 
254
 Harold Saunders, “Interactive Conflict Resolution: A View for Policy-Makers on Making and Building 
Peace,” in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman (eds.) International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 
(Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000) 
255
 Daniel Lieberfeld, “Promoting Tractability in South Africa and Israel/Palestine: The Role of Semi-Official 
Meetings,” American Behavioural Scientist Vol.50, No. 11 (2007), 1544  
256
 Ibid. 
257
 Ibid.  
78 
 
3.4.2.2. Pact-Making 
 
The subject of political pacts occupies a prominent place in the Latin American 
democratization literature of the 1980s. Terry Karl’s studies on the democratization of 
Venezuela in the late 1950s
258
 and comparative historical analysis of select Latin American 
cases
259
 are the most authoritative accounts of this phenomenon.  
 
Karl writes that the nature of Venezuela’s democracy in the late 1950s was profoundly 
affected by, and depended largely on, “the perceptions formed and political skill exercised in 
the immediate context of transition – a context still delineated by traditional elites.”260 She 
identified the significance of “explicit agreements forged among elites during 1957-1958 
embodying a negotiated compromise, and establishing the future rules of governance.”261 
These agreements permitted key actors to “develop new norms and operational codes of 
regulating partisan and interest disputes.”262  
 
Karl defined these negotiated agreements as ‘pacts’ i.e. “agreements between contending 
actors, which define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital 
interests’ of those involved.”263 These series of negotiated agreements, exemplified in the 
Venezuelan case, rested on explicit institutional arrangements: 
 
“The military agreed to leave power and to accept a new role as an ‘apolitical, obedient, and [non-deliberative] 
body’ in exchange for an amnesty for abuses committed during authoritarian rule and a guaranteed improvement 
of the economic situation of officers. Political parties agreed to respect the electoral process and share power in 
a manner commensurate with voting results. They also accepted a ‘prolonged political truce’ aimed at 
depersonalising debate and facilitating consultation and coalitions. Capitalists agreed to accept legal trade 
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unions and collective bargaining in exchange for significant state subsidies, guarantees against expropriation or 
socialising property, and promises of labour peace from workers representatives.”264 
 
These pacts contained three essential components. 
 
First, they were comprehensive in nature and were inclusive of all politically significant 
actors. This was important for the success of political transition: “because pacts are 
negotiated compromises in which contending forces agree to forego their capacity to harm 
each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each other’s vital interests, they are 
successful only when they include all significantly threatening interests.”265 Thus, pacts are 
series of interlocking and interdependent political agreements.  
 
Second, because pre-negotiation is the first and most important stage in the process of 
negotiated political compromise, pacts emphasis rule-making. This is important as it is “only 
after all contending forces have agreed to bargain over their differences can power-sharing, 
which leads to consensual governance result.”266  
 
Third, pacts ensure survivability as they restrict the scope of representation “in order to 
reassure traditional dominant classes that their vital interests will be respected.”267   
 
Hartzell and Rothchild write that pacts operate at both procedural and substantive levels.  
 
The procedural rules of pacts may include “mechanisms for enhancing consultation among 
elites; alternation of political offices among groups that elites represent (at times irrespective 
of electoral outcomes); formal power-sharing arrangements; and the mutual veto.”268  
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Substantively, pacts not only institutionalise certain policy orientations, but may also 
“eliminate issues from the competitive policy arena that are likely to become a source of 
conflict.”269 The authors also stress that pacts are temporary arrangements, and that over time 
they “cannot freeze the balance among the elite interests that they are originally designed to 
protect.”270 Factors such as political violence, coalitions with other actors (domestic or 
international), or key events may disproportionally benefit some pact members, leading to 
changes in bargaining power between opposing leaders, and may produce shifts in bargaining 
power to groups previously excluded from the pact.
271
  
 
Scholars disagree over the effects of pacts on negotiated processes to democracy. Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter take note of their positive contribution: “Pacts are not 
always likely or possible, but we are convinced that where they are a feature of the transition, 
they are desirable – that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable 
political democracy.”272 Their positive statement flows from the perceived capacity of pacts 
to guarantee the “surest and safest exit out of authoritarian rule. Pacts tend to minimise 
uncertainty about the democratic transition and its eventual fate, an outcome intimately 
linked to the substance as well as the political symbolism they convey.”273 
 
Scholars also warn about the perilous legacies that such pacts leave behind for a new 
democracy. Frances Hagopian identifies pacts as conservative and corporatist given their 
essentially elitist and exclusionary nature.
274
 She cautions that pacts “impinge on 
democratisation because pacts by design subvert the notion of majority rule.”275 Karl adds 
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that “the very decision to enter into a pact can create a habit of pact-making and an 
accommodative political style based on a pact to make pacts.”276 Echoing Hagopian, she 
argues that this leads to a corporatist democracy whose structures are designed to exclude 
popular participation in politics.
277
 And Adam Przeworski notes that while pacts “protect 
embryonic democratic institutions by reducing the level of conflict about policies and 
personnel, the costs of their success extracts from society may be too high to bear.”278 Pacts 
inevitable evolve into “cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict 
competition, bar access, and distribute the benefits of political power among insiders. 
Democracy would then turn into a private project of leaders of some political parties and 
corporatists associations, an oligopoly in which leaders of some organisations collude to 
prevent outsiders from entering.”279  
 
3.5. Structuring the Case Study 
 
The remainder of the dissertation will use Tomlin’s five-stage model to explain pre-
negotiation in South Africa. To get maximum theoretical value from the South African case 
study, there are specific theoretical issues the dissertation seeks to address.  
 
First, the dissertation will investigate the extent to which the South African pre-negotiation 
process is consistent with Tomlin’s five-stage model. In this process, the dissertation will 
refine and enhance the explanatory power of Tomlin’s analytical framework for explaining 
pre-negotiation, and contribute to theorising about pre-negotiation. This process is important; 
it will provide a clear illustration of the point at which ripeness helps us explain why 
negotiations begin. From this perspective, the dissertation will show that ripeness is a 
function of pre-negotiation and plays an important role in producing a commitment for a 
negotiated solution to a problem. 
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Second, the dissertation will investigate how components of ripeness can contribute to the 
beginning of negotiations. The study starts with the work of Zartman who contends that there 
is a condition in conflict that approximates ripeness, and in this situation, mediation plays a 
positive role in resolving crises. Zartman contends that the core components of ripeness 
involve the belligerent parties’ perceptions about the course of the conflict and their 
alternatives to continuing the conflict.  
 
Third, the dissertation wants to investigate the politics internal to groups and ripeness for the 
beginning of negotiation. The exploration of negotiation possibilities occurs within each 
adversary, in the relations between adversaries, and also among other parties in the political 
environment. 
 
Fourth, the dissertation wants to investigate how mediation can contribute to the beginning of 
negotiation.   
 
The abovementioned goals demand that in each stage of pre-negotiation in South Africa the 
following questions are asked: 
 
1. Who are the main actors and what are their goals? 
2. Is there a mediator, and if so, does the mediator have a conception of a possible 
settlement? 
3. Do the actors perceive the situation to be a hurting stalemate?  
 
These analytical components will be used to structure the South African discussion. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
Ripeness offers a metaphor for understanding disputant motivation to resolve conflict that 
centres on an image of ‘ripe moments’ for negotiation. The concept is parsimonious, elegant 
and grounded in case material. This concept centres on the construct of ripeness – a necessary 
but insufficient condition that is directly linked to the decision to negotiate with an opponent 
in conflict. This condition is brought about by the perception of two essential elements: a 
mutually hurting stalemate between the parties, coupled with a mutually enticing opportunity 
to gain a more favourable outcome in the conflict.  
 
The concept proposes that when parties find themselves on a ‘pain-producing path’, they 
begin to look for alternatives that are less painful and more advantageous.
280
 If such an 
alternative is discovered, they will be moved to seek it out. Ripeness is thus based on two 
core motives and elements: pain and opportunities to escape from pain. It is portrayed as a 
state that may or may not exist objectively, but that must be perceived to mutually exist by 
parties in order for it to motivate. This can occur either naturally, as the result of external 
events, or be induced, as by active intervention from parties or third parties. 
 
The dissertation will test ripeness in terms of the South African pre-negotiation process. Pre-
negotiation has five stages: 1. Problem Identification; 2. Search for Options; 3. Commitment 
to Negotiate; 4. Agreement to Negotiate; and 5. Setting Parameters. Two-dimensional activity 
occurs during this process: semi-official diplomacy and pact-making. These analytical 
components will be used to structure the South African discussion.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Background of the South African Conflict 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the central issues in the South African conflict. The chapter 
will argue that the root of the South African conflict in the twentieth century was white minority 
rule. The basic demand of the ANC and its allied organisations that resisted racial domination 
during this period was for the universal franchise and the right to be included as equals in society 
and in political life. At the centre of this conflict was the system of apartheid. Successive NP 
governments devised various methods to coopt Africans on unequal terms so as to maintain 
white minority rule. These methods were repeatedly rejected and rendered unworkable.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first two sections provide a history of apartheid and 
early resistance. Sections three and four discuss the NP governments of John Vorster and Pieter 
Willem Botha. Section five discusses the experiences of the ANC in exile up until the mid-
1980s. Section six discusses the state of the South African conflict and principle actors on the 
eve of pre-negotiation in 1983. 
 
4.1. The Foundation of Apartheid 
 
4.1.1. Segregation, 1910 – 1948  
 
The origins of apartheid are located in the segregationist policies of the four colonies and 
republics which combined to form the Union of South Africa in 1910. The Act of Union 
restricted the franchise to white men, and excluded Africans from the political system.  
85 
 
 
After the Act of Union, the building blocks of apartheid evolved through various ad hoc 
legislative measures in reaction to, and designed to curb, the increased flow of Africans into the 
towns and cities. In 1922, the Stallard Commission laid down the principle that Africans should 
only be in urban areas to “minister the needs of the white man and should depart when he ceases 
to minister.”281 African men over 16 years had to carry a reference book, known as a ‘pass’, 
which recorded their permission to work and live in a white area. These ‘influx controls’ 
controlled the flow of African labour into urban areas and allocated labour between sectors and 
regions. 
  
In the spirit of the Stallard Commission, the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act initiated a policy of 
urban residential segregation to apply the principles of the 1913 Land Act to urban areas.
282
 The 
Act, however, left it to the discretion of local authorities to implement this policy. As a result, 
there was considerable variation in its application. This prevented wholesale segregation as some 
municipalities lacked the means and incentives to provide for the building of new townships 
which Africans would have been relocated.
283
 Furthermore, official policy discouraged African 
families and “favoured the mining industry’s system of migrant workers housed in all-male 
compounds, while their families remained in the reserves thus keeping down African numbers 
and retaining their links with the tribal areas.”284 These laws hindered Africans wishing to leave 
white farms or reserves or to enter, or move between, the towns and cities.
285
  
 
The development of large-scale manufacturing during the second quarter of the century, made 
possible by the installation of a massive domestic steel-and-electricity industrial infrastructure 
from the 1930s, upset this segregationist dynamic. Many Africans were attracted to the new 
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urban job markets.
286
 Between 1921 and 1936, the African urban population doubled.
287
 During 
this period, the number of urban Africans as a percentage of the total African population doubled 
from 14 percent to 28 percent.
288
 According to the 1946 census, “Africans for the first time 
outnumbered whites in all of South Africa’s major cities.”289 Furthermore, manufacturing 
“permitted a relatively permanent and residentially stable African labour force, involving not 
only the workers themselves but also their families: in metropolitan areas, the percentage of 
urban Africans living with their families rose from only 30 percent in 1936, to 45 percent in 
1951, and to 65 percent in 1960.”290 
 
 
These developments introduced new ideas in South Africa’s liberal intelligentsia and in urban 
business circles. These were reflected in the publications of important official commissions at the 
time, such as the van Eck, Smit and Fagan Reports. They argued that “industrialisation, and the 
poverty of the crowded reserves, meant that increasing and permanent African urbanisation was 
inevitable, and that industrialisation required that African workers should be stabilised with their 
families in the towns and provided with improved education, pay and prospects of promotion 
that would turn them into the committed, motivated workforce required by modern industry, as 
well as providing an expanding market for consumer goods.”291 The job colour bar, pass laws, 
and migrant labour were criticised as “unjust and inefficient, deterring ambition and 
competition.” Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister argued that African urbanisation was inevitable: 
“you might as well try to sweep the ocean back with a broom.”292 Jan Hofmeyr, Smuts’s deputy, 
went further and called for the “ultimate removal of the colour bar from our constitution.”293 
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As a result, the job colour bar was eased and this was followed by an extension of training 
facilities for Africans in order to expand the supply of skilled workers. Through the Wage Board, 
government policy led to the raising of African wages to such an extent that black-white wage 
ratios narrowed.
294
 In 1942, the Department of Native Affairs recommended the abolition of pass 
laws and their implementation was subsequently relaxed resulting in a significant drop in the 
number of prosecutions.  
 
 
The ruling United Party (UP) went into the infamous 1948 election firmly committed to these 
ideas and recommendations, which accepted the principle that African workers were a permanent 
part of urban South African society and migrant labour was socially and economically 
undesirable. The Fagan Report had concluded that “urbanisation was an economic phenomenon 
… [which] can be guided and regulated” but not prevented, and urged that “the policy should be 
one for facilitating and encouraging stabilisation.”295 The Fagan Report also advocated that the 
mining industry be “allowed to provide housing for stabilised labour on the new [Orange Free 
State] goldmines.”296   
 
 
4.1.2. Early Apartheid, 1948 – 1960  
 
The National Party (NP) that was elected into power under Prime Minister Daniel F Malan in 
1948 reversed the limited reforms of the UP, and proclaimed their belief in segregation, racial 
inequality and apartheid. The foundation of their electoral platform was a rejection of the Fagan 
recommendations and an affirmation of the proposals of the Sauer Commission; an NP 
commission tasked with formulating NP policy on the racial question. In setting out the terms of 
the investigation, Malan stated that the commission had to “investigate the implementation of 
apartheid in the political and industrial terrains, and also had to consider the question of 
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residential segregation; it had to be practical, positive and constructive, rather than negative and 
divisionary in character.”297 
 
 
The report listed three main aims of apartheid policy: “first, the maintenance of the white 
population and a complete eradication of any racial mixing; second, the maintenance of the 
indigenous non-white racial groups as separate [communities] by working against any influences 
aiming to undermine those separate identities and by facilitating opportunities to develop each 
according to its own … character; third, the maintenance of the traditional principle of 
trusteeship, which entailed the fostering of national pride and self-respect for each group, and the 
encouragement of mutual respect between different racial groups.”298 To achieve these aims, 
each racial group had to “have its own territory in which it would be able to develop its 
inalienable right to self-maintenance and self-determination.”299    
 
Regarding Africans, the report stated that African ‘ethnic’ groups should each be drawn together 
territorially so that each could develop as separate tribal/national units, “offering a spiritual, 
national and economic home to the natives.” This would “encourage ‘talented and progressive 
Natives’ to move there in order to use their initiatives in the service of their own people.”300  
 
 
When dealing with Africans on farms and in the cities, the commission advocated the continued 
use of African labour on farms and that urban-based Africans were only temporary visitors to the 
towns, and should never be able to claim equal political rights with whites. Cities “had a ‘white 
character’ to be maintained.”  
 
 
Consequently, separate African locations had to be developed and steps had to be taken to limit 
their numbers in cities and reinstate their links with tribal reserves: 
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“… The urbanisation of natives is in conflict with the policy of apartheid and the Native can thus never form part of 
the urban population. The influx into the cities has to be subjected to all possible limitations and the Native has to be 
informed of the disadvantages of urbanisation and the advantages of an own national home.” 
 
The report also made a crucial distinction between theoretical and practical apartheid: 
 
“We put as final ideal and aim total separation between whites and natives which has to be implemented as far as is 
practical on a gradual basis, with consideration of the needs of the country and with the necessary prevention of 
detribalisation of agriculture, industries and general interests.”301 
 
The NP did not want to halt industrialisation and modernisation; it wanted to control it so as to 
make it compatible with a hierarchical racial structure and the preservation of white identity. 
They believed that this required the “reinforcement of racial divisions against the social forces 
released by industrialisation and modernisation.”302 As a result, they drew sharper distinctions 
between whites and non-whites and resorted to legislation to enforce this. The legislative basis 
for this was laid by the 1950 Population Registration Act, which classified the whole population 
by race.  
 
The basis for the creation of separate political systems for Africans was laid by the 1951 Bantu 
Authorities and 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Acts, legal interventions whose 
intention was to convert Africans into foreigners in South Africa. Each of the so called ‘eight 
tribes’ or ‘nations’ could only exercise political rights in designated and ethnically defined 
homelands. In 1957, the government stopped all trading by Africans outside the reserves and 
townships. The 1950 Group Areas Act had already restricted the residential and trading rights of 
all Africans.  
 
                                                          
301
 Cited in ibid., 119 
302
 Ibid. 
90 
 
Other existing economic and social controls were tightened. In the public service, hundreds of 
Africans were dismissed and replaced by whites at higher wages, and job preferences were 
particularly given to Afrikaners. The Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, 
spelt out the intention of ensuring job preferences for whites: 
 
“There is no place for [the Bantu] in the European Community above the level of certain forms of labour … it is of 
no avail for him to receive a training which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing 
him the green pastures of the Europeans but still did not allow him to graze there … [This led to] the much-
discussed frustration of educated natives who can find no employment which is acceptable to them … it must be 
replaced by planned Bantu education … [with] its roots entirely in the Native areas and in the Native environment 
and community.”303  
 
Following this, the 1953 Bantu Education Act centralised control of African education and 
separate ‘ethnic’ universities were set up for each ‘nation’.  
 
 
Migrant labour became the means for reconciling urban capital’s need for African labour with 
the NP’s determination to limit African numbers and prevent their permanent urbanisation.304 
With regard to Africans already living in urban areas, Verwoerd clearly spelt out the new policy:  
 
“… The Bantu have no claim to permanency in the European areas, they are in these areas as workers, and therefore 
own no real estate and can claim any political rights outside of the Bantu reserves.”305 
 
The rights of urban Africans were withdrawn and thousands of families were forcibly removed 
from freehold houses to short-term leasehold houses in newly built townships further away from 
the main cities and towns.  
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Finally, the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act legalised the provision of unequal 
facilities for different races. This was followed by the 1957 Native Amendment Act, which 
extended compulsory segregation into churches, places of entertainment, clubs, buses and sport.  
 
 
During the early years of NP rule, the pillars of apartheid were enacted. After Verwoerd became 
prime minister in 1958, apartheid evolved into ‘separate development’ which served as the 
structural solution to turn South Africa into a white republic in which Africans would not feature 
as citizens. Ten homelands would be created to rid South Africa of African citizens. Every 
African would be assigned a homeland according to their ethnic identity.  
 
 
4.2. Early Resistance to Segregation and Apartheid, 1912 – 1960  
 
The origins of resistance to white minority rule are located in the politics of African nationalism 
in South Africa.  
 
On the 28
th
 of January 1912, South Africa’s most prominent African citizens assembled in 
Bloemfontein and resolved to form the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). For 
this group, Union was a bitter disappointment: “[despite African] expressions of imperial loyalty 
… the British government made it clear that its paramount concern was with the question of 
white unity in South Africa.”306 The Act of Union removed the right of enfranchised Africans to 
be elected to parliamentary seats, and provided for the removal of the franchise from African 
voters.  
 
The first post-Union administration embarked on a path of consolidating this dynamic: the 1911 
Natives Land Bill prohibited rural landownership by Africans or occupation outside the 
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‘reserves’, effectively dispossessing many landowners and outlawing tenant farming 
relationships. The 1913 Land Act destroyed a whole class of peasant producers, and forced them 
into crowded reserves, driving them into new and arduous social relationships.
307
  The group that 
assembled at Bloemfontein had a particular concern and fear of a petty bourgeoisie at a time of 
crisis: “the fear of being thrust back into the ranks of the urban and rural poor.”308 
 
The SANNC represented the concerns and anxieties of an African middle class. It retained close 
ties with the African aristocracy and the rural chieftaincy, who were conservative constituencies 
concerned with protecting a moral and social order under attack.
309
 The SANNC was intended to 
function as an organised pressure group and planned to agitate for changes through ‘peaceful 
propaganda’, the election of sympathisers to legislative bodies, protests and enquiries, and 
passive resistance.
310
 The SANNC was renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923.  
 
The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was founded in 1921 by small left-wing groups in 
Cape Town and on the Rand. When the Labour Party split over whether or not to support the 
First World War, members who contended that the war was an anti-working class imperialist 
struggle broke away to form the International Socialist League.
311
 Informed by experiences of 
eastern European migrants, and the Russian Revolution, the International Socialist League fused 
together with various Zionist, socialist and Marxist organisations to form the CPSA. Although 
not a mass-based organisation, it had a well-organised and centralised structure, organised along 
the lines of a Marxist-Leninist political organisation.  
 
The relationship between the ANC and CPSA dates back to 1924. At its 1924 congress, the 
CPSA’s Young Communist wing argued successfully that the CPSA should formally recognise 
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the strategic importance of organising African workers.
312
 This brought them into closer contact 
with other trade unions and political organisations with African members. The most important 
was the ANC, and the most important leader within the ANC in this regard was Josiah 
Gumede.
313
 The CPSA was later named the South African Communist Party (SACP) after it was 
banned by the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950.  
 
The important turning point for resistance happens during the Second World War. This global 
event was associated with far reaching economic and social changes in South Africa; changes 
that created the conditions for a mass-based African political movement. The growing 
urbanisation of the African population was the key feature of these changes.  
 
 
Accompanying this increased flow of Africans from the countryside to the towns was another 
demographic change. Before the war, the majority of African urban migrants were adult males. 
During the war years, entire families for the first time constituted significant portions of the 
African urban population. The great majority of these families confronted harsh conditions in the 
cities: insufficient wages to meet family subsistence needs, and the lack of housing, resulting in 
families “squatting” in dwellings made of sacking, wood, corrugated iron and cardboard.  
 
This new, impoverished and urbanising African population became militant, posing a greater 
challenge to political authority: “large-scale squatter movements involving thousands of 
homeless people took shape during the mid-1940s; Africans in large numbers engaged in a series 
of bus boycotts to protest increasing fares; and a wave of strikes erupted during the war despite 
wartime regulations prohibiting them.”314  
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When the NP won the 1948 election and began implementing apartheid policies, the ANC, as 
part of these changes, became more confrontational and responded with a major program of 
resistance, the most prominent being the Defiance Campaign of 1952.  
 
 
The Defiance Campaign began the ANC’s transformation from a small to a mass-based 
organisation. Led by a young and charismatic lawyer, Nelson Mandela, and beginning on 26 
June 1952, the campaign was one of civil disobedience to confront apartheid laws.  
 
 
In 1955, the ANC formed additional alliances with the South African Indian Congress, the 
Congress of Democrats, and the South African Coloured People’s Organisation into an anti-
apartheid coalition, the multiracial ‘Congress Alliance’. That same year, the Congress Alliance 
adopted the Freedom Charter which embodied the ideals of non-racism, a common South 
African nationhood, and equal citizenship, beyond racial exclusivity.  
 
 
In response to this multiracial position, an important group of Africanist led by Robert Sobukwe 
and Ashby Peter Mda broke away from the ANC to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 
1959. 
 
At a PAC-organised nationwide demonstration against pass laws, in the township of Sharpeville, 
the police took a particularly heavy handed approach killing 69 protesters and wounding 180. 
The Sharpeville shootings were a turning point in the South African conflict, “when protest 
finally hardened into resistance, and when African politicians were forced to begin thinking in 
terms of a revolutionary strategy.”315  
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Following the events in Sharpeville, the subsequent prohibition of the ANC and PAC, and the 
state’s overall repressive action, both the ANC and PAC produced military offshoots. The ANC 
formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK, ‘spear of the nation’) on 16 December 1961 with Nelson 
Mandela as its commander, and the PAC formed Poqo (meaning ‘alone’) with Potlako Leballo as 
its commander. MK advocated the “implementation of a carefully controlled campaign of 
violence which in its initial stages would attempt to avoid bloodshed.” Poqo’s programme 
“developed from the same vision of a spontaneous popular uprising which had informed the 
PAC’s conception of their pass campaign.”316 Poqo was later renamed the Azanian People’s 
Liberation Army (APLA).     
 
Prior to being unbanned in 1960, the ANC had established an external mission headed by its 
deputy president, Oliver Tambo. Tambo was a Johannesburg lawyer and shared a legal practice 
with Mandela. After 1960, Tambo set out to organise the ANC internationally and solicit 
support. By 1962, “many of the top leaders of the ANC were arrested at the Lilliesleaf farm in 
Rivonia.”317 The accused, including Nelson Mandela and the entire MK high command were 
tried, found guilty of treason in 1964, and imprisoned for life in on Robben Island.  
 
The ensuing conflict between the South African government and the ANC lasted from 1961 to 
the early 1990s.
318
 The conflict did not involve MK and the South African Defence Force 
(SADF) facing each other on a battlefield; rather, it was an internal conflict where the objective 
for both sides, Stephen Ellis writes, was “the population itself.”319 The point, Ellis further points 
out, was not so much to destroy the enemy as to win political support: 
 
“To be more precise, for more than three decades there was a prolonged confrontation between the apartheid state 
and a substantial part of the South African population. The ANC, the SACP and some other organisations sought to 
turn this confrontation into a war that would be fought among the people, by bringing in trained soldiers from 
outside. They had strictly limited success in this endeavour, but some communities in South Africa were in any 
event disposed to engage in violent protest on their own initiative, notably in 1976 and after 1984. Furthermore, 
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from 1975, the SADF was simultaneously fighting an old-fashioned conventional war in Angola using all the 
expensive military equipment required.”320 
 
The issue of white minority rule was at the centre of the conflict. The basic demand of the ANC 
was the universal franchise. The government, for its part, devised various methods to include 
Africans on unequal terms so as to maintain white minority rule. 
   
During the course of this conflict, the ANC was transformed. Before the Defiance Campaign, the 
ANC was organisationally weak with a membership of around “10,000 subscribers.” By the time 
of its banning in 1960, the number had climbed to “100,000.” Towards the end of exile, the ANC 
had evolved into a “centralised party with a code of conduct, enforced by severe sanctions, a 
distinct ideology and a well-defined programme. The ANC had turned itself into a liberation 
movement.”321  
 
 
Nelson Mandela and the SACP played an important role in this process. Mandela emerged as the 
most decisive ANC leader from the period of the Defiance Campaign up until the Rivonia Trial.  
 
The relationship between the ANC and SACP and between the SACP and MK offered the ANC 
the financial, military and political support of a superpower, the Soviet Union.
322
 This in turn 
brought with it an impressive global infrastructure of solidarity by way of an international 
alliance of communist and socialist parties. SACP veteran Ben Turok writes that the extent of the 
SACP’s influence over the ANC was “a system without precedence in the history of national 
liberation movements and arguably no [communist] party has managed to insinuate its presence 
and influence on such a scale.”323  
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4.3. Pragmatic Apartheid: From Vorster to Botha, 1966 – 1978   
 
After the death of Verwoerd and the ascension of Balthazar Johannes Vorster to the premiership, 
apartheid, Giliomee and Schlemmer argued, shifted “from a missionary sense of purpose to a 
pragmatic functionalism.”324 Whereas Verwoerd projected apartheid as a goal, under Vorster 
apartheid became perceived as a means to another vaguely defined end. Realising that apartheid 
was incompatible with winning broad support, “Vorster declared apartheid was not the ultimate 
goal, but the means to achieve Afrikaner identity in a white sovereign state”325; if this did not 
work, other means would have to be explored:    
 
“No, chaps, you have got it all wrong. The cardinal principle of the NP is the retention, maintenance and 
immortalisation of Afrikaner identity within a white sovereign state. Apartheid and separate development is merely 
a method of bringing this about and making it permanent. If there are other better methods of achieving this end, 
then we must find those methods and get on with it.”326     
 
Vorster’s style was ad hoc, “with no clearly outlined strategic goals, and no certainty about 
direction.”327 According to Giliomee, the main goal of government was “om die fort te hou – to 
keep the Afrikaner power base intact.”328 While slightly modifying Verwoerdian apartheid by 
moving away from pervasive social segregation, Vorster sought to retain separate development 
and not compromise principles.
329
 He encouraged contact with English-speakers and the outside 
world. 
 
The turning point came in the early 1970s, when the government came under pressure. This 
pressure had three important sources.  
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First, in the beginning of the 1970s, the economy began to experience contradictions. The 
emergence of manufacturing as the leading sector of the South African economy had 
implications. The rapid growth of manufacturing “undermined the apartheid goal of preventing 
the development of a large and permanent population of African city dwellers.” The “pull of 
jobs” in the urban-based manufacturing sector, and the “push of poverty” in the rural and 
depressing homelands, “combined to vitiate the elaborate government effort at influx control into 
the white areas.”330 The African population living in urban areas thus tripled in the first two 
decades of apartheid.  
 
This inability to slow the pace of African urbanisation constituted a failure of one of apartheid’s 
core goals and was expensive. While the social demography of South Africa was changing 
towards a growing and large permanent urban African population, with the forces of economic 
development shifting toward a technically skilled and permanent urban-based African workforce, 
apartheid bureaucracy was working to prevent Africans from acquiring the very skills and 
technical know-how needed by the most dynamic sector of the economy.
331
 This inevitably 
contributed to low levels of productivity, increased training costs for employers, and skills 
shortages, all of which impinged on prospects for future economic growth and development for 
the manufacturing sector. The system of influx control also led to the instability of the available 
workforce. South Africa’s new and leading industrialists began to face difficult choices between 
significant aspects of apartheid and future economic growth and development. Industrialists 
chose the latter.  
 
The NP’s core Afrikaner constituency also began to change. In 1948, the economic interests of 
the Afrikaner community had a bias towards agriculture.
332
 The majority of parliamentarians at 
the time were directly elected from rural constituencies, with many Members of Parliament 
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themselves being farmers.
333
 According to Giliomee, in the late 1940s, Afrikaners controlled 11 
percent of the private sector economy outside agriculture.
334
 However, the economic base of the 
Afrikaner community changed. From agriculture, it shifted into all sectors of the non-agricultural 
economy including the state bureaucracy.
335
 By the mid-1960s, over “one quarter of the private 
sector outside agriculture was controlled by Afrikaners, and the proportion of Afrikaners in 
agricultural occupation dropped below 16 percent from over 30 percent in the1940s.”336 
 
As white controlled agriculture underwent modernisation during the 1950s and 1960s i.e. 
extensive mechanisation and the reduction in reliance on large numbers of African tenant 
farmers, it began to change its positions on the importance of labour control and repression. 
Organised agriculture began to relax its insistence that the state exercise more elaborate political 
control over the African labour market. This reduced the forces pushing for an extension of 
apartheid, and increased those advocating for the reform of apartheid in light of economic 
constraints.  
 
The second source of change was external. A military coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974 
precipitated a series of events that changed the political landscape of southern Africa. Before the 
coup, the four territories of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia were each ruled by a 
white minority government, had a longstanding working relationship with the South African 
government, and constituted a buffer zone between South Africa and the forces of African 
nationalism across the Zambezi River. When the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the 
Portuguese dictatorship, South Africa’s buffer zone collapsed. The new Marxist government in 
Portugal dismantled its African colonial empire. By the end of 1975, Mozambique and Angola 
had been granted independence and were controlled by political parties that professed a 
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commitment to Marxist-Leninism, had a history of opposition to apartheid, had close fraternal 
ties with the ANC, and received substantial assistance from the Soviet Union.
337
   
 
The third source of change was the revival of black popular protest. This happened in two waves.  
 
The first wave begins in 1973 when a wave of strikes by black workers swept across South 
Africa. Although legally constrained from forming trade unions and organising strikes, “tens of 
thousands of black workers put down their tools in a disciplined and ultimately successful effort 
to improve their wages.”338  
 
The second wave begins on 16 June 1976 in Soweto when school children protested the 
introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in secondary school courses. They were 
met by a detachment of police who opened fire killing several children.  
 
This series of events touched off a revolt against the apartheid system “that was unprecedented in 
its scope and endurance.”339 The revolt, and its suppression, galvanised the attention of 
international public opinion and “emphasised anew the pariah status that South Africa’s domestic 
arrangements conferred upon it within the international community.”340 It revived the whole 
issue of the international acceptability of apartheid and subjected South Africa to a different type 
of world pressure.  
 
These pressures transformed entrenched attitudes; “they shaped Afrikanerdom’s future leaders, 
forced a re-think in government policy, and created a generational split.”341 By the mid-1970s, 
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“some knew that Racial Utopia was unworkable and eroding.”342 Importantly, “traditional 
associations, beliefs, memberships and organisations no longer led to promised lands. Just as the 
parents of this generation, economically-empowered by their service in the semi-state in the 
1950s and 1960s, could see a world beyond their parent’s devotion to radical nationalist 
populism in 1930s and 1940s, so the elite born in the 1974-76 furnaces saw a world beyond 
Racial Utopia.”343 Leading Afrikaners began to question apartheid’s mission and its ethical basis. 
The question was no longer whether apartheid was the framework but rather what were its 
alternatives. Giliomee writes that two factors underpinned this debate; the future security of 
Afrikaners, and that the new order must have moral underpinnings.
344
  
 
 
4.4. Reforming Apartheid: The Rise of P.W. Botha  
 
It is in this context that Defence Minister Pieter Willem (PW) Botha succeeded Vorster as the 
Prime Minister, and sought to provide a response to the challenges facing the South African 
government.  
 
 
Botha, Giliomee writes, was convinced that old-style apartheid had to be discarded. But this 
realisation did not stem from moral considerations or visions of justice; it stemmed from the 
stark military, economic and demographic realities of the 1970s.
345
 Botha believed that “the 
unrestrained pursuit of white interests was [not] sustainable, and recognised a political formula 
for urban Africans had to be found.”346 He realised that “Afrikaner political and social isolation 
could not work, and allies were needed to secure a more broadly based white dominance.”347 He 
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concluded that classical apartheid was impracticable.
348
 He told a provincial congress of the NP 
in the late 1970s that “apartheid was a recipe for permanent conflict [and that] change is the only 
alternative to revolution.” He advised Afrikaners that “the moment you start oppressing people… 
they fight back. We must acknowledge people’s rights.”349  
 
The initial move towards reform came in 1977 through a report of the NP parliamentary 
committee on the constitution, and the appointment of two government commissions: the Riekert 
and Wiehan Commissions. The Wiehan Commission was charged with investigating industrial 
relations and trade union rights. It was instructed to make recommendations regarding the 
“adjustment of the existing system” in order for it to “provide more effectively for the needs of 
our times.”350 However, it was the Riekert Commission and the report of the NP parliamentary 
committee under Botha, while serving as Defence Minister, which had important implications. 
 
4.4.1. The Riekert Commission and the NP Constitutional Committee 
 
The Riekert Commission was instructed to investigate the systems and procedures that controlled 
the movement of Africans from the rural homelands to industrial cities. The commission was 
told to make recommendations “with a view to eliminate bottlenecks and other problems 
experienced by both employees and employers in the utilisation of labour.”351 The impetus for 
reform was less for moral reasons; it was an attempt to resolve the inefficiencies associated with 
apartheid’s economic contradictions.  
 
The Riekert Commission had two main objectives: to create an environment in respect to labour 
mobility and African urbanisation that would increase economic efficiency and reduce political 
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opposition.
352
 To achieve these objectives, the commission called for major alterations in the 
system of influx control, and for new legislation that would “explicitly make provision for the 
social and economic development of urban Black communities that live in the White area.”353  
 
 
The commission distinguished between the “established inhabitants of urban Black residential 
areas” and urban residents who were considered commuters, migrants and squatters.354 This 
latter and larger category of black urban inhabitants was not entitled to rights of permanent 
residence.
355
 The former category of ‘established residents’ were defined as those who had 
acquired “residential rights” under Section 10 of the Group Areas Act.356 The Riekert 
recommendation, accepted and implemented by the government, treated the two categories of 
black urban dwellers very differently. New means were recommended to keep the commuters 
and migrants out of the urban residential areas, and for the ‘established residents’, the 
commission proposed that residential rights be secured, that other rights and privileges be 
extended, and that living conditions be improved.
357
  
 
Riekert’s proposals were designed to create an environment conducive for the emergence of a 
black middle class in the townships. This social strata was in turn expected to support the 
government’s efforts to limit the size of the black population in urban areas, for the ‘outsiders’ 
and revolutionaries would be a threat to the black middle class’s newly found stature and 
lifestyle.
358
 
 
The report of the parliamentary committee of the NP, issued at the same time as the Riekert 
commission, also signalled an inclination for political reform. The report introduced a set of 
constitutional recommendations involving the extension of parliamentary representation to 
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Indian and coloured population groups.
359
 Although excluding the African majority, and placing 
limits on the nature of Indian and coloured representation, these recommendations constituted a 
significant reversal of the NP’s policy of barring Indian and coloured participation in central 
government.
360
 
 
The strengthening of the reformist drive was marked by the ascension of Botha to the 
premiership. Botha made domestic reform the centrepiece of his political strategy, and defined 
the purpose of his administration as adaptation and change.  
 
 
4.4.2. Constitutional Reform 
 
 
In June 1980, in the spirit of reform, the South African Parliament passed the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Amendment Act. The Act abolished the Senate and replaced it with a 
multiracial President’s Council tasked with agreeing on a new constitution. The council proposed 
a tricameral legislature with respective chambers for white, coloured and Indian members. This 
proposal was accepted by the South African Parliament when the Republic of South African 
Constitution Act was passed in late August 1983, and then ratified by a referendum in November 
1983.  
 
 
As for the African majority, the plan was to design separate institutions for them to exercise their 
rights. Three sets of legislation were drafted in this regard. The ‘Orderly Movement and 
Settlement of Black Persons Bill’ and the ‘Black Community Development Bill’ modified the 
influx control system by conferring urban status to Africans with stable employment in white 
areas.
361
 A system of “approved accommodation” was introduced to prevent the increase of 
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informal settlements in urban areas, and the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 gave extra 
powers to black municipal councils to run township affairs.
362
   
 
With a victory in the referendum of November 1983 behind him, Botha faced two important 
challenges.  
 
 
First, he had to get the support of urban black leaders to accept the exclusion of black Africans 
from the Tricameral Parliament. Second, he had to persuade them to participate in a negotiating 
forum on black political rights
363
.  
 
 
To deal with these twin issues, Botha appointed a special cabinet committee (SKK) five days 
after the referendum. The SKK was chaired by Botha’s close ally, Jan Christiaan (Chris) Heunis, 
the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning. Giliomee writes that Botha made his 
intention clear from the start: “he was opposed to a fourth chamber for blacks, but would support 
regional development, land consolidation in the homelands and a creation of a constellation of 
states.”364 Thus, for the government, the Black Local Authorities Act, and accompanying 
legislation, was designed to compensate urban blacks from their exclusion from parliament. The 
system, however, would have an inherent flaw; black local authorities did not have a proper 
revenue base. Few township residents owned property, revenue from rates were limited, and 
many township beer halls (a major potential source of revenue) had been destroyed in the 
Soweto uprising in 1976 and the subsequent unrest.
365
    
 
 
The government was not able to meet the expectations generated by its own discourse and 
actions. The most important constraint was financial; the cost of improving the physical and 
social conditions of urban black life were extremely high, and the government had expected to 
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finance the upgrade of black townships out of revenues generated by economic growth. 
However, for a variety of reasons (falling gold prices, the structural impediments of the South 
African economy, and international economic isolation after the Soweto Uprising), the 1980s 
was a period of economic stagnation for the South African economy. The most important 
consequence was a decline in the level of black living standards.
366
 The recession of the 1980s 
brought increased levels of unemployment, high rates of inflation, and stagnating wages to the 
urban black population.
367
  
 
 
Increases in rents became a significant threat to the living conditions of township residents. 
During the 1970s, the finances of the township administrations neared crisis proportions; “costs, 
driven by inflation, escalated; [the government] seeking to end state subsidisation of township 
administration, pursued a policy of township self-financing; and township-based revenues, 
generated largely by liquor taxes and rents, lagged behind expenditures.”368 By the end of the 
decade, township administrations were bankrupt.
369
 Consequently, pressure mounted to raise 
rents in order to cover the costs of domestic reform i.e. the costs of electricity, water, refuse 
collection, sewerage etc. Escalating rents thus became the salient feature of township life in the 
early 1980s.
370
  
 
 
Government’s reform policies became a significant stimulus for the emergence of mass 
opposition in the black community, and latitude for that opposition to organise. The role of 
reform in the emergence of mass opposition worked in two ways.  
 
 
First, reform policies gave rise to grievances. These became the “stimulus for the formation of 
new organisations, as well as the fuel for their efforts at mass mobilisation.”  
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Second, reform “limited government’s latitude in acting repressively against opposition 
organisations once they emerged.”371 To ban newly created organisations and to put a blanket 
restriction on all political expression by the majority “would have made it impossible to convince 
the international community of the seriousness of the South African government’s intentions.”372 
Out of these new organisations, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was arguably the most 
significant.  
 
 
In the history of black resistance in South Africa, the UDF was a movement of unprecedented 
pervasiveness and depth. The UDF was a broad coalition of student groups, civic associations, 
church societies, women’s organisations and trade unions. At its peak, it claimed a total 
membership of two million and an adherence to about seven hundred affiliates grouped in ten 
regional clusters, and embracing every major centre of population in the country. Its affiliates 
were ideological diverse but united only in their opposition to the apartheid government and 
demand for the universal franchise.
373
  
 
  
The immediate spur to the founding of the UDF was the government’s reform proposals in 1982 
and 1983 for the reform of the influx control system to control and regulate the presence of 
Africans in the cities, and the introduction of the new constitution that gave coloured and Indians 
limited power in a tricameral parliament but excluded the African majority. While these 
proposals were a catalyst for the UDF’s birth, “the actual genesis of the UDF lay in five strands 
of activity that developed following the banning of black consciousness bodies in 1977. Youth 
and student groups, trade unions, township civic organisations, and the revival of the nationalist 
tradition linked to the ANC each contributed in important ways to the UDF’s creation.”374 
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However, despite the emergence of new organisations, and challenges of reform, the South 
African government was not on a ‘pain-producing path’ in 1983. There was no hurting stalemate 
and the conflict was not getting worse. Reform apartheid was simply an alternative means of 
achieving the central objective: the preservation of white minority rule.  
  
4.5. The ANC’s External Mission, 1960 – 1983  
 
 
Immediately after the banning of the ANC and PAC, the organisational base of these resistance 
movements shifted into exile and while both professed a commitment to end apartheid, 
competition between them continued. By 1983, however, the fortunes of the PAC would 
considerable decline and the ANC would resurge.  
 
 
Any explanation of the ANC’s resurgence inside South Africa in the 1980s needs to take into 
account its diplomatic activities in exile. The ANC’s exile diplomacy was the responsibility of 
the ‘external mission’, established by Oliver Tambo on the eve of its banning in 1960. The 
purpose of the external mission was to function as a foreign mission devoted to fundraising and 
diplomacy. After the arrest of the internal leadership at Rivonia in mid-1963, the external 
mission assumed greater responsibility.  
 
It inherited three key objectives.  
 
The first was the physical survival and relocation of the ANC. The difficulty with this was that 
South Africa was surrounded by colonial territories too economically reliant on South Africa to 
provide secure bases for banned South African organisations. As a result, the ANC had to 
relocate beyond the Zambezi River.  
109 
 
 
Second, the external mission assumed responsibility for military decisions. The continuation of 
the armed struggle was made possible through the alliance with the SACP and the support of the 
Soviet Union.  
 
The third objective was most important: to gain exclusive recognition in the international 
community as “the sole legitimate representative” of South Africa’s oppressed people. For this, 
the ANC equated mobilisation for the struggle against apartheid with supporting the ANC i.e. if 
people genuinely opposed apartheid they should support the ANC.
375
 
 
In order to pursue these objectives, the ANC established 43 missions in exile between 1960 and 
1983. These missions can be organised into three important target areas of diplomacy: the 
Western powers (North America and Western Europe); the Soviet Union (including Eastern 
Europe); and Africa. Two institutions were responsible for this diplomacy: the Department of 
International Affairs (DIA) responsible for diplomatic work, and the Department of Information 
and Publicity (DIP) responsible for mass propaganda. These were accountable to the president, 
Oliver Tambo.  
 
4.5.1. Diplomacy in the Western World 
 
Apart from the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and The 
Netherlands, the majority of the ANC’s diplomacy in the Western world was confined to the 
activities of subnational anti-apartheid organisations (e.g. the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 
Britain, TransAfrica in the US, and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa), political parties 
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(e.g. Socialist, Social Democratic and Communist Parties in Western Europe), and international 
non-governmental organisations involved in anti-apartheid solidarity (e.g. the International 
Defence and Aid Fund, and the Socialist International).
376
 The objective of this diplomacy was to 
put pressure on national governments, either directly or indirectly (using the above-mentioned 
organisations), to support economic sanctions against South Africa and provide humanitarian 
assistance to the ANC. One can divide this diplomacy to that which targeted governments or 
non-governmental organisations.  
 
4.5.1.1. Western Governments 
 
Nordic countries provided support to the ANC at the highest level; since the early 1960s, they 
provided humanitarian assistance to South African political exiles, financed their educational 
activities and supported political detainees in South Africa.
377
 This official aid was initially 
provided through various United Nation agencies, but by the late 1970s, Nordic countries began 
providing aid directly to the ANC. While the money was small compared to the Soviet Union, 
the overall direct assistance (financial, humanitarian and political) gave the ANC international 
political legitimacy as important actors in South African politics. Sweden provided the largest 
amount of financial assistance followed by Norway, Denmark and Finland.
378
 
 
Dutch assistance to the ANC came after the Soweto uprising when Tambo and Thomas Nkobi, 
the ANC Treasurer-General, met the Dutch Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl and his cabinet for the 
first time on 5 and 6 October 1977. Den Uyl promised official Dutch assistance for the ANC 
missions in Angola and Tanzania.  
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4.5.1.2. Western Anti-Apartheid Organisations 
 
The ANC’s relationship with Nordic governments and The Netherlands was complimented by 
the formation and activities of a global network of anti-apartheid groups that consolidated the 
ANC’s international legitimacy. The formation of these anti-apartheid groups in North America 
and Western Europe occurred as a result of three major events in South Africa.  
 
First, during the Treason Trial of ANC activists between 1956 and 1962, Christian Action set up 
the Defence and Aid Fund (DAF), led by Canon L. John Collins of St. Paul’s Cathedral, “to help 
with the legal expenses of the accused and provide assistance to their families.”379 After the 
1960s repression, the DAF moved to Britain and formed the International Defence and Aid Fund 
(IDAF), the first anti-apartheid international non-governmental organisation.    
 
Second, a Boycott Movement was formed in Britain in 1959. The aim of the Boycott Movement 
was to persuade co-operative stores in Britain to withdraw South African goods from their 
shelves. After the shootings in Sharpeville, the Boycott Movement changed its name to the Anti-
Apartheid Movement (AAM). The AAM “worked to mobilise British public opinion to support 
economic sanctions, but it increasingly became a transnational actor. It participated in anti-
apartheid activities beyond Britain’s borders by collaborating with anti-apartheid groups in other 
countries… and working closely with the ANC and other liberation movements.”380  
 
Third, following the Rivonia Trial in 1963, British solidarity organisations began to work with 
Amnesty International, and a Norwegian South Africa Committee was established to assist South 
African refugees.       
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The ANC also established political relations with Western European political parties such as the 
Italian Communist Party, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, and the French Communist Party. 
These relations were complimented by the ANC’s links to the Socialist International, the main 
international organisation of Social Democratic and Socialist parties. Social Democratic, 
Socialist and Communist governments and parties in Western Europe “supported the ANC’s 
claim to be the “sole legitimate representative” of South Africa’s oppressed people.”381 This 
reinforced the ANC’s international legitimacy.  
 
The ANC, however, never acquired the ‘sole legitimate representative’ status from Western 
governments and organisations despite its diplomatic success and increase in status. International 
organisations such as the United Nations and most western actors were aware of the plurality 
among South African opposition organisations. 
 
4.5.2. The Soviet Union 
 
The Soviet Union was a reliable supporter of the ANC. The re-establishment of important 
contacts between the Soviet Union and the ANC and SACP occurred in October and November 
1961 when Moses Kotane, the Secretary General of both the ANC and SACP, was an official 
guest at the congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Accompanied by 
Yusuf Dadoo, a senior SACP official, Kotane used his presence in Moscow to outline plans 
concerning the armed struggle and to “seek ‘support in training military instructors’.”382 The 
CPSU approved the request.  
 
As a result, from 1963 to 1965, “hundreds of Umkhonto fighters came to the USSR to be trained 
at Odessa, Moscow and Tashkent. In 1969-70 the surprise closure of the ANC camps in 
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Tanzania resulted in ‘retraining’ of the core of Umkhonto fighters in Simferopol in the Crimea 
and in other places in the USSR.”383  
 
This, however, was only one sphere of cooperation. Others included “diplomatic support, 
participation in international solidarity campaigns, supplies both through Soviet government 
channels and through the NGOs of food, clothes, cars, trucks, stationary, sportswear, building 
materials and other goods. Assistance in the medical field included the training of dozens of 
doctors and nurses, the supply of medicine and equipment, treatment of sick and wounded ANC 
members in the USSR, and at a later stage, dispatch of Soviet doctors to the ANC camps in 
Angola.”384 Support also included academic and political training. This level of support was 
sustained up until the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991.
385
 
 
4.5.3. Africa 
 
The ANC’s diplomacy in Africa was the most complex, and it took the ANC many years to 
acquire legitimacy.  
 
In Africa, the PAC’s policy of Pan-Africanism was more appealing to continental leaders. 
Mandela, who embarked on a continental tour, before his arrest, to garner support for the ANC 
wrote that the ANC’s non-racial policy was often criticised: “In the rest of Africa, most African 
leaders could understand the views of the PAC better than those of the ANC.”386  
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By 1964, the ANC had “established exile missions in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania and 
Zambia, while the PAC was represented in Botswana, Egypt, Tanzania, and Zaire.”387 The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), and the government of 
Tanzania for many years tried to mediate and manage the tensions between the ANC and PAC. 
In 1969, for instance, the UN General Assembly gave recognition to both the ANC and the PAC 
as “authentic representatives of South Africa’s population.”388 And Tanzania housed both the 
ANC and the PAC.  
 
Five years later, “the ANC still had to share the privilege of being granted observer status at the 
General Assembly and the Special Committee against Apartheid with the PAC.”389 This situation 
began to change from the mid-1970s. Five factors are important.  
 
First, Zambia’s president, Kenneth Kaunda, had for many years lobbied the OAU and the UN to 
recognise the ANC as the most important anti-apartheid organisation. Kaunda went to the extent 
of expelling PAC members from Zambia in 1962.
390
 In addition, the ANC was able to establish 
its headquarters in Lusaka in 1970.  
 
Second, the independence of Angola and Mozambique strengthened Kaunda’s position and 
provided further impetus to the ANC’s claim to exclusive legitimacy. The MPLA and FRELIMO 
were not only Marxist-Leninist and part of the Soviet alliance; they were also “part of an alliance 
with the ANC that had been concluded on the occasion of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity 
Organisation (AAPSO) Conference in 1969 in the Sudanese capital Khartoum.”391   
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Third, through a chronic shortage of skilled administrators, persistent internal instability and ill-
discipline, the PAC was excluded by the governments of Mozambique and Swaziland (in 
addition to Zambia).
392
 By the end of the 1970s, “the exiled PAC also faced de-recognition by 
Tanzania, the OAU, and the UN” as a result of its internal instability.393 By the beginning of the 
1980s, Mozambique, Angola and Zambia became openly hostile to the PAC, and Lesotho began 
to expel PAC members.
394
  
 
Fourth, when a leading Southern African regional organisation was formed in 1974 by 
Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia, the Front Line States, to pursue the objective of majority rule 
in Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), South West Africa (later Namibia) and South Africa, the 
governments of Zambia, Angola and Mozambique lobbied for sole recognition of the ANC.  
 
While the Front Line States continued to play the role of mediator in the conflict between the 
ANC and PAC, the lobbying paid dividends; the ANC was able to establish MK training camps 
in Angola and Mozambique, while APLA was forbidden to do the same in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe. This facilitated MK’s ability to launch military attacks against South Africa, thereby 
increasing the ANC’s visibility.  
 
Five, the formation of the UDF in 1983 provided the ANC with an important source of internal 
legitimacy. There are two reasons for this. 
 
First, most of the UDF’s leaders were drawn from the ranks of 1950s ANC veterans.395 Most – if 
not all – of this UDF leadership had been members of the Congress Alliance and “saw 
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themselves as part of the ANC underground inside the country, whether formally or 
informally.”396 Further, a significant number of these leaders “had spent time in jail for ANC or 
MK-related activities or had joined the ANC whilst in jail.”397 
 
Second, UDF leaders generally saw themselves as subordinate to the ANC in exile, although 
“subordinate in the sense more of a subordinate partner than of a subordinate in a straightforward 
hierarchical command structure.”398 
 
By 1983, the ANC was regarded both internationally and in South Africa as an important 
opposition organisation to apartheid. In the Western world, it was part of a global network of 
anti-apartheid non-governmental organisations, political parties and governments who gave it 
international legitimacy. This, however, was in the context of the recognition of other anti-
apartheid organisations. In the Soviet Union, the ANC was a client and the Soviet patronage 
included an extensive global network of socialist solidarity organisations. In Africa, recognition 
was in competition with the PAC, but as the PAC succumbed to internal instability, so the status 
of the ANC surpassed that of the PAC.  
 
During this period, the ANC’s primary objective was consistent; the universal franchise. Armed 
struggle through MK was a means towards this goal. For this, political relations with the Front 
Line States, particularly Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique were important. Diplomacy 
in the Western World and the Soviet Union was aimed at acquiring political support (the West) 
and military financial support (the Soviet Union) for this strategy. This was the position of the 
ANC at the beginning of 1983.  
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The ANC, however, was not on a ‘pain-producing path’ in 1983 and there was no perception of a 
hurting stalemate. Diplomacy in exile was a success in 1983 and the formation of the UDF had 
opened up possibilities of mass mobilisation in South Africa.  
 
4.6. The Eve of Pre-negotiation: 1983          
 
By 1983, the main actors in the South African conflict were the South African government, on 
the one hand, and a collection of opposition organisations on the other, based inside South Africa 
and internationally. The central issue of the conflict was white minority rule, and the NP 
government’s system of apartheid (in its various formulations) was central for the 
implementation of white minority rule.  
 
The NP government in 1983 under PW Botha should be understood within the context of the 
changes in the 1970s. The NP government realised that they could not slow the pace of African 
urbanisation. Separate development was not going to achieve the goal of reversing African urban 
migration. After the Soweto Uprising, leading Afrikaners began to question the ethical basis of 
apartheid. As a result, PW Botha reached three conclusions: (1) classic apartheid was 
impracticable; (2) Afrikaner political and social isolation could not work; and (3) a political 
formula for urban Africans had to be found. 
 
The goal, however, was still the same: the preservation of white minority rule. Given the changes 
of the 1970s, an alternative framework had to be found to maintain this goal. Constitutional 
reform, in particular the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983, the Black Local 
Authorities Act of 1982 and accompanying legislation, was the development of this alternative 
framework. Thus, the NP government in 1983 was undergoing reform.  
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In 1983, there were two anti-apartheid fronts. Externally there was the ANC, PAC and an 
important number of international solidarity anti-apartheid organisations covering the broad 
spectrum of international politics. This external front also included governments and regional 
and international organisations. By 1983, the ANC had become a prominent anti-apartheid 
organisation, surpassing the PAC. It by no means, however, was the solely recognised 
organisation. Internally there was an abundance of civil society-based organisations bound 
together by a commitment to social and political equality, and the universal franchise. The most 
prominent were those under the umbrella of the UDF which had important historical ties to the 
1950s Congress Movement.  
 
In this anti-apartheid organisational mosaic, the historical ties between the ANC and the UDF, as 
discussed, were older and stronger. This gave the ANC a powerful sense of historical legitimacy. 
 
Thus, in 1983, neither the NP government nor the ANC were on a pain-producing path. Both 
parties did not perceive the conflict to be a hurting stalemate and there was no mediator in sight 
to deflect the parties from their unilateral positions into a joint bilateral solution. An aborted pre-
negotiation initiative in 1979 confirms this absence of a pain-producing path. On 30 and 31 
October 1979, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the chief minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan and 
leader of Inkatha, brought an official delegation to London to meet Tambo and senior ANC 
leaders. According to Thabo Mbeki, the ANC’s propaganda chief and later chief diplomat, the 
South African government had sent a message through Buthelezi on possibilities of opening a 
communication channel, but the ANC was “not ready to listen.”399 Tambo’s response to 
Buthelezi had been curt: “What has PW done to suggest that he’s worth seeing?”400 
 
 
 
                                                          
399
 Gevisser, 492-493 
400
 Ibid. 
119 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter identified the central issue in the South African conflict as white minority rule. The 
basic demand of the ANC and its allied and other resistance organisations was for the universal 
franchise and the right to be included as equals in society and in political life.  
 
Successive NP governments devised various methods to coopt Africans on unequal terms so as 
to maintain white minority rule. These methods were repeatedly rejected by opposition 
organisations. By 1983, however, neither the NP government nor the ANC and its allied 
organisations were on a pain-producing path. Both parties did not perceive the conflict to be a 
hurting stalemate and there was no mediator in sight to deflect the parties from their unilateral 
positions into a joint bilateral solution. The NP government was committed to reforming 
apartheid as a means of preserving white minority rule. And the ANC and its allied organisations 
were committed to the struggle for the universal franchise in South Africa.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Stage One and Two of the Pre-negotiation Stage 
The ANC    
 
The question this chapter seeks to answer is why the ANC chose to negotiate at all. In 
answering this question the chapter will use stages one and two of Tomlin’s model on pre-
negotiation. Tomlin writes that the first stage of pre-negotiation is brought about by a change 
in conditions that causes a restructuring of values attached to alternative outcomes. The stage 
is characterised by an assessment of the problem produced by changing conditions, and a 
preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that adds negotiation to the range of policy 
options. When negotiation is added, a turning point is reached and the process moves to the 
second stage. In the second stage, a negotiated solution is actively considered. Another 
turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as the preferred policy alternative, moving 
the process to the third stage. The chapter will end by discussing whether indicators of 
ripeness can assist in answering why the ANC chose to negotiate at all.  
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one discusses the important political and 
military conditions in exile that resulted in the consideration of a negotiated solution. The 
second section discusses the first stage of pre-negotiation where the ANC assesses these 
changing conditions, evaluates alternative outcomes, and adds negotiation to the range of 
policy options. The third section discusses the second stage of pre-negotiation where the 
ANC actively considered a negotiated solution. The discussion on the second stage continues 
into the next chapter as the ANC and government’s stream in pre-negotiation merge. The 
fourth section discusses the theoretical implications of the discussion for pre-negotiation and 
ripeness. 
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5.1. Changing Conditions: 1983-1984  
 
Five important changing conditions led to the exploration of negotiated solutions for the 
ANC: United States pressure for a negotiated settlement; changing political and military 
conditions in Southern Africa for the ANC; MK’s inability to reinforce the 1984-86 uprising 
in South Africa; Oliver Tambo’s case for adding a diplomatic option at the Kabwe 
Conference; and the increased interactions between ANC leaders and non-ANC aligned civil 
society organisations in South Africa.  
 
5.1.1. Background: International Pressure for Negotiation  
 
Towards the end of 1983, the ANC was subject to international pressure for a negotiated 
resolution to the South African conflict. The first important source of pressure came from the 
United States in 1983. As part of the Ronald Reagan’s administration’s mediation in the 
Angolan civil war, the United States government sought to raise the profile of their dialogue 
with the ANC in order to test the their seriousness about negotiation.
401
 According to Chester 
Crocker, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs: 
 
“We would use our contacts to focus on the shape of a post-apartheid future, underscoring our conviction that 
Marxist-Leninist principles were the last thing South Africa needed. Raising the visibility of our ANC contacts 
would directly confront Pretoria’s absurd attempt to dictate who should be on the other side of any future 
table…. Meeting visibly with the ANC would set an example to Pretoria: talking to someone does not mean that 
you approve of them or agree with them. Placing our weight solidly behind negotiation would be the best way to 
signal to all parties the alternatives they faced.”402  
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Crocker sent his senior intelligence staffer, Robert Cabelly, to make contact and meet with 
the ANC through Thabo Mbeki, Tambo’s political secretary and the DIP director. On 7 
September 1983, at the United States Information Service office in Lusaka, Cabelly met 
Mbeki and Sipho Makana, the Head of Information at the ANC’s Department of Intelligence 
and Security (NAT). Makana recalls that the encounter was very blunt: “we don’t trust each 
other but we have to work together.” He and Mbeki read it as an attempt by South Africa to 
get a message to the ANC: “Drop the SACP and the Soviet Union, and we can do 
business.”403 Cabelly insisted that the ANC become part of the “policy reforms in the region”, 
and if this was not done, the ANC would be “driven out of the region.”404  
 
Cabelly told Mbeki’s biographer, Mark Gevisser, that he reported three primary impressions 
to Crocker: “Firstly, that the ANC was in no way a military threat to South Africa; secondly, 
that behind the united front of the frontline states, they were all very iffy about the ANC; and 
thirdly, that Thabo Mbeki was a very sharp guy.”405 Mbeki and Cabelly kept an open channel 
of communication, and in the following three years, would meet at least six times in Lusaka, 
culminating in the first official meeting between the ANC and the United States government 
in Washington in 1987.  
 
5.1.2. Conditions in Southern Africa 
 
Taken together, two important changing conditions in Southern Africa contributed to the shift 
towards exploring negotiated solutions: the position of MK in Mozambique and resultant 
pressure from the Front Line States. 
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5.1.2.1. The Nkomati Accord and the Closure of the Eastern Front 
 
The regional strategy of the South African government involved various military and 
economic policies designed to “persuade the countries in the region to expel the ANC from 
their territories.”406 In 1984, this strategy began to bear fruit. At the same time, MK 
strategists had warned the ANC leadership on the need to locate the armed struggle within 
South Africa’s borders in order to “overcome MK’s dependence on rear bases in 
neighbouring countries.”407  
 
For MK in 1984, Mozambique was of strategic importance. MK’s structures in Mozambique 
were the most active at the time and were responsible for Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape, 
therefore handling the majority of MK personnel flowing in and out of South Africa.
408
  
 
Because Mozambique could not fight a war on two fronts i.e. the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian and 
the South African, it chose to prioritise the immediate Zimbabwean struggle for 
independence.
409
 As a result, the ANC adopted three measures to adapt to Mozambique’s 
needs.  
 
First, MK would not transport guerrillas or weapons into South Africa across Mozambique’s 
borders; instead, MK would infiltrate South Africa indirectly through Swaziland.
410
 Second, 
MK would not establish military training camps on Mozambican soil. Third, MK units inside 
South Africa would not conduct military operations near Mozambique’s borders.411  
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The ANC’s concessions had important consequences; because the Mozambique-Swaziland-
South Africa border area became a hive of activity, especially in the post-Soweto exodus 
where large groups of militant youth crossed the borders, the Swazi and Mozambican 
governments soon “lost their nerve.”412 As the civil war with Renamo intensified, with the 
SADF increasing the rate of commando raids into Mozambique, Samora Machel succumbed 
to pressure; support for MK was replaced by a desire to achieve rapprochement with South 
Africa.  
 
After an SADF commando raid in May 1983 killing several Mozambicans, an angry Machel 
told John Nkadimeng, the ANC representative in Mozambique, that it was ‘high time’ the 
ANC “got its act together and started to make its numbers count.”413 Soon, “the number of 
ANC members permitted to reside in the country was cut down and active steps were taken to 
reduce the traffic of its cadres in and out of the country.”414  
 
Under pressure, Machel sort to achieve a rapprochement with South Africa at almost any cost 
and in pursuit of improving relations, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) 
government began a process of negotiation with the South African government, culminating 
in the signing of the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984. The Accord stipulated that “neither 
country could allow its territory to be used as a springboard for attacks on the other.” 
Essentially, this involved Mozambique agreeing to expel the ANC, and South Africa ceasing 
its support for Renamo.
415
    
 
As a result of the Accord, over 100 MK personnel in Mozambique were expelled. Large 
numbers crossed the border into Swaziland, taking with them truckloads of arms and 
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ammunition, and entered an ANC infrastructure designed to support between 70 and 80 
members in transit.
416
  
 
This exodus was exacerbated by a simultaneous intake of larger recruits from South Africa 
into Swaziland. Raymond Lalla, MK’s chief of intelligence in Natal, recalled that “while 100 
or so went from Mozambique to Swaziland … about 300 to 400 went from South Africa to 
Swaziland.”417   
 
The co-operation between Swazi and South African security agents compounded the 
problem; South African agents operated with authority in Swaziland. The sudden influx of 
large numbers of MK personnel made skirmishes with local security forces, and 
confrontation with South Africa security agents, inevitable. When an MK assassination squad 
killed a senior Swazi security officer, ANC structures became “subject to an aggressive 
conjoint Swazi-South African offensive.”418 The “ensuing ‘Battle of Swaziland’ took a heavy 
toll on the ANC … particularly the … ‘middle-cadre’ … who were people with almost a 
decade of experience in underground work and therefore were poised to be promoted to 
positions of leadership in the future.”419   
 
5.1.2.2. Pressure from the Front Line States 
 
The turning point that signalled a shift towards negotiation came in the run-up to the Nkomati 
Accord.  
 
The ANC’s Lusaka office was concerned about its exclusion from consultations and briefings 
by the Mozambican government on high-level South Africa-Mozambique ministerial 
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negotiations. Johnny Makhathini, the DIA director, stated that this had made Tambo 
unusually anxious.
420
  
 
In anticipation of the signing of the Accord, the ANC’s National Working Committee (NWC) 
called an extended meeting at the end of 1983, to explore scenarios for potential negotiations. 
The NWC commissioned a group chaired by Pallo Jordan, the deputy director of DIP, with a 
brief to examine various scenarios in the event of negotiations.  
 
Jordan reported that negotiations could come about under three circumstances: (1) the 
outright defeat of the apartheid regime; (2) a stalemate; or (3) a ‘Patriotic Front dilemma’ i.e. 
the situation of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front (the coalition of the Zimbabwe African 
National Union and the Zimbabwean African People’s Union) in 1979 when the Front Line 
States gave them an ultimatum to go to Lancaster House or get out of their countries.
421
 They 
pointed out that if the ANC was subjected to sufficient political pressure by the Front Line 
States, it would need to be well prepared; “it would, therefore, be important to set their terms 
on the table.”422    
 
In the chaos of the aftermath of the Nkomati Accord, and the ensuing ‘Battle of Swaziland’, 
the exploration of negotiated solutions began.
423
     
 
The regional implications of the Nkomati Accord were discussed at a Front Line States 
summit meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, on 29 April 1984. An important shift in favour of a 
negotiated solution to the South African conflict occurred with Front Line State leaders. The 
final communiqué of the summit illustrates that the ANC in 1984 was in a ‘Patriotic Front 
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dilemma’. The communiqué also referred to the ANC, and not the PAC, as the leading 
resistance organisation.  
 
Front Line State leaders made it clear their preference for a negotiated solution to the end of 
apartheid and set preconditions: 
 
“For South Africa, the objective of the Front Line States and Liberation Movements is the abolition of apartheid 
by whatever means are necessary. The Leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for apartheid to 
be brought to an end by peaceful means. This can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free 
discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa 
who are unrepresented in the present government structure of that country. A prerequisite for any such 
discussions would be the unconditional release from prison, detention, house arrest or ‘banning’ of Nelson 
Mandela and all other political leaders. Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African 
Government, there is no way to peace in southern Africa except through discussions between the South African 
Government and the African people of South Africa.” 
 
The ANC was identified as principal liberation movement: 
 
“The political and the armed struggles being waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa led by SWAPO 
and ANC respectively, are taking place inside those two countries. The struggle is between the people of 
Namibia and the occupying power, and between the people of South Africa and the apartheid regime. Therefore, 
the strategy of the Liberation Movements is that of internal struggle, firmly based on the people’s will and 
determination.”424 
 
The Front Line States summit was important; it put pressure on the ANC to add negotiation 
into their policy alternatives. This pressure from the Front Line States was sufficient and the 
ANC began to explore negotiation possibilities. 
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5.1.3. The Vaal Uprising and Operation Zikomo 
 
5.1.3.1. The 3
rd
 Day of September 
 
Five months after the Front Line States Summit and as the ANC began exploring negotiation 
possibilities, an uprising began in the townships of the Vaal Triangle that set into motion a 
sustained period of popular protest unprecedented in scope and intensity. The uprising and its 
consequences significantly challenged the authority and legitimacy of the South African 
government.  
 
On 3 September 1984
 
the government began to lose control of the reform process. The 
uprising that began in the Vaal Triangle was a rejection of reform and was initiated by the 
UDF-affiliated Vaal Civic Association (VCA) over the issue of rent increases. 
 
The rent increases had an important context. As discussed in the previous chapter, as part of 
Botha’s reforms, legislation was passed to deal with the position of urban Africans, 
culminating in the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, which gave more powers to black 
municipal councils in running township affairs. Revenue for the councils would come from 
the rent and service charges that would accrue once the council obtained responsibility for the 
control of housing, as well as special levies on township residents.
425
   
 
This township self-financing regime soon reached a cul-de-sac; rising inflation and the 
government policy of getting township residents to pay for township upgrade themselves 
escalated the costs of financially administering townships. Rents were consistently hiked in 
order to cover the costs of electricity, water, refuse collection, sewage and the like.  
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Township residents subsequently held public meetings addressed by various national 
opposition organisations such as the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), the Azanian 
Students Organisation (AZASO), and the UDF-affiliated organisations such as the Soweto 
Civics Association (SCA), Congress of South African Students (COSAS), and VCA. 
Residents resolved not to pay the increases, and called on the councillors to resign. When the 
councillors refused to reduce the increases and meet the demands of the residents, the VCA 
called for a work stay-away and a school boycott on 3 September. 
 
On 3 September 1984, 60% of workers stayed away and almost all the 93,000 pupils in the 
Vaal Triangle boycotted classes, solidifying an emerging alliance of residents, trade unions, 
and students.
426
 A week-long state of paralysis set in, with a profound impact on the Vaal 
Triangle’s industries and wider regional economy.427 
 
When the overwhelmed local councils requested police assistance to restore order, violence 
followed, and in the following four weeks, the Vaal witnessed pitched battles between 
residents and students against police, leaving more than 60 people dead, and thousands of 
arrests and detentions. A phase of general chaos ensued; police and commercial vehicles were 
stoned, the homes of community councillors were torched, and the school boycotts were 
extended and expanded in geographical reach. New anti-apartheid organisational structures 
were emerged; a COSAS proposal to trade unions on 27 October led to the formation of the 
UDF-affiliated Transvaal Regional Stay-away Committee (TRSC), an alliance of 36 political, 
community, and student organisations and trade unions. 
 
Toward the end of October, the government stepped in to re-establish order; 7,000 SADF 
soldiers, assisting the South African Police (SAP), conducted Operation Palmiet, a major 
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search-and-arrest operation in the Vaal Triangle.
428
 Over 400 people were arrested and 
detained.
429
 
 
The state’s response intensified the uprising. The TRSC called for another two-day stay-away 
between 4 and
 
6 November. The call was once again widely heeded; in a massive 
demonstration of the nature of discontent, 800,000 workers stayed at home, joined by 
400,000 pupils from an extended school boycott led by COSAS. The discontent in the 
Transvaal townships converged in the November stay-away organised by the TRSC, when 
school children, community organisations and trade unions united under the TRSC and 
expressed their discontent in the largest political stay-away on record.
430
  
  
The government response to the uprising was two-fold.  
 
First, the government declared a partial state of emergency on 21 July 1985.
431
 Second, the 
military intervened again, occupying the streets in force, setting up road blocks, conducting 
house-to-house searches and maintaining 24hour patrols.
432
 Soldiers and policemen were 
given absolute authority to arrest, interrogate, search homes, and confiscate possessions.
433
 
These powers were used extensively.
434
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When the partial state of emergency failed to suppress the uprising, the government declared 
a second, and general, state of emergency on 12 June 1986. Unlike the first state of 
emergency, which affected specific magisterial districts, the second affected the whole of 
South Africa. Applied with an unprecedented harshness that temporarily put a halt to the 
uprising, it was renewed annually for four years. The detentions which came with this general 
state of emergency were particularly damaging to the UDF. In the first six months of the 
general state of emergency, between 20,000 and 30,000 people were detained, and several 
thousand endured months, and others years, in police cells and prisons. Detentions were 
countrywide, with the largest numbers recorded being in Soweto and Port Elizabeth.
435
  
 
5.1.3.2. ‘Operation Zikomo’ 
 
The ANC initially sought to provide guidance to the township uprising. Thabo Mbeki sought 
to “encourage confrontation while moderating expectations”: 
 
“[In] our planning, in our thinking, we must proceed from the basis that we inflicted a humiliating defeat on our 
enemy [through the boycott of coloured and Indian elections]… [As] revolutionaries, as fighters for liberation, 
[we] must plan how we should continue our offensive, knowing very well that the enemy will, as it must, hit 
back to stop the emergence and consolidation of the revolutionary situation that Pretoria fears so much.”436  
 
Mbeki called for a campaign to make South Africa ‘ungovernable’: 
 
“We must destroy the enemy organs of government. We must render them ineffective and inoperative… In 
rejecting Botha’s regime, we also reject his puppets. There is no reason that we should allow there puppets to 
control our lives… In every locality and in all parts of our country, we must fight to ensure that we remove the 
enemy’s organs of government.”437 
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The ANC’s opportunity to intervene and reinforce the uprising arrived in mid-1985 with the 
launch of Operation Zikomo, a large-scale infiltration of MK combatants into South Africa. 
According to Ronnie Kasrils, the MK chief of intelligence, the purpose of Zikomo was to 
“inject several hundred combatants as ‘shock forces’ in the township uprisings.” They were 
to “form a kind of officer class for township militants, providing them with leadership and 
training.”438  
 
However, the ANC’s political conditions in exile i.e. the dismantling of its military structures 
in Mozambique and the uncertain transitional environment of Swaziland, severely limited its 
ability to provide tactical guidance to the township revolt. This was compounded by the fact 
that MK strategists sought to apply prescriptions of ‘military combat work’ to the revolt. The 
view developed that MK fighters would form the officer corps of an army to be created by 
organising and arming the township activists, resulting in a coordinated and sustained 
uprising.
439
  
 
Ivan Pillay, MK’s intelligence chief in Swaziland, told Barrell that the combatants had 
minimal back-up: “they had maybe … R1,000 or R2,000, maybe … 12 hand grenades and an 
AK … many of them just being put across the fence and sent home to integrate themselves 
with the defence committees, street committees etc.”440 According to Mac Maharaj, Zikomo 
was a legacy of the Angolan mutiny the previous year and “represented a belated attempt to 
accommodate the grievances in the camps by sending a large number of cadres back home.” 
However, “it quickly degenerated into sending them like cannon fodder, to put it crudely.”441 
 
Several arguments had preceded Zikomo: the lack of underground structures to integrate MK; 
and the poor quality of political and intelligence briefings guerrillas received before 
infiltration. From this view, Zikomo was an attempt to compensate for the unpreparedness of 
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the ANC when the Vaal Uprising began.
442
 Zikomo, however, did have some important short-
term effects. As the government lost control over some of the townships, the newly infiltrated 
guerrillas survived. Consequently, MK activity increased to new levels from June 1985: 
“whereas there had been 30 attacks in the five months to May, there were 31 in June alone 
and 75 more between July and December; a total of 136 attacks for the year, more than 
double the number in any previous year.” In 1985, “the state killed or captured a mere 31 MK 
guerrillas, which meant a ratio of three guerrillas captured or killed for each 13 attacks; MK’s 
best year and most favourable casualty rate ever.”443 
 
However, the ANC was not able to provide tactical direction to the uprising. MK’s 
intelligence officers acknowledge that their role in developing street committees and rent 
boycotts in the townships in the 1985-86 period was minimal. Garth Strachan, Joe Slovo and 
Ronnie Kasrils acknowledge that the ANC simply picked up on local initiatives made by 
ordinary residents and internal activists and then, post facto, developed strategies which made 
sense to them.
444
 After the second state of emergency, MK could not spread insurrectionary 
pressures beyond scattered localities, and therefore could not attenuate security forces to any 
significant degree.  
 
As the state rolled back the unrest through the second state of emergency, MK’s casualty rate 
rose sharply. Bill Anderson, a senior NAT intelligence officer based in Lusaka, recalled that 
intelligence communications after losing the eastern front in the post-Nkomati period were 
established in an ad hoc manner “with infiltrated units only given very brief instructions 
about potential contacts in the internal underground.” Most of these units “soon lost contact 
with their external handlers upon entry into the country and were left to fend for 
themselves.”445 Kasrils estimated that as many as “75-80% of those infiltrated in the early 
1980s were lost by 1986/87, whether through being killed, captured or having deserted for a 
variety of reasons ranging from a loss of contact with their external commanders, a shortage 
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of ammunition, or basic disillusionment with the ANC.”446 Usually, “communications were 
so poor that the first the forward areas usually heard about the cadres that they deployed was 
after news of their capture or death was announced in the media.”447  
 
5.1.4. The Kabwe Conference and its Consequences 
 
The importance of the Kabwe Conference should be viewed within this context of early 
discussions with United States diplomatic envoys over possibilities of a negotiated solution, 
the Nkomati Accord and the closure of MK’s eastern front, the Front Line States preference 
for a negotiated end to apartheid, and MK’s inability to reinforce the uprising. These 
developments presented the ANC with two fundamental choices: (1) to continue the armed 
struggle with limited possibilities of its success, or (2) to pursue a negotiated settlement.  
 
Given that the Kabwe Conference occurred during Operation Zikomo, armed struggle could 
not be discounted in 1985. The ANC therefore theorised that the two options could be 
mutually reinforcing: “revolutionary pressures could feed the prospects for negotiations; and, 
if negotiations started, this might create legal space in which its organisers could advance the 
prospects for revolutionary confrontation. But realising a symbiotic relationship between 
them would prove difficult.”448  
 
In the midst of this fluidity, Tambo, who had repeatedly been approached for a meeting by 
various intermediaries acting for South African business interests, seized the opportunity to 
make the case for negotiation possibilities. He asked conference delegates “for clearance to 
meet an unnamed group of ‘important people’ who wanted to talk to the ANC; the talks, he 
specified, would not amount to negotiations with the government.”449  
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This request for clearance was presented as a tactical shift by Tambo in his political report to 
the conference. Tambo stated that the ANC could not be against negotiations and a negotiated 
settlement in principle.
450
 The ANC had to place great emphasis on its role as an alternative 
government of South Africa. This meant that it had to act as a “credible representative of a 
liberated South Africa.” This had tactical and strategic implications: 
 
“… It is clear that we have to improve the quality of our diplomacy and therefore the training of our 
representatives and their staff. We need also to tap and utilise in a better way the intellectual cadres available to 
us, both inside and outside our country.”451 
 
In other words, the ANC needed to evolve a set of ideas and tactics in preparation for the 
possibility of a political settlement.  
 
Tambo drew a distinction between ‘talks’ and ‘negotiations’.  
 
‘Talks’ were regarded as exploratory exchanges of views, designed to feel out an enemy or, 
alternatively, to cement understandings with real, temporary or potential alliances.
452
 Tambo 
identified categories of talks.  
 
The first comprised talks with ANC-aligned organisations inside South Africa, such as 
organisations aligned to COSATU and the UDF. The objective here was to build unity with 
all those who sort to dismantle apartheid and to draw them in as components of an ANC-led 
assault.
453
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The second category comprised talks with non-governmental organisations not aligned to the 
ANC. These would include business organisations, civil society groups and opposition 
political parties inside South Africa, such as the Progressive Federal Party. The objective here 
was to turn them against apartheid.  
 
Negotiations were understood as having a clearly defined framework within which attempts 
would be made to settle the South African conflict. A range of preconditions applied, the 
most important being that negotiations should be premised on the agreement to dismantle 
apartheid, replace it with a democratic political system. This was not negotiable.  
 
Other preconditions included the release of political prisoners, the unconditional return of 
exiles, and a climate of political freedoms conducive to negotiations. Talks and negotiations, 
Tambo continued, were not mutually exclusive but complimentary. If the ANC was to 
negotiate from a position of strength, it had to use talks with non-ANC aligned organisations 
and constituencies to politically isolate the South African government. Successful talks thus 
bolstered and strengthened the ANC’s negotiation strategy and tactics.454 The Kabwe 
Conference endorsed Tambo’s case for talks and negotiations, and gave its approval for him 
to proceed to meet the ‘unnamed group of important people’.   
 
According to Maharaj, Tambo’s political report was important: “there was a formal 
acknowledgement of the primacy of the political in the balance between the political and 
military components of the struggle.”455 The implication of this tactical shift was that the 
political struggle became fundamental and armed struggle had to be integrated into it. Simply 
put, if apartheid could not be defeated by the armed struggle, then all that remained was the 
political option with MK support. MK’s armed struggle was one element of the political 
struggle, and not its principle or even necessarily its important vehicle. Tambo’s alternative 
diplomatic option i.e. talks and negotiation represented a potentially more important vehicle. 
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The Nkomati Accord thus led to the important rethink and shift toward the consideration of 
negotiation possibilities. The closure of MK’s eastern front seriously hampered MK at a time 
when the ANC needed to reinforce the momentum generated by the uprising. With MK’s 
shortcomings, the momentum could only be sustained through alternative tactics. Tambo’s 
diplomatic alternative was a way out; while it was not military, it was still aimed at fighting 
apartheid.  
 
5.1.5. Talking with Civil Society  
 
In order to give effect to the tactical shift, the ANC turned its attention toward civil society 
organisations and opinion-leaders non-aligned to the ANC. The first of these was a meeting 
between a select group of ANC leaders and a delegation of prominent white businessmen and 
opinion-leaders. After discussions with Zambian President Kaunda, Gavin Relly, the 
chairman of Anglo American Corporation, South Africa’s largest multinational corporation, 
assembled a team of business executives and editors to exchange views with the ANC on 
South Africa’s political crisis in 1985 and the way forward.  
 
On 13 September 1985, Gavin Relly led thirteen business executives and journalists on an 
Anglo American Gulfstream into the tropical heat of the South Luangwa National Park, 
400km east of Lusaka. They were received by President Kaunda at the presidential hunting 
lodge of Mfuwe, and introduced to a team from the ANC led by Tambo and included 
Mbeki.
456
 President Kaunda chaired the session and opened proceedings. Kaunda stated that 
it was not possible for decisions to be taken; the objective was mutual learning and exploring 
common ground.
457
 The meeting lasted six hours.
458
 The businessmen were impressed by the 
cordial rapport between the groups.
459
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This event broke the ice between non-ANC aligned South African civil society organisations 
and the ANC, and significantly contributed to the legitimisation of the ANC. That the event 
was highly publicised added to its importance; almost overnight it made it acceptable for 
other non-ANC aligned groups to open dialogue with the ANC. After September 1985 there 
was a steady, open flow of visitors to Lusaka.  
 
Table 5.1 illustrates some of the more prominent ones. 
 
Table 5.1: Meetings between the ANC and non-affiliated civil society organisations  
Date Delegation  
September 1985 Major industrialists and journalists, Gavin Relly (Anglo American), Zac De Beer (LTA 
Construction), Tony Bloom (Premier Milling), Peter Sorour (South African Foundation), 
Hugh Murray (publisher, Leadership), Harald Pakendorf (former editor, Vaderland), 
Terius Myburgh (editor, Sunday Times) met the ANC in Zambia 
September 1985 Dries van Heerden, editor of Die Vaderland, met with the ANC in Lusaka  
November 1985 Progressive Federal Party, Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert (party leader), Colin Eglin 
(foreign affairs spokesperson), Peter Gastrow (member of parliament), Dr Alex Boraine 
(deputy leader), met the ANC in Lusaka 
December 1985 Thirty seven South Africans mostly church leaders (including the Anglican and Roman 
Catholic archbishops of Cape Town) but also including five Stellenbosch University 
students and four University of Cape Town students, led by Bishop Philip Russell, met 
the ANC in Lusaka 
January 1986 Federated Chamber of Industries met the ANC in Lusaka  
March 1986 National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) led an eight-member delegation, 
including students from seven English-speaking campuses and one Afrikaans-speaking 
campus to Lusaka 
April 1986 South African Catholic Bishops Conference: four-person delegation led by Archbishop 
Denis Hurley to Lusaka 
May 1986 Professor J.P. de Lange (chairman of the Broederbond) and Mbeki meet for 5 hours in 
New York 
May 1986 National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) delegation led by Sam 
Motsuenyane met with ANC in Lusaka followed by second meeting in Europe 
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September 1986 Joint delegation from University of Cape Town (UCT) and University of the Western 
Cape (UWC): including the vice chancellor, deputy vice chancellor, and dean of the 
medical school at UCT; and the rector and vice rector of UWC to meet the ANC in 
Lusaka 
November 1986 South African Council of Churches (SACC) delegation led by Dr Manas Buthelezi and 
the Lutheran Church led by Dean Farisani meet the ANC in Lusaka 
July 1987 Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) organised delegation of 
fifty, mostly Afrikaans-speakers, including members of parliament, academics, 
journalists, and teachers to meet the ANC in Dakar, Senegal  
September 1987 Prominent white South Africans including Dennis Worral, former NP member of 
parliament and ambassador to Great Britain; Tommy Bedford, former Springbok rugby 
player; and Richard Steyn, editor of Natal Witness met the ANC in Lusaka 
September – 
December 1987 
Richard Rosenthal personal mission meeting with different ANC leaders in Europe and 
Lusaka 
September 1987 Group of lawyers from Natal meet with ANC in Lusaka 
October 1987 UWC academics and Western Cape Teachers Union delegation meet with ANC in 
Lusaka 
October 1987 Delegation led by Chief Minister Enos Mabuza from KaNgwane Homeland met with 
ANC in Lusaka 
November 1987 Two delegations of lawyers (Black Lawyers Association and the National Democratic 
Lawyers) met the ANC in Lusaka 
Source: Price, 240 and conversations with Professors Andre du Toit and Annette Seegers.   
 
No one meeting was seminally important; they together “increased the ANC’s stature, 
generating a momentum favouring negotiations.”460  
 
Each group raised its own concerns with the ANC, but three themes dominated.  
 
First, the ANC’s armed struggle was questioned. Many groups questioned the logic of 
“challenging the government militarily, where its advantage was strongest, rather than 
concentrating all resources on the government’s glaring political vulnerabilities.” The ANC 
often defended the use of violence by pointing out that “ultimately all violence was initiated 
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by the government, and that without the actions of MK many whites would never have taken 
the ANC seriously.”461  
 
Second, groups were anxious about when negotiations would begin: “When and how would 
the government and the ANC begin to talk about a political solution?” The ANC “could deny 
that sooner or later talks with the government would occur – even were this to happen in the 
improbable context of a military ‘seizure of power’. Yet rushing into negotiations when 
Pretoria still clearly had the upper hand would be foolhardy.”462 
 
A third issue was the allegedly dominant position of the SACP in the ANC’s leadership. This 
led to a fourth concern: “what was the ANC’s vision of a post-apartheid political and 
economic system? Was it a vision shaped by communist models?” They dismissed the 
allegation of SACP domination arguing that ANC members were loyal to “the goals of 
democracy and non-racialism.”463 The ANC, however, was undecided in 1985 on how a post-
apartheid society would look like. Beyond the Freedom Charter, there was no blueprint for a 
future political order. 
 
The ‘breaking of the ice’ between non-ANC aligned organisations and the ANC contributed 
to the legitimisation of the ANC among South African constituencies who were not 
sympathetic and empathetic to the struggle against apartheid. The gains for the ANC were 
important: (1) talks with civil society groups increased its domestic and international prestige; 
(2) talks divided South Africa’s ruling classes; and (3) talks allowed the ANC to clarify its 
own views. As a political strategy, talks were a resource that exposed the government’s 
political vulnerabilities and thus paid greater dividend than armed struggle.  
 
By late 1985, four important developments generated momentum toward negotiations.  
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First, a channel of communication opened between the ANC and the United States 
government. As part of its conflict resolution policy in the region, the United States favoured 
a negotiated end to apartheid and sought to legitimise the ANC in the process.  
 
Second, the Front Line States, the ANC’s most important allies in Southern Africa, preferred 
a negotiated end to apartheid in 1984. This preference was crucial; the ANC was dependent 
on the Front Line States.  
 
Third, Tambo proposed a way out in which armed struggle could gradually be phased out; 
armed struggle and the pursuance of a negotiated settlement could be mutually reinforcing, 
but the primacy was political i.e. talks and negotiations.  
 
Fourth, talks with non-ANC aligned organisations paid greater dividend than armed struggle; 
their placed the ANC as a major actor in South African politics (domestically and 
internationally) in such a way that the ANC had to be a part of any South African political 
solution. What reinforced this momentum was that these developments occurred within the 
context of MK’s limited ability to provide tactical guidance to the revolt. This set the stage 
for the beginning of pre-negotiation.   
 
Thus, the period of the Nkomati Accord and Kabwe Conference represented those events and 
resulting change in condition that caused a restructuring of the values attached to alternative 
outcomes for the ANC, and resulted in the addition of a negotiated solution to the array of 
outcomes under consideration. Political events subsequent to the Kabwe Conference would 
involve an assessment of this change in condition and preliminary evaluation of alternative 
responses that would add negotiation to the range of policy options. The ANC however did 
not perceive the situation as a hurting stalemate. Mozambique was strategic for MK’s armed 
struggle in the eastern front but the Nkomati Accord closed this option. The perception of a 
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hurting stalemate manifested at patron level and it was efficacious in making the ANC re-
evaluate its position and add negotiation to the range of policy options.    
 
5.2. Stage One: Problem Identification  
 
In response to these changing conditions, Tambo embarked on a two-pronged strategy.  
 
First, he set up a negotiation commission and a constitutional committee to respectively 
explore negotiation possibilities and guidelines for a post-apartheid constitution. The 
responsibility for this was given to Jordan and Zola Skweyiya, the ANC’s senior judicial 
officer.  
 
Second, he embarked on a diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom and United States to 
generate an international consensus on the preconditions for settlement negotiations. The 
responsibility for this was given to Thabo Mbeki. The political process that resulted from 
these two strategies ran simultaneously and will be discussed separately.  
 
5.2.1. The Negotiation Committee and the Constitutional Committee 
 
After the Kabwe Conference, Tambo set up a four member sub-committee tasked with 
providing a systematic analysis of the question of negotiation possibilities. Chaired by 
Jordan, it included Mbeki, Makana and James Stuart. They presented a report to the national 
executive on November 1985.  
 
Titled ‘A Submission on the Question of Negotiation’ the paper stated that talks with the 
enemy are, in and of themselves, not harmful:  
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“If negotiations are viewed as yet one more terrain of struggle, rather than as a means of drawing the struggle to 
a close, we have no reason to shun them. However, as has been demonstrated in the case of Namibia, the enemy 
may press for talks in order to employ them as a means to buy time and forcing the movement to wind down the 
struggle through a de fact moratorium. We must therefore approach talks as a means of winning at the 
conference table or consolidating what we have won on the battlefield. In other words, we will enter into talks as 
a means of pursuing our political objectives employing other means, or to supplement our conventional 
means.”464 
 
The paper argued that in the event the ANC should go into settlement negotiations, they 
should do so with a view to “extracting from the new situation the optimum conditions for the 
continuation of our struggle. [The] strategic objective – people’s power, as defined in the 
Freedom Charter – will remain the same, though the means we employ to arrive at it [i.e. 
negotiation] may have to change.”465 Conditions should therefore be created in which “[the 
ANC] can visibly emerge as the chief determinant of the pace of events.”466   
 
Four preconditions were listed for entering negotiations: (1) the release of political prisoners 
and detainees, all captured freedom fighters and prisoners of war; (2) the lifting of the state of 
emergency, the withdrawal of all SADF and police personnel from the township and their 
confinement to barracks; (3) the cessation of political trials and trials arising from 
participation in the uprising and the unconditional release of all those charged and arrested; 
and (4) the repeal of all politically repressive laws and all other laws empowering the 
government to proscribe freedom of assembly, speech and the press.
467
  
 
The paper stated that in preparation for getting to settlement negotiations, the ANC had to 
develop a set of constitutional proposals and not merely rely on the Freedom Charter. To this 
end, the national executive needed to set up a constitutional think tank under the supervision 
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of a sub-committee to draft the relevant proposals for the ANC to consider. The paper 
concluded that the ANC needed to adopt a Bill of Rights setting out the rights all South 
Africans would enjoy under an ANC-led government.
468
 The proposed sub-committee would 
also be responsible for studying and familiarising the national executive with regard to 
negotiated transitions in the region “in order to learn negotiations tactics and pick up tips on 
specific situations.”469 
 
Tambo established a department of legal and constitutional affairs under Skweyiya and a 
constitutional committee under Jack Simons, a senior SACP member.
470
 
 
The constitutional committee reported its first discussions to the national executive less than 
a week after its formation. Five issues underpinned these discussions: (1) the problem of 
power-sharing and rights of minorities; (2) how to reconcile freedom of speech, organisation 
and electoral activity with the need to combat racism and tribalism; (3) how to devise an 
electoral system and appropriate structure of government that would encourage the 
achievement of constitutional principles; (4) how to establish forms of regional and local 
government that would be consistent with constitutional principles; and (5) how to deal with 
the logistics for maintaining an on-going legal and administrative system while rapidly 
dismantling the institutional structures of apartheid.
471
 Their bottom-line and non-negotiable 
was the universal franchise in a non-racial multiparty political system with an entrenched Bill 
of Rights.     
 
On 20 September 1986, the constitutional committee presented a memorandum to the 
national executive proposing the basic features of the text for a new constitution. Reiterating 
their previous position, they stressed the non-racial objectives of a new constitution, that it 
should be based on the principles of a unitary state with a system of universal suffrage based 
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one person one vote, and that it should contain a Bill of Rights. The committee proposed that 
the national executive considers the adoption and publication of guidelines for a new 
constitution before the actual writing of a constitution.
472
 The national executive accepted the 
proposal.  
 
On 9 October 1987, the national executive of the ANC released its first public statement on 
negotiations. The ANC stated that it was not opposed to a negotiated settlement: 
 
“We wish to reiterate that the ANC has never been opposed to a negotiated settlement of the South African 
question. On various occasions in the past we have, in vain, called on the apartheid regime to talk to the genuine 
leaders of our people. Once more, we would like to reaffirm that the ANC and the masses of our people as a 
whole are ready and willing to enter into genuine negotiations provided they are aimed at the transformation of 
our country into a united and non-racial democracy. This, and only this, should be the objective of any 
negotiation process. Accordingly, no meaningful negotiations can take place until all those concerned, and 
especially the Pretoria regime, accept this perspective which we share with the whole of humanity.”473   
 
The ANC stated that the issue of negotiations should be put before the entire ANC leadership. 
Therefore, since a considerable number were in prison, their unconditional release was a 
precondition for settlement negotiations: 
 
“We further wish to state again that the questions whether or not to negotiate, and on what conditions, should be 
put to our entire leadership, including those who are imprisoned and who should be released unconditionally. 
While considering these questions our leadership would have to be free to consult and discuss with the people 
without let or hindrance.” 
 
The ANC also rejected the demand that the ANC suspend the armed struggle as a condition 
for talks: 
                                                          
472
 African National Congress, Memorandum to the NEC by the Constitutional Committee, September 20, 1986. 
BC 1081 (P25.5) Manuscripts and Archives Department, University of Cape Town 
473
 African National Congress, “The Question of Negotiations.” Statement by the ANC National Executive 
Committee, Lusaka, October 9, 1987. Document 139 in Gail Gerhart and Clive Glaser, From Protest to 
Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990, Volume 6: Challenge and 
Victory 1980-1990 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 615 
146 
 
 
“We reject unequivocally the cynical demand of the Pretoria regime that we should unilaterally abandon or 
suspend the armed struggle. The source of violence in our country is the apartheid system. It is that violence 
which must end. Any cessation of hostilities would have to be negotiated and entail agreed action by both sides 
as part of the process of the creation of a democratic South Africa.”474   
 
To end apartheid, the ANC further stated, means “to define and treat all our people as equal 
citizens of our country, without regard to race, colour or ethnicity.” Consequently, the ANC 
accepted that a Bill of Rights would accompany a new constitution in order to guarantee and 
safeguard the rights of the individual. The ANC stated that before any settlement negotiations 
take place, the government would have to demonstrate its seriousness by implementing 
various measures to create a climate conducive for settlement negotiations. These would 
include the unconditional release of political prisoners, the lifting of the state of emergency 
and withdrawal of the army and police from the townships, and the repeal of all repressive 
legislation limiting the freedom of assembly, speech, and the press.
475
 
 
On 9 October 1987, Stage One of the pre-negotiation stage for the ANC was complete. The 
ANC officially added negotiation to its range of policy options. The negotiation commission 
had assessed the ANC’s changing conditions in exile. In the aftermath of the Nkomati Accord 
and the Front Line States summit in 1984; the ANC was in a ‘Patriotic Front dilemma’ and 
had to prepare for negotiation. The next step was to develop a set of preconditions for 
settlement negotiations. There were two sets of preconditions: those that related to creating a 
climate conducive for settlement talks, and non-negotiables (bottom lines) related to the 
creation of a new constitutional order to replace apartheid. The former was political 
liberalisation. The latter was a non-racial constitutional democracy accompanied by a Bill of 
(individual) Rights. The public diplomacy that complimented this process (designed to 
generate international support for these preconditions) opened the path to Stage Two. 
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5.2.2. Semi-Official Diplomacy 
 
As discussed, Tambo’s second strategy was a diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom and 
Unites States to generate international support and consensus on preconditions for settlement 
negotiations. The target was Britain’s ruling Conservative Party of Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and their allies. Anthony Sampson (a close friend of Tambo and Mandela) and 
David Astor, a former proprietor and editor of the Observer, arranged a week-long visit for 
Tambo in late October 1985 to meet British businessmen, bankers and politicians.  
 
5.2.2.1. Meeting with House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
 
On 28 October, Tambo went to a private meeting of Conservative Party MPs led by Sir 
Anthony Kershaw, the chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee and former foreign office minister. The following day, on 29 October, after a 
meeting at Chatham House, Tambo and Mbeki gave evidence at a public session of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Kershaw.
476
   
 
The committee members had four general concerns. First was the issue of violence, 
particularly political violence against black policemen and black town councillors. Second, 
they wanted to know whether the ANC was committed to a political philosophy beyond the 
simple end of apartheid, particularly whether the intention was to destroy or reform the 
capitalist system. Third, committee members were concerned whether the ANC was prepared 
to renounce the use of violence in exchange for the release of political prisoners, particularly 
Mandela. They also wanted to gauge the ANC’s views on power-sharing. Fourth, they 
wanted to know whether sanctions would assist in bringing about peaceful democratic change 
in South Africa.
477
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Tambo argued that the ANC’s violence should be viewed in historical context; the ANC was 
a non-violent organisation for 50 years before the formation of MK. Armed struggle had thus 
been a last resort. Tambo further the committee that the ANC was committed to a democratic 
system and did not want to destroy the capitalist system:  
 
“The Freedom Charter does not even purport to want to destroy the capitalist system. All that the Freedom 
Charter does is envisage a mixed economy in which part of the economy, some of the industries, would be 
controlled, owned, by the State (as happens in many countries), and the rest by private ownership – a mixed 
economy.”478  
 
In his contribution, Mbeki argued that the release of political prisoners alone would never be 
a sufficient condition to renounce the use of violence. Many other steps would have to be 
taken: “the state of emergency must he lifted, the ban on the ANC must be lifted and on all 
other political organisations.” Mbeki stated that the expression ‘power-sharing’ is not the 
term the ANC would prefer as it suggested a “continuing fragmentation of the population” 
whereas distinct groups they must share power amongst themselves. The ANC was in favour 
of an entrenched Bill of ‘individual’ Rights as opposed to ‘group’ rights. The ANC, Mbeki 
continued, was also against federalism: “We do not want to federate these constitutional units 
that the apartheid system has created. We cannot say we need a federal structure which must 
recognise the reality of the Bantustans…”479 Tambo concluded by stating that their pursuit of 
sanctions was aimed at limiting the escalation and scope of the conflict.
480
  
 
After giving evidence to the committee and further meetings with editors and businessmen, 
Tambo and his party left on 31 October. Conservative Party MP Robert Harvey, who sat on 
the committee, was impressed by what he described as “the remarkable moderation displayed 
by the ANC team.” He described Tambo’s London diplomacy a turning point: 
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 “It had been a highly significant trip: [Tambo] and his colleagues had begun to cross the line (even in the minds 
of Conservative politicians and businessmen) that divides a terrorist revolutionary movement from a legitimate 
and politically sensitive resistance organisation against an oppressor government.”481  
 
While the Anti-Apartheid Movement had always been well-supported in Britain, it became 
possible after Tambo’s presentations to be a supporter of the ANC as well.482 
 
5.2.2.2. Meetings with Official Representatives of the United Kingdom and United States 
 
Sampson arranged a second series of meetings for Tambo. In this second round, he arranged 
for Tambo to address a larger audience of businessmen on 24 June 1986. This was held under 
the auspices of David Astor at the Connaught Rooms in London. The participants included 
Lord Barber, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer and chairman of Standard Chartered 
Bank; Sir Timothy Bevan, chairman of Barclays Bank; Sir Alistair Frame; Lord Greenhill of 
SG Warburg; Sir Martin Jacomb; Evelyn de Rothschild; George Soros; Sir James Spooner; 
and Michael Young. The ANC delegation included Tambo, Mbeki, Maharaj, Aziz Pahad 
(deputy head of the ANC’s mission in London), and Jacob Zuma (NAT’s deputy director and 
head of intelligence). 
 
Sampson writes that the encounter was surprisingly relaxed. Tambo was still looking to the 
British commercial elite to bring pressure on both the South African and British government. 
The second state of emergency changed the businessmen’s perspectives of South Africa; they 
were anxious, and trying to rethink their policies towards South Africa. The chairman of the 
two biggest banks in South Africa, Lord Barber of Standard and Sir Timothy Bevan of 
Barclays, were at odds with Margaret Thatcher over Britain’s relationship with South Africa. 
They took turns talking privately with Tambo.  
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Bevan was openly confronting the Botha government and refused to lend money to South 
Africa until apartheid “had been abolished.” Lord Barber had also boldly stated that it was 
unreasonable to expect the ANC to renounce violence unconditionally.
483
  
 
Michael Young, the public affairs director at Consolidated Goldfields approached Tambo 
privately and asked him what Consolidated Goldfields, with its large interests in South 
Africa, could do to assist.
484
 Young’s request was not random; Consolidated Goldfields was 
Cecil John Rhodes’ old company and had been making handsome profits for over a century 
through its South African subsidiary, Gold Fields of South Africa. But the London parent 
company “had to take a longer perspective, wondering who might rule South Africa in ten 
years’ time.”485 
 
According to Young’s account of the conversation, Tambo asked if he could assist in creating 
a secret communication channel between the ANC and the government; specifically, Tambo 
requested building a bridge between the ANC and Afrikaners close to the government as a 
first step. Tambo told Young that no means of communication existed and, without this, the 
ANC’s diplomacy towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible.486 Mbeki 
requested that Young arrange a meeting between Tambo and Lynda Chalker, the foreign 
office minister in charge for Africa.
487
 Because of Young’s close proximity to the 
Conservative Party, Chalker agreed to meet Tambo in late June 1986. This meeting was the 
first official-level meeting between the ANC and a British cabinet minister.
488
 Chalker 
effectively placed the ANC-British government relationship “on an entirely different and 
more proactive footing.”489   
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The Tambo-Chalker meeting had far-reaching implications for the ANC. A few days later the 
United States State Department publicly announced it was planning closer and official 
contacts with Tambo. 
 
 In September 1986, Tambo met Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British foreign secretary, for a two-
hour official-level discussion in his country house. Also in September 1986, Tambo also held 
official discussions with Chester Crocker, Ronald Reagan’s special envoy for Africa. 
According to Crocker, he met with Tambo to lay groundwork for an October 1986 official 
visit by George Schultz, the United States Secretary of State, to the ANC headquarters in 
Lusaka, and an official visit by Tambo to the United States State Department, on invitation 
by Schultz the following year. Schultz stressed the importance of a negotiated solution to the 
South African crisis, and “spoke of his firm plan to advance [a negotiated process] by 
meeting with the ANC leader in exile, Oliver Tambo.”490 
 
The Tambo-Schultz meeting was an important diplomatic breakthrough for the ANC. On 28 
January 1987, Tambo led a delegation of four to Washington that included Mbeki, 
Makhathini, Barbara Masekele (the ANC’s representative in the United States) and Neo 
Mnumzana, the ANC’s chief representative to the United Nations. On the US side, Schultz 
was accompanied by a delegation of eight, which included Crocker, his deputy Chas 
Freeman, a representative of the National Security Council, the State Department spokesman, 
Charles Redman, and the US ambassador to Zambia, Paul Hare.
491
 Minutes of the meeting 
show convergence in views on the resolution of the South African conflict. Schultz opened 
the meeting, referring to the ANC leader as ‘President’ Tambo, and stated the position of the 
United States government towards South Africa: 
 
“The Secretary of State said the U.S. Administration is against apartheid and that the sooner that system goes 
the better. However, they were against all violence from whichever side it came. They wished to see an open, 
democratic state with equal opportunities for all to participate in government and in the economy of the country. 
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This should come through negotiations. While the U.S. Administration has its own ideas, it does not wish to 
prescribe solutions. This is a task for South Africans. To that end the Pretoria regime should release the political 
prisoners, unban political parties and involve everybody in negotiations. The U.S. Administration has been 
talking to South Africans as well as talking to the ANC to convey its views about the need for negotiations. It 
recognised the ANC as an important player in South Africa. He had read the ANC’s January 8th statement with 
interest and noted what it said about a non-racial democracy.”492  
 
Schultz outlined the US government’s areas of concern:  
 
“[Schultz] wanted to make it clear that the U.S. Administration was opposed to violence and viewed the 
“practice of necklacing” as horrible. He also wished to take up the issue of Soviet influence over the ANC rather 
than the question of communism.”493 
 
Tambo stated that the US and the ANC were in agreement about the overall objective: “the 
goal of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.”494 Their major difference was on 
“what action to take to achieve this result.” Tambo also presented other issues to Schultz: 
 
“6. We believe that the policy of constructive engagement has not succeeded to move Botha towards this goal. 
Instead, Pretoria read it as encouragement to dig in; 7. We are also aware that your stated policy is to bring 
about negotiations. Our view is that Botha is not ready because pressure is still insufficient; 8. Therefore we 
urge strict implementation of the present set of U.S. sanctions.”495 
 
Tambo described a possible scenario around the issue of the release of political prisoners: 
“To unblock the political process we urge the U.S. Administration to do everything possible 
to secure the unconditional release of all political prisoners. There is a way of handling 
Botha’s expressed concerns.”496 Schultz stated that the US was in favour of the release of 
political prisoners, and this had been communicated to the South African government. He 
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asked whether the ANC would be prepared to renounce violence if Botha were to agree to 
“serious negotiations.” Tambo explained that the ANC “could not agree to a unilateral 
cessation of hostilities but that hostilities could end as a result of negotiations during which 
both sides could agree to end the use of force.” Further, the ANC would “need strong signals, 
and not words, to convince [the ANC] that Pretoria was serious about negotiations.”497  
 
Tambo and Schultz appreciated they had met in an official capacity, and stated that the 
meeting was the beginning of an official dialogue between the United Sates and the ANC.
498
 
Originally scheduled for thirty minutes, Tambo and Schultz spoke for over an hour.
499
 The 
meeting signalled the official recognition of the ANC by the US government.  
 
The meeting in the Connaught Rooms was crucial; Tambo requested international assistance 
for the negotiated ending of apartheid. Consolidated Goldfields came to his assistance in two 
ways.  
 
First, they offered to create a communication channel between the ANC and South African 
government. To this end, Consolidated Goldfields would facilitate building a bridge between 
ANC and Afrikaners close to the government as a first step.  
 
Second, Michael Young, the corporation’s public affairs director, facilitated the first official-
level meeting between the ANC and a British cabinet minister. This was complimented by 
George Schultz’s official visit to the ANC headquarters in Lusaka, and Tambo’s official visit 
to the United States State Department. By 1987 a consensus on preconditions for negotiation 
emerged that was supported by the United States: the unconditional release of political 
prisoners and unbanning of political parties.    
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The process moved to the second stage; the active consideration of a negotiated solution.  
 
5.3. Stage Two: Search for Options 
 
With the ANC publicly putting forward its position on negotiations, and after official level 
meetings between Tambo and Howe and Schultz, Michael Young proceeded to set up a secret 
channel between the ANC and the South African government.  
 
First, Young approached Rudolf Agnew, the chairman of Consolidated Goldfields and 
suggested the company provide funds for the project.
500
 Agnew authorised over £500 000.
501
  
 
Second, Young sought the advice of Fleur de Villiers, a senior consultant for Consolidated 
Goldfields. Both agreed that De Villiers would initiate contact with politically influential 
Afrikaners and Young would liaise with the ANC leadership. De Villiers approached Willie 
Esterhuyse, a professor of philosophy at Stellenbosch University, to assist with a list of 
participants for the dialogue. Esterhuyse could only initially convince two other professors 
from his university, Willie Breytenbach and Sampie Terreblanche. All three had gained a 
reputation as notable reformers with important links to the NP government.  
 
In the meantime, South Africa’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) had closely observed 
Tambo and Mbeki’s public diplomacy in the United Kingdom and United States. Senior 
officers of the Zambia Security and Intelligence Service (ZSIS) undertook regular missions to 
the NIS in Pretoria, and the heads of the NIS and the South African Military Intelligence 
Division (MID) travelled regularly to visit President Kaunda; “they took tea with the 
[Kaunda] within yards of the residence of Oliver Tambo, who lived in a cottage in the State 
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House grounds.”502 The MID Generals used Kaunda as a go-between in communicating with 
Angola’s president, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, during the Angolan civil war.503 The NIS used 
relations with the ZSIS to gather information on the thinking of senior ANC leaders.
504
   
 
When Esterhuyse agreed to De Villiers’ request, the NIS viewed this as a means to gain 
closer information on the motives of the ANC’s diplomacy. According to Mike Louw, the 
NIS deputy director-general, identifying Esterhuyse as their ‘point person’ was important: 
“We trusted him, his instincts… We regarded him not as someone who had a rosy view of 
meeting with the ANC… He was a trained person in political science and … his views were 
balanced. He could give you quite a clear report on the personalities that he spoke to, what he 
saw as weak points, how a person behaved under this or that circumstance.”505  
 
In 1987, Neil Barnard, the director general of the NIS, approached Esterhuyse and requested 
he report to him on the discussions with the ANC. Esterhuyse agreed provided he informed 
his ANC equivalent, which would turn out to be Mbeki. This informal dialogue thus became 
a shield for the secret channel between the government and the ANC.  
 
Six meetings took place in England between elite Afrikaner academics, led by Esterhuyse, 
and a number of ANC officials, led by Mbeki, between October 1987 and February 1990. 
The meetings were held on average every four months, and follow-up meetings continued 
after the beginning of official negotiations. Each of the meetings in England lasted three days, 
were typically over a weekend, with formal sessions on Saturday and Sunday extending to 
the mid-afternoon.
506
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Esterhuyse writes that the informal dialogue was an attempt to “dismantle the ‘enemy 
construct’ and to create a construct around the idea of negotiated partners.” This objective 
“was why the discussion forum was not a public one, and also why the dialogue was limited 
to politically influential Afrikaners and pro-negotiation ANC figures.”507 
 
5.3.1. Meeting held in Henley-on-Thames, England, 31 October – 1 November 1987  
 
The first meeting was held in Henley, England, between the 31
st
 October and 1
st
 November 
1987. The ANC team was led by Aziz Pahad, and included Wally Serote, Tony Trew and 
Harold Wolpe. The Afrikaner professors were led by Willie Esterhuyse, and included Willie 
Breytenbach and Sampie Terreblanche.
508
  
 
 
Accounts of this first dialogue session differ.  
 
 
Esterhuyse writes that Young, who facilitated the discussion made no attempt to impose an 
agenda. The parties, he further states, made exploratory statements about the situation in exile 
and in South Africa and “talked about the main agenda items for subsequent talks.”509  The 
talks were thus “particularly probing and by no means as stressful or aggressive.”510 
 
Esterhuyse writes that six items formed the basis of the discussion: preconditions for a 
settlement process; the issue of violence; the issue of sanctions and what a post-apartheid 
economic dispensation should look like; consensus about a transition process; the release of 
political prisoners and especially the position of Nelson Mandela in this process; and how to 
deal with, on the one hand, the expectations of people who had been disadvantaged and 
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oppressed because of their skin colour, and, on the other hand, the political reality of the fears 
of whites and the position of Afrikaners in particular.
511
  
 
The ANC recollects a more structured discussion. According to the ANC, The objective of 
the professors was to obtain information about “how the ANC would react to various possible 
moves by the state, and especially the release of Govan Mbeki and then Nelson Mandela – 
aimed at opening … the path to negotiations.”512  
 
In the first session, Breytenbach opened the discussion and gave a background of the 
perceptions of the security experts in Botha’s government. Breytenbach stated that the 
security experts believed the South African conflict and prevailing impasse “required a 
political solution.” This was dependent on the support and ‘buy-in’ of the black population: 
 
“The approach of the “securocrats”, other than the inner group of “controllers”, is that political stability requires 
20% coercion, 80% political solution. The political solution depends on the support of the mass of the blacks 
and in the short/middle term the question is whether this support can be won.”513  
 
There were two important groups in the government, each with a different interpretation on 
how to reach such a political solution: one group, associated with the MID believed that the 
black population should be co-opted within the existing framework of reform; and another, 
associated with the NIS, recognised the ANC and argued that the way out of the stalemate 
was to enter negotiations with them.
514
 For the latter group, the possibility of negotiations 
with the ANC arose because the second state of emergency had effectively diminished two of 
the ANC’s three options: mass mobilisation and the creation of alternative structures. Thus 
while the ANC could continue to prosecute the armed struggle, it would be deploying its 
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weakest arm against the government’s strongest point – the military. The conclusion was that 
the ANC would inevitably run out of options, and would have to negotiate.
515
   
 
Breytenbach stated that the security experts were more amenable to negotiation than the 
politicians as they did not possess the “ideological emotionalism” of politicians i.e. they were 
more pragmatic. Their view of a political solution was premised on two main realisations; 
first, that the second state of emergency, and the accompanying political stability, had created 
conditions for the opening of serious negotiations; and second, that any future political 
system to replace apartheid would have to “provide for all [the races] at the highest level” i.e. 
at the level of the central state.  
 
In the final session, Breytenbach and Esterhuyse were more precise about actual initiatives. 
First, the security experts viewed the release of political prisoners as crucial to a political 
solution and a priority matter. Second, for the security experts, it was not a condition of 
negotiation that the ANC relinquish violence. This however was an issue for the electorate 
i.e. for politicians: “They are interested in results (i.e. a political solution) and they do not 
demand that the ANC abandon violence as a condition of negotiation.” Esterhuyse qualified 
that “a response from the ANC which included something about the armed struggle would be 
necessary if the release [of political prisoners] was to be a step forward” so as to put the 
politicians at ease.  
 
Third, the important sequential steps were to release Govan Mbeki followed by Mandela, and 
then the unbanning of the ANC. However, the security experts regarded the release of 
political prisoners and the ANC’s unbanning as two separate issues. Their willingness to 
release Mbeki and Mandela was purely an issue of timing; before the state of emergency, this 
would not have been possible as it would have been interpreted as buckling under the 
pressure of the uprising i.e. “it would have been interpreted as violence paying off.” 
However, the second state of emergency and the restoration of stability had created more 
favourable conditions; they were now prepared to release Mbeki and then Mandela.
516
 The 
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immediate goal of releasing political prisoners was to relieve international pressure in order 
to revive the economy. However, by responding positively to this, the ANC could seize the 
initiative and insert itself more constructively in an evolving political solution.  
 
The central issue was for the government to release of prisoners without losing face i.e. 
“without stoking white fears about violence and without giving the [Conservative Party] the 
opportunity to make capital out of the release and what the response of the ANC will be.” 
However, before the government embarked on the process, the security experts were 
concerned and wanted to know what the response of the ANC will be – “if there is not some 
sort of positive response (in the sense of welcoming the release and treating it as a step 
towards negotiations) from the ANC, if the ANC downgrades the step and simply moves the 
goal posts, then there will be a blockage. Negotiations will lose, not the [government].”517 
Pahad led the ANC response. The ANC, he stated, would welcome the release of some 
prisoners but preferred to deal with the issue on political terms; they would call for the 
release of all political prisoners. Breytenbach and Esterhuyse regarded this as a positive 
response. Pahad then pointed out that while the issue of political prisoner release had 
previously been handled by lawyers, it was now necessary to shift it to the political; the 
government had to communicate directly with the ANC on this issue.
518
  
 
The logic of the security experts, however, was clear; the government was aware that without 
the release of political prisoners, the stability created by the second state of emergency was 
unsustainable. By releasing political prisoners, space would open to make viable Botha’s 
reformist political measures and in that way weakens the position of the ANC if it continued 
to stay outside the reformed structures.
519
 The strategy of negotiation, therefore, was a 
continuation of reform and not the consequence of its failure. More importantly, the MID and 
NIS position was taken from a position of relative strength; they believed that the ANC had 
little room to manoeuvre and were thus engaged in a process of co-opting them. However, in 
order for reform to be viable, the government needed the ANC on board. This was a bilateral 
solution to their goal of reform.  
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5.3.2. Meeting held in Eastwell Manor, Kent, 21 – 24 February 1988 
 
The second meeting was held in Eastwell Manor Hotel in Kent between 21 and 24 February 
1988. The ANC team was led by Thabo Mbeki, and included Pahad, Serote and Trew. 
Esterhuyse was accompanied by Terreblanche and Marinus Wiechers. Mbeki’s participation 
enhanced the legitimacy and status of the talks. Koos Kruger, Esterhuyse’s NIS handler, 
identified Mbeki as their contact person and advised Esterhuyse accordingly: “Some of my 
NIS contacts warned me against speaking too much; I should rather listen carefully to what 
Mbeki said. Koos Kruger asked me to keep detailed notes because Mbeki was an important 
ANC leader.”520 Kruger also arranged for Esterhuyse to meet Barnard in preparation for 
contact with Mbeki. Esterhuyse informed Mbeki on the status of the talks. 
 
Three issues dominated the meeting. First was the renunciation of violence as a precondition 
for opening negotiations. While the government could not relax its requirement that the ANC 
declare a cessation of violence before settlement negotiations could begin, they realised that 
the ANC alone could not end the violence.
521
 Therefore, the government were prepared for a 
dialogue without a cessation of violence.  
 
Second, Mbeki outlined the conditions for the beginning of settlement negotiations: the 
release of all political prisoners and the unbanning of all political organisations. Mbeki added 
that their public diplomacy in the United States and United Kingdom had confirmed this: “All 
Western countries support us on this. There is an international consensus.”522 For the ANC, 
this was non-negotiable. What was up for discussion, Mbeki continued, was the logistics of 
these conditions: “of course, the ‘how’ of the conditions has to be discussed. The ANC would 
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like to talk about their implementation. But we seek in principle acceptance, even if it’s not 
via a public announcement.”523  
 
Mbeki proposed that the ANC was in favour of a ‘controlled introduction of freed political 
prisoners’ into the community. Further, released political prisoners, who enjoyed significant 
status in most communities, could play a constructive role in reducing levels of violence thus 
transforming them into part of the evolving political solution. 
 
The meetings were not well received by the ANC security officers once they became known 
to them; beyond a carefully chosen circle of trusted confidants of Tambo, few in the ANC 
knew about the talks. Chris Hani, MK’s chief of staff, was furious when he discovered at an 
NWC meeting on 22 February 1988 that Mbeki was absent because he was attending the 
meetings in London. When the chair of the meeting suggested that an item on the agenda be 
put off until Mbeki returned from London to compile a report, Hani exploded: “On whose 
authority has [Comrade] Thabo entered into discussions with these Afrikaner intellectuals [in 
Britain]? Does the NEC/NWC know anything of this?” Hani stated that it was “disturbing 
that a member of the NEC leaves to hold discussions with Afrikaner intellectuals without 
prior consultations with the NWC… I cannot understand why the NWC… were not apprised. 
Anyone who goes to such a meeting should be delegated by the movement.”524 There was a 
general acclamation of approval of Hani’s objections.  
 
Joe Nhlanhla, the director of NAT, stated that this was indicative of a broader problem where 
ANC officials were “meeting people from home without any prior consultation let alone 
coordination.” A consequence of this uncontrolled contact, Hani continued, “is that people 
from home complain that we are saying different things to them.” Hani then concluded: “Let 
the minute’s record that we register our extreme displeasure that [Comrade] Thabo has 
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unilaterally gone to London without any consultation and without a mandate from the 
NWC.”525  
 
By August 1988, the ANC’s constitutional committee had published a set of constitutional 
guidelines for a future democratic South Africa, and were accepted by the national executive. 
The guidelines reiterated their call for an “independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial 
state.” All South Africans would “have the right to vote under a system of universal suffrage 
based on the principle of one person, one vote.” The constitution would “include a Bill of 
Rights based on the Freedom Charter [guaranteeing] the fundamental rights of all citizens 
irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed.”526  
 
5.3.3. Meeting held in Mells Park, Somerset, August 1988 
 
Meetings reconvened at Mells Park, the secluded manor house owned by Consolidated 
Goldfields, in August 1988. There were three on the ANC side; Mbeki, Pahad and Trew. On 
the South African side were Esterhuyse and Terreblanche and a newcomer Willem de Klerk 
(Wimpie), a senior broederbond member, newspaper editor, and elder brother of Frederik W. 
De Klerk, the Transvaal leader of the National Party and most conservative successor to 
Botha.   
 
Three issues dominated the meeting. First, Mbeki admitted that the ANC was deeply worried 
that political violence was spiralling out of control. The “supremacy of the political 
leadership”, Mbeki added, would be undermined as a result, and thus the position of the ANC 
leadership was that “violence [was] not an alternative to mass political struggle.”527 The ANC 
wanted to prevent a situation of “violence for violence sake.”528 Mbeki stated that the ANC 
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would be prepared to abandon violence if the ‘political struggle’ i.e. negotiation, yielded 
results and proved effective in bringing about a non-racial constitutional order: “violence can 
be unnecessary.”529 In order for this to happen, “there had to be a strong commitment to a 
meaningful process that would lead to a non-racial democratic settlement.”530   
 
Second, the group spoke at length about a ‘transitional stage’, and this brought about 
consensus and acceptance on the need for a transitional phase to establish a “pro-negotiation 
culture.”531 Third, discussion was also devoted to the ANC’s constitutional guidelines. 
According to Mbeki, the formation of a constitutional committee and publication of the 
guidelines was an indication of the ANC’s preparation for an eventual constitutional 
negotiation process. The guidelines, Mbeki continued, “would be discussed as widely as 
possible to ensure an inclusive consensus on basic principles and values.”532 
 
5.3.4. Meeting held in Mells Park, 21 – 24 April 1989  
 
The meetings held in Flitwick Park in Bedfordshire, on December 1988 had limited 
achievement beyond advancing mutual understanding. The meetings in April 1989, however, 
were crucial. The most important issue was the political context; Botha had suffered a stroke, 
and with F.W de Klerk as National Party leader, Willem de Klerk took over the leadership 
from Esterhuyse.
533
 Willem de Klerk revealed that his brother had little patience with the 
security experts; he had a civilian inner circle with close ties to the Transvaal business 
community alienated by Botha. His rise was “viewed with suspicion by the military and 
security apparatus … which feared that a major purge could get under way should he become 
president.”534 
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According to Esterhuyse, the discussion that followed focused primarily “on the question as 
to when the time would be ripe for the two contending parties to start talking directly to each 
other.” By April 1989, the conditions for settlement negotiations had been clearly defined: 
 
“By [April 1989] the conditions set by both the ANC and the NP had been clearly defined for some time, with 
the release of Nelson Mandela one of the non-negotiable conditions on the part of the ANC. For Botha and his 
government, the insistence on a renouncement of violence by the ANC was of prime importance. Naturally, 
none of the participants at our meeting had the mandate or power to give any authoritative view in this regard. 
This was a matter the contending parties themselves had to discuss.”535 
 
Botha’s stroke was a turning point. Esterhuyse reported that Botha’s stroke had impaired his 
judgment and temperament. His illness had stalled his communication with Barnard over the 
secret channel with the ANC. Mbeki responded by stating that it would therefore be better to 
delay the impending talks, Mandela’s release, and the unbanning of the ANC until after De 
Klerk was inaugurated as the president; this would give his presidency enormous impetus, 
credibility and legitimacy, all of which were crucial for any settlement talks with the ANC.
536
    
 
Barnard, however, did not hold the same view. He told Mbeki’s biographer that he learned 
two things from Esterhuyse’s reports: “Firstly, it was reassuring that there were South 
Africans on the other side who were interested in finding a solution, and secondly, 
reaffirmation that we should not find the solution outside the country. We had to bring them 
home.”537 Botha’s stroke, however, had prevented him getting the necessary instruction. 
Barnard found other means to secure the necessary orders. On 16 August, the State Security 
Council, chaired for the first time by FW de Klerk, approved a resolution carefully drafted to 
provide authorisation of the first official NIS-ANC meeting:  
 
“It is necessary that more information should be obtained and processed concerning the ANC, and the aims, 
alliances and potential approachability of its different leaders and groupings. To enable this to be done, special 
                                                          
535
 Esterhuyse, 192 
536
 Ibid., 167 
537
 Neil Barnard cited in Gevisser, 545 
165 
 
additional direct action will be necessary particularly with the help of the National Intelligence Service 
functionaries.”538  
 
To understand the importance of the events following this decision, it is important to trace the 
government’s parallel stream in the first and second stage of pre-negotiation.  
 
5.4. Theoretical Implications: Pre-negotiation and Ripeness 
 
5.4.1. Implications for Pre-negotiation  
  
This dissertation has discussed that pre-negotiation is the period when negotiation is 
considered and adopted as an option. The onset of the process is marked by a turning point 
when negotiation is added to a range of options being considered by one or more parties.
539
  
 
The first stage is brought about by a an event or change in conditions that “causes a 
restructuring of the values attached to alternative outcomes by one or more parties in a 
relationship and results in the addition of a negotiated solution to the array of outcomes under 
consideration.” The stage is characterised by “an assessment of the problem produced by the 
changing conditions and a preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that may or may 
not add negotiation to the range of policy options.” A turning point is reached if that addition 
does occur and pre-negotiation moves to its second stage.
540
   
 
In the second stage, the search for options, the parties actively consider a negotiated solution. 
If a negotiated solution is chosen as the preferred policy alternative, another turning point is 
reached 
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The ANC’s process of exploring negotiation possibilities between late 1983 and 1988 is 
consistent with the first and second stages of pre-negotiation as described by Tomlin.  
 
The turning point is 1984. Important events and changing conditions contribute to the onset 
of stage one. 
 
In 1983, the United States opens up a channel of communication with the ANC. In early 
1984, the Nkomati Accord led to the closure of MK’s eastern front and neutralised MK’s 
strategic capabilities in Southern Africa. The turning point comes during this period; 
anticipating the Nkomati Accord, Pallo Jordan was commissioned to undertake a strategic 
analysis on potential scenarios for settlement negotiations. Jordan reported that if the ANC 
was subjected to sufficient political pressure by the Front Line States, it would need to start 
preparing for settlement talks.  
 
The Nkomati Accord and the resulting Front Line States summit in Arusha on 29 April 1984 
brought about the onset of the first stage of pre-negotiation i.e. caused a restructuring of the 
values attached to alternative outcomes, and resulted in the addition of a negotiated solution 
to the array of outcomes. The Front Line States effectively push the ANC towards exploring 
negotiation possibilities.  
 
The eve of stage one is June 1985, when the Kabwe Conference endorses Tambo’s 
alternative diplomatic option on talks and negotiation. This, however, coincides with 
Operation Zikomo, an MK attempt to reinforce the uprising in the face of broader tactical 
changes towards negotiation.  
 
The coincidence of Operation Zikomo and the Kabwe Conference has important implications 
for the beginning of pre-negotiation. 
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First, immediately before the substantive shift towards negotiation, there was one last shift to 
making the military option succeed. Stage one of pre-negotiation was thus preceded by 
radicalisation.  
 
Second, the ineffectiveness of the military pillar coincided with an effort to intensify the 
military struggle. In other words, as there was a push towards negotiation, there was a push in 
the other direction. This confirms an important critique of the rationality assumption in 
ripeness theory. As discussed, ripeness propositions incorporate assumptions from realist and 
rational choice perspectives i.e. unitary actors rationally calculate the costs and benefits of 
policy choices, based primarily on the consideration of power.  However, leaders of conflicts 
may be subject to irrational processes, and can become trapped in the continued pursuit of 
victory, even after costs would seem to have begun to outweigh benefits. Pre-negotiation thus 
incited organisational and strategic divisions. Thus, pre-negotiation is not accompanied by 
de-escalation; the military and diplomatic tracks run simultaneously.     
 
Stage one involved research and deliberations by the negotiation commission and 
constitutional committee (between 1985 and 1987). As a result of this process, the ANC adds 
negotiation to the range of policy options in its statement on negotiation on 9 October 1987. 
Stage one ends with the release of this statement on negotiation.  
 
The second stage begins with the secret conversations in England. These conversations 
facilitated by Consolidated Goldfields were a concerted ANC attempt to communicate more 
substantively their preconditions for settlement talks to the South African government. The 
point at which stage two ends for the ANC, is when the government and ANC streams 
converge in 1989, and the process becomes outer-directed. The dissertation will discuss the 
end of stage two in the next chapter. 
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5.4.2. Implications for Ripeness 
 
In order to discuss the ripeness implications of the ANC stream in the first and second stage 
of pre-negotiation, it is important to review briefly Zartman’s notion of ripeness. Zartman 
argues that compelling opportunities arise for conflict resolution based on the perceptions of 
the main actors concerning their military situations. The important condition must be a 
mutual sense of hurting stalemate i.e. a feeling that neither side can win, and all will be 
dramatically worse off if the conflict is not ameliorated.
541
 The actors must also perceive a 
possible solution to meet their minimum needs. A third party can attempt to shape the 
perceptions of the actors, and provide assistance to one or both parties, but must also use its 
problem-solving ability to put forward a satisfactory compromise solution.  
 
Zartman provides us with a set of indicators to look for in the South African case: a sense of a 
hurting stalemate; a sense of a moment in the future that will worsen if negotiations fail; a 
sense that the tide of the combat has changed; the mediators’ need for leverage; and the 
development of a political solution.  
 
5.4.2.1. Major Actors 
 
Who are the main ANC actors and what are their goals?  
 
This dissertation challenges the conception of the antagonists as unitary actors. The 
dissertation has a polycentric view of actors; revolutionary movements and organisations 
consist of many coalitions, factions and individuals who sometimes have conflicting interests.  
 
Hermann provides a useful way of classifying political decision-making units that can 
enhance our ability to account for governments’ and political organisations’ behaviour in 
                                                          
541
 Stedman, 236 
169 
 
diplomacy. Hermann identified three possible types of authoritative decision units: a 
predominant leader, a single group or a coalition of autonomous actors.  
 
One can classify the major actors and decision unit model in the ANC during the first and 
second stage of pre-negotiation as that of a predominant leader decision unit with an advisory 
group i.e. a leader who uses advisors as consultants to provide information and expertise but 
reserves the right to make the decision. For the predominant leader unit, the individual’s 
sensitivity to information from the political context “helps to define how much attention he or 
she will pay to others’ point of view and to situational cues.”542  
 
The predominant leader in the ANC was its president, Oliver Tambo, and the highest 
authoritative institution was the Office of the President. His advisory group on negotiation 
comprised of three officials located within this office. Thabo Mbeki was Tambo’s political 
secretary, and the director of the DIP (located in the Office of the President). Mbeki’s 
responsibility was to assist Tambo’s diplomacy in generating international support for the 
ANC’s preconditions for initiating official negotiations. Pallo Jordan was the deputy director 
of the DIP. His responsibility was to generate consensus within the ANC on preconditions for 
initiating official negotiations. Zola Skweyiya was the chief legal advisor in the Office of the 
President. His responsibility was to develop a set of constitutional guidelines in preparation 
for an eventual constitutional negotiation process.  
 
Their perceptions on both the course of the conflict and the South African government did 
not change: the overthrow of the apartheid system and the goal was the universal franchise.  
 
5.4.2.2. Third Parties 
 
Was there a mediator, and if so, dose the mediator have a conception of a possible 
settlement? 
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Consolidated Goldfield’s mediation through Michael Young happens in stage two after the 
ANC adds negotiation to its range of policy options.  
 
This was an example of the mediator as ‘communicator’, addressing the conflict as a 
breakdown in the ability of the ANC and South African government to communicate with 
each other. Young acted as a telephone wire i.e. creating an environment in which the ANC 
and South African government could establish contact and carry messages. Michael Young’s 
role was thus completely procedural, with no substantive contribution, and completely 
passive, and only involved carrying out the parties’ orders for the facilitation of dialogue and 
delivery of messages.  
 
These series of facilitated meetings had two goals: to improve understanding between the 
government (through Esterhuyse) and the ANC by ‘humanising’ the adversary groups 
through face-to-face meetings, and to prepare the ground for settlement negotiations by 
exploring, in an unofficial and informal setting and without commitment, underlying issues 
and possible solutions.
543
  
 
These meetings took place in exotic and novel settings: grand estates in the English 
countryside. These settings were important; they were able to overcome “communication-
inhibiting conflict norms and promoted learning and new ideas.”544 As a result, the meetings 
all included “substantial social interaction, with participants’ typically dining and drinking 
alcohol together.”545 This level of informality and ‘equal status’ between groups fostered 
interpersonal bonds and trust and had a significant impact on their perceptions of each other, 
the conflict, their role in it, and anxieties about its resolution.  
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Zartman writes that potential mediators can work to effect settlement of conflict by creating 
the perception of a ripe moment among combatants. A mediator must convince the parties 
that their unilateral options are blocked and present them with mutually beneficial 
alternatives. In this process, the mediator has to push belligerents towards settlement by 
imposing deadlines in order to create a sense of urgency. However, the ANC’s addition of 
negotiation to their range of policy options in no way meant that they believed their most 
preferred policy outcome had been foreclosed. The political process was conducive to 
mediation as communication. The interests of the ANC from this perspective, was to use 
mediation as a means for communicating with the government and not to find imaginative 
formulas. 
 
5.4.2.3. Hurting Stalemate and Way Out 
 
Did the ANC perceive their situation to be a hurting stalemate in late 1983 and early 1984?  
 
It is important to consider the conditions of the ANC in exile in the 1980s, and the major 
actors’ perceptions of these conditions. Two important periods are important; before and after 
the Nkomati Accord.  
 
5.4.2.3.1. Before the Nkomati Accord: 1983-1984 
 
Before the Nkomati Accord, the ANC’s position in exile was varied. On the political front, 
the ANC was viewed both internationally and in South Africa as the major liberation 
movement in the struggle against apartheid. In the Western world, it was part of a global 
network of anti-apartheid non-governmental organisations, political parties and governments 
who gave it international legitimacy as the principal anti-apartheid organisation. In the Soviet 
Union, the ANC was a client and the Soviet patronage was in full support of MK. As 
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discussed, this patronage also included an extensive global network of socialist solidarity 
organisations. In Africa, significant recognition of the ANC occurred after the independence 
of Angola and Mozambique, particularly after these respective countries joined the Front 
Line States. 
 
On the military front, conditions illustrate a noticeable reversal of fortunes for MK, an 
important factor that can lead to a hurting stalemate. While MK armed attacks had escalated 
in 1983, statistics showed an appalling casualty rate: 43 MK guerrillas were killed or arrested 
in 1983, translating into about three MK fighters neutralised for every four attacks. In 
anticipation of the closure of MK’s strategic Eastern Front, Jordan was commissioned to 
investigate a potential plan B i.e. alternative scenarios and potential strategies in event of a 
worse-case scenario. These political developments at the end of 1983 indicate preparations 
for, and anticipations of, a blockage of unilateral solutions, and the conceivability of joint 
solutions.  
 
This condition is therefore consistent with the ripeness notion of an imminent catastrophe i.e. 
the realisation that matters will get worse if they haven’t gotten better in ways that 
negotiation seeks to define. The Nkomati Accord was a looming catastrophe; a deadline that 
threatened to impose additional and unacceptable costs of high magnitude.   
 
5.4.2.3.2. After the Nkomati Accord: 1984-1987 
 
The series of events that occur subsequent to Nkomati illustrates a ‘ripening process’ on the 
part of the ANC.  
 
Four events and political processes are important.  
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The first was the position of MK; over 100 MK personnel based in Mozambique had to leave 
immediately as a result of the Nkomati Accord. This crisis was exacerbated by the fact that 
the Mozambique exodus was accompanied by a simultaneous intake of larger recruits from 
South Africa into Swaziland. The co-operation between Swazi and South African security 
agents compounded the problem; the sudden influx of large numbers of MK personnel made 
skirmishes with local security forces, and confrontation with South Africa security agents, 
inevitable. ANC structures became subject to an aggressive Swazi-South African offensive.  
The ensuing ‘Battle of Swaziland’ took a heavy toll on the ANC.  
 
While Operation Zikomo provided MK with much needed success in 1985, it was 
insufficient; after the second state of emergency MK could not spread insurrectionary 
pressures beyond scattered localities, and therefore could not attenuate security forces to any 
significant degree. As the state rolled back the unrest through the second state of emergency, 
MK’s casualty rate rose sharply.  
 
The Nkomati Accord and the second state of emergency effectively diminished the MK’s 
ability to effectively wage the armed struggle from the eastern front. While the ANC could 
continue to prosecute the armed struggle in 1985, it would be deploying its weakest arm 
against the government’s strongest point – the military. The ANC was running out of options; 
bilateral solutions presented the way out and had to be considered. 
 
Second, the South African government had inflicted such high costs on Mozambique that 
Machel succumbed to pressure. The hurting stalemate that ensued was perceived at the patron 
level and the resulting Nkomati Accord hindered MK’s capability of continuing armed 
struggle. This is consistent with Stedman’s conclusion on the Zimbabwean case i.e. the 
perception of a stalemate can be manifested at patron level and be efficacious. 
 
The Front Line States summit in late April 1984 pushed the ANC into exploring negotiation 
possibilities as a preferred policy option. Front Line States leaders made clear their 
preference for a negotiated settlement. In Zartman’s formulation, ripeness is a product of 
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actors believing that their most preferred outcome has been foreclosed, which prompts a 
willingness to look for compromise solutions. This is what happens after the Front Line 
States summit.  
 
Third, serious consideration toward a negotiated settlement happens as a result of this 
summit. The tactical shift at the Kabwe Conference in June 1985 (i.e. the primacy of the 
political) is crucial. The implication of this tactical shift was that the political struggle 
became fundamental and armed struggle had to consequently be integrated into it. Simply 
put, if apartheid could not be defeated by the armed struggle, then all that remained was the 
political option with MK support. Therefore, MK’s armed struggle became one element of 
the political struggle, and not its principle or even necessarily its important vehicle. Tambo’s 
alternative diplomatic option i.e. talks and negotiation represented a potentially more 
important vehicle. This is an illustration of a condition of ripeness i.e. when unilateral 
solutions are blocked and joint solutions (talks and negotiations) become conceivable. This 
was the result of the Nkomati Accord that foreclosed armed struggle, prompting a willingness 
to look for compromise solutions. This however did not mean that armed struggle was 
discontinued; it simply meant that a negotiation track was opened that ran parallel with the 
military option.  
 
Once the ANC agreed on the primacy of the political, the next step was to design a political 
solution through which they could meet their minimal demands. The political developments 
after Kabwe represent the search for such a political solution. Tambo’s advisory team of 
Mbeki (chief diplomat), Jordan (negotiation advisor) and Skweyiya (legal and constitutional 
advisor) was central for this task.  
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5.4.3. Why did the ANC negotiate at all? 
 
Four conditions influence the ANC’s choice of exploring negotiated solutions. 
 
First, a channel of communication opened between the ANC and the United States 
government. As part of its conflict resolution policy in the region, the United States favoured 
a negotiated end to apartheid and sought to legitimise the ANC in the process.  
 
Second, the Front Line States, the ANC’s most important allies in Southern Africa, preferred 
a negotiated end to apartheid in 1984. This preference was crucial; the ANC was dependent 
on the Front Line States.  
 
Third, Tambo proposed a way out in which armed struggle could gradually be phased out; 
armed struggle and the pursuance of a negotiated settlement could be mutually reinforcing, 
but the primacy was political i.e. talks and negotiations.  
 
Fourth, talks with non-ANC aligned organisations paid greater dividend than armed struggle; 
they placed the ANC as a major and legitimate actor in South African politics (domestically 
and internationally) in a way that the ANC had to be a part of any South African political 
solution. What reinforced this momentum was that these developments occurred within the 
context of MK’s limited ability to provide tactical guidance to the revolt. This set the stage 
for the beginning of pre-negotiation.   
 
The period of the Nkomati Accord and Kabwe Conference represented those events and 
resulting change in conditions that caused a restructuring of the values attached to alternative 
outcomes for the ANC, and resulted in the addition of a negotiated solution to the array of 
outcomes under consideration. Political events subsequent to the Kabwe Conference would 
involve an assessment of this change in condition and preliminary evaluation of alternative 
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responses that would add negotiation to the range of policy options. The ANC however did 
not perceive the situation as a hurting stalemate. Mozambique was strategic for MK’s armed 
struggle in the eastern front but the Nkomati Accord closed this option. The perception of a 
hurting stalemate manifested at patron level and it was efficacious in making the ANC re-
evaluate its position and add negotiation to the range of policy options.  
 
5.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter sought to answer is why the ANC chose to negotiate at all. In answering this 
question the chapter used stages one and two of Tomlin’s model on pre-negotiation. Tomlin 
writes that the first stage of pre-negotiation is brought about by an event or change in 
conditions that causes a restructuring of values attached to alternative outcomes. The stage is 
characterised by an assessment of the problem produced by changing conditions, and the 
addition of negotiation to a range of policy options. When negotiation is added, a turning 
point is reached and the process moves to the second stage. In the second stage, a negotiated 
solution is actively considered. Another turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as 
the preferred and necessary policy alternative, moving the process to the third stage. 
 
The chapter argued that four events and conditions influenced the ANC’s choice of exploring 
negotiation possibilities. First, a channel of communication opened between the ANC and the 
United States government.  Second, the Front Line States, the ANC’s most important allies, 
preferred a negotiated end to apartheid in 1984. Third, Tambo offered a way out in which 
diplomacy could pay greater dividend. Fourth, talks with non-ANC aligned organisations 
placed the ANC as a major actor in South African politics in such a way that the ANC had to 
be a part of any South African political solution. These occurred within the context of MK’s 
limited ability to provide tactical guidance to the township uprising.   
 
Therefore, period of the Nkomati Accord and Kabwe Conference represented those events 
and resulting change in condition that caused a restructuring of the values attached to 
alternative outcomes for the ANC, and resulted in the addition of a negotiated solution to the 
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array of outcomes under consideration. Political events subsequent to the Kabwe Conference 
would involve an assessment of this change in condition and preliminary evaluation of 
alternative responses that would add negotiation to the range of policy options. The ANC did 
not perceive the situation as a hurting stalemate. The perception of a hurting stalemate 
manifested at patron level (Mozambique and the Front Line States) and it was efficacious in 
making the ANC re-evaluate its position and add negotiation to the range of policy options.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Stage One and Two of the Pre-negotiation Stage 
The NP Government  
 
This chapter seeks to answer two questions: (1) why the NP government chose to negotiate at 
all; and (2) why the NP government chose to negotiate with the ANC. In answering this 
question the chapter will use stages one and two of Tomlin’s model on pre-negotiation. 
Tomlin writes that the first stage of pre-negotiation is brought about by an event or change in 
conditions that causes a restructuring of values attached to alternative outcomes. The stage is 
characterised by an assessment of the problem produced by changing conditions, and a 
preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that adds negotiation to the range of policy 
options. When negotiation is added, a turning point is reached and the process moves to the 
second stage. In the second stage, a negotiated solution is actively considered. Another 
turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as the preferred and necessary policy 
alternative, moving the process to the third stage. The chapter will end by discussing whether 
indicators of ripeness can assist in answering why the NP chose to negotiate at all.   
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a background on the 
context of the government’s stream in stage one of pre-negotiation. Attention is paid to the 
politics of constitutional reform in the 1980s and the re-emergence of Nelson Mandela as an 
important actor in that process. The second section discusses the confidential conversations 
between a team of senior government officials and Mandela in prison, culminating in the 
historic meeting between Botha and Mandela. The third section discusses the second stage of 
pre-negotiation where the South African government and the ANC communicate their 
intentions to each other and choose negotiation as the preferred policy alternative. The fourth 
section discusses the theoretical implications of the discussion.  
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6.1. Changing Conditions: Constitutional Reform and the Re-emergence of Mandela 
 
Two important changing conditions led to a consideration of a negotiated solution for the NP 
government: (1) the consequences of the unfolding constitutional reform process; and (2) the 
re-emergence Nelson Mandela as an important actor in South African politics.  
 
6.1.1. The Politics of Constitutional Reform 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, in 1973, the NP government realised that white South Africans 
could no longer monopolise central government. As a result, the Theron Commission was set 
up to examine the constitutional position of coloureds. Following Theron’s report in 1976, a 
cabinet committee proposed a parliament with separate racial chambers, and a council to 
mediate in matters of mutual concern with ultimate power exercised by the State President.
546
 
This resulted in the Tricameral Constitution – endorsed by white voters in a referendum in 
November 1983 and inaugurated in September 1984. The aim was to preserve white minority 
rule by “[associating] the 2.5 million coloureds with whites to broaden the NP’s power base, 
preventing their surrender to a ‘black-power’ situation.”547  
 
The Tricameral Constitution was not meant to provide a final solution: “it was tailored as a 
transitional document.”548 Botha stated: “We do not know what tomorrow will bring. We are 
not prophets. This is a step in the dark. We can only proceed into the future with faith.”549 
Excluding Africans from this new constitution raised new questions on black political rights 
and black political representation in central government. These questions moved centre-stage 
in the constitutional reform debate. Apartheid’s basic principle and answer to this question 
was that African representation took place in the homelands. However, many government 
officials by 1980 realised that not all Africans would be politically represented inside the 
homelands. In 1980, for instance, Botha conceded that “urban blacks might gain 
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representation outside the homelands.” In opening the Tricameral Parliament, he 
acknowledged that “black political rights topped government’s agenda.”550 Botha, however, 
had no idea how to proceed beyond this point.  
 
As discussed, in Chapter Four, in February 1983 Botha established the SKK to deal with 
black constitutional issues. Chaired by Heunis, it was attended by all senior cabinet ministers: 
FW de Klerk, Barend du Plessis, Gerrit Viljoen, Louis le Grange, Pik Botha, Kobie Coetsee 
and Magnus Malan. SKK met monthly and received inputs from “academics, businessmen 
and especially, [officials of the department of] Constitutional Development.”551 While there 
was no obvious direction of argument, nor any single paper of special importance, 
constitutional policy was gradually formulated within SKK and became the point in the 
political system where pressure for change was generated.
552
 
 
The constitutional reform process that unfolded had some important consequences for South 
Africa.  
 
First, the process shifted the terms of debate in the South African government, providing the 
framework for apartheid’s demise. Botha “forced whites, willingly or not, to embark on a 
voyage to a new and inevitably much different future.”553 The debate was no longer whether 
apartheid should end but how i.e. sequences, times-spans, and methods.  
 
Second, constitutional reform was an attempt to share power while preserving white minority 
rule i.e. without losing control. Power-sharing involved granting citizenship to Africans, and 
accepting their permanence in urban areas. Reform, however, did not involve blacks and 
whites participating in the same structures; it involved African participation in a constitution 
in which whites would have the final say. Government strategists had no idea how this would 
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be done, but Botha would have been happy if Mandela would be part of the process.
554
 
Therefore, Botha favoured negotiations and African participation in central government but 
only on his terms. 
 
Third, the constitutional reform process was rejected, resulting in an uprising that created a 
crisis of legitimacy. Consequently, the government realised it was running out of options. As 
constitutional reform failed to acquire the necessary legitimacy, government strategists were 
“forced to accept that negotiations and constitutional change must include the ANC, pre-
eminently Mandela.”555  
 
Fourth, the message from constitutional development and SKK was that the “ANC’s 
unbanning and Mandela’s release were pre-requisites for meaningful constitutional 
reform.”556 Talking to Mandela became the most important strategy for continuing reform in 
the face of a legitimacy crisis.   
 
The identification of the ANC was important; the events post-1983 (discussed in the previous 
chapter) showed that the ANC was weak militarily and a moderate organisation.  
 
6.1.2. The Re-emergence of Mandela 
 
The re-emergence of Mandela at the centre of South African politics was the result of the 
activities of the AAM in Britain, in particular its campaign for the release of South African 
political prisoners. The AAM focus on political trials and prisoners began in August 1962, 
when Mandela was arrested and intensified during the Rivonia Trial of 1963-64. At the end 
of the Rivonia Trial, the focus of the attention declined. Anthony Sampson points out that 
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while Mandela was mentioned 24 times in the New York Times of 1964, he then disappeared 
from the newspaper for the rest of the decade.
557
 
 
This changes in December 1973 when the AAM formed the SATIS (Southern Africa: The 
Imprisoned Society) committee. Supporting organisations included the British Council of 
Churches, the Trade Union Congress, the UN Association and Amnesty International. The 
SATIS committee felt that while political trials had been the focus for many years, “once 
prisoners were imprisoned they were forgotten and campaigns stopped.”558 New tactics of 
personalising campaigns around specific individuals would benefit all political prisoners. 
SATIS thus began to encourage AAM affiliated organisations to take up a campaign for a 
specific political prisoner and circulate biographies, dock statements and other materials 
produced by the AAM, IDAF, and UN on legislation and prisoners.
559
 
 
The initial focus of SATIS was not Mandela; SATIS was concerned with political prisoners 
in general. Interest in Mandela begins in 1978 through the request of the ANC when the 
AAM was asked to assist in an international campaign focusing on Mandela’s birthday. This 
would become one of the largest and most successful AAM initiatives ever embarked on; it 
succeeded in not only making Mandela well known to the majority of the Western world, 
“but also in increasing support for the ANC and for the struggle against apartheid.”560 The 
1978 celebration of Mandela’s 60th birthday began the campaign that became the focal point 
of international anti-apartheid activity. The ANC and AAM identified and actively promoted 
Mandela as the leader of anti-apartheid resistance, and made it clear that “South Africa could 
experience no real change or peace as long as the real leaders were in prison.”561 The 
Mandela campaign also focused on broader political issues; “by emphasising Mandela’s 
incarceration and police brutality against [Winnie Mandela], broader public support was 
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harnessed.” At the same time, his words and actions “were used to publicise the actions and 
ideology of the ANC and to inform people about apartheid,”562     
 
This paid dividend. On Mandela’s birthday in 1978, the British Prime Minister James 
Callaghan sent greetings to Mandela from the floor of the House of Commons.
563
 The Times 
called Mandela “the colossus of African nationalism.”564 And in a private conversation with 
Botha at Chequers in 1984, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made it clear to Botha 
that Mandela was central to the resolution of the South African conflict: 
 
“I had to tell him how appalled we were by the forced removals of blacks from areas which had been designated 
for white residents only. I went on to raise the case of imprisoned Nelson Mandela whose freedom we had 
persistently sought. It was my view, moreover, that no long-term solution to South Africa’s problems could be 
achieved without his cooperation.”565 
 
The AAM campaign portrayed Mandela as a natural leader, and a victim of the South African 
government. In this process, he became an accepted and powerful symbol of the struggle 
against apartheid. Soon, the AAM began to make use of various medium in transmitting this 
message, such as the use of popular culture, music and media, drawing in diverse 
international support. This in turn popularised Mandela in the 1980s, transforming him into 
the focal point international mass mobilisation in the struggle against apartheid. More 
importantly, as Mandela gained international acceptance as a future South African leader, so 
the ANC gained further legitimacy internationally as “the liberation movement of choice.”566  
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6.2. Stage One: Problem Identification  
 
Within the context of this international popularisation of Mandela, the government search for 
negotiation possibilities is located in the politics of political prisoner releases, and in 
particular, secret debates about what to do with Nelson Mandela. The lead on the 
government’s side was taken by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Department 
of Prisons. The thinking and strategy was dependent on personalities, particularly President 
Botha, the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons H.J (Kobie) Coetsee, and the head of the 
NIS, Dr Niel Barnard.  
 
At the centre of the government’s thinking was the political role of Nelson Mandela first as a 
means of legitimising constitutional reform, and then as a means of developing a broader 
political solution. Both Coetsee and Barnard reported directly to Botha, and their discussions 
with Mandela were conducted without the knowledge of the cabinet or the State Security 
Council.  
 
6.2.1. The Major Actors: Thinking and Motivation  
 
In June 1980, the month the South African Parliament passed the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Amendment Act, Dr Jannie Roux, then the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, 
spoke with Mandela for two-and-a-half hours. Roux reported that “Mandela took strong 
exception to being called a ‘self-confessed communist’.” He “appeared to see a place for 
white people in a future South Africa, but not as holders of political power: he had in mind a 
five-year transition during which they would be accustomed to the transfer of power; but he 
understood [Roux’s] warning that white’s would not just capitulate.” He “appeared to have 
relatively rigid thinking patterns … and it is difficult to get him to accept an opposite 
viewpoint.”567 
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In February 1981, the Department of Justice received another report about Mandela. The 
report stated that Mandela “had so adjusted himself to prison regulations that he gave the 
impression of good behaviour, and no contraventions of prison regulations had been recorded 
against him up to 1976.” It further stated that Mandela adopted a “persistent attitude by 
making repeated representations about conditions, but in a way that no steps can be taken 
against him.” It warned that this was not good behaviour: “he gives the orders and then 
withdraws to regard his actions from a distance. Mandela sticks to his chosen course and 
influences everyone with him not to deviate from this… It is clear that Mandela has in no 
way changed his position and that imprisonment so far has had no positive effect on him.”568  
 
Botha appointed Roux as his director-general in the Office of the State President.
569
 The 
psychological profile of Mandela was for perusal of the Broederbond and the cabinet, and it 
had a major bearing on Mandela’s removal from Robben Island in 1982, along with the 
Rivonia political prisoners.
570
  
 
In October 1981, Botha appointed his Deputy Defence Minister, Kobie Coetsee, as the 
Minister of Justice and Prisons. On instruction from Botha, his immediate task was to work 
on a policy for releasing political prisoners.  
 
Botha was not initially concerned with Mandela; his concern was with the imprisonment of 
Breyten Breytenbach, a dissident Afrikaner poet and ANC supporter. Breytenbach was a 
member of a prominent Cape National Party family close to Botha, and the twin brother of 
the legendary SADF soldier Colonel Jan Breytenbach.
571
 According to Coetsee, Botha was 
“unhappy about the security system having dealt with Breyten Breytenbach the way it did … 
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and felt that he was dealt with unfairly by the … justice system.”572 Jailed in 1975, Botha 
believed that Breytenbach was simply an idealist “who should be given another chance.”573  
 
Coetsee got instruction from Botha to find legal ways of getting Breytenbach out of prison.
574
 
The problem was that political prisoners did not qualify for parole or remission of sentence: 
“I had to tell [Botha] that the policy was … not to release political prisoners until the 
sentence had expired, and in the case of life sentences it meant a life sentence.”575 Coetsee 
told Botha that the only way he could get Breytenbach out of prison was to change 
government policy regarding the release of political prisoners. Botha simply told him to work 
on it, as long as Breytenbach got out of prison.
576
     
 
With Botha’s support, Coetsee got cabinet approval to change the government’s political 
prisoner release policy: “all of them would be entitled to the same release facilities as other 
prisoners.” Most cabinet ministers were in support of this; political prisoners with life 
sentences were the most problematic for the government and had the greatest influence on 
younger political prisoners:  
 
“Those who had no prospect of ever being released were the most difficult people in all the prison, and because 
they were so difficult they were all taken down to Robben Island, which makes Robben Island the most difficult 
place to manage. They couldn’t get staff and personnel … to go to Robben Island. So I said with this we’ve also 
got to change, people with the prospect of being released could become model prisoners … we should try and 
arrange for prisoners to be not grouped together and to be confined Robben Island but … there must be other 
institutions to which they can go as well.”577     
 
The goal of the new release policy was to demystify the Rivonia political prisoners and 
demobilise Robben Island of radical political prisoners.  
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Coetsee was soon confronted with the ‘release Mandela’ question. 
 
 Coetsee stated that Botha wanted to release Mandela; he considered Mandela’s release “as a 
given situation but he wanted him released to have him safely deposited where he couldn’t 
cause any more trouble … He wanted him to go to the Transkei.”578 Botha did not initially 
consider Mandela’s release as part of a political solution: “[According to Botha] his release 
was solving the problem of him being in jail.”579 Botha saw Mandela as part of the problem; 
“he wanted him out of jail because imprisoning him was more trouble than it was worth.”580  
 
Coetsee subsequently familiarised himself with Roux’s background reports on Mandela. 
When he asked for further reports, he was given a more detailed analysis from the 
Department of Prisons, which made specific points:  
 
“A. Mandela is exceptionally motivated and maintains a strong idealistic approach; B. He maintains outstanding 
personal relations; C. He is manipulative, but nevertheless not tactless or provocative; D. There are no visible 
signs of bitterness towards whites, although this may be a fine game of bluff on his part; E. He acknowledges 
his own shortcomings, but nevertheless believes in himself; F. He is a practical and pragmatic thinker who can 
arrive at a workable solution on a philosophical basis; G. He has a capacity for integrated and creative thought; 
H. He has an unbelievable memory, to reproduce things in the finest detail; I. He has an unflinching belief in his 
cause and in the eventual triumph of African nationalism; J. He regards himself as called to the task and this 
elevates him above the average white who, according to him, has apparently lost his idealism; K. He believes in 
self-discipline, and continually taking the initiative, to the requisites of success. There exists no doubt that 
Mandela commands all the qualities to be the Number One black leader in South Africa. His period in prison 
has caused his psycho-political posture to increase rather than decrease, and with this he now has acquired the 
characteristic prison-charisma of the contemporary liberation leader.”581  
 
The analysis provided no answer of what to do with such an opponent. 
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In November 1979, Botha appointed Professor Lukas Daniel (‘Niel’) Barnard as the head of 
the Department of National Security (DONS), the successor to the Bureau of State Security 
(BOSS). In June 1980, DONS was renamed the NIS.  
 
At the time, the NIS was a transitional organisation; the intelligence staff at NIS comprised 
two groups. At the senior level were many old BOSS officials recruited from the ranks of the 
security police in the 1960s. At lower levels were younger intelligence officers, recruited 
from universities with degrees in political science, law, psychology and African studies.
582
  
 
Barnard was of the younger generation, and sought to transform NIS from its predecessor 
BOSS; “[originally] consisting of former security policemen, it subsequently turned itself into 
an organisation that valued professional, often academic, qualifications.”583 Professional 
reviews of individuals included assessments of relevant books read and it was open to civilian 
influence, the largest part of its budget was spent on research and it recognised the strategic 
studies qualifications of the University of Pretoria (UP) and Orange Free State (UOFS).
584
  
 
The NIS focused on the long-term resolution of events at a macro-level; “NIS spoke the 
language of causes, consequences and prevention” and much of its work involved the 
gathering, sorting and evaluation of information obtained in the media, the security, public 
and diplomatic services, and from informants.
585
 According to Maritz Spaarwater, an NIS 
official who worked in various senior positions, the NIS “was intellectualised and 
transformed into the nearest thing the state had to an objective think-tank.”586 Under Barnard, 
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it rapidly gained credibility and respect of senior government officials, especially Botha.
587
 
The NIS reported to Coetsee.  
 
It is unclear at what point and under what circumstances the government’s exploration of 
negotiation possibilities begins.  
 
Coetsee states that it begins as a part of a general policy reform on political prisoner releases, 
and in the process of what to do with Mandela.  
 
Barnard and his deputies offer a different account. Barnard states that the NIS took the view 
from the early 1980s that a negotiated end to apartheid was the only viable solution to the 
South African conflict: “[We] were confronted daily with an accurate assessment about the 
real problems of this country… You see the problems internally, you see the problems with 
the labour unions, you see the problems with education, you see the problems with socio-
economic development, and you see the speeches made by other people… I tried to form an 
honest assessment based on good and accurate intelligence as to the true problems of this 
country.”588 
 
Barnard states that his perceptions were shaped by two senior colleagues; Mike Louw and 
Maritz Spaarwater. Louw was Barnard’s deputy and also came from the political studies 
department at UOFS. He had risen through BOSS where he wrote the agency’s annual 
intelligence estimate.
589
 When he joined NIS, Louw became the Chief Director of Evaluation 
and deputy to Barnard. Louw agrees with Barnard’s interpretation stating that by the end of 
the 1970s, the realisation of the permanency of the urban African population had rendered 
apartheid unworkable:  
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“The whole idea on which South Africa was built was crumbling. The homelands were failing hopelessly, they 
were totally corrupt, and billions were pumped into them and would just disappear. Apartheid couldn’t work 
because it wasn’t tackled with gusto, and implemented with vision – it was just hand-outs here and there… We 
were left without anything to guide the country, except the pragmatic constitutional manoeuvrings of PW 
Botha...”590  
 
Louw had a significant impact on Barnard’s thinking: “Mike Louw was a man who very 
strongly all the time took the line that there is only one solution for this country and that is to 
find a political settlement; there is just no other way out. That influenced my thinking to a 
large extent.”591  
 
Spaarwater was younger than Louw and “had been part of the short-lived radical movement 
among Afrikaner students in the late 1960s that debated the theological morality of 
apartheid.” He confirms Louw’s explanation and points out that “his disillusionment with 
apartheid had taken root in 1978 when it became clear … that NP politicians’ claim that 
government policy would reverse the influx of black people to the cities was nonsense.”592 
He rose to the rank of Colonel in MID and was recruited by Louw to the NIS.  
 
Spaarwater writes that research output from NIS in the early 1980s gradually inspired a 
rethink in the higher echelons of the South African government about the country’s security 
situation. This led to the realisation that “the only way out was to proceed to a negotiated 
settlement.” Louw, he writes, was critical to this process: “No one in the intelligence 
community had a greater influence on bringing this about than Mike Louw, with the strong 
leadership and support of Niel Barnard, in gaining the confidence of the highest decision-
makers.”593  
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Thus one can conclude that among highly placed strategists and officials in the South African 
government, the shift towards exploring negotiation possibilities happens in the early 1980s 
during the early reform period. This shift among a handful of NIS strategists coincides with 
debates and initiatives concerning reforming political prisoner release policy. In this context, 
Mandela was identified as an important actor. 
 
6.2.2. Approaching Mandela: The Logical Conclusion of Reform 
 
Fourteen months after the Department of Prisons’ final psychological profile of Mandela on 
Robben Island, Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Andrew Mlangeni and Ahmed 
Kathrada (the ANC leadership on Robben Island) were transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in 
April 1982.
594
 Niel Barnard stated the intention: “One of the critical issues at the start of the 
‘80s, when I was at the NIS, was we should find a way of almost demystifying this man 
[Mandela] … How should we defuse a very critical and difficult situation.”595  
 
The government began to use Mandela’s isolation to investigate his views on South Africa’s 
political future. This was done by authorising visits by influential personalities.  
 
In August 1984, one month after the beginning of the Vaal Uprising, Mandela was visited by 
a journalist, Benjamin Pogrund of the Rand Daily Mail whom he hadn’t seen in twenty years. 
In October 1984, he was visited by Professor van der Merwe from the University of Cape 
Town who had been trying to broker peace between the government and the ANC. In late 
1984 and early 1985, he was visited by Lord Nicholas Bethell, a member of the British House 
of Lords, and Professor Samuel Dash, from Georgetown University’s law faculty.  
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Mandela and Lord Bethell discussed the armed struggle and Mandela explained that it was up 
to the government to renounce violence.
596
 In his discussions with Professor Dash, Mandela 
laid out what he saw the minimum for a future non-racial South Africa: “a unitary state 
without homelands, non-racial elections for the central Parliament and one-person one-
vote.”597   
 
The township uprising had important implications for constitutional reform. The response to 
the uprising is the point at which the government begins to restructure the values attached to 
alternative outcomes, adding negotiation to the array of outcomes under consideration.  
 
In January 1985, SKK persuaded Botha to announce at the opening of Parliament that 
“Africans permanently resident in South Africa could not forever be politically represented in 
homeland structures.” Urban Africans “were to have the right to political participation and a 
say [inspraak] in the higher levels… Consequently structures must be developed for black 
communities outside national states [i.e. in non-independent homelands] whereby they can 
enjoy self-determination over their own affairs up to the highest level.”598   
 
Botha proposed an open-ended non-statutory black negotiation forum. He stated that 
“existing mechanisms for negotiation must be improved, and expected all ‘responsible’ black 
leaders to participate.” Heunis elaborated that “anyone could participate, and the only 
qualification was renouncing violence.”599 Negotiation meant negotiating structures for urban 
African representation outside non-independent homelands, and within central government. It 
did not mean negotiating the end of apartheid; it meant negotiating the reform of apartheid.  
 
Following from this, while on a European tour at the beginning of January 1985 Botha had 
been encouraged by a group of German leaders, in particular Franz-Josef Strauss, the 
Bavarian Christian-Socialist, to offer to release Mandela if he would renounce all violence. 
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Botha presented this formula to the cabinet but was warned by Coetsee and Louis le Grange, 
the Minister of Law and Order, that Mandela would not give up his strongest bargaining chip 
prematurely.
600
 However, with the support of the rest of the cabinet, Botha further told 
Parliament that he was offering Mandela his freedom provided he “unconditionally rejected 
violence as a political instrument.”601 Publicly challenging Mandela, he concluded that it was 
therefore “not the South African government which now stands in the way of Mr Mandela’s 
freedom. It is he himself.”602 
 
Mandela, determined to insert himself into the political process, prepared a statement which 
rejected the offer but kept open the option of negotiation. The statement was read out at a 
mass rally in Jabulani Stadium, Soweto: 
 
“I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose on me… It is only … when all other 
forms of resistance were no longer open to us, that we turned to armed struggle… Let [Botha] renounce 
violence. Let him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban … the African National Congress. Let him 
free all who have been imprisoned, banished or exiled for their opposition to apartheid. Let him guarantee free 
political activity so that people may decide who will govern them… Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners 
cannot enter into contracts … I cannot give any undertaking at a time when I and you, the people, are not 
free.”603  
 
To Botha’s formula, ‘Mandela in exchange for non-violence’, Mandela responded ‘legality in 
exchange for non-violence’ and “Botha’s gambit became an albatross.”604 Realising the 
deadlock, Coetsee was summoned to the President’s office and Botha told him: “You know 
we have painted ourselves in a corner. Can you get us out?”605  
 
A chain of important events followed this interaction.  
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In April 1985, Stoffel van der Merwe, a cabinet minister, wrote in a booklet titled ‘And What 
about the Black People?’ that separate development could not work. He admitted that 
attempts at expelling blacks from urban areas “had failed, that it was a mistake to force 
blacks in urban areas to accept citizenship of independent homelands, and maintained the 
situation in which blacks lived in one area and voted in another was ineffective and 
meaningless.” He proposed “including all South Africans in a common political system, 
though not necessarily within the same structures.”606 The booklet confirmed that the 
government accepted that urban Africans were permanent resident in ‘white’ South Africa 
with legitimate claims for political representation. However, no detail was provided how this 
would be achieved, “save for rejecting a fourth parliamentary chamber, and confirming that 
future dispensations would be group-based.”607 
 
In August 1985, at the NP Natal Congress (in a speech that would become known as the 
Rubicon speech), Botha declared that South Africa was one country: 
 
“Should any of the Black National States therefore prefer not to accept independence, such states or 
communities will remain a part of the South African nation, are South African citizens and should be 
accommodated within political institutions within the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa.”608 
 
Botha announced that Africans “needed a forum to represent themselves in future 
negotiations, and would be included in government.” Additionally, Botha admitted that 
“influx control was out-dated and costly.”609  
 
In September 1985, Botha accepted that some Africans who lived and worked permanently 
inside South African could be granted citizenship: 
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“We must consequently accept the South African citizenship of those black persons who lost their 
citizenship because of the independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei but who 
permanently reside in South Africa.” 610 
 
This was Botha’s crucial concession as voting rights follow from citizenship rights. Exactly 
who qualified remained unclear. It was even more unclear “how African participation would 
be exercised beyond government’s commitment to groups, its belief that the country was 
made up of minorities, that there should be community self-determination, and that no one 
group should dominate.”611  
 
This was the political climate in which Mandela requested a meeting with Coetsee to discuss 
talks between the government and the ANC. Although Coetsee did not respond, the 
opportunity came in December 1985 when a routine medical examination diagnosed Mandela 
with an enlarged prostate gland that required surgery. Mandela’s hospitalisation provided the 
opportunity for Coetsee. He arrived at Mandela’s side unannounced. He told Sparks that he 
was immediately impressed by Mandela. For his part, Mandela was surprised but recognised 
the government was extending an olive branch: “I was amazed. The government, in its slow 
and tentative way, was reckoning that they had to come to some accommodation with the 
ANC. Coetsee’s visit was an olive branch.”612  
 
Although no substantive political discussions occurred, the government signalled its intent. 
Mandela told Sparks: “at one point he said to me ‘I am interested in your being put in a 
situation between prison and freedom’.”613 Coetsee assigned Mandela a new cell, away from 
his colleagues in order to create the environment for commencing talks.
614
 Coetsee received 
instruction from Botha: 
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“We got the green light from Mr Botha that we could start talking to Mr Mandela in general. Just [keep] in mind 
that at the time it was the department of prisons mostly taking initiatives. We weren’t constitutionally equipped, 
we weren’t mandated, that’s why Mr Botha also decided to form a committee a little bit later. But it was to have 
access to Mr Mandela, and also put him in a position where he could have the opportunity to impose his views, 
which he did… I got the impression that he decided to use the opportunity and he interpreted it correctly, that it 
is something very special being designed.”615 
 
Mandela’s second isolation achieved the government’s desired results. According to 
Mandela, he came to the realisation that the time had come to begin discussions with the 
government:  
 
“I had concluded that the time had come when the struggle could best be pushed forward through negotiations. 
If we did not start a dialogue soon, both sides would soon be plunged into a dark night of oppression, violence 
and war. My solitude would give me an opportunity to take the first steps in that direction, without the kind of 
scrutiny that might destroy such efforts.”616 
 
It was therefore not about the human cost of violence that led to Mandela’s perception of a 
stalemate but that the violence threatened to marginalise the ANC as an organisation. In other 
words, this was a deeply political understanding of costs. This happens at the beginning of 
1986.  
 
At the same time, Botha continued to give concessions as a way of legitimising constitutional 
reform. In the same month Botha formally proposed a National Statutory Council to “plan 
and prepare a constitutional dispensation which provides participation by all South African 
citizens in the processes of government”, and to grant Africans a voice in government “on an 
interim basis.”617 However, despite Botha’s efforts, no black African leader, even those 
closely associated with the government, supported the NSC. Buthelezi refused to participate 
unless Mandela was released.
618
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The point at which Mandela communicates his intentions to the government happens in June 
1986 during the imposition of the second state of emergency. Mandela approached the 
Commissioner of Prisons, Lieutenant-General Willie Willemse, and requested a meeting with 
Coetsee in order to begin talks-about-talks with the government.
619
 Willemse immediately 
contacted Coetsee and Mandela was driven to Coetsee’s official residence in Cape Town, 
Savernake, spending three hours in discussion.
620
  
 
According to Mandela, Coetsee asked relevant questions “that reflected a familiarity with the 
issues that divided the government and the ANC.” Mandela was asked on the circumstances 
under which the ANC would suspend the armed struggle, whether he spoke for the ANC as a 
whole, and whether he envisioned any constitutional guarantees for minorities in a new South 
Africa.
621
 Mandela, encouraged by the meeting, “saw the beginnings of a compromise.”622 
 
The major turning point happens in 1987, the same year in which the ANC adds negotiation 
to its range of policy options. Two events are important.  
 
First, in order to regain control of events and bring about political certainty, Botha informed 
senior government officials early in 1987 to review government strategy. The Department of 
Constitutional Development and Planning produced a document, Ons Skrik Vir Niks (We Are 
Not Afraid of Anything), signalling an important shift in thinking inside the Department in 
favour of negotiation. The document was supported by more than twenty of the Department’s 
senior members. The document argued that “reform could not proceed within apartheid’s 
framework as government was insensitive to legitimate black political aspirations and lacked 
credibility among blacks and some whites. Without urgent political reform, conflict would 
intensify and the economy would further deteriorate.”623  
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As a result, it argued against detentions of anti-apartheid activists, concluding that the 
security agencies’ way of addressing the uprising was counter-productive. According to the 
department’s senior leaders, it was better to leave the anti-apartheid activists alone, unban 
political organisations and remove apartheid laws that had become unenforceable such as the 
Group Areas Act.
624
  
 
The document proposed “negotiating a new constitution; representation for all South Africans 
on central, regional and local constitutional structures; incorporating all homelands into South 
Africa; protecting human rights; scrapping discriminatory laws; freezing parliament for a 
year, and establishing an inclusive, transitional parliament and executive authority to draw up 
a new constitution; withdrawing troops from the townships and ending the Emergency.”625  
 
In short, the message was that the political liberalisation was a prerequisite for meaningful 
constitutional reform. Government thinking was moving towards finding accommodation 
with the ANC. The strategy, however, was reaching out to the ANC as a means of 
legitimising constitutional reform. Government strategists were unclear on the endgame of 
such reform.  
 
Second, the NP interpreted its electoral victory in the May 1987 white election as providing it 
with a mandate to continue constitutional reform to its logical conclusion. Its slogan, “reform 
yes – surrender no”, indicated the government’s dual concern and helped secure electoral 
triumph. The result indicated that reformist under-currents could not be stemmed.  
 
Gerrit Viljoen, a senior cabinet minister and government strategic thinker, admitted that 
government “had completely abandoned attempts at forcing blacks to channel their political 
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aspirations towards the homelands, and wanted a mandate for constitutional reform which 
will bring about political power-sharing with blacks at central government level.”626  
 
De Klerk stated that all efforts to prevent black urbanisation had failed: “it does not help to 
bluff ourselves about this. The economy demands the permanent presence of the millions of 
blacks in urban areas.”627 Cabinet ministers argued that denying blacks’ political 
representation would turn them into revolutionaries: “White stability can be ensured only if 
blacks are given political rights and socio-economic upliftment.”  
 
According to Magnus Malan, the government “wanted to meet black aspirations and 
negotiate future political structures, and planned to give blacks, especially the estimated five 
million urban blacks, full participation on the same basis as whites, coloureds and Indians.” 
Most urban blacks, Malan continued, “have no ties to the homelands whatsoever and if these 
are forced and the people shifted back to these areas, we will lose the revolutionary war.” 
Barend du Plessis “predicted an explosion if blacks were not given rights.”628    
 
By May-June 1987, constitutional reform had become official NP policy and the election had 
the unintended consequence of promoting the ANC’s stature and symbolic appeal. According 
to an observer of the times, “one major winner of the [May] election was the ANC. It 
participated like a silent phantom. Pretoria elevated the ANC to its major threat. It therefore 
made the Congress the only alternative to NP rule.”629 
 
In July 1987, Mandela resumed contact with Coetsee, holding several meetings at Savernake. 
In early 1988, Botha instructed Barnard to begin more structured discussions with Mandela. 
Barnard recalls:  
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“Mr Botha, during a discussion, told me, ‘Dr Barnard, we want you to … meet Mr Mandela now. There will be 
a team… Try to find out what you have been advocating for some time. Is it possible to find a peaceful 
settlement with the ANC, with this man Mandela? Try to find out what are his views on communism … and 
then try to find out is Mr Mandela and the ANC interested in a peaceful settlement. For we also have deep 
suspicions about what they would be interested in’…”630  
 
Coetsee approached Mandela and proposed they begin more structured discussions with a 
team of four: Barnard and Louw from NIS, and Fanie van der Merwe (director-general of the 
Department of Prisons) and Willemse (Commissioner of Prisons), all reporting to Coetsee. 
Barnard would lead the team, and Barnard and Coetsee would keep Botha informed. Botha 
instructed Coetsee to keep the talks confidential; neither the cabinet nor the State Security 
Council would be informed.  
 
Stage one for the NP government ends at this point; when Botha instructs Barnard to form a 
committee of officials to investigate, through Mandela, whether the ANC is amenable to a 
negotiated settlement. This is when negotiated solutions are added to the range of policy 
alternatives. 
 
6.3. Stage Two: The Search for Options 
 
6.3.1. Mandela and the Committee of Senior Officials 
 
Stage two begins with the formal meeting of the committee of senior officials on 25 May 
1988 at the officer’s club in Pollsmoor. After that they met every week for a few months, and 
then at irregular intervals; sometimes not for a month, and then suddenly weekly. Sometimes 
meetings would go on for seven hours at a time. Barnard and Mandela would equally 
schedule the meetings.
631
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Barnard stated that the meetings were “not a political debate but an effort on the part of 
knowledgeable persons to establish ‘how Mr Mandela’s head worked’.” Barnard approached 
the discussion with three objectives: “(1) to establish whether Mr Mandela was interested in a 
peaceful solution to South Africa’s political problems; (2) to establish whether Mr Mandela 
himself was a communist or not; and (3) whether he would support the protection of minority 
groups in a future constitutional dispensation.”632  
 
The committee of senior officials would meet Mandela 47 times. The majority of the 
meetings involved Mandela, Barnard and Louw. Barnard and Louw developed an admiration 
and deep respect for Mandela, referring to him, out of his presence, as ‘the Old Man’, and in 
his presence as ‘Sir’. 
 
Mandela recollects that the group focused on three issues: (1) the armed struggle, (2) the 
ANC’s relationship with the South African Communist Party (SACP), and (3) the meaning of 
majority rule.  
 
The group spent months debating the armed struggle. Mandela recalls that the government 
insisted the ANC renounce violence and end the armed struggle “before the government 
would agree to negotiations … and before [Mandela] could meet President Botha.” Mandela 
would counter-argue that armed struggle was a “legitimate form of self-defence” and 
believed that he advanced their understanding on this point.
633
  
 
The ANC’s relationship with the SACP also troubled the government team; they maintained 
that “the Communist Party dominated and controlled the ANC and that in order for settlement 
negotiations to begin [the ANC] must break from the [SACP].” Mandela explained that the 
ANC and SACP were separate and distinct organisations “that shared the same short-term 
                                                          
632
 Cited in Saunders, 244 
633
 Mandela, 641 
202 
 
objectives [the over throw of apartheid], but [their] long term interests were not the same.” 
The group never reached consensus on this.
634
  
 
The group was also not able to reach consensus on majority rule; the government team 
insisted that minority rights are inevitably threatened with Mandela arguing contrary.
635
  
  
In August 1988, Mandela was told that Botha had planned to see him later that year. After 
being hospitalised a second time, and another transfer to a large bungalow on prison grounds, 
the secret talks with the group continued, but stalled on the same issues. Mandela got 
increasingly restless. He told Barnard that he wanted to “talk to the man with the power, and 
that is PW Botha.” But for endless hours, Mandela recollects, Barnard’s team pressed him on 
the same questions: “Was he interested in a negotiated settlement? What were his views 
about communism? How would an ANC government treat minorities? The same old 
questions, the same reassuring answers – the same paralysis.”636  
 
After repeated requests to meet Botha had fallen on deaf ears, Mandela put his views in 
writing in late 1988 on the explicit understanding that a meeting would materialise. While 
hammering down demands and preconditions for negotiation in a memorandum, Botha 
suffered a stroke. While it did not incapacitate him, he was significantly weakened.  
 
A month after being rushed to hospital, Botha announced that he “intended to separate the 
position of state president from the leadership of the National Party” with the explicit 
intention of creating a prime minister beneath the state president.
637
 Botha’s strategy 
backfired and NP power-brokers seized power; in February 1989, FW De Klerk, a senior 
cabinet minister and the conservative Transvaal leader of the NP was elected head of the 
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party, and on March 13, won the support of the NP for the leader of the party to occupy the 
state presidency.
638
  
 
An extraordinary interregnum emerged raising the political stakes. The tension and anxiety 
following Botha’s stroke was not lost on Mandela and the government team. According to 
Barnard, Mandela became increasingly restless and irritated with the team as he sensed that if 
he could not meet and find agreement with Botha quickly, he would have to start with the 
whole process all over again with new role players. Barnard agreed with Mandela that the 
meeting had to occur before it was too late. He subsequently approached Botha: 
 
“I remember … telling him that the time is absolutely right to meet Mr Mandela, as quickly as possible. If not, 
we are going to slip, perhaps, one of the most important opportunities in our history … My views with Mr Botha 
were the following, ‘Mr President, if you meet him and it becomes the basis, the foundation for future 
development in our country, history will always acknowledge you as the man who started this due process. If 
it’s the beginning of going forward, it would always say that you have taken each and every step, and so in my 
concerned opinion there is only a win-win situation…’ So approval was finally given…”639    
 
6.3.2. The Mandela-Botha Meeting  
 
The historic meeting between Mandela and Botha was premised on two important 
documents; a memorandum written by Mandela and presented to Botha (i.e. the Mandela 
Document) for the meeting, and the government team’s response to the Mandela Document 
(i.e. the Government Team Document). Both these documents can be considered the first 
official positions that the government and Mandela put to each other during the pre-
negotiation stage. More importantly, this moment, and the subsequent meeting between 
Mandela and Botha, indicates ripeness.  
 
6.3.2.1. The Mandela Document 
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In this historic document, Mandela stated that the 1980s political crisis had made it necessary 
for the ANC and the government to negotiate a political settlement. Mandela stated that his 
role, at this stage, was limited: “to bring the country’s two major political bodies to the 
negotiating table.”640 His intervention was “influenced by purely domestic issues, by the civil 
strife and ruin into which the country is sliding.” Mandela responded to three main demands 
set by Barnard’s team as preconditions for settlement negotiations: “that the ANC renounce 
violence, break with the SACP and abandon its demand for majority rule.”  
 
Mandela argued that while the ANC “has no vested interest in violence” it considered the 
armed struggle “a legitimate form of self-defence” against a government which would “not 
allow peaceful forms of protest.” The fundamental problem was not the refusal of the ANC to 
renounce violence but that “the government is not yet ready for negotiation and for the 
sharing of political power.” The government had to accept that the ANC would not suspend 
the armed struggle until the government demonstrated its willingness to surrender the 
monopoly of political power, and to negotiate directly and in good faith with acknowledged 
black leaders. Therefore, the renunciation of violence by either the government or the ANC 
“should not be a precondition to, but the result of, negotiation.”  
 
Mandela “[rejected] the charge that the ANC is dominated by the SACP.” He stated that “at 
no time has the [ANC] ever adopted or co-operated with communism itself … [and] the 
SACP was throughout the years accepted the leading role of the ANC.” Mandela argued that 
the ANC was a non-aligned organisation that welcomed support “from the East and the West, 
from the socialist and capitalist countries… and have no intention whatsoever of changing 
[their] stand on this question.”  
 
On majority rule, the document stated that the principle is a foundation of democratic 
societies. More importantly, “majority rule and internal peace are … two sides of a single 
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coin, and white South Africa simply has to accept that there will never be peace and stability 
… until the principle is fully applied. It is precisely because of its denial that the government 
has become the enemy of practically every black man. It is that denial that has sparked off 
the current civil strife.”641 
 
Mandela’s resolving formula was a “negotiated settlement, and a meeting between the 
government and the ANC [as] the first major step towards lasting peace in the country.” Two 
issues would have to be discussed: “the demand for majority rule in a unitary state; [and] the 
concern of white South Africa over this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on 
structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by 
blacks.” The most crucial task facing the government and the ANC was “to reconcile these 
two positions. Such reconciliation will be achieved if both parties are willing the 
compromise.”  
 
The negotiation process that would reconcile these two positions would be done in two 
stages: In the first stage, the ANC and the government would need to work out preconditions 
for a proper climate for negotiations; and the second stage would be the actual settlement 
negotiations themselves that would occur when the climate is ripe for doing so.”642              
 
 
 
 
 6.3.2.2. The Government Team Document 
 
                                                          
641
 Ibid. 
642
 Ibid. 
206 
 
Barnard’s team provided Mandela with a frank response.643 They reminded Mandela that 
their task was not to conduct negotiations but investigate whether, and how, he could 
contribute to a peaceful settlement.  
 
The government criticised Mandela for belittling the government preconditions and 
“relapsing into revolutionary rhetoric [in which] Mandela the ‘freedom fighter’ holds floor.” 
They refuted his assertions about the armed struggle, the renunciation of violence and 
majority rule. They stated that Mandela’s viewpoint was “nothing new” and to become 
involved in disputes on this issue “would merely promote polarisation and be counter-
productive.” The team stressed that the government was “honest and sincere in its efforts to 
achieve a breakthrough in respect negotiations with all South Africans who commit 
themselves to a peaceful future for RSA.”  
 
On the ANC relationship with the SACP, the government stated that Mandela’s views on the 
issue were not authoritative and he was not informed about the SACP’s power over the ANC 
in exile: “this tendency is not a mere propaganda statement as you maintain; it can be 
substantiated by hard intelligence facts and independent sources.” They disagreed with 
Mandela over the ANC’s views on communism, the role of SACP members in the ideological 
direction of the ANC, and of the role of Marxist ideology in the relevance of the ANC’s 
struggle against apartheid. In short, Mandela was being disingenuous in claiming SACP 
members and their Marxist ideology were irrelevant. They also rejected Mandela’s 
contentions on majority rule.
644
   
 
The government team stated that Mandela’s views on a negotiated political settlement were 
“evidently written in a more rational style and [indicated] a readiness to put national interests 
before sectarian interests, and willingness to play a constructive role.” They believed 
Mandela’s approach to a negotiated settlement contained definite points of agreement with 
government positions. The government also saw a two-staged negotiation process, where 
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intensive talks-about-talks on stumbling blocks and obstacles (i.e. preconditions) would 
precede a formal phase where “participants in the negotiation process [would] be empowered 
to enter into an agreement if they reach a consensus.” One possibility, the government team 
argued, would be “for a democratic process to empower people to really become formally 
involved in a more structured negotiation situation.”645  
 
6.3.2.3. Tea at Tuynhuys 
 
On 5 July 1989, Nelson Mandela and President PW Botha sat down to tea for Tuynhuys, the 
presidential office in Cape Town. Botha poured the tea. Also in attendance were Barnard, 
Coetsee and Willemse. The meeting lasted thirty minutes. No substantive issues were 
discussed.  
 
The meeting began with a conversation about South African history and culture. Mandela 
drew parallels between African and Afrikaner nationalism. He explained that the liberation 
struggle was akin to the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion, the difference being that it was a struggle 
“between brothers who happen to be different colours.”646 Botha stated that “the Afrikaner 
loved South Africa, which was his only home [and] Mandela said that he understood.”647 
Mandela raised the subject of Walter Sisulu’s release. Botha listened and told Barnard that he 
had to assist Mandela on this request.
648
  
 
All who were present have sentimental recollections of this historic encounter and their role 
in it. Mandela writes that his impressions of Botha were formed the moment he walked into 
his office: “PW Botha walked towards me. He had planned his march perfectly, for we met 
exactly halfway. He had his hand out and was smiling broadly, and in fact, from the very first 
moment, he completely disarmed me. He was unfailingly courteous, deferential and 
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friendly.”649 The meeting, Mandela recollects, “was friendly and breezy until the end” and he 
came out “feeling that I had met a creative, warm head of state that treated me with all the 
respect and dignity that I could expect.”650 Waldmeir writes that Botha told an opposition 
politician, “‘Ek het begrip vir die ou man’ (I can understand the old man), and [faced] with 
the same circumstances, ‘I don’t know what I would have done’.”651 
 
According to Barnard, he had prepared Mandela and Botha for the meeting. He recalls: “I 
tried to convince [Mandela], ‘Listen, this is an ice-breaker meeting. It is not about 
fundamental issues. Come to learn the man. Talk about all those easy things in life… Don’t 
tackle a difficult issue, that’s not the reason for the first meeting.” He advised Botha:  
 
“… I told [Botha] that I think [Mandela] is a man of quite a personality with a very firm understanding of what 
was going on in terms of politics. And that he should be handled in such a way that he can, with honour, take the 
whole process forward. ‘Listen to him with a lot of respect… If you don’t mind [don’t] do the talking, listen to 
him to what he has to say. He has a lot on his mind, and then agree that he will take the process forward, if I can 
advise that, Mr President,’ which broadly, to a large extent, happened. I think it was a good meeting…”652   
 
Coetsee recalls that there were no moments of tension and there was chemistry between the 
two.
653
  
 
Barnard decided it was time to talk with the ANC in exile. He instructed Esterhuyse to liaise 
with Mbeki in London to facilitate a meeting between Spaarwater and Mbeki.
654
 The 
meetings would be given the name ‘Project Flair’. 
 
6.4. End of Stage Two: The State and the ANC 
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As mentioned, in the second stage, a negotiated solution is actively considered. Another 
turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as the preferred and necessary policy 
alternative, moving the process to the third stage. The process of choosing negotiation as the 
necessary policy alternative was concluded and made jointly by the NIS and ANC. The 
process that facilitated the final stages of the second stage was Project Flair. Project Flair was 
preceded by two developments that marked the completion of stage two in pre-negotiation for 
the ANC; the resolution of the Angolan civil war, and the drafting of the Harare Declaration. 
 
6.4.1. The New York Accords 
  
In 1989, MK was plunged into an indefinite crisis effectively rendering the armed struggle 
obsolete.  
 
On 22 December 1988, two important agreements were signed in New York, bringing a 
temporary end to over twenty years of civil war in Angola and Namibia.  
 
The first agreement, signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, set 1 April 1989 for the 
beginning of the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435. The resolution 
contained a plan for “achieving the independence of Namibia, under which a 7,500 strong 
UN military force … was to be inserted into Namibian territory to ensure suitable conditions 
for the holding of ‘free and fair elections’ for a constitution-making assembly in November 
1989, seven months after the implementation of the resolution commenced. Formal 
independence would follow shortly afterwards.”655  
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The second agreement provided for the “total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, in 
stages, by July 1991, and was signed by Cuba and Angola.”656  
 
Implicit in both agreements was a non-aggression pact similar to the Nkomati Accord. 
Principle G of the New York Principles stated that the signatories should “not allow their 
territory to be used for acts of war aggression, or violence against other states.”657 
Consequently, in return for South Africa’s dropping UNITA, the Angolan government would 
cease offering military facilities to the ANC.  
 
In early January 1989, Oliver Tambo announced the decision to abide by the New York 
Accords and closed all MK military bases in Angola.  
 
According to the chief mediator in the Angolan conflict, Chester Crocker, the New York 
Accords were of historical significance for Southern Africa:  
 
“The principles contained potent symbolism and it would set new standards of regional conduct. UNITA would 
lose its regional military ally at the moment when the MPLA was losing the Cubans. The ANC would lose its 
last remaining sanctuary within reach of South Africa just when SWAPO [South West African People’s 
Organisation] would become free to return home and seek power through elections. South African would put 
Namibia on the path to independence and begin shedding their interventionist military role in neighbouring 
countries.”658  
 
The New York Principles would serve as a resolving formula for civil wars in Angola and 
Namibia, and consequently, begin the path to the negotiated end of apartheid.  
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The New York Accords had a profound impact on MK. A large exodus of MK fighters 
moved across the Angolan border into Zambia “where the ANC did not have permanent 
military camps, but rather an agreement with the Zambian government that it could use 
‘transit’ residences for its military personnel headed towards South Africa.”659 Morale was at 
its lowest.  
 
Bill Anderson, a senior NAT intelligence officer in Zambia, stated that after the New York 
Accords MK was “in a state of absolute chaos with [MK fighters deployed] without briefings, 
without proper preparations of documents, without proper clothing.”660 Keith Mokoape, a 
senior MK intelligence officer, told Anderson that “because the number of MK operations 
was perceived to be declining, ‘there was one objective and one alone’ for the intelligence 
department in helping to plan operations: this was ‘to make the graph of actions go up, 
irrespective of what actions were undertaken, irrespective of basing cadres, and so on’.”661 
Chris Hani, the MK Chief of Staff, stated that “of about 240 MK cadres deployed from 
Zambia in 1989, a third had defected, a third were captured or killed, while a third were 
somehow in place, whether active or drifting.”662   
 
The resulting uncertainty led to increasing levels of frustration and ill-discipline in MK, with 
serious diplomatic implications for the ANC’s relationship with the Zambian government. As 
a result, the NAT Security Department (Mbokodo) and the ZSIS carried out regular raids to 
disarm MK fighters.
663
  
 
The violence within MK continued; “on 30 July [1989] an explosive device detonated at a 
house belonging to the ANC in Kamanga township in Lusaka.”664 Mbokodo became more 
ruthless in its policing, and a vicious cycle ensued. Things came to a head in August 1989 
when Mbokodo agents arrested and detained four MK fighters who had applied for refugee 
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status with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and awaiting 
resettlement. The Zambian government, furious with this heavy handed response, demanded 
their release.
665
  
 
When allegations of torture and abuse in Mbokodo custody surfaced, the Zambian 
government had enough; on 16 August, Alfred Nzo announced that over 5,000 MK fighters 
in Zambia would be relocated to Tanzania and Uganda.
666
 A second exodus of MK took place 
within just a month, this time from Zambia, the ANC’s most loyal ally in the region.  
 
This was of extreme significance for the ANC’s external mission and the armed struggle; the 
infiltration of MK into South Africa was no longer an option. In the aftermath of the Nkomati 
and New York Accords, MK’s military camps in Tanzania and Uganda faced an enormous 
strip of territory preventing any significant deployment of MK fighters into South Africa. It 
became impossible for the ANC to pursue the armed struggle in any meaningful way; armed 
struggle had reached its endgame, and MK was checkmated in August 1989.    
 
6.4.2. The Harare Declaration 
 
As the Angola/Namibia conflict resolution came to an end, Oliver Tambo realised that the 
ANC was losing control of events. If the ANC wanted to control the unfolding process, it 
would have to embrace the principles of negotiations as a first preference. Simon Makana, 
now the ANC’s chief representative in the Soviet Union, stated that political events in 
Southern Africa isolated the ANC; the Front Line States were tired of decades of war in 
Southern Africa and by 1989, were actively pushing the ANC toward a negotiated settlement 
with the NP government.
667
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In the immediate aftermath of the New York Accords, Tambo instructed Mbeki to organise 
an internal committee to draft an ANC bottom line for settlement negotiations. Tambo’s 
strategy was to draft a document to be endorsed by the Front Line States, the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations (UN) as a basis for the ANC’s negotiation with 
the government.
668
  
 
The document, known as the Harare Declaration, was drafted by Tambo and Mbeki, and 
accepted by the OAU on 21 August 1989 (less than week after MK’s relocation to East 
Africa) and by the UN on 14 December 1989.  
 
The preamble declared apartheid “an obstacle to peace and an affront to justice and human 
dignity, and must be abandoned.”669 The declaration encouraged the negotiated end to the 
apartheid system and the creation of a non-racial democracy and constitutional order, with 
“universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, under an entrenched Bill 
of Rights.” It stated that it was essential for a necessary climate of negotiations to be created 
before any negotiations can take place and placed the responsibility on the South African 
government to create this climate. Accordingly, the government, at the very least, was called 
to: “release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing 
restrictions on them; lift bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations 
and persons; remove all troops from the townships; end the state of emergency and repeal all 
legislation … designed to circumscribe political activity; and cease all political trials and 
political executions.” These measures were essential and necessary to produce conditions in 
which “free political discussion can take place.”   
 
The declaration defined how the process of negotiation should unfold:  
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“Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the 
suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire; negotiations should then 
proceed to establish the basis for adoption of a new Constitution by agreeing on, among others, the Principles 
enunciated above; having agreed on these principles, the parties should then negotiate the necessary mechanism 
for drawing up the new Constitution; the parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the 
international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order; the parties shall agree on the 
formation of an interim government to supervise the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new 
constitution…; after the adoption of the new Constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed to have formally 
terminated.”670 
 
The day before Tambo was to present the Harare Declaration to the OAU, he suffered a 
stroke that seriously weakened him and was airlifted to a hospital outside Stockholm, 
Sweden. The stroke ended Tambo’s active participation as the ANC’s predominant leader in 
the pre-negotiation stage. While Nzo and Mbeki temporarily filled the vacancy, it led to a 
power vacuum in the ANC’s external mission. The consequence was that Mandela’s 
authoritative role was significantly elevated. The problem was that he was still in prison; his 
release was thus of crucial importance for the ANC to reconstitute political authority, and 
maintain momentum in pre-negotiation.      
 
6.4.3. ‘Project Flair’ 
 
Following Barnard’s instruction, Esterhuyse informed Mbeki that the NIS was ready to meet 
and to begin to negotiate preconditions for settlement negotiations. Project Flair was carried 
out by Louw and Spaarwater on the government side. On the ANC side was Mbeki and Jacob 
Zuma, the deputy director of NAT.  
 
The first meeting took place on 12 September 1989, at the Palace Hotel in Lucerne, 
Switzerland. The meeting lasted seven hours. The agenda covered substantive issues: the 
necessity of a negotiated settlement; the release of Mandela; the state of emergency; the 
ANC’s relationship with the SACP; and the armed struggle. The NIS was seeking assurance 
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that the ANC was ready to talk and negotiate. Louw and Spaarwater were given this 
assurance. The second item discussed was the role of would-be facilitators and mediators. 
Both sides agreed that only direct dialogue between the ANC and the government would lead 
to progress. Esterhuyse writes that what was primarily intended as a clarification of positions 
became in reality also an unofficial declaration of intent: “we have to make peace with one 
another and among ourselves.”671 
 
The second meeting took place on 6 February 1990, in Lausanne, Switzerland. The ANC 
delegation comprised Mbeki and Pahad, and for the NIS, Louw and Spaarwater. According to 
Pahad, concrete details were discussed about “the release of Mandela, structures to be 
established to manage the return of the exiled ANC leadership, and preparations for the first 
[public] meeting between the ANC and the government in South Africa, the issue of 
indemnity, the definition of a political prisoner and the cessation of violence.”672  
 
They set up working committees: ‘Group Alpha’ was the codename for Mandela’s release; 
‘Group Bravo’, the release of detainees; ‘Charlie’ for setting up discussions at a political 
level; and ‘Delta’, for maintaining contact between the NIS and NAT.673 Issues pertaining to 
removing obstacles for settlement negotiations had to be dealt with, indemnity had to be 
arranged, and the question of who was a political prisoner had to be resolved. There was 
agreement that the negotiation process would need to have an initial phase of talks about talks 
i.e. of deciding who would represent whom, and on the form the process would take.
674
 Louw 
cautioned that De Klerk was about to take enormous political risk, and the ANC would need 
to respond positively in order to keep the momentum. Specifically, Louw wanted “a positive 
response from the ANC’s executive committee, ‘greater discipline’ in controlling the protest 
campaign inside South Africa, and an agreed formula for ending guerrilla struggle.”675 
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6.4.4. The Mandela-De Klerk Meeting 
 
De Klerk was formally elected on 14 September 1989, two days after the first ANC-NIS 
meeting in Lucerne.  
 
De Klerk’s first action as the president was to take constitutional reform to its logical 
conclusion. In his election as NP leader on February 1989, De Klerk stated that his new goal 
was a ‘new’ South Africa: “a totally changed South Africa which would rid itself of the 
antagonisms of the past and would be free from domination and suppression, in whatever 
form. Our goal was a South Africa in which all reasonable people would unite behind 
mutually acceptable goals and against radicalism, regardless of its origin.”676 De Klerk used 
this message as the NP platform in the all-white 1989 election campaign and “as the basis on 
which [he] asked the electorate to give [the NP] a mandate for fundamental reform.”677  
 
In his inauguration speech on 20 September De Klerk stated that the mandate of the 6 
September election had placed the white electoral irrevocably on the road to a new South 
Africa and that “there was only one way to peace and justice for all: it was the way of 
reconciliation; of searching together for mutually acceptable solutions; of talking together 
about what the new South Africa must look like; and of constitutional negotiations which 
could lead to lasting understandings.” His government’s specific goals with thus include “the 
elimination of mistrust; the initiation of negotiations to develop a new constitutional 
dispensation; economic growth and prosperity; and a firm stand against unrest, terrorism and 
violence.”678       
 
His first task was to reinstall cabinet government. To this end, he began to dismantle the 
security structures developed under Botha. According to De Klerk, in the new political 
environment accompanying his presidency, the security services “would have to maintain an 
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impartial stance towards the political role of the ANC and other revolutionary organisations.” 
He says he realised “how difficult it would be for them to change their attitudes, virtually 
overnight, to organisations that they had for decades come to regard, in all respects, as their 
mortal enemies.” On 10 January 1990, he told 800 senior police officers at the South African 
Police College that it was their duty to be impartial: “… they would no longer be required to 
promote or oppose any particular political cause; … they should refrain from any political 
involvement; and they should restrict their activities to combating crime and protecting the 
lives and property of all South Africans.”679  
 
Mandela had continued to meet the secret working group. On 10 October 1989, De Klerk 
unconditionally released Walter Sisulu, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, and other old 
guard ANC political prisoners. In early December, Mandela was informed that he was to 
meet De Klerk for the twelfth of that month. He drafted a letter to De Klerk, similar in 
message and content to the Mandela Document sent to Botha.  
 
Mandela’s letter stated that the ANC would not accept the suspension of the armed struggle 
as a precondition for talks; the ANC’s commitment to peace was in their readiness to talk and 
this was articulated in various public statements.
680
 He reiterated his proposal to Botha that 
talks take place in two stages: “the first being where the government and the ANC would 
together work out the preconditions for negotiations; [the] second stage would consist of the 
actual negotiations themselves when the climate for doing so was ripe.”681 Mandela told De 
Klerk that the principle source of all South Africa’s problems was the policy of apartheid, and 
to this end he fully supported the guidelines adopted in the Harare Declaration for its 
dismantling.
682
  
 
Mandela and De Klerk met on the morning of 13 December in Tuynhuys. In attendance were 
Barnard, Louw, Willemse and Coetsee. Mandela raised the issue of ‘group rights’, which was 
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contained in the National Party’s recently introduced five year plan, arguing that “it was not 
in his interest to retain this concept, for it gave the impression that he wanted to modernise 
apartheid without abandoning it.” Mandela said the concept must be “entirely cast aside” as 
“the ANC had not struggled against apartheid for seventy-five years only to yield to a 
disguised form of it.”683 De Klerk stated that the National Party’s support for group rights 
was a mechanism to provide “structural guarantees that majority rule would not mean the 
domination of the white minority by blacks.”684  
 
Both Mandela and De Klerk have pleasant recollections of the meeting. Mandela’s 
impression of De Klerk was a reasonable leader who was a very good listener.
685
 De Klerk’s 
impression was that Mandela conveyed “dignity, courtesy and self-confidence [and] had the 
ability to radiate unusual warmth and charm – when he so chose.” De Klerk saw him as 
“every inch of a Thembu patriarch [who] bore the mantle of authority with the ease of those 
who are not troubled by self-doubt.”686 They both more or less reached the same conclusions: 
that it would be possible to do business together.      
 
After meeting Mandela, De Klerk summoned his cabinet and began developing a 
comprehensive strategy for negotiations. By the beginning of the New Year, the cabinet had 
accepted the full consequences of power-sharing, “provided there would be reasonable 
protection for minority rights” and agreed that the ANC would have to be part of the process 
and political solution. This would require “a strategy to bring the ANC to the negotiating 
table.” They reached consensus “on the need for an approach that would surprise [the ANC] 
and give [the government] the early initiative.”687  
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6.5. Theoretical Implications: Pre-Negotiations and Ripeness 
 
6.5.1. Implications for Pre-negotiation 
 
The South African government stream in pre-negotiation features factors analogous to the 
first and second stages of pre-negotiation as described by Tomlin.  
 
As discussed, pre-negotiation is bought about by either an event or change in conditions that 
“causes a restructuring of the values attached to alternative outcomes and the addition of a 
negotiated solution to the array of outcomes under consideration.” The stage is characterised 
by “an assessment of the problem produced by changing events or conditions and a 
preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that may or may not add negotiation to the 
range of policy options.”688 A turning point is reached if the addition does occur, and the 
process moves into its second stage.  In the second stage, one of the parties “has under active 
consideration a negotiated solution to the policy problem identified in stage one.” When 
negotiation is chosen as the preferred or necessary policy alternative, another turning point in 
the pre-negotiation process is reached.
689
 
 
The government exploration of negotiation possibilities emerges as part of the process of 
constitutional reform.  
 
The first phase of constitutional reform begins in 1973 with the appointment of the Theron 
Commission and ends in September 1984 with the inauguration of the Tricameral 
Constitution. The government faced two important challenges in this process: to get the 
support of urban African leaders to accept the exclusion of Africans from the Tricameral 
Parliament and to persuade them to participate in a negotiating forum on black political 
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rights. To deal with these twin issues, Botha appointed the SKK five days after the 
referendum of November 1983.  
 
Botha was initially opposed to a fourth chamber for blacks, but would support regional 
development, land consolidation in the homelands and a creation of a constellation of states.  
Thus, for the government, the Black Local Authorities Act, and accompanying legislation, 
was designed to compensate urban blacks from their exclusion from parliament. 
 
The turning point comes in September 1984 when the government loses control of the reform 
process. The ensuing uprising creates a legitimacy crisis for the government. Important 
conditions facilitate the restructuring of the values attached to alternative outcomes and the 
addition of a negotiated solution to the array of outcomes under consideration. The process of 
stage one occurs between 1985 and 1987, through five major concessions.  
 
First, in January 1985, Botha announces at the opening of parliament that Africans 
permanently resident in South Africa could not forever be politically represented in homeland 
structures. Urban Africans were to have the right to political participation in central 
government. The implication is that political structures would have to be developed for black 
communities outside non-independent homelands. To this end, Botha proposed an open-
ended non-statutory black negotiation forum. Heunis stated that anyone could participate, and 
the only qualification was renouncing violence. 
 
Second, in April 1985, Stoffel van der Merwe wrote that separate development was 
unworkable. He admitted that attempts at expelling blacks from urban areas “had failed, that 
it was a mistake to force blacks in urban areas to accept citizenship of independent 
homelands, and maintained the situation in which blacks lived in one area and voted in 
another was ineffective and meaningless.” He proposed “including all South Africans in a 
common political system, though not necessarily within the same structures.”690 Van der 
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Merwe confirmed that the government accepted that black Africans were permanent resident 
in ‘white’ South Africa with legitimate claims for political representation.  
 
Third, in August 1985, at the NP Natal Congress, Botha declared that South Africa was one 
country and that “[should] any of the Black National States therefore prefer not to accept 
independence, such states or communities will remain a part of the South African nation, are 
South African citizens and should be accommodated within political institutions within the 
boundaries of the Republic of South Africa.”691 Botha further announced that blacks “needed 
a forum to represent themselves in future negotiations, and would be included in 
government.”692  
 
Fourth, in September 1985, Botha accepted that some Africans who lived and worked 
permanently inside South African could be granted citizenship. This was Botha’s crucial 
concession as voting rights follow from citizenship rights. Exactly who qualified remained 
unclear. It was even more unclear “how African participation would be exercised beyond 
government’s commitment to groups, its belief that the country was made up of minorities, 
that there should be community self-determination, and that no one group should 
dominate.”693    
 
Fifth, at the beginning of 1986, Botha formally proposes the National Statutory Council to 
“plan and prepare a constitutional dispensation which provides participation by all South 
African citizens in the processes of government”, and to grant Africans a voice in 
government “on an interim basis.”694  
 
By February 1986, the government reached a cul-de-sac; despite these concessions, no 
African leader, even those closely associated with the government, is in full support of these 
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constitutional reform initiatives. Botha expresses this in his private papers: “we are rapidly 
reaching the stage at which we have to say how far we are prepared to go.”695  
 
The turning point comes with the opportunity to review government strategy in 1987. The 
Department of Constitutional Development proposes constitutional negotiations and the 
dismantling of apartheid. Senior cabinet ministers’ interpretation of the May 1987 NP 
electoral victory is consistent with the views expressed in this document; the government’s 
official policy in 1987 was constitutional reform which would bring about political power-
sharing with blacks at central government level. This is the message that Professor Willie 
Breytenbach transmits to the ANC representatives in Henley-on-Thames in England in 
October-November 1987.  
 
The first stage of pre-negotiations thus ends after the 1987 election. This is the point where 
negotiation with the ANC is added to the range of policy options. 
 
For the government, the second stage begins in early 1988 where Botha instructs Barnard to 
begin more structured discussions with Mandela. Conversations with Mandela begin on 25 
May 1988 and end in December 1989. In this process, the government actively considered a 
negotiated solution. This process can be grouped into three phases.  
 
The first phase was from May 1988 to mid-1989. This phase was characterised by 
confidential discussions between Mandela and a government team led by Barnard. Four 
major issues characterised these discussions: the armed struggle, the ANC’s relationship with 
the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the meaning of majority rule. The phase 
ends with the formal tabling of positions between Mandela and Barnard. While both parties 
disagreed on the abovementioned issues, both agreed on the need to pursue a negotiated 
settlement, and on the format that such a process would take i.e. a two-staged negotiation 
process, where intensive talks-about-talks on preconditions would precede official 
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negotiations. It is at this point i.e. on the eve of the Mandela-Botha meeting, where the 
government and Mandela choose negotiation as the preferred and necessary policy 
alternative. Mandela’s meetings with Botha and De Klerk represent the official 
acknowledgement of this mutual decision and the end of stage two.  
 
For the ANC’s external mission, the second stage (as discussed) begins with the meetings on 
Henley-on-Thames in England, and ends in August 1989 with the formal tabling of the 
Harare Declaration at the OAU. The conversations in England, even though confidential, 
were semi-official and involved the ANC putting forward their preconditions for settlement 
talks to brokers with access to the NIS and government.  
 
The turning point happens in December 1988 with the signing of the New York Accords, 
bringing a temporary end to the Angolan Civil War. These accords effectively served as a 
resolving formula for the conflicts in Southern Africa: UNITA would lose its South African 
allies at the moment when the MPLA was losing the Cubans. The ANC would lose its last 
remaining sanctuary within reach of South Africa just when SWAPO would become free to 
return home and seek power through elections. South African would put Namibia on the path 
to independence and begin shedding its interventionist military role in Southern Africa.  
 
This had important consequences for MK. First, MK lost its Angolan bases and relocated to 
Zambia. Second, the resulting uncertainty led to a process of implosion in MK, jeopardising 
the ANC’s relationship with the Zambian government, its closest ally in the region. MK is 
consequently relocated to East Africa, making it impossible to pursue the armed struggle in 
any meaningful way. The drafting of the Harare Declaration occurs during this process, and 
its presentation to the OAU on 21 August 1988 is the moment when the ANC chooses 
negotiation as the preferred and necessary policy alternative. This marks the end of the 
second stage.  
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6.5.2. Implications for Ripeness 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, in order to discuss the theoretical implications of the South 
African government stream in the first two stages of pre-negotiation, it is important to review 
briefly Zartman’s notion of ripeness. Zartman argues that compelling opportunities arise for 
conflict resolution based on the perceptions of the main actors concerning their military 
situations. The important condition must be a mutual sense of hurting stalemate i.e. a feeling 
that neither side can win, and all will be dramatically worse off if the conflict is not 
ameliorated.  The actors must also perceive a possible solution to meet their minimum needs. 
A third party can attempt to shape the perceptions of the actors, and provide assistance to one 
or both parties, but must also use its problem-solving ability to put forward a satisfactory 
compromise solution.  
 
Zartman provides us with a set of indicators to look for in the South African case: a sense of a 
hurting stalemate; a sense of a moment in the future that will worsen if negotiations fail; a 
sense that the tide of the combat has changed; the mediators’ need for leverage; and the 
development of a political solution.  
 
6.5.2.1. Major Actors 
 
Who are the main actors and what are their goals?  
 
Similarly to the ANC, one can classify the major actors and decision unit model in the South 
African government during the first two stages of pre-negotiation as that of a predominant 
leader decision unit with an advisory group i.e. a leader who uses advisors as consultants to 
provide information and expertise but reserves the right to make the decision.  
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The predominant leader in the government was President PW Botha. However, unlike in the 
ANC where the highest authoritative institution was the Office of the President, in the South 
African government, Botha with help from his inner circle decided policy on pre-negotiation. 
Two individuals formed the core of Botha’s inner circle with regard to pre-negotiation; Kobie 
Coetsee and Niel Barnard. Coetsee was Minister of Justice and Prisons, and Barnard was 
director-general of the NIS which reported to Coetsee. Additional actors involved in pre-
negotiations (Louw, van der Merwe, Willemse and Spaarwater) were all under the authority 
of Coetsee in his ministerial capacity.  
 
Thus, while cabinet, SKK and the Department of Constitutional Development were important 
institutions with regard to constitutional reform (which evolved during pre-negotiation) they 
were not the primary decision-making bodies with regard to pre-negotiation. Like the ANC, 
the political dynamics of this authoritative decision unit resemble that of a sensitive 
predominant leader; the beginning of talks with Mandela in May 1988 was the culmination of 
an extended process constitutional reform that included deliberations in SKK, the cabinet and 
the Constitutional Development.  
 
Within this process, the major actors’ perceptions of the conflict went through important 
transformation. The central issue for the government was the pivotal question of black 
political rights i.e. black political representation in central government, in the process of 
constitutional reform. Apartheid’s basic principle was that African political representation 
took place in the homelands. The theory was that all Africans belonged to one of the ten 
homelands, each of which would in time become independent, at which time its citizens 
would lose South African citizenship.
696
 Mike Louw, however, suggests that by the mid-
1970s, many government strategists realised that not all Africans would be politically 
represented in the homelands. By 1980, Botha conceded that urban blacks might gain 
political representation outside the homelands. In January 1985, Botha announces that 
Africans permanently resident in South Africa could not be forever by politically represented 
in homeland structures, and that new structures had to be developed outside of the homelands 
to facilitate representation at higher levels in the South African government. In April 1985, 
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Botha states that “Africans belonging to independent homelands would not inevitable lose 
South African citizenship.”697 In August 1985, his Rubicon speech effectively abandoned 
Verwoerdian apartheid by declaring that South Africa was one country. And in September 
1985, he accepted that certain blacks could become citizens in “white” South Africa. 
 
6.5.2.2. Third Parties  
 
Was there a mediator, and if so, does the mediator have a conception of a possible 
settlement? 
 
There was no mediator in the government stream of pre-negotiation that shaped the process.  
  
6.5.2.3. Hurting Stalemate and Way Out 
 
Did the NP government perceive the situation to be a hurting stalemate?  
 
In answering these questions, it is important to consider the position of the ANC (Chapter 
Five) and the government.  
 
The important period is 1987-1989, where a process of convergence in the positions of the 
parties happens, leading to mutual perceptions of a stalemate. The process begins in early 
1987 when Botha informs senior officials that independent sub-committees would review 
government strategy. Constitutional Development’s secret document, ‘Ons Skrik Vir Niks’ 
was important. The document argued that “reform could not proceed within apartheid’s 
framework as [this] was insensitive to legitimate black political aspirations and lacked 
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credibility among blacks and some whites.”698 It argued against detentions of anti-apartheid 
activists, concluding that the security agencies’ way of addressing the uprising was counter-
productive. It was better to leave the anti-apartheid activists alone, unban political 
organisations and remove apartheid laws that had become unenforceable.
699
 The document 
proposed “negotiating a new constitution; representation for all South Africans on central, 
regional and local constitutional structures; incorporating all homelands into South Africa; 
protecting human rights; scrapping discriminatory laws; freezing parliament for a year, and 
establishing an inclusive, transitional parliament and executive authority to draw up a new 
constitution; withdrawing troops from the townships and ending the Emergency.”700 The 
message was that the political liberalisation was a prerequisite for meaningful constitutional 
reform. Government thinking was moving towards finding accommodation with the ANC. 
Joint solutions become conceivable.  
 
The ANC took note of these developments. An ANC document noted proposals to “dissolve 
parliament, dismiss government, release political prisoners, and transform the Statutory 
Council into an interim government, which would draft a new constitution immediately 
followed by elections.” The document records that “army chiefs and some ministers agreed to 
these proposals, but Botha’s response was unknown.”701 Thabo Mbeki also reported to the 
ANC on this line of thinking: “army chiefs… and cabinet agreed to the dismissal of 
government and scrapping of the NSC. That document was taken to PW. PW’s views are not 
known.”702 This was the same period the ANC explored negotiation possibilities. 
 
After the NP electoral victory in May 1987, the government focused on constitutional issues, 
claiming an overwhelming mandate to include blacks in central government. Like 
government leaders, government supporters “saw the election as a mandate for reform.”703 
Observers of the time noted this significance. According to Hendrik van der Merwe: “The 
removal of apartheid has been accepted, at least intellectually, by those who voted for the 
                                                          
698
 Melunsky, 92 
699
 Seegers, The Military in the Making, 249 
700
 Melunsky, 92  
701
 African National Congress, “Pointers towards an initiative aimed at imposing negotiations on the ANC”, 
23/7/1987, MCH01-66.2, ANC Archives, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape 
702
 African National Congress, “Minutes of meeting on 8/9/87 in London Between Ourselves and the Sparrow 
Comrades”, MCH01-66.3, p6, ANC Archives, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape 
703
 Melunsky, 108 
228 
 
National Party, as inevitable. They know white rule has come to an end. The greatest fear 
now is not black majority rule, but the process through which black majority rule will be 
achieved and the way it will be manifested.”704 
 
Three months later, in October 1987, the ANC adopts two resolutions on negotiations. The 
first is a public statement on negotiations (discussed in Chapter Five) where the ANC 
reaffirms that it was ready and willing to enter negotiations provided they were aimed at 
ending apartheid and transforming South African into a non-racial democracy. The second is 
a confidential resolution declaring that “a suspension of violence must be negotiated and 
must involve agreed action on both sides.”705  
 
In mid-1988, at a strategizing meeting on Robben Island attended by inter alia PW Botha, 
Barnard, Coetsee, Fanie van der Merwe and Louw, there was intense debate on strategies to 
reduce violence and break the impasse. A discussion document advocated the release of 
Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners as a preparatory step for Mandela’s release and 
beginning of constructive negotiations.
706
 The document stressed that Mandela’s release be 
part of a broader process of negotiations. The ANC was able to get information on this 
meeting. They doubted the government’s bona fides, and believed that the government 
intended to use Mandela’s release “to trigger a political realignment and start off a sterile 
negotiations exercise in order to play for time.” The ANC argued that the armed struggle 
“should not be derailed by the release” and highlighted various obstacles to negotiations.707   
 
The turning point for the ANC happens on 22 December 1988 with the signing of the New 
York Accords. The subsequent closure of MK camps in Angola, and relocation of MK into 
East Africa effectively rendered the armed struggle obsolete. The ANC would have to 
negotiate the end of apartheid. This happens at the same time that the government realises 
they need to negotiate with the ANC. The turning point for the government happens after the 
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May 1987. Therefore, the period between January and August 1989 i.e. the end of the second 
stage of pre-negotiation, is when the South African pre-negotiation process reaches the point 
of seriousness where the NP government and ANC reach a shared understanding that 
negotiated solutions are possible. This is the perception by each side that the other is serious 
about finding a negotiated solution – that is, that the other is willing to lose a little to win a 
little rather than win or lose all in a non-negotiated approach. The contents of three 
documents indicate this shared understanding: the Mandela Document, the Government 
Team Document and the Harare Declaration.   
 
The important question is whether this shared understanding that a negotiated solution is 
possible, was a ripe moment i.e. a mutual sense of hurting stalemate.  
 
Yes, reaching a shared understanding that a negotiated solution is possible is a ripe moment. 
The crucial condition in 1989 was the mutual sense of hurting stalemate – both sides felt that 
they could not win and all would be worse if the conflict was not ended. South African 
government leaders, faced with a legitimacy crisis, and lack of black popular acceptance of 
constitutional reform measures, saw negotiations as a way out.
708
 Mandela made this point 
clear in his position paper to Botha stating that the 1980s political crisis had made it 
necessary for the ANC and the government to negotiate a political settlement and that his 
intervention was “influenced by purely domestic issues, by the civil strife and ruin into which 
the country is sliding.”709 And in the aftermath of the New York Accords, the Harare 
Declaration, drafted by Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki, declared apartheid “an obstacle to 
peace and an affront to justice and human dignity, and must be abandoned.”710 The 
declaration encouraged the negotiated end to the apartheid system. 
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The actors agreed that a negotiated settlement would meet their basic needs. To this end, they 
agreed on the basic format through which such a settlement would be reached i.e. a two-
staged process, first involving a period of talks-about-talks on preconditions, and then the 
opening of official negotiations. The government saw a two-staged negotiation process, 
where intensive talks-about-talks on stumbling blocks and obstacles (i.e. preconditions) 
would precede a formal phase where “participants in the negotiation process [would] be 
empowered to enter into an agreement if they reach a consensus” (i.e. settlement 
negotiations). One possibility, the government team argued, would be “for a democratic 
process to empower people to really become formally involved in a more structured 
negotiation situation.”711 This mirrored Mandela’s format who wrote in the first stage, the 
ANC and the government would need to work out preconditions for a proper climate for 
negotiations; and the second stage would be the actual negotiations themselves that would 
occur when the climate is ripe for doing so.”712 The Harare Declaration was also in 
agreement. It stated that it was essential for a necessary climate of negotiations to be created 
before any negotiations can take place and placed the responsibility on the South African 
government to create this climate. 
 
This shared understanding that a negotiated solution is possible did not occur simultaneously 
for both sides, and did not correspond to a specific moment. For the government, it was the 
consequence of the constitutional reform process which created a momentum the government 
found difficult to control. For the ANC, it was the political pressures brought about by the 
Nkomati and New York Accords that rendered armed struggle obsolete. This is the ripe 
moment for resolution. However, despite reaching the important shared understanding, it 
would take another two years for settlement negotiations to commence. 
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6.5.3. Why did the NP Government Choose to Negotiate? 
 
NP government chose to negotiate with the ANC in order to legitimise constitutional reform. 
 
By mid-1987 there was a consensus in the government that meaningful constitutional reform 
needed to provide for all the races at the level of central government. Exactly how this was to 
come about was unclear. In the face of the de-legitimation of Botha’s reform proposals and 
concessions, negotiation with the ANC was the only feasible alternative as to how such 
representation would occur. Possibility for negotiations with the ANC arose because the 
second state of emergency had effectively diminished two of the ANC’s three options: mass 
mobilisation and the creation of alternative structures. Thus while the ANC could continue to 
prosecute the armed struggle, it would be deploying its weakest arm against the government’s 
strongest point – the military. The government reasoned that the ANC would inevitably run 
out of options, and would have to negotiate. 
 
The release of political prisoners was central to this process and crucial for the viability of a 
political solution to legitimise constitutional reform. The government’s logic was that without 
the release of political prisoners, the stability created by the second state of emergency was 
unsustainable. By releasing political prisoners, space would open to make viable i.e. ensure 
buy-in from the black population, and legitimise constitutional reform, especially if the ANC 
was an important part of this process. The strategy of negotiation, therefore, was understood 
as a continuation of constitutional reform and not the consequence of its failure; negotiation 
with the ANC was a bilateral solution to their goal of constitutional reform. The release of 
Nelson Mandela and his political role in taking constitutional reform to its logical conclusion 
is the crucial government strategy.    
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6.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to answer two questions: (1) why the NP government chose to negotiate 
at all; and (2) why the NP government chose to negotiate with the ANC. In answering this 
question the chapter used stages one and two of Tomlin’s model on pre-negotiation. Tomlin 
writes that the first stage of pre-negotiation is brought about by an event or change in 
conditions that causes a restructuring of values attached to alternative outcomes. The stage is 
characterised by an assessment of the problem produced by changing conditions, and a 
preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that adds negotiation to the range of policy 
options. When negotiation is added, a turning point is reached and the process moves to the 
second stage. In the second stage, a negotiated solution is actively considered. Another 
turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as the preferred and necessary policy 
alternative, moving the process to the third stage.  
 
The chapter concluded by discussing whether indicators of ripeness can assist in answering 
why the NP government chose to negotiate. The chapter argued that the NP government 
chose to negotiate in order to legitimise constitutional reform. The strategy of negotiation was 
understood as a continuation of constitutional reform and not the consequence of its failure; 
negotiation with the ANC was a bilateral solution to their goal of constitutional reform. The 
release of Nelson Mandela and his political role in taking constitutional reform to its logical 
conclusion was the crucial government strategy. 
 
In the unfolding pre-negotiation phase, the NP government and ANC reach a point of 
seriousness i.e. a shared understanding of the problem, and shared understanding that a 
negotiated solution is possible. This was when the South African conflict was ripe for 
resolution; it is the consequence of first and second stages of pre-negotiation. The next stage 
would involve developing a commitment to a negotiated solution.   
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   CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
The Third Stage of Pre-negotiation 
Committing to Negotiate 1990-1991 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss how the NP government and the ANC produced a 
commitment to a negotiated solution. In explaining this process, the chapter will use the third 
stage of Tomlin’s model on pre-negotiation. Tomlin writes that the third stage is the transition 
from ‘whether’ to negotiate to ‘what’ will be negotiated. The policy focus is initially inner-
directed as parties consider alternative negotiating scenarios, reflecting varying degrees of scope 
for the potential negotiation, and successive steps towards increasing commitment toward a 
negotiated solution. The focus of policy makers then becomes outer-directed as the 
preoccupation with internal decision dynamics gives way to increased concern for the other 
parties to the problem. The communication of a desire to negotiate from one party to another is 
the turning point to stage four.
713
   
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the processes and issues that 
served as a background to the period of preliminary pact-making. Attention is paid to the 
negotiating positions and strategies of the South African government and ANC, and the 
preconditions that topped the agenda. The second section shows how the parties produced a 
commitment to a negotiated solution through a series of official agreements that established 
important rules of interaction, defined the incentive structure for political violence and peace, 
and locked the parties into an interdependent bargaining relationship.  
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7.1. Turning Point: Going Public on 2 February 1990 
 
The transition from secret and informal to open and formal pre-negotiation is signalled by the 
parties’ going public with their intent to replace violence with talking. This is an important 
turning point; it shows that political leaders are willing to accept the inevitable risks and costs of 
negotiations. This public acknowledgement radically changes the dynamics of the conflict: “it 
unleashes a new, uncertain interregnum.”714  
 
De Klerk’s seminal address to the Tricameral Parliament that opened the third stage of pre-
negotiation was broad in scope. De Klerk responded positively to a number of demands made in 
the Harare Declaration, signalling a commitment to negotiate. De Klerk announced a series of 
immediate, short, and longer term initiatives that profoundly changed the course of pre-
negotiation.  
 
In the immediate measures, the prohibitions placed on the resistance organisations i.e. the ANC, 
PAC, SACP and a number of subsidiary organisations were rescinded. Political activists who 
were serving prison sentences for membership of the above resistance organisations, or who had 
committed offenses because a ban on these organisations was in place, would be identified and 
released. This excluded activists who were serving prison sentences for murder, terrorism or 
arson. Media and education regulations imposed in terms of the state of emergency would be 
abolished and the emergency restrictions on the radical UDF-aligned National Education Crisis 
Committee (NECC), the South African National Students Congress, the UDF, COSATU, and 33 
organisations were rescinded.  
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The short-term measures included the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela. Mandela, De 
Klerk stated, could make a constructive contribution to a peaceful political process in South 
Africa.  
 
Long-term measures included a request to the South African Law Commission to examine 
suitable constitutional models for a new South Africa that could safeguard the government’s mix 
of individual and minority rights.  
 
De Klerk stated that while the government accepted the principle of the recognition and 
protection of individual rights, and that the most practical way of protecting those rights was 
vested in a declaration of rights justiciable by an independent judiciary, a system for protection 
of the rights of individuals, minorities, and national entities had to form a well-rounded and 
balanced whole: 
 
The South African Law Commission’s task was thus directed at “the balanced protection in a 
future constitution of the human rights of [all South Africans], as well as collective units, 
associations, minorities and nations. This investigation [would] also serve the purpose of 
supporting negotiations towards a new constitution.”715At the same time, De Klerk stressed that 
the government remained committed to its vision of law and order.
716
 As De Klerk saw it, “the 
process of unbanning was not coupled to the right to political expression per se, but rather to 
facilitate participation in politics geared towards a negotiated settlement.”717     
 
The government’s intention was to negotiate with all political leaders who sought peace and the 
unconditional lifting of the prohibitions of the said organisations placed all political players in a 
position to pursue politics freely:  
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“The time for talking has arrived and whoever still makes excuses does not really wish to talk… Walk through the 
open door; take your place at the negotiating table together with the Government and other leaders who have 
important power bases inside and outside of Parliament. Henceforth, everybody’s political realism will be tested 
against their realism, their workability and their fairness. The time for negotiation has arrived.” 
 
De Klerk further stated that the government had laid the table for political leaders to “begin 
talking about a new dispensation, to reach an understanding by way of dialogue and discussion.” 
In these initiatives, “Mr Mandela could play an important part. The Government has noted that 
he has declared himself to be willing to make a constructive contribution to the peaceful political 
process in South Africa.”718     
 
De Klerk writes that he had opted to make such far-reaching announcements because they would 
surprise his opponents, provide the government with an early initiative, and enable them to seize 
the moral high-ground early.
719
 De Klerk also realised that Botha’s incremental reforms were 
dangerous: “it gave the reforms’ intended beneficiaries the impression that the government was 
responding to their pressures, which, in turn, sharpened their demands.”720 
 
Mandela was released on 11 February 1990 after 27 years in prison. His release was 
accompanied by a wave of township demonstrations reflecting both the excitement at political 
liberalisation and the impatience for an end to the hardships of life under apartheid.
721
 Protests 
were held on the Reef in Thokoza (80,000 residents), Daveyton (60,000), Alexandra (50,000), 
and Tembisa (20,000).
722
 These demonstrations highlighted local grievances, and targeted the 
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discredited system of black local authority. Mandela’s release was also accompanied by a wave 
of unrest in the homelands.
723
  
 
It was in KwaZulu and Natal where political violence intensified, transforming the conflict in 
that region effectively into a low-intensity civil war. In the weekend of Mandela’s release, more 
than fifty people were killed as armed gangs rampaged through urban townships, fighting, 
looting and burning homes.
724
 The violence was particularly intense in the Edendale Valley 
outside Pietermaritzburg, with the body count reaching 700 by the beginning of March 1990.  
 
7.2. Preparing the First Bilateral: The Parties’ Positions 
 
Despite the mounting violence, preparations for public and formal pre-negotiation gathered 
apace with a third ANC-NIS meeting later in February, this time at the Bellevue-Palace Hotel in 
Berne, the Swiss capital. The agenda was to lay the ground for the return of exiles, and to 
prepare the first official meeting that would take place between the South African cabinet and 
ANC leaders.  
 
At the end of the meeting, the NIS and ANC agreed to form a Steering Committee, charged with 
arranging the first round of parleys. Headed by Fanie van der Merwe (for the government) and 
Jacob Zuma (for the ANC), the Steering Committee would work through the details of the first 
official pre-negotiation meeting i.e. the agenda, location, size and composition of the delegates, 
security and related procedural issues.
725
 The Steering Committees first task was to negotiate 
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indemnity; although the ANC was legalised, individual members had not yet been indemnified 
against prosecution for their violations of security laws. In order to do its work, the ANC 
members of the committee had to be smuggled into South Africa by the NIS. The committee set 
11 April as the date for the first meeting between the government and the ANC.  
 
7.2.1. The NP Government Position and Strategy 
 
The government negotiating team was essentially the cabinet. The Department of Constitutional 
Development was transformed into a structure that would initiate, direct and support the 
government negotiations team and strategy.
726
 De Klerk appointed Gerrit Viljoen as its minister 
and Roelf Meyer as his deputy. Barnard was removed from the NIS and appointed the director-
general of constitutional development. Viljoen, Meyer and Barnard’s task was to “develop the 
government’s negotiation’s policy into more detailed concepts” in order to “put well-considered 
proposals and fall-back positions on the table when the real negotiations began.”727  
 
For the broader negotiating team, De Klerk appointed cabinet ministers on the assumption that 
their portfolios would be involved in different aspects of the negotiation process. Stoffel van der 
Merwe, the minister of education and development aid, “was responsible for black education in 
the white areas and for relations with the six self-governing black states.” Pik Botha, the minister 
of foreign affairs, “was responsible for relations with the four ‘independent’ black states – 
Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.” Hernus Kriel was responsible for provincial 
affairs. And the three security ministers, Kobie Coetsee (justice), General Magnus Malan 
(defence), and Adriaan Vlok (law and order), were responsible for matters such as the release of 
political prisoners, the return of exiles, the lifting of the state of emergency, and the ANC’s 
suspension of the armed struggle.
728
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The government’s negotiating strategy rested on five assumptions: “that the NP could stay united 
and hold off the far right during the process; that Western countries would accept some notion of 
group rights and lift sanctions; that sufficient numbers of conservative black leaders would rally 
to an anti-ANC alliance to destroy the ANC claim to majority representation; that state power 
could be used to sap the demands of the ANC negotiators, forcing them into compromise; and 
finally that the ANC was controlled by strong leaders who could command compliance from 
their radical constituents.” The foundation of their constitutional strategy was based on the 1989 
Broederbond guidelines: “[each] ‘component unit’ of the population would control its ‘own 
affairs’, with ‘general affairs’ decided by consensus between the majority of each such unit in the 
national legislature.”729 The Broederbond had constructed various arguments and scenarios on 
these principles through comparative constitutional studies of countries marked by racial and 
ethnic imbalances such as Fiji, Canada, and Singapore.
730
  
 
Four principles that formed the basis of an envisioned constitutional dispensation emerged from 
this internal NP debate.  
 
First, the ‘group’ rather than the individual would provide the basis for political representation, 
and would be the primary repository of constitutional rights and protections.
731
 Second, South 
Africa was understood to be a country of minority groups with no majority. Third, a system of 
minority protection was fundamental. And fourth, all racial groups should be allocated separate 
legislative institutions to decide their ‘own’ affairs. In short, the basic notion was that the South 
African population “would be statutorily differentiated into a variety of groups (white, 
‘coloured’, Indian, urban black, ethnic homeland, national state). The groups would participate in 
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central government through representation in an executive institution, within which the principle 
of ‘co-determination’ (or mutual veto) would govern decision-making.”732  
 
The NP’s 1987 and 1989 electoral manifestos had “recognised the logic of a common voters’ roll 
in a shared state” and NP documents soon “began to refer to the concept of maintenance of 
community life.”733 The party’s 1987 manifesto stated that the NP was “committed to striving for 
‘full participation for all’, ‘freedom’, ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’.”734 The manifesto stated that 
the party would promote reform by “broadening the democratic base of the government.”735  
 
The party’s 1989 Five-Year Plan of Action, which outlined the government’s vision for a future 
South Africa, and adopted at the party’s 1989 conference, was the key document.736 The 
document moved from the premise of ‘group rights’, articulated within the existing distinction 
between ‘own’ and ‘general affairs’, and argued that every South African would have the right to 
participate in decision-making at levels of government that affected their interest, subject to the 
principle of ‘non-domination’. Accordingly, the document rejected the principles of unitarism 
and majoritarianism. Viljoen stated that these principles were unacceptable to the NP: “The 
practical realities of our country require an effective form of protection for minorities as a 
component of any new power dispensation.”737 Thus any negotiation for a system guaranteeing 
full political participation would move from the premise of group rights, and the protection of 
minorities, which was argued to be a move away from rigid race classification.
738
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The NP, however, did realise that the new concept was troublesome. They had to deal with an 
inherent problem: given that the new path was justified as a move away from race classification, 
how could they articulate the notion of ‘the group’ as a concept that did not simply restate race 
classification in a different form? The Plan of Action dealt with this through a clumsy “circuitous 
logic” that illustrated the dilemma and quandary a group rights ideology produced. First, 
‘groups’ were “defined and recognised through negotiation with ‘existing groups’.” Second, 
“protection for continued, legally sanctioned, effective racial discrimination i.e. a right to 
‘disassociation’” was entrenched. Third, “a group [could] be non-ascriptive, such that a person 
[could] change ‘groups’ if accepted by the ‘recipient group’.” And fourth, the plan allowed for 
the creation of a ‘non-group’.739 Because of the terminological difficulties that arose from the 
group rights discourse, the NP began to relax its call for statutory group rights. As the public pre-
negotiation gathered apace, Viljoen acknowledged that the NP would no longer insist on the 
concept: “If groups are no longer to be essential building blocks of the constitution, of the whole 
system as such, it should nevertheless remain available as one option for those requiring its 
protection.”740 
 
NP insiders thus saw the process of negotiations as an extension of the old ‘consociation’ 
approach: “[through] a process of bargaining, trade-offs and compromise, representative racial 
and ethnic elites would come to a ‘pact’ about South Africa’s future.” This process was 
envisaged as a “series of stages to a settlement” as well as some kind of “grudging joint rule with 
the ANC.”741 A few days after De Klerk’s speech, Viljoen predicted a political settlement in ten 
years where “South Africa would have ‘some kind of coalition of parties’ with the NP no longer 
in sole control.”742 Describing the process that would follow, Viljoen stated that “[the] first phase 
[would] be to clear away perceived obstacles to negotiations.” The next phase would be to “deal 
with how the negotiation process should be structured and who should be there.” The phase after 
that “would involve actual negotiation on a new constitution.” Viljoen also stated that 
“negotiations proper” could begin at the end of 1990; that the “entire negotiation process should 
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be completed in about two years”; and that a “general referendum would have to be held for the 
whole country to give legitimacy to any new constitutional proposals.”743            
 
7.2.2. The ANC Position and Strategy 
 
The lifting of restrictions happened at a time when the ANC was floundering.  
 
On 18 January 1990, Alfred Nzo had mistakenly read a confidential document in a press 
conference admitting the ANC no longer had the capacity to intensify the armed struggle in any 
meaningful way.
744
 This statement contradicted a public statement by Nzo a week before. A 
week later, Joe Modise maintained that the ANC “was still determined to ‘escalate’ the armed 
struggle but confirmed that ‘some problems’ had caused a reduction in military operations.”745  
 
The movement of guerrillas from Angola to Zambia and then finally to East Africa confirmed 
that MK’s war had failed to achieve its primary purpose i.e. the generation of a popular 
insurrection, and given that this process coincided with the inauguration of public pre-
negotiation, rendered the armed struggle option obsolete. As this realisation sunk in, it created a 
climate of confusion and anxiety. Mbokodo agents further dented morale; according Jacob 
Zuma, deputy director of NAT, in early 1990, Mbokodo already had over 100 people detained in 
a new Ugandan detention camp who “had instruction to sow discord within our forces.”746 This 
climate of uncertainty had serious organisational implications; according to Maharaj, the ANC 
consequently became bogged down in factional disputes, poor communication lines and mixed 
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messages. Personnel management in sensitive areas such as special operations and information 
gathering, dissemination and evaluation became extremely poor.
747
 
 
While the prospects in continued exile darkened rapidly, the ANC was not in a position to come 
home let alone negotiate. Further, since it was not its creation, the 1980s uprising had nurtured 
several groups of rival claimants to the key positions of authority in the resistance against 
apartheid. The most important one for the next round of pre-negotiation was the Reception 
Committee for released political prisoners headed by Cyril Ramaphosa and it included prominent 
UDF activists who were dominant in the 1980s uprising.
748
 
 
To prepare for the new terrain brought about by De Klerk’s announcements, and manage the 
post-Tambo succession process, the ANC decided on a collective internal leadership group. This 
group was chaired by Walter Sisulu and comprised of Robben Islanders, UDF regional leaders, 
ANC department heads from Lusaka, and all members of the NEC who could be sent to South 
Africa.
749
 
 
To consider the changing situation arising from De Klerk’s announcements, the NEC met 
between 14 and 16 February in Lusaka. In a statement released after the NEC meeting, the ANC 
stated that the government had not met the conditions of the Harare Declaration, and that the 
ANC would suspend hostilities only once the government had done so. Specifically, the ANC 
called for the release of all political prisoners and detainees, the end of the state of emergency, 
the repeal of all repressive legislation, the end of political trials and the removal of all troops 
from the townships as preconditions.
750
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The ANC highlighted “the need for MK to continue operating” given the escalating political 
violence.
751
 The argument was that MK had a responsibility to defend the people until the 
government took “all necessary measures to end this violence and thus create the situation when 
the present obligation on our part to act in defence of the people, arms in hand, will fall away.”752 
The ANC’s policy was thus neither one of peace nor war; “it emphasised that it was not 
continuing with violence in order to overthrow the state … but rather that the armed struggle was 
being maintained in order to pressure the government into submitting to the terms of the Harare 
Declaration.”753 The strategy was to perpetuate the notion that MK was an effective fighting 
force in order to sustain the claim that negotiations had been achieved through its actions and 
that it was entering talks on its own terms.           
 
Two weeks after his release, Mandela flew to Lusaka to meet and brief the NEC. At the meeting, 
the national executive elected Mandela as the ANC’s deputy president, and Nzo as the acting 
president. The NEC also agreed that Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma would provide Mandela with 
political assistance for an upcoming bilateral with the NP government. Penuell Maduna and 
Mathews Phosa, both from the ANC’s legal department in Lusaka, would provide Mandela, 
Mbeki and Zuma with technical assistance. Thus, the ANC’s representatives in the Steering 
Committee would comprise the ANC’s core negotiating team.  
 
The ANC’s constitutional policy can be traced back to the principles laid out in the Freedom 
Charter. Albert Luthuli writes that the Freedom Charter was not only a product of its time but 
also the most agreed-upon articulation of an alternative South Africa.
754
 It presented an 
unambiguous non-racial alternative to Verwoerdian apartheid.
755
 The ANC’s constitutional 
proposals for going into a formal negotiation process were contained in a document called the 
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‘Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa’, that was published by the 
Constitutional Committee chaired by Zola Skweyiya.  
 
The Constitutional Guidelines was an extension of the Freedom Charter, “a partial conversion of 
that document from a vision for the future into a constitutional reality.”756 According to 
Skweyiya, the Constitutional Guidelines were an illustration of a paradigm shift in the ANC in 
preparation for negotiations: “It is an ideological instrument, a morale booster and a clarification 
of our objectives in our present struggle against apartheid.”757 Where the two documents differ, it 
must be assumed that the Freedom Charter is authoritative. According to the guidelines: 
 
“The constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter. Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee 
the fundamental human rights irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed and shall provide appropriate mechanisms 
for their enforcement.”758 
 
The guidelines guaranteed freedom of association, expression, thought, worship and the press. 
These freedoms were subject to the qualification that the “advocacy or practice of racism, 
fascism, Nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred shall be 
outlawed.”759 They guaranteed social and economic rights – “the state would be obliged to 
protect the right to work, to guarantee education and social security, and to take active steps to 
eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination.”760 
The guidelines also made the case for a Workers’ Charter, protecting the right to strike and 
collective bargaining, to be incorporated into the constitution, and provided for affirmative action 
to redress past inequalities.
761
 The NP’s proposals on the constitutional protection of group rights 
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were denounced with the argument that such protection would simply perpetuate apartheid.
762
 
Simultaneously, the guidelines did declare that “the state shall recognise the linguistic and 
cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural 
development.”763  
 
While the guidelines reflected the ANC’s first order preferences, the Harare Declaration outlined 
the preconditions to official negotiations and contained a brief section describing the ANC’s 
view of a future state. The Declaration called for negotiation but with conditions; the bottom line 
would be the creation of a non-racial majoritarian democracy. The Mandela Document to Botha, 
however, showed flexibility in the ANC’s position; the importance of addressing white fears, an 
outcome of secret talks with Barnard’s team, poured cold water over the Declaration’s bottom 
line. After Mandela was released, he began to emphasise addressing minority concerns in the 
constitution, to the consternation of many in the ANC.
764
 
 
7.3. Getting to the First Official Meeting: The Issues 
 
Three main issues shaped the process leading to the first official meeting between the South 
African government and the ANC: the issue of indemnity (the release of political prisoners and 
return of exiles), the political violence in Natal, and the escalation of violence beyond Natal’s 
borders. 
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7.3.1. The Indemnity Issue: The Release of Political Prisoners and Return of Exiles 
 
As discussed, the Steering Committee, formed as a result of the ANC-NIS bilateral in 
Switzerland, had been tasked with putting together the details of the first formal talks i.e. the 
agenda, location, size and composition of the delegations.
765
 The committee also dealt with the 
details of possible agreements that would remove the remaining obstacles in the way of 
negotiation. The ANC team made it clear that these developments did not signal the beginning of 
settlement negotiations; the ANC was only prepared to enter such negotiations only after 
preconditions set out in the Harare Declaration had been met, the most important being the 
unconditional release of all political prisoners. By contrast the government team wanted to 
ensure that the ANC renounce violence in exchange of lifting the state of emergency.
766
  
 
In response to the ANC’s demands, the government conceded that it was willing to release select 
political prisoners as a gesture and in particular those serving sentences merely because they 
were members of a banned organisation or because they committed an offense because a 
prohibition on the respective organisation was in force.  
 
While the government’s intention was to break a logjam, it created another impasse; the 
government position, articulated in the February 2 announcement, fell short of the Harare 
Declaration. This is because political prisoners who committed offenses in the category affected 
by De Klerk’s announcements essentially committed ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ political offenses. 
These are offenses that do not involve the commission of common law crimes. Essentially, they 
are aimed directly at the government, do not involve injury to private individuals and property, 
and include treason, sedition and espionage.
767
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The problem was that given the nature of the South African conflict, the majority of political 
prisoners were convicted of common offenses such as murder, assault, robbery, public violence, 
malicious damage to property etc.
768
 However, these offenses were committed within a political 
context or with some sort of political motive. These are called ‘related’ political offenses, but 
because of their composite character, it was difficult to distinguish between those that were 
essentially political and those that weren’t.769 What complicated matters was the nature of these 
offenses given the South African conflict; they frequently involved elements of extreme violence 
against private individuals.
770
 To avoid the impasse standing in the way of the first bilateral, the 
Steering Committee came to a compromise; the category of political prisoner release would be 
negotiated, defined, and placed on the agenda of the first formal pre-negotiation bilateral. This 
was acceptable to both parties. 
 
7.3.2. The Roots of Political Violence 
 
Preparations for the first ANC-Government bilateral also provided a glimpse of trends to follow.  
 
The first trend was that it became clear that the ANC and government were not the only role-
players in the unfolding political process; the sustainability of the process would also depend on 
the alliances and relationships that these two players were able to develop. The most important 
role-player in this regard was Inkatha, and its leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.  
 
Inkatha had an awkward relationship with the ANC. On the one hand, Inkatha had fought 
running battles with the UDF in Natal in the 1980s, effectively transforming Natal’s midlands 
region into killing fields. At the same time, Inkatha had refused to negotiate with the South 
                                                          
768
 Raylene Keightley, “Political Offences and Indemnity in South Africa” South African Journal on Human Rights 
9 (1993), 336 
769
 Ibid. 
770
 Ibid., 337 
249 
 
African government until the ANC was legalised and all political prisoners released. To 
compound matters, Inkatha was also essentially a regional political organisation, trapped in 
ethnic mobilisation, and formed to preserve Zulu cultural traditions.
771
 While this ‘ethno-
nationalist’ character fitted very well with its relationship with the government, it did not sit well 
with the ANC and UDF, especially its Natal midlands leadership.   
 
The second trend was that political violence regularly interrupted the political process, but at the 
same time drew the parties closer together in their commitment to negotiation. There were two 
sources of this violence.  
 
The first is rooted in the UDF-Inkatha relationship. The political direction of Inkatha in the 
1980s, particularly its consolidation as a Zulu ethnic movement entrenched as a regional 
(Bantustan) and local government, set it on a path that led to regionalism, federalism and 
increasingly to militant Zulu ethnic mobilisation.
772
 This set it apart from the UDF, which was 
riding on a post-Soweto uprising wave of popular revolt, directed at the very regional and local 
government and the ethnic divisions of apartheid that Inkatha became entrenched and sought to 
defend.  
 
The 1980s uprising intensified the UDF versus Inkatha conflict, transforming these two 
movements into enemies; when it appeared that the state would lose all control over the 
structures it had created among African people, when township councils came under massive 
political and physically violent attack, when revolt spread to the Bantustans, Inkatha defended 
those structures, attempted the incorporation of even more people under its jurisdiction, and 
extended it repressive apparatus through the formation of the notorious Zulu Police.
773
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The second source of violence is rooted in the networks of the government’s security services, 
notably the South African Police and to a lesser extent the SADF. These networks became 
known as the Third Force. While the idea of the Third Force can be located in the 1960s counter-
insurgency strategies of the South African security forces, its 1990s manifestation can be traced 
to senior security service official discussions in the 1980s. Between 1985 and 1986, the State 
Security Council (SSC) discussed the establishment of a Third Force as a parallel structure to the 
SADF and SAP on a number of occasions.
774
 The most important was a document circulated by 
the Secretariat of the SSC on 9 May 1986 entitled ‘Creation of a Special Counter-Revolutionary 
Capacity (Including a Third Force)’. The document “defined ‘special capacity’ as ‘specifically 
organised, equipped and trained to plan, co-ordinate and set up counter-revolutionary actions to 
fight internal unrest and terrorism’.”775 A close relationship between Inkatha and the Third Force 
soon developed.  
 
The third trend was that the government wanted to ensure that it had allies in the negotiation 
process. To this end, government strategists began to apply to South Africa the techniques drawn 
from the decolonisation process in Namibia where SWAPO’s electoral power had been 
considerably reduced.
776
 Government strategists calculated that they could form a right-of-centre 
alliance with conservative homelands leaders which could defeat the ANC at the polls. Viljoen 
was identified as a key architect and leading advocate of this strategy.
777
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Viljoen argued that this would be achieved “by negotiating full citizenship rights for all in a 
constitution with strong guarantees for minority rights and a powerful second chamber.
778
 The 
strategy depended crucially on Inkatha, as this was the only organisation outside of the 
Chartersist movement, with which the NP government could reasonably hope to build an 
alliance.
779
 Not only did Inkatha have a substantial power base in Natal, but it had a long 
historical presence and pedigree in that region.  
 
7.3.3. Escalation of Violence 
 
By early March, the Steering Committee had set aside 11 April as the date for the first bilateral 
between the ANC and the government. However, political violence after Mandela’s release 
escalated in scope and intensity, putting enormous pressure on these preparations. Two incidents 
are significant, both occurring towards the end of March. 
 
The first happened in the Edendale Valley in the Pietermaritzburg area and was the worst 
violence at the time in the conflict between the UDF and Inkatha.
780
 This fresh outbreak of 
violence signalled a new phase of major, calculated escalation of fighting.
781
 
 
The violence began on 25 March 1990 after an Inkatha-political rally in Durban addressed by 
Buthelezi. In the emotionally charged post-rally environment, Inkatha warlords organised and 
mobilised an army of 12,000 militants from the outlying Inkatha-controlled areas, and divided 
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into separate battalions armed with shotgun rifles and spears. These legions, numbering several 
thousand a piece, “mounted a full-scale assault from the KwaZulu territory on ANC [residential] 
strongholds in the embattled Edendale complex.”782 In what was to become known as the ‘Seven 
Days War’ (25 – 31 March 1990), “Inkatha battalions, which were ferried by bus from place to 
place by the KwaZulu Police [KZP], fought pitched battles with UDF/ANC supporters.” By the 
time the fighting subsided, “whole communities lay in ruins, dozens of houses had been set 
ablaze, hundreds killed or seriously injured, and thousands of people had fled for their lives.” In 
terms of the body count and levels of destruction, Inkatha scored an impressive victory; “over 
200 people were killed and 20,000 were made refugees, almost all of them UDF supporter or 
people not prepared to show allegiance to Inkatha.”783  
 
In response, Mandela and Buthelezi scheduled a joint peace rally on 2 April at Taylor’s Halt, an 
Inkatha stronghold, where both leaders were meant to share a platform. However, the 
UDF/ANC’s Natal leadership rejected Mandela’s peace gesture to Buthelezi and summarily 
cancelled the Mandela’s participation. In a public show of defiance, Harry Gwala led a 70-strong 
delegation from the Edendale ‘Valley of Death’ to lobby against the meeting arguing that “the 
intensity of the war [with Inkatha] is such that an ANC-Inkatha rally could reduce Taylor’s Halt 
to a battleground.” The prevailing atmosphere, Gwala continued, was not ideal for a joint peace 
rally in Natal.
784
 Gwala had the support of influential power-brokers in the ANC’s Natal 
leadership such as Archie Gumede (the national UDF co-president) and Diliza Mji, the ANC’s 
Natal secretary. The issue created major divisions in the ANC about how to manage and resolve 
the Inkatha matter; with Mandela argued for a rapprochement with Inkatha, while Gwala insisted 
that this was counter-productive when it was ANC members filling the mortuaries. In the face of 
the peace rally cancellation, Mandela addressed a 2,500 audience in Edendale and stated that 
Inkatha was not the enemy, and that Inkatha had to know that the ANC wanted to make peace.
785
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The second incident occurred in Sebokeng, in the Vaal Triangle. On 26 March, police opened 
fire on an unarmed crowd of 50,000 people; an incident that became known as a second 
Sharpeville. The UDF had called a March to protest against the chronic housing shortage, 
unaccountable councils, rentals, and a persistent education crisis. 60 rounds of buckshot 
ammunition, one of the most lethal, were fired in 2 second, 5 people were killed, and 161 
injured, and all were shot from behind. As a result of these developments, the ANC’s suspended 
its participation in the Steering Committee. Mandela was livid: 
 
“This sort of action angered me like no other, and I told the press that every white policeman in South Africa 
regarded every black person as a military target. After consultation with the NEC, I announced the suspension of our 
talks and warned Mr de Klerk that he could not ‘talk about negotiations on the one hand and murder our people on 
the other’.”786   
 
De Klerk was dismayed with the ANC’s decision: 
 
“In my response, I expressed my astonishment at the ANC’s decision. I said that it was difficult to understand why 
an organisation which claimed to be interested in peace, refused to talk about that very issue. They had wanted to 
discuss their perceptions of the obstacles in the way of negotiations, and so did we. I added that a continuing 
commitment to violence and peaceful negotiations were mutually exclusive.”787 
 
Despite the suspension of talks, Mandela met privately with De Klerk on 5 April at Tuynhuys. 
Both leaders discussed their perceptions of the obstacles in the way of negotiations and agreed 
that violence and negotiations were mutually exclusive. Mandela and De Klerk resolved the 
deadlock. De Klerk promised a judicial inquiry into the Sebokeng shootings. The two also agreed 
that the first round of talks would go ahead on 2 May.  
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7.4. The Groote Schuur Minute 
 
7.4.1. The Proceedings and Agreement 
 
The first formal bilateral between the ANC and the NP government began on 2 May 1990 at 
Groote Schuur. The meeting lasted three days. There were eleven delegations on each side. The 
government delegation was headed by De Klerk and included Gerrit Viljoen, Kobie Coetsee, Pik 
Botha, Hernus Kriel, Roelf Meyer, Adriaan Vlok, Dawie De Villiers, the minister of energy and 
public enterprises, Barend du Plessis, the minister of finance, and Stoffel van der Merwe. The 
ANC delegation was led by Mandela and included Thabo Mbeki, Joe Modise, Alfred Nzo, Joe 
Slovo, Walter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrada, Ruth Mompati, the head of the ANC’s religious affairs, 
Cheryl Carolous, the publicity secretary of the Western Cape UDF, Beyers Naudé and Archie 
Gumede, the national co-president of the UDF, and UDF Natal leader. 
 
Comparison between the ANC and NP government negotiating teams shows important 
differences. The ANC side consisted of senior political figures. This was to be a dominant 
theme; ANC teams comprised of high-powered political figures, representing broad 
constituencies, and thus were able to manage the ANC’s broad interests. By contrast, NP 
government teams comprised of cabinet ministers and government officials whose roles in the 
process were not delegated based on political seniority, but for the mere fact that their portfolios 
were involved in the different parts of the negotiation process. Niel Barnard identified this as a 
strategic weakness on the part of the government: 
 
“In my view, Mr de Klerk never, never really understood the strategic issue of the whole negotiation process. Its 
tough words but I believe that. De Klerk was very good intellectually and tactically understanding small, minor 
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tactical moves like playing cards or whatever. He was not really, in my view, a chess player knowing when to move 
the big pieces at what stages.”788    
 
Government officials were allocated sensitive political roles in the pre-negotiation process, and 
senior politicians were allocated junior roles either on minor constitutional matters, or were not 
involved in the process at all. As a result, government teams were never capable of strategically 
managing government and NP interests.
789
  
 
The first day of the bilateral was exploratory and was spent getting acquainted.
790
 Journalists 
who observed the mood on the first day of the first encounter wrote about the cordiality of the 
talks, as participants mingled freely and socialised openly.
791
  
 
On the second day, the parties discussed a range list of issues in order to define mutual 
differences, lay the foundations for compromise solutions, and thus clear the obstacles to 
negotiations. The ground work for these matters was laid by the Steering Committee, and 
included the release of political prisoners, the safe return of exiles, the lifting of the state of 
emergency, the suspension of political trials, and withdrawal of troops from the townships and 
the steps to be taken to curb political unrest in the townships.  
 
The most urgent matter for the ANC was the release of all political prisoners, and the safe return 
of all exiles. The ANC also demanded the immediate release of all detainees who had not been 
charged or convicted of any offence, and the repealing of apartheid security legislation in terms 
of which the detainees were held in prison.
792
 However, given that no register of political 
prisoners existed, reaching agreement as to who constituted a political prisoner was a crucial 
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precursor to any further negotiations. Consequently, the primary issue discussed was the 
definition of political prisoners.  
 
The government, consistent with the February 2 announcement, argued for a narrow definition of 
political prisoners, essentially defined as those who had committed ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ political 
offenses. By contrast, the ANC, in demanding the release of all political prisoners, argued for a 
broad definition, defined as those who had also committed ‘related’ political offenses. The 
parties’ positions on the issue were strategic; the government wanted to restrict the number of 
people who would qualify for an indemnity, and negotiate the release of the remainder, thus 
using the political prisoner release issue as leverage, which would enable them to gain a strategic 
advantage. The ANC wanted “any person who was convicted for an offence that was politically 
motivated [to] qualify for an indemnity.”793 Essentially, they wanted all their supporters out of 
prison. The parties agreed on the general question of whether political prisoners should be 
released. However, they deadlocked; they could not agree on a mutually satisfactory definition of 
‘politically motivated’ crimes, which would primarily affect the identification, number and time-
scales of political prisoner releases. To manage the deadlock, the ANC and the government 
established a ‘working group’ with a mandate to develop a definition of political offence and a 
plan for indemnity for political prisoners and exiles.  
 
The meeting produced a working agreement known as the Groote Schuur Minute, which 
committed both parties towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and 
intimidation, to political stability, and to a peaceful process of negotiations. Flowing from this 
commitment, the parties agreed to five points.   
 
First, following the disagreement and deadlock on the definition of political prisoners and exiles, 
the parties agreed to establish a ‘Working Group on Political Offenses’ to make 
recommendations on a definition of political offences, to discuss timescales, and to advise on 
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norms and mechanisms for dealing with the release of political prisoners and the granting of 
immunity in respect of political offences.
794
 The working group was instructed to “bear in mind 
the experiences of Namibia” and was given a deadline of 21 May 1990. Two offences were to 
receive immediate attention: “[the] leaving of the country without a travel document”; and “[any] 
offences related merely to organisations which were previously prohibited.”   
 
Second, temporary immunity from prosecution for political offences committed by ANC national 
executive committee (NEC) members, and selected exiles, would be considered on an urgent 
basis to enable them “to return and help with the establishment and management of political 
activities, to assist in bringing violence to an end and to take part in peaceful political 
negotiations.”  
 
Third, the government undertook to review the existing security legislation to bring it into line 
with the unfolding liberalisation process.  
 
Fourth, the government committed to work towards the lifting of the state of emergency. In this 
context, the ANC would work towards the resolution of political violence and commit to 
political stability so as to assist the government in this regard.  
 
Fifth, channels of communication between the parties were established in order to curb violence 
and intimidation.
795
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7.4.2. Significance of the Minute 
 
The Groote Schuur Minute was important in that it illustrated the South African government was 
in firm control of the third stage of the pre-negotiation process, with a favourable balance of 
power. Important features of this agreement stand out.  
 
First, the Groote Schuur Minute committed the parties to working towards a common definition 
of political crimes.
796
 While it did not provide much description on the form this would take, it 
awarded the government considerable discretion in considering other “political parties and 
movements and other relative bodies.”797  
 
Second, the reference to Namibia’s experience pointed the working group to consider the 
Norgaard Principles, which used the approach of extradition law to define political crimes.
798
 
Within these principles, it was unclear “whether serious human rights violations would be treated 
as political due to their gravity and the proportionality test.”799  
 
Third, Paragraph 1 stipulated that individuals who left the country illegally and joined the 
prohibited organisations would immediately receive attention for these offenses, “which were 
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deemed to be purely political.”800 This corresponded to February 2 indemnity announcement and 
was heavily biased in favour of the older generation, and a select group, of ANC leaders.  
 
Fourth, the Groote Schuur Minute granted immunity from prosecution of political offences 
committed before 4 May, to enable the ANC leadership to return to South Africa and participate 
in the negotiations.
801
 ANC members who continued their involvement in activities ‘related’ to 
the armed struggle would be acting in violation of the agreement and would thus not be entitled 
to protection under its terms.
802
 
 
The Minute thus strengthened the pro-negotiation lobby and more moderate grouping close to 
Mandela in the ANC, and began to create a central government-ANC coalition in favour of 
negotiation.  
 
7.4.3. The Indemnity Act and the Working Group on Political Offenses  
 
Immediately following the Groote Schuur Minute, two important developments occurred. First, 
the NP government successfully passed the Indemnity Bill through parliament on 7 May, and the 
Indemnity Act was signed by de Klerk on 15 May. This new piece of legislation was needed to 
permit the return of ANC exiles that had yet to be charged as per the 2 February announcement 
and Groote Schuur Minute.
803
 
 
The act gave the president enormous discretion in granting immunity “either conditionally or on 
conditions he may deem fit.” The effect of the indemnity was that no civil or criminal 
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proceedings would be instituted against any person granted the indemnity “during the period 
stipulated in such notice in respect of him, in respect of anything done or omitted by him any 
date prior to the announcement of that period, and such person shall not be detained during such 
periods of immunity.”804 This provision implemented paragraph 2 of the Groote Schuur Minute 
by “permitting ANC operatives to return to South Africa to participate in the negotiations 
without facing legal sanctions.
805
  
 
On 19 May, the government indemnified 38 ANC leaders for a period of six months. Those 
granted indemnity included senior exile leaders such as Oliver Tambo, Chris Hani, Thabo 
Mbeki, Alfred Nzo, Joe Slovo, Joe Modise, and Jacob Zuma.
806
  
 
Second, following the Groote Schuur Minute, the Working Group on Political Offences began 
functioning with members drawn from both the government and the ANC.
807
 The Working 
Group submitted its report on 21 May as per the Groote Schuur Minute.  
 
The Working Group followed the Norgaard Principles in approaching the contentious issue of 
political crimes recommending that they “form the basis of guidelines to meet the South African 
situation.”808 The Working Group, however, added an additional criterion to the Norgaard 
Principles: “The question on whether the act was committed in the execution of an order or with 
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the approval of the organisation, institution or body concerned.”809 The report acknowledged that 
‘related’ political offenses may be regarded as political: “In certain circumstances, a ‘common 
crime’, even a serious one such as murder, may be regarded as a political offence.”810  
 
The Working Group created enough space for the indemnity to cover the crimes of both state and 
anti-apartheid agents: 
 
“[The government] shall be free to formulate its own guidelines which it will apply in dealing members of such 
organisations, groupings or institutions, governmental or otherwise, who committed offences on the assumption that 
a particular cause was being served or opposed.”811 
 
The Working Group further stated that indemnity would be assessed and implemented 
individually: “Whether or not an offence is political depends on the facts and circumstances of 
each individual case. The question is thus approached on a case by case basis.”812 In granting the 
indemnity, the Working Group suggested that “a mechanism” be established that would “provide 
the executive with wise advice and to demonstrate that the interests of all parties are being taken 
into account in an objective a manner as possible.”813 These “mechanisms” should consist of “a 
convener with ad hoc appointments from concerned groups when dealing with particular 
offences.”814 These mechanisms and the Working Group, however, “were only intended to have 
advisory roles and the government would retain discretion for granting indemnity.”815 
Significantly, “neither the Indemnity Act nor the mechanism established following the Working 
Group’s report required individuals to renounce violence in order to gain indemnity.”816 
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7.5. Breakdown: The Escalation of Violence 
 
Despite the timeous tabling of the Working Group report, and the resultant raised expectations of 
a major breakthrough toward settlement negotiations, political violence increased, politics 
became increasingly uncertain, and mutual suspicion and mistrust remained. The main culprit 
was the escalation, and spill-over, of Natal’s violence into the Reef. 
 
7.5.1. Natal’s War on the Rand   
 
The ‘Seven Days War’ had a significant impact on the country’s political landscape. In 
particular, it created important differences within the ANC on how to manage the Inkatha 
question. Two groups emerged. One group, sympathetic to Mandela’s views and included Zuma 
and Mosiuoa Lekota (the ANC’s Natal coordinator), and COSATU, wanted immediate peace 
talks with Inkatha. According to Lekota, the ANC believed in multiparty democracy and 
tolerated all political views, including Inkatha. Lekota said that the ANC “was totally opposed to 
the use of armed force to solve its differences with Inkatha, and that Inkatha members were 
‘ordinary men and women who were [also] suffering under apartheid’.” He stated that “a 
solution could be found if ‘poor communication’ between Inkatha and the ANC could be 
improved.”817  
 
The second group was sympathetic to Natal midlands leader, Harry Gwala. According to Gwala, 
the non-violence Mandela and his team of negotiators preached was misguided. Gwala saw no 
merit in sending an olive branch to Inkatha: 
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“At times of crisis opinions differ sharply. Some people fear an insurrectionist and they deal in academic discussions 
of the lives of the people who are suffering. I am a black person. I enjoy no privilege and struggling is not an option, 
but something I have to do to survive.”818  
 
The war with Inkatha, as Gwala saw it, was not between the ANC and Inkatha, nor was it 
between the government and the ANC, but rather between those who wanted to preserve 
apartheid (which included Inkatha) and those who wanted a democracy: 
 
“Now the whole conflict here was not between UDF and Inkatha, nor is it between the ANC and Inkatha. The 
conflict is between apartheid on one side, which doesn't want the people to advance and the people on the other side 
who are trying to push forward to liberate themselves. Organisations like Inkatha, the impis, are merely used as a 
pawn by the ruling class in this country to uphold their apartheid institutions. The real problem is between the 
people and the apartheid regime.”819 
 
Jabulani Nxumalo, a senior ANC strategist, was sympathetic to Gwala. He argued that talking to 
Buthelezi was futile as he “had little ability to stop the conflict.” Moreover, the violence could 
not be ended “without recognising that ‘the South African police and army were at its centre’.” 
For Nxumalo, “the only realistic, meaningful and long-term solution was to arm the people in 
self-defence” and to “bring about the total elimination of apartheid and its structures.” This, 
according to Nxumalo, was “not war talk but logic.”820 The immediate strategy against Inkatha, 
Gwala therefore added, was not to talk peace but to fight back: 
 
“Make no mistake, we will kill Inkatha warlords. Why be apologetic about it, when they come to attack us, we offer 
them no Bibles. We believe in a just war. The difference between us and Inkatha is that we do not kill women and 
children. We hit hard on those who target us.”821 
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As the violence spiralled out of control, with Gwala creating a vast network of highly armed and 
trained self-defence units in Natal’s townships, ANC regional leaders descended into the Natal 
Midlands to learn how Gwala and his units repelled Inkatha attacks. De Klerk’s introduction of 
the South African Special Forces, 32 Buffalo Battalion, into the Natal Midlands escalated the 
conflict. As the body count mounted, with academics, churchmen and lawyers becoming the 
targets of Inkatha assassination squads, the ANC began to take a harder position towards Inkatha, 
weakening Mandela’s group.822  
 
With no end to the violence in sight, the ANC alliance decided to raise the temperature. On 25 
June, COSATU mounted a successful nation-wide work-stoppage in order to draw attention to 
the violence in Natal and isolate Inkatha. The demands included an end to the state of emergency 
in Natal, the disbanding the KwaZulu Bantustan, the withdrawal of 32 Buffalo Battalion from the 
townships and the arrest of Inkatha warlords. Over 3 million workers stayed at home, and tens of 
thousands of people marched through South Africa’s cities and towns in support of COSATU’s 
demands.  
 
The strategy backfired horribly. COSATU’s call for a national stayaway had coincided with an 
Inkatha political strategy of realignment; in a calculated manoeuvre designed to adapt to the 
changing circumstances of 1990, Buthelezi sort to remould Inkatha from an ethnic-based 
regional movement into a national political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In particular, 
the idea was to extend Inkatha’s constituency into the greater Johannesburg region. The first step 
towards this end was a massive recruitment drive targeting the 56 single-sex hostels in the 
region, housing Inkatha’s natural social and political base – over 175,000 Zulu-speaking migrant 
men who had come to Johannesburg from Natal in search of work.
823
 The new IFP’s intention 
was clear: “to reclaim its self-professed mandate to speak on behalf of Zulu-speakers, despite the 
diaspora that left them stranded on the fringes of the Rand townships.”824 ANC supporters 
resented this attempt by the IFP to establish permanent base in traditional, and predominantly, 
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ANC strongholds.  It was a matter of time before the ANC-IFP vendettas, spawned in Natal’s 
killing fields, “were transported like an airborne virus to South Africa’s industrial heartland as 
the power struggle between the two organisations assumed a wider, national political 
significance.”825    
 
The violence exploded on 22 July, after an IFP rally in Sebokeng. Armed IFP militants went on a 
rampage in a residential area killing over 30 people in a very gruesome attack.
826
 The violence 
spread like wildfire and very quickly developed a logic and momentum of its own.
827
 The 
fighting primarily involved Zulu-speaking migrants in hostels and residents of squatter camps in 
the established townships, both were desperately seeking permanent and stable working and 
living space in the cities.
828
  
 
Murray writes that labour-market segmentation created deep divisions between professionals and 
skilled workers with a modest stake in the system and unskilled workers and the unemployed 
who competed for temporary and casual work.
829
 The resulting competition for scarce resources 
“led to social tensions” that “coalesced around ‘tribal’ identities, political affiliations, and 
geographical (home-boy) affinities.”830  The dynamic of the ensuing conflict followed a very 
clear logic: “As the battle lines were hastily drawn, Inkatha loyalists in the squalid hostels 
forcibly evicted non-Zulu speakers and those who refused to swear allegiance to the IFP. The 
hostels became paramilitary staging areas from which vigilantes planned and executed their 
forays into the townships. When young comrades mounted counter-attacks, the hostels became 
fortresses in which to retreat.”831  
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7.5.2. Bilateral Talks Continue: Drawing the Battle-lines  
 
In the midst of the escalation of violence, and spill-over of Natal’s killing fields into South 
Africa’s industrial heartland, stage three of pre-negotiation continued. Public debate arose on 
three questions: whether an interim government was necessary to oversee an election before 
drafting a new constitution; whether the new constitution should be drafted by a constituent 
assembly, in particularly whether it should happen before or after an election; and whether the 
notion of group rights had a place in a new constitution. There were two competing scenarios.   
 
The perspective of the NP government was that “the present government would remain intact 
while a Great Indaba [i.e. a conference] representing different parties would negotiate a new 
constitution.”832 The Tricameral Parliament would then pass this constitution. On constitutional 
issues, the NP government argued forcibly on the issue of the protection of minority rights; 
Viljoen stated this “could be used as a temporary nation-building measure rather than being 
permanently enshrined in the constitution” and their argument “was an assurance for minority 
groups that they will have a particular say in the new constitutional system, by way of 
representation and decision-making, in spite of the fact that they are not part of the majority.”833 
Viljoen further added that the NP government would go to formal roundtable negotiations to 
negotiate the protection of minority rights, and that this was a significant departure from the 
original group rights preference: 
 
Viljoen added that the NP government was not setting itself apart from the ANC; rather, its 
demands complimented ANC preferences: “Minority protection is not a cancellation of majority 
rule, but a qualification of it.”834 The Department of Constitutional Development subsequently 
began to develop the government bottom-line for negotiations. By June 1990, the department, 
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working with the cabinet, produced an important charter of six principles for a new society, 
intended as a precondition for all parties intending to participate in negotiation: 
 
“There should be efficient government and administration at national, regional and local levels at all times, before 
and during the process of negotiating a new constitutional dispensation… There should be economic growth and 
development… Intimidation and political and other violence should cease… Peaceful protest as a political method 
should be used sparingly… [All] political entities and interests committed to peaceful solutions and having a proven 
base of support should be involved in negotiating a constitution… The real negotiation for a new constitution should 
be the highest priority, and should start as soon as possible.”835   
 
The ANC’s perspective was premised on the Harare Declaration. Thabo Mbeki explained that 
the Groote Schuur Minute set into motion a process of removing obstacles to negotiations. The 
next step was to determine the participants at the negotiating table. The ANC wanted an elected 
constituent assembly, which would decide who should sit together to draw up a new constitution. 
Mbeki added that “before a new constitution is adopted, and before political structures change on 
the basis of it, there would need to be an interim government which [enjoyed] the confidence of 
all political groups.”836  
 
The question of the suspension of the armed struggle, a key government demand, remained very 
tricky for the ANC; despite the closure of MK’s Angola camps, and resultant endgame for the 
military wing, MK remained a symbolic hope for the ANC. Yet MK’s circumstances revealed 
the hard truth that political power would not come from the ‘barrel of a gun’. Sticking to this 
trump card invited more problems after the Groote Schuur Minute; the government inevitably 
became more hesitant in allowing exiles to return and in releasing political prisoners while the 
ANC maintained its policy of armed struggle. The ANC soon began to recognise that it was not 
possible for the government to address all obstacles identified in the Harare Declaration, and that 
it needed to be flexible in its demands. The review of this position came in the form a publication 
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written by Raymond Suttner, the head of the ANC’s Political Education section, entitled Road to 
Peace in July 1990: 
 
“In the present situation, it seems that we need to consider some of these questions afresh or in greater depth. Do all 
our preconditions need to be met before there can be negotiation? Must all apartheid laws be scrapped before the 
democratic forces can negotiate with the forces of apartheid? We need to be more precise and examine which 
preconditions need to be met immediately to ensure participation of authentic leaders acting with a mandate from 
organisations in an atmosphere where consultation is possible. What is suggested here is a shift in the way we tackle 
preconditions. In no way do we abandon our demand for the total abolition of apartheid laws… We cannot conduct 
a struggle in some pure form where one tactic serves us all the time, or where we use only one weapon. We must 
change if the struggle needs it. What we need now is to reorient ourselves towards the question of negotiation.”837 
 
7.6. The Pretoria Minute: Breaking the Logjam  
 
In the context of the tactical issues and suggestions put forward by Suttner, and before the next 
scheduled bilateral between the government and the ANC, the ANC announced the unilateral 
suspension of the armed struggle. Slovo had privately approached Mandela before a national 
executive meeting and suggested that the ANC voluntarily suspend the armed struggle to create a 
positive climate to move the pre-negotiations forward. Slovo told Mandela that de Klerk “needed 
to show his supporters that his policy had brought benefits to the country.”838  
 
This was a major breakthrough for the political process as it dealt with the government’s core 
demand. This was also a strategic move by the ANC on two counts.  
 
First, while the Working Group on Political Offences had produced a final report on 21 May, 
concerns over its content had delayed an ANC-government meeting scheduled to consider the 
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report. By August, “there had been little or no progress towards resolving the form and timescale 
for meeting these commitments.” As a result, those affected political prisoners and exiles began 
the pressure the ANC negotiators to deliver results.
839
  
 
Second, in order to resolve the issue with a favourable concession from the government, the 
ANC needed to meet a core government demand. But this had to appear not at government 
insistence in order to save face. The suspension of the armed struggle was thus made unilaterally 
before the scheduled meeting, and was intended to give the ANC the moral high ground in the 
process, thus setting a positive tone to the meeting.  
 
7.6.1. The Agreement 
 
The ANC and government met at the Presidency in Pretoria on 6 August. The meeting lasted 13 
hours, and gave birth to the Pretoria Minute. In the meeting, the Groote Schuur Minute and the 
Working Group report were accepted by both parties. The Working Group report had made 
provisions for the formulation of guidelines to be applied in dealing with members of all 
organisations who committed political offences.
840
 However, the Working Group report was 
subsequently amended; the previous acknowledgement that murder could be a political crime 
was left out, an omission that caused significant problems later.
841
 
 
The Pretoria Minute generated a joint working group on indemnity, and this new group was 
instructed to draw up a plan “for the release of ANC-related prisoners and the granting of 
indemnity to people in a phased manner and to report before the end of August.”842 The minute 
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also agreed on specific target dates. The mechanism to implement the indemnity process, 
recommended by the report of the Working Group on Political Offences, would be created by 31 
August 1990. The release of political prisoners was scheduled to start on 1 September 1990, and 
for the granting of indemnities as from 1 October 1990. Indemnity for categories of persons was 
to be completed by the end of 1990, and on an individual basis by April 1991.
843
 
 
The ANC suspended the armed struggle, with the Minute stating that “no further armed actions 
and related activities by the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe will take place.”844 
The minute established another working group, the Armed Action Working Group, to resolve all 
outstanding questions arising out of this decision to report by 1 September 1990.
845
  
 
The government undertook to lift the state of emergency in Natal and to review the Internal 
Security Act. Both parties also committed themselves to steps and measures aimed at 
“normalising and stabilising the situation in line with the spirit of mutual trust obtaining among 
the leaders involved.”846 Paragraph 8 of the Pretoria Minute reasserted a strong commitment by 
the parties to the goal of negotiated change: 
 
“We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone on the road to true peace and 
prosperity for our country. In this we do not pretend to be the only parties involved in the process of shaping the new 
South Africa. We know there are other parties committed to peaceful progress. All of us can henceforth walk that 
road in consultation and cooperation with each other. We call upon all those who have not yet committed themselves 
to peaceful negotiations to do so now.”847   
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Finally, in order to facilitate movement on substantive issues, paragraph 9, the concluding 
section of the agreement, stated” “Against this background, the way is now open to proceed 
towards negotiations on a new constitution. Exploratory talks in this regard will be held before 
the next meeting which will be held soon.”848 To give expression to this clause, another joint 
working group, the Paragraph Nine Working Committee, was established to discuss procedural 
and agenda items for an as-yet-defined constitutional conference.
849
 
 
7.6.2. Consequences of the Pretoria Minute 
 
The Pretoria Minute was the beginning of the most complex phase in the pre-negotiations. Three 
issues deserve attention: the political fall-out emanating from the ANC’s suspension of the 
armed struggle; continue dispute and uncertainty around the indemnity process; and the 
escalation of violence.  
 
7.6.2.1. The Fall-Out 
 
After the unilateral suspension of the armed struggle, Joe Slovo told Patti Waldmeir that 98% of 
ANC supporters, both in and outside the NEC, “thought the decision was a sell-out.” Mandela 
was convinced that “time was not on our side that the longer the process stretched out the more 
time would be given to those who would like to sabotage the process.”850  
 
ANC’s authoritative perspective of the Pretoria Minute was explained by Zola Skweyiya, the 
ANC’s chief constitutional lawyer. According to Skweyiya, the suspension of the armed struggle 
was a necessary compromise not unique: 
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“The same can be found in the history of the Algerian war of independence, in Vietnam and other countries. 
Democratic international law recognises ceasefires as agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary 
cessation of hostilities. It does not bring an end to the conflict between parties. The negotiations between the ANC 
and the South African government aimed at a general ceasefire. It is a temporary agreement. If the duration of the 
ceasefire is not fixed in an agreement, as in the Pretoria Minute, it continues in force for a reasonable period.”851 
 
Skweyiya conceded that the signing of the Pretoria Minute was a departure from the Harare 
Declaration as the ANC “unilaterally suspended the armed struggle without the South African 
government’s removing all the obstacles [i.e.] repressive legislation still exists, the State of 
Emergency in Natal is still fully in place.”852 It was therefore unsurprising that the rank-and-file 
had raised serious questions whether “the failure of the Pretoria Minute to adhere strictly to the 
provisions of the Harare Declaration means that we have made an unacceptable compromise.” 
However, the aim of the negotiating team was to “avoid a permanent blockage of the negotiation 
process.”853 
 
Skweyiya reasoned that while the Pretoria Minute effectively closed the armed option, it opened 
“new possibilities for [non-violent] mass struggles” such as “consumer boycotts and industrial 
strikes and a wide variety of actions which are judged normal in any Western democracy.”854 
The ANC, however, reserved the right to revive the armed struggle, should the government fall 
short of its obligations.  
 
The ANC’s anxiety found its way into the Armed Action Working Group; the group could not 
arrive at a definition of ‘armed action’. The ANC contended that the “training and recruitment of 
soldiers were not armed activities, and that the cessation of armed activities did not bind the 
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organisation to reveal arms caches inside the country or hand those over to the authorities.”855 
According to Ivan Pillay, a senior ANC intelligence officer, his reading of the Pretoria Minute 
was that “it doesn’t say we will stop shipping weapons, it says we will stop, we won’t carry out 
armed action.”856 Pillay admitted that he and his commanders continued to ship arms into South 
Africa, and train and arm the ANC’s self-defence units.857  
 
By contrast, government security officials within the committee continued to pressure the ANC 
to reveal armed caches, “arguing that the release of trained MK personnel could not take place as 
long as their arms were still readily available to them.” In this way, the government “sought to 
use the frustration of political prisoners awaiting release as a pressure on the ANC to extend its 
definition of armed actions to incorporate the delivery and surrender of arms to the 
authorities.”858 The ANC countered and insisted that the government first disband covert security 
force units if it was to reveal arms caches and stop recruiting and training soldiers. The ANC also 
objected to the government linking the release of political prisoners and indemnity of exiles to 
the suspension of the armed struggle in order to force further concessions from the ANC.
859
 
 
7.6.2.2. Frustrations with the Indemnity Process 
 
As discussed, the Pretoria Minute stated that the mechanism to implement the indemnity process, 
recommended by the Working Group on Political Offences, would be created by 31 August 
1990. However, there were difficulties assembling a group of experts as while the group was 
meant to “consist of three government and three ANC-appointed judges, the ANC nominees 
refused to participate because of a ruling that deliberations had to be held in secret and they felt 
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they could be compromised if the ANC rejected an application.”860 Nonetheless, and following 
the Pretoria meeting and the Working Group’s recommendations, the Department of Justice 
published its Guidelines for Defining Political Offences in South Africa in the Government 
Gazette. There were some important changes. 
 
First, in contrast to the working group report, the Guidelines did not recognise ‘related’ political 
offences as ‘political’. This meant that the definition of political violence was “conditional on the 
progress of negotiations rather than a preconditions to them, and the issue of political prisoners 
and the return of exiles was … set to become a bargaining counter.”861 Consequently, the 
timescales of granting indemnity and releasing political prisoners were linked directly to the 
progress in pre-negotiation, particularly regarding the definition of armed struggle and related 
activities.
862
 
 
Second, the individual applications for indemnity were particularly controversial: “applicants 
were required to furnish sufficient particulars of the event(s) in respect of which indemnity is 
sort; to describe their political motivations for committing such actions; and to give details of 
any pending prosecutions or sentences being served. They were further required to confirm that 
they subscribed to ‘peaceful solutions and development’.863 
 
This form became problematic as both prisoners and exiles felt that it bore strong resemblance to 
a confession in respect of past crimes committed.
864
 The resistance to applying for indemnity 
“centred on the argument that to do so would imply an acceptance of guilt for the ‘crimes’ they 
committed in opposition to apartheid, which was unacceptable for some members who argued 
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that they had been fighting a just war.”865 Exiles and political prisoners simply refused to fill out 
forms and sharply criticised the ANC members of the working group.
866
 ANC representatives in 
the working group in turn claimed that agreements reached in meetings with the government 
“had been drafted in broad principle and had been left to lower-level bureaucrats” who drove a 
hard bargain “insisting on the government’s final veto and control of the indemnity and release 
process.”867 Nicholas Haysom, Mandela’s legal advisor, stated that the ANC was criticised for 
failing to negotiate its accords in tighter form: 
 
“Negotiation processes require swans and swine. Swans may sail through the troubled waters of conflict securing 
agreements in principle. The swine move in holding the ground and tying up the detail without conceding an inch. 
Some trade unionists suggested that the ANC negotiating style boasted too many swans and not enough swine. The 
government, supported by a barrage of negotiators and lawyers, had their swine fully in place to ensure concessions 
granted in principle would be clawed back in detail.”868  
 
The Groote Schuur Minute, Pretoria Minute, and the indemnity process that flowed through 
them, contained one political problem; whether indemnity would be applied to all political 
prisoners of just high-profile political prisoners needed for pre-negotiations. While the ANC 
simply wanted all their people out of prison and back into the country, the government only 
wanted to release select high-profile and senior ANC leaders needed to legitimise their strategy 
of pre-negotiation.
869
   
 
7.6.2.3. Escalating Levels of Political Violence 
 
Political violence flared immediately after the signing of the Pretoria Minute. It began in the 
Vaal Triangle and further attacks brought the death toll in the East Rand to 140 within a few 
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days, with more than 300 injured.
870
 In the coming weeks, political violence grew in intensity 
and brutality. 24 ANC supporters died in the Crossroads shack settlement.
871
  
 
By late August, security forces were brought in to stem the slaughter. Designating 27 townships 
‘unrest areas’, and providing the police with extensive powers of search and arrest without a 
warrant, “a police dragnet of the hostels and [informal settlements] produced an awesome 
armoury of deadly weapons ranging from primitive spears and axes to limpet mines, machine 
guns and hand grenades.”872 The killings however, intensified and Mandela demanded to meet de 
Klerk.  
 
The two met on September 11. On the agenda was the situation in Natal, which, Mandela argued, 
was the source of the violence in the Reef. In his opening statement to de Klerk, Mandela stated 
that the Natal violence is a result of “acts of commission and omission on the part of members of 
the KwaZulu police, the South African police and the South African Defence Force.”873 The 
government, Mandela continued, “has utterly failed to respond to this situation, thus encouraging 
the commission of further crimes and compelling the people to take the law into their own 
hands.” Therefore, the government bears huge responsibility for the conflict. 
 
In order to end the violence in Natal and related killings in the Transvaal, the ANC compiled a 
list of six demands. First, the KwaZulu police had to be disbanded and cease to exist. Central 
government should be responsible for security in Natal. Second, security forces should be 
impartial. Third, a liaison and monitoring machinery between the ANC and the government 
should be established to monitor the outbreak of violence. Fourth, individuals who are alleged 
responsible for earlier incidents of violence should be prosecuted. Fifth, the state of emergency 
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should be lifted. And finally, a high-level joint working group of representatives of the 
government and ANC “should be established to oversee the implementation [of] such 
agreements.”  
 
The primary responsibility, Mandela concluded, rested with the South African government: 
“these political efforts will fail unless that question of law and order is dealt with as a matter of 
urgency.”874 De Klerk was defensive and rejected without qualification that the government was 
ever behind the violence: 
 
“We, from our side, regarded many of Mandela’s representations as the height of hypocrisy – given the ANC’s own 
deep involvement in the violence in Natal and throughout the country – as well as its apparent unwillingness to rein 
in members and supporters who were clearly involved in the violence. If Mandela was so concerned about violence 
why would be not agree to meet with Chief Minister Buthelezi to try to resolve the issue?”875 
 
De Klerk’s argument was why would he instigate violence which would jeopardise the initiative 
into which he had sunk all is moral and political capital?
876
   
 
On 15 September, de Klerk ordered a massive security crackdown. Codenamed Operation Iron 
Fist, the crackdown involved “the large-scale deployment of SADF and police riot units to the 
war-torn townships, the cordoning off of migrant workers’ hostels with razor wire, and the 
imposition of night-time curfews.”877 These measures bore strong resemblance to the states of 
emergency and drew the ire of ANC activists.
878
 Township residents accused the police of 
favouring Inkatha, “providing them with armed escorts, and allowing them to brandish what 
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were euphemistically termed ‘traditional weapons’, such as spears, axes, pangas and clubs 
known as knobkerries, while tear-gassing and disarming their opponents.”879  
 
The intervention of the security forces failed to explain why the violence spread so quickly, why 
it affected specific townships, and why the political violence was essentially between the most 
impoverished township communities, particularly those in informal settlements and hostel 
dwellers.  
 
The ANC’s suspicions were on point; Colonel Eugene de Kock, the head of the SAP’s counter-
insurgency unit, C10 (a.k.a Vlakplaas), told Stephen Ellis that in July 1990, he began selling 
guns to the pro-Inkatha inhabitants of the hostels on the East Rand.
880
 This was done in collusion 
with the chairman of the Inkatha Youth Brigade in the Transvaal, Themba Khoza, who was on 
the ‘Vlakplaas’ payroll as a police informer. The aim was to turn the East Rand into a veritable 
war-zone. De Kock further told Ellis that he carried out “some offensive actions of this sort on 
his own authority, and others under direct orders.”881 
 
As ANC security officers uncovered more security force complicity in the violence, ANC 
supporters began to cast serious doubt on the negotiating team’s ability to move the government 
on the ANC’s core demands, in particular the issues of political prisoners, political exiles and 
violence. The perception grew that “the aged Mandela was getting the run-around from a 
younger, wily, and politically deft de Klerk.”882 By the beginning of December, and after heated 
public exchanges, the relationship between Mandela and de Klerk deteriorated. In the face of 
mounting pressure from hardliners in the ANC, a disillusioned Mandela took the gloves off; he 
told an ANC rally in Johannesburg that the ANC would suspend its participation in the Working 
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Group on Political Offences and set unilateral deadlines for the implementation of the agreement 
on exiles and political prisoners.
883
 
 
7.6.3. Intra-Party Configurations: The ANC and NP Congresses 
 
7.6.3.1. The ANC Consultative Congress: The Pretoria Minute Hangover  
 
In the volatile environment of the late 1990s, with stalling pre-negotiations, all frustrations with 
the ANCs moderation in their negotiation strategy and overall leadership style came to the fore 
when it held its ‘consultative conference’ of 1,600 delegates in Johannesburg in December 1990. 
Tensions between the old guard and younger militant activists came to the fore. Tambo formally 
opened the conference. 
 
Mandela’s main task was to use the conference to hold the ANC together, reassert the authority 
of the old guard, and reign in all the different components. In the face of mounting criticism over 
the slow pace of meeting the Harare Declaration, Mandela began to drive a hard bargain. His 
own speech was an uncompromising attack on the government, in particular De Klerk, “for 
dragging their feet in clearing way obstacles to negotiation, notably concerning the return of 
exiles, the release of political prisoners and the removal of the final vestiges of discriminatory 
legislation”884: 
 
“Since the signing of the Pretoria Minute, we have come to recognise that our own commitment to see the process 
move along as swiftly as possible is not yet matched by that of the government. It is becoming increasingly clear 
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that, in spite of our initiative, the government is dragging its feet in carrying out its undertakings to clear away the 
obstacles in the path to real negotiations.”885 
 
He left his most serious accusation to elements in the state security services who were 
orchestrating “a campaign of counter-revolutionary violence aimed at weakening the ANC and 
discrediting the concept of ‘disciplined mass action’”886: 
 
“Let there be no mistake! We have through our struggle stripped the apartheid state and its repressive organs of their 
former capacity to repress the mass movement by detentions, [jailing] and executions. The number of our supporters 
is such that it has rendered these conventional methods ineffective. In response, elements within the apartheid power 
bloc, who are opposed to the peace process, are resorting to acts of widespread terror and carnage against the people. 
These killings have a dual aim: To weaken the ANC and to discredit the concept of disciplined mass action.”887 
 
What was being played out, Mandela continued, was a double-agenda. The government, 
Mandela added, was in effect “extending the meaning” of the ANC’s suspension of the armed 
struggle “so as to cast [the ANC] in the role of a surrendering belligerent.” Ceasefires, he 
warned, “whether bilateral or unilateral, are by their nature temporary measures.”888 
 
What followed was a conference characterized by militancy and introspection. Divisions 
emerged over the fruitfulness of negotiating with the government, with most militants arguing 
for the suspension of talks. Mandela and his negotiating team faced outspoken criticism from 
delegates, particularly for having failed to consult them during talks with the government.
889
 
They argued that the negotiators spent more time with government leaders than the rank and file, 
engaged in ‘personal diplomacy’, and kept the rank-and-file uninformed.890 
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The conference endorsed the negotiations strategy outlined in the Harare Declaration but left 
room for flexibility; “whilst the Harare Declaration remains our lodestar, it is not a dogma.”891 It 
mandated the NEC to proceed with pre-negotiations but with conditions; the conference resolved 
that “the NEC serve notice on the regime that unless all the obstacles are removed on or before 
the 30
th
 of April 1991, the ANC shall consider the suspension of the whole negotiation process 
[and] will find it difficult to adhere to the agreements entered into with the government, 
especially paragraph 3 of the Pretoria Minute pertaining to armed action and related activities.” 
The ANC would continue to recruit and train personnel for MK in order to set up self-defense 
units “for the purpose of defending our people against enemy orchestrated violence and to 
prepare ourselves for a central role in a new army whose tasks will be to defend and uphold 
democratic values.” The ANC saw “no contradiction between the Pretoria Minute and our right 
to self-defense.”892 In a clear indication of their dissatisfaction with Mandela’s team, the 
conference recommended that a “comprehensive negotiating team composed of chief 
negotiators, working groups, [and] researchers be created as a matter of extreme urgency”, and 
in the execution of its tasks, “should regularly consult with ANC membership in all regions, on 
all major issues.”893  
 
A serious divide emerged between the ANC leadership and the general membership over the 
issue of negotiations with the government. The conference crystallized the growing unease 
within the rank-and-file that secretly “Mandela was striking deals and making unauthorized 
compromises and concessions with De Klerk.”894 In order to rein in a potential rebellion, 
Mandela had to accede to some of their demands but at the same time keep the organization on 
course towards negotiations. 
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However, De Klerk’s response to Mandela’s predicament was to extract as much political 
capital, and to squeeze more and more concessions from a shaken ANC leadership on the 
meaning and fate of its most sensitive internal political issue, i.e. the suspension of the armed 
struggle.  
 
7.6.3.2. The National Party: February 2 and its Consequences  
 
Given De Klerk’s commitment to a negotiation process, it was vital the NP reinvent itself. For 
De Klerk, the issue of non-racialism was the key:  
 
“A racially based party, as the National Party then was, would simply not be in step with the new South Africa. If 
racial discrimination and differentiation were removed from the statute book, then the National Party would have to 
remove them from its own constitution so that it could become a political home for everyone who supported its 
policy and principles. If we wished to present an effective counterbalance to the ANC, with its Communist allies and 
socialist tendencies, we would have to find a way of allowing moderate South Africans to join hands in a new non-
racial political movement. All these ideas ripened in my mind – just as my thoughts had done prior to my speech of 
2 February 1990.”895 
 
In August 1990, he told the provincial congress of the Natal NP that the NP “would have to be 
transformed into a non-racial party and open its membership to all South Africans.”896 By 
October 1990, all the NP provincial congresses voted unanimously to open party membership to 
all races. Senior cabinet ministers launched a public offensive to justify the move. Kobie Coetsee 
stated that the party leadership had asked provincial congresses to ratify the position on party 
membership “since the NP’s limitation on membership was contrary to the party’s stated anti-
discriminatory stance and was a stumbling block in the formation of alliances.”897 Other cabinet 
ministers went further, endorsing negotiated change towards a non-racial political order. Dawie 
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De Villiers, the NP Cape leader, said that the “the challenge facing political parties was that there 
was a natural force that would not rest until all South Africans had attained freedom and 
rights.”898 Roelf Meyer, Viljoen’s deputy, added that “the government was determined that black 
people would participate in the next general election and that there would not be another whites-
only election.”899  
 
7.7. Tactical Changes 
 
7.7.1. Moving Towards Multiparty Negotiations 
 
On the back of a consultative conference that had imposed new and tight deadlines for the 
ANC’s negotiating team, Mandela and his negotiators had to move quickly in order to neutralize 
the militant threat. To this end, the NEC had to take the initiative in the pre-negotiations and alter 
their tactics.  
 
First, Mandela used the occasion of the ANC’s annual January 8 Statement to propose a political 
solution; he call for the convening of an All-Party Congress on constitutional negotiations. The 
proposed All-Party Congress “would constitute the first step in the process leading to the 
adoption of [a] new constitution.”900 The All-Party Congress would only be convened after all 
obstacles to negotiations had been removed and would have three tasks:  
 
“To set out the broad principles within which the detailed constitutional work would be carried out; to determine the 
make-up of the body, such as an elected Constituent Assembly, that would draw up the constitution; [and] to 
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establish an interim government to oversee the process of transition until a new parliament was elected, and a 
democratic government formed on the basis [of a new] constitution.”901  
 
Since the All-Party Congress would not be established by a general election based on a universal 
franchise, it could not have the power to draw up a new constitution. According to the ANC, 
only an elected sovereign Constituent Assembly comprising of elected members of the assembly 
could have such powers. Therefore, having performed the three identified tasks, “the All-Party 
Congress would then dissolve, unless… it obtained a specific popular mandate to continue as a 
constitution-making body, an interim government or both.” The installation of an interim 
government was critical for the ANC: 
 
“The early installation of an interim government, as a body with real power in fact and in law, and in control of all 
instruments of state power, is critical to the process of the transition to the new order. Quite clearly this process of 
transition away from apartheid cannot be supervised by an apartheid institution, which is precisely what the present 
government is.”902  
 
Second, in seeking ways to arrest the escalating violence, the negotiating team decided to reach 
out to the IFP and arranged a meeting with Buthelezi. This acknowledgement of a role for 
Buthelezi in the unfolding political process was a political triumph for the IFP; the political 
standing Inkatha was unable to achieve through diplomacy, “it was able to acquire through an 
orchestrated campaign of social violence” and in the process “ensured itself a place in 
negotiating stability in the townships.”903 After behind the scenes preparations, both leaders and 
their delegations met for an all-day session at the Royal Hotel in Durban on January 29. At the 
end of 13 hours of talks, a peace accord, the Royal Hotel Minute, was concluded. Both parties 
called for an end to violence, made a commitment to political tolerance and freedom of activity, 
and promised to take steps to peacefully reintegrate divided communities. The parties resolved to 
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create a high-level joint committee to facilitate local level peace initiatives and act as a crisis 
contact point.  
 
As for the NP government, the cabinet held a meeting on Robben Island in mid-January to 
review the government’s plan and tactics for 1991. Shortly after the Royal Hotel Minute, De 
Klerk used the occasion of the traditional opening of parliament to unveil further reforms. In his 
speech, De Klerk announced the imminent repeal of apartheid legislation which categorized 
people by race, and defined land ownership and occupation of land and property by race: “The 
Group Areas Act of 1966, the Black Land Act of 1913, the Development Trust and Land Act of 
1936 and the Population Registration Act of 1950 were [to be] repealed at the end of June 
[1991].”904 Further, the Internal Security Act of 1982 was amended to restrict the term of 
detention to ten days.
905
 Despite these attempts, many apartheid laws remained in force. In a 
major critique of the reforms, Lawyers for Human Rights indicated that “22 apartheid laws 
remained, including the 1983 constitution and all legislation relating to the Tricameral 
Parliament as well as pertaining to segregated local authorities and the homelands.”906  
 
The NP’s overall views and strategy towards roundtable talks also shifted a gear. The NP 
“committed itself to full democracy in a single state and measures to address black economic 
deprivation.”907 Consistent with the outcome of the provincial congresses, the NP’s future now 
“lay in alliance with people who shared its values, not necessarily a white skin.”908 A carrot and 
stick approach was now used with the ANC. De Klerk welcomed the idea of a multiparty 
conference. However, their interpretation on its role was that the conference “would work out 
‘common ground’ and ‘basic principles’ before deciding the composition of the ‘more formal 
body’ to draw up the new constitution.”909 This position offered the prospect of a semantic 
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compromise on the ANC’s preference for a Constituent Assembly; “Parties to the conference 
would be offered a limited decision-making role in a form of a ‘council of state’ during the 
transition process.”910  
 
7.7.2. The DF Malan Accord  
 
Due to the divergent interpretations on the meaning of ‘suspension of armed struggle and related 
activities’ contained in paragraph 3 of the Pretoria Minute, bilateral pre-negotiations between the 
ANC and the government had reached a deadlock by the beginning of 1991. The Paragraph 
Three Working Group had for months discussed the meaning and implications of the terms. 
Since the ANC’s consultative conference, the government had pressed the ANC on what 
activities it would have to forgo to give meaning to the idea of an end to armed struggle. This 
included the establishment of self-defense units in townships, the identification and surrender of 
arms caches, and the demobilization of MK fighters.  
 
An agreement was brokered on the meaning of the ‘suspension of armed action and related 
activities’. The agreement, the DF Malan Accord, was confirmed at DF Malan Airport in Cape 
Town on 12 February 1991. In terms of the agreement, the ANC undertook not to carry out 
armed attacks or infiltrate men or weapons inside South Africa.
911
 The creation of underground 
structures and training of fighters inside South Africa would cease. Further, statements inciting 
violence and threatening armed action would cease.
912
 However, there was no agreement on the 
surrender of ANC weapons, the identification of arms caches, the demobilization of MK or the 
disestablishment of self-defense units. Membership of MK would continue to be lawful and 
individual weapons would be licensed.
913
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7.7.3. Breakdown: The ‘Mandela Ultimatum’  
 
De Klerk felt that the terms of the DF Malan Accord could be a major contribution to the 
restoration of peace and stability. However, he was apprehensive about the ANC’s role in 
implementing it: “the ANC was either unwilling or unable to abide by the terms of the DF Malan 
Accord and dismally failed to carry out its undertakings.”914 For the ANC, their assumption in 
the aftermath of the DF Malan Accord was that their concessions would pave the way for their 
core demands to be met as per the Harare Declaration i.e. loosen the logjam on the release of 
political prisoners and the return of exiles, in effect setting the stage for the meeting of the 30 
April deadline set at the ANC consultative conference.
915
  
 
But this was not to be. The major culprit was the implementation of the indemnity process. 
Under Government Notice 3013 of 18 December 1990, there was a requirement that to obtain 
indemnity, individuals had to complete application forms. While applications by persons who 
had committed ‘non-violent’ crimes went relatively quickly, “cases involving more serious acts 
required greater individual consideration.”916 The cumbersome procedure of application and 
review led to persistent delays and resultant tensions. A period of bitter accusations and counter-
accusations ensued in which “the government blamed the ANC for failing to meet its 
commitments to provide lists of prisoners and exiles, and the ANC accused the government of 
delaying the process to pressure the ANC into further concessions on the armed struggle.”917 
This slow indemnity process was strategic; Mallinder writes that the government had hoped that 
“individual considerations of amnesty applications would delay the release of senior ANC 
members from prison, undermine ANC credibility among its support base and stall the transition 
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to universal suffrage.”918 This would ensure a favourable power balance once settlement 
negotiations begun. 
 
As the 30 April deadline drew nearer, only 900 prisoners had been released and 364 had been 
refused release because of the seriousness of their offenses. Approximately “5,900 applications 
from exile had been processed, of which close to 100 had been refused or referred to a committee 
for review.”919 The Human Rights Commission stated that by April 2, over 1,300 political 
prisoners were still in prison.
920
 The slow pace of the political prisoner release process finally 
took its toll; ANC political prisoners went on a hunger strike, raising the tension between the 
government and the ANC, and between the ANC leadership and the political prisoners.”921  
 
The ANC’s negotiating strategy was bearing no fruit; the organization had essentially interpreted 
its commitments regarding the fate of MK as dependent on sufficient progress in removing 
obstacles towards constitutional negotiations and they were nowhere near the removal of such 
obstacles. For his part, De Klerk failed to empathies with a moderate ANC coalition, under 
pressure from militants, who were willing and anxious to begin official negotiations. According 
to an observer of the times, De Klerk was pursuing “a myopic strategy of going for maximum 
short-term gains at ANC expense, seemingly oblivious to the eroding effect this tactic was 
having in prospects for obtaining a larger settlement.”922   
 
Frustrated by his inability to rein in militants who began challenging his authority, and 
disappointed by De Klerk’s non-commitment to meet the core conditions of the Harare 
Declaration, the escalating violence in the township was the last straw for Mandela.  
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The turning point came on 3 April when Mandela, as the featured speaker, spoke to a symposium 
organised by the Aspen Institute for members of the US Congress and their aides. According to 
journalists who attended, Mandela stated that De Klerk “had betrayed his trust, spurned his 
requests for help, and done nothing to curb the violence in the townships.”923 According to 
Ottaway, “he listed by date, and recounted in great detail various occasions over the past year 
when he had asked De Klerk for help in rendering justice to the latest ANC victims of the 
township violence.”924 By ignoring Mandela’s pleas for help, De Klerk had undermined 
Mandela’s credibility in the eyes of his constituency. Mandela came to the conclusion that De 
Klerk’s inaction was a betrayal and that he was intent on “exploiting his goodwill for purely 
personal political gains.” Consequently, he “had made a fundamental error of judgment about De 
Klerk and had been duped into believing the two of them had similar agendas and objectives in 
mind.”925 What particularly hurt for Mandela was that he felt he had gone out on a limb for De 
Klerk by defending him as an honest reformer in the face of ANC militant leaders, who had 
consistently questioned Mandela’s judgement.  
 
Mandela’s change of attitude was felt immediately. The ANC’s NEC held a two-day meeting on 
4 April, at which Mandela formally apologised for misleading the organisation for calling De 
Klerk ‘a man of integrity’, and that he had tried to get through to De Klerk but had failed.926 
Suddenly Mandela was the ‘hawk’ “calling for the suspension of all contacts with the 
government until it did something concrete to dampen the violence.”927 At the end of the 
meeting, the NEC issued an ultimatum in the form of an open letter: 
 
“The ANC is of the view that the government’s equivocal attitude to the cycle of violence reflects either an attitude 
of cynical irresponsibility or is evidence of connivance at acts of organised terror in the hope that they will succeed 
in destroying or seriously crippling the ANC.”928 
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The ANC charged that the violence reflected a pattern of State/IFP collaboration designed to 
paralyse the ANC and kill ANC political activists and members: 
 
“It is the considered opinion of the ANC that it is inconceivable that the authorities lack the capacity or the skill to 
prevent the violent deeds we have enumerated. We suspect that, at best, the feeble response on the part of the state 
betrays an absence of will to take measures adequate to avert violence, detect and bring the guilty parties to justice 
because the perpetrators of this violence are providing a line of defence for government institutions that would 
otherwise have been rendered dysfunctional.”929  
 
The ultimatum then listed seven demands: 
 
“the immediate dismissal of defence minister Magnus Malan and law and order minister Adriaan Vlok…; legislative 
action to outlaw the carrying of cultural weapons (spears, shields, knives etc.) used in township violence; the visible, 
public dismantling and disarming of certain units in the SADF such as 32 Battalion… and Koevoet…; the 
immediate suspension of all police who were involved in the Sebokeng shootings…; assurances that the SADF 
would use restraint in crowd control; the phasing of single-sex worker hostels and their transformation into family 
housing; [and] the establishment of an independent commission to hear complaints about security-related issues.”930 
 
If these demands were not met by 9 May, the ANC would suspend all talks with the government. 
The ANC now realised that negotiations could no longer be driven by an apparent ‘chemistry’ 
between Mandela and De Klerk or abstract talks about a future democratic country, while low-
intensity civil war waged in the townships. Whereas months earlier Mandela had depicted De 
Klerk as a man dedicated to a new South Africa, “now he was being depicted… as a crafty and 
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ruthless rival, prepared to give free rein to elements within the state security apparatus which 
sought to destabilise government opponents.”931 
 
Buthelezi denounced the ANC’s demands as unreasonable and provocative: “The ANC is … 
making the kind of demands which would precipitate … civil war.”932 De Klerk rejected the 
ANC’s demands. He insisted that “he had moved steadily to fulfil the pledges his government 
made in the Pretoria summit in August 1990, to release all political prisoners and ease the return 
of exiles by the end of April, thus opening the way to negotiations.”933 The ultimatum, De Klerk 
continued, was an attempt by the ANC to cover-up divisions in its own ranks.
934
 
 
However, as relations between the government and the ANC worsened, and the body count 
climbed, De Klerk decided to unilaterally develop a strategy to end the violence. In particular, he 
was keen to address the ultimatum demands in such a way that would not appear as a sign of 
weakness. He called for a tripartite meeting between himself, Mandela and Buthelezi and 
“suggested the appointment of a standing commission to investigate all forms of violence 
originating from whatever source.”935 He also announced that he would convene a conference on 
violence and intimidation “to cut the root causes of conflict.”936 
 
Responding to calls to disband traditional weapons, De Klerk set about trying to persuade the 
IFP to accept restrictions on cultural weapons. By early May, following several shuttle 
diplomacy meetings and a direct meeting at Tuynhuys, De Klerk had an agreement with 
Buthelezi; Zulu traditional weapons would only be carried at so-called cultural functions.
937
 
However, as this agreement was not enforced, the issue would recur, and as the ultimatum 
deadline approached, “it was clear that the government would be unable (in part the result of a 
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flood of indemnity applications just prior to the 30 April deadline) or unwilling to meet the 
deadlines set out by the ANC and the agreements included in the Pretoria Minute.”938 
 
The ANC rejected the government’s proposals and on May 18, after a belated effort by the South 
African Council of Churches to broker an agreement, announced that they were pulling out of 
constitutional talks with the government and would not participate in the proposed peace summit. 
The ANC particularly objected to De Klerk calling the peace conference. As Slovo explained; 
“implicit in this is the inference that the state is an impartial body standing above the violence 
and is calling all those connected with it plus a broader section of the community to discuss 
it.”939 De Klerk had made a tactical error; “He called the conference unilaterally and without 
consultation. And he virtually declared himself the referee, though clearly, in the eyes of other 
parties, he is a participant, even an ‘accused’. It was an invitation to breakdown.”940 The ANC 
called for mass protests, a consumer boycott, a two-day general strike and a day of fasting in 
solidarity with the political prisoners’ hunger strike.941 
 
The ANC, however, did not severe all contact with the government. The ANC and government 
had met in a top-level summit on the day of the ultimatum deadline. After a gruelling six-hour 
session, the parties agreed to continue talking through the working groups about the return of 
exiles and political prisoners, and armed action. The government also agreed to “act legislatively 
on the display of cultural weapons and to step up to curb violence in the townships.”942 Despite 
De Klerk’s patent refusal to dismiss the contentious cabinet ministers, a key ultimatum demand, 
the working groups were firmly in place through which pre-negotiation would continue. 
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7.8. Theoretical Implications: Pre-negotiation and Ripeness 
 
7.8.1. Implications for Pre-negotiation  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Tomlin writes that third stage of pre-negotiation begins the shift 
from ‘whether’ to ‘what’ will be negotiated. This stage is characterised by the consideration of 
alternative negotiating scenarios, reflecting varying degrees of scope for the potential 
negotiation, and by successive steps towards increasing commitment to a negotiated solution. 
The focus of the major actors becomes outer-directed; “the preoccupation with internal decision 
dynamics gives way to increased concern for the other parties.”943 Druckman’s framework 
emphasised the monitoring activity as the parties attempt to define the scope of the negotiation. 
This involves “determining the interests of various parties, including those of domestic agencies 
within the principals.”944 
 
This is the most complex of pre-negotiation stages; parties have to judge whether a negotiated 
solution would be better than continuing the present situation, whether a fair settlement could be 
fashioned, whether the other side could accept, and whether the balance of forces would permit 
agreement on such a settlement.
945
 Thus the complexity of this stage is that it involves a series of 
interrelated judgements. Tomlin writes that it is the communication of a desire to negotiate from 
the parties on one side to those on the other that marks the turning point to stage four in the pre-
negotiation process.
946
 
 
The third stage of pre-negotiation in South Africa to a certain extent features factors analogous to 
Tomlin’s third stage. 
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7.8.1.1. Steps towards Increasing Commitment 
 
The ANC and South African government took for successive steps towards increasing 
commitment towards a negotiated solution once they reached a shared understanding of the 
possibility of a negotiated solution. First, De Klerk’s 2 February speech was a clear intention to 
open official negotiations: 
 
“The time for talking has arrived and whoever still makes excuses does not really wish to talk… Walk through the 
open door; take your place at the negotiating table together with the Government and other leaders who have 
important power bases inside and outside of Parliament. Henceforth, everybody’s political realism will be tested 
against their realism, their workability and their fairness. The time for negotiation has arrived.”947 
 
 Second, the Groote Schuur Minute committed the ANC and the South African government 
towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation, to political stability, 
and to a peaceful process of negotiations. Flowing from this commitment, the parties agreed to 
establish a ‘Working Group on Political Offenses’ to make recommendations on a definition of 
political offences, to discuss timescales, and to advise on norms and mechanisms for dealing 
with the release of political prisoners and the granting of immunity in respect of political 
offences.
948
 The government also undertook to review the existing security legislation to bring it 
into line with the unfolding liberalisation process, and committed to work towards lifting the 
state of emergency. The ANC in turn would work towards the resolution of political violence and 
commit to political stability so as to assist the government in this regard. Fifth, channels of 
communication between the parties were established in order to curb violence and 
intimidation.
949
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Third, in the Pretoria Minute, the ANC suspended the armed struggle, with the Minute stating 
that “no further armed actions and related activities by the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto 
we Sizwe will take place.”950 The agreement also contained specific target dates with regard to 
resolving the contentious indemnity issue. In order to facilitate movement on substantive issues, 
paragraph 9 stated that the way was open to proceed towards negotiations on a new constitution 
and another joint working group, the Paragraph Nine Working Committee, was established to 
discuss procedural and agenda items for an as-yet-defined constitutional conference.
951
 
 
Fourth, in the DF Malan Accord, the ANC undertook not to carry out armed attacks or infiltrate 
men or weapons inside South Africa, the creation of underground structures and training of 
fighters inside South Africa would cease and statements inciting violence and threatening armed 
action would cease.
952
 However, there was no agreement on the surrender of ANC weapons, the 
identification of arms caches, the demobilization of MK or the disestablishment of self-defense 
units. Membership of MK would continue to be lawful and individual weapons would be 
licensed.
953
 
 
Therefore, the parties institutionalized their commitment to a negotiated solution through a series 
of pacts and agreement aimed at assuring the protection of their interests. These pacts and 
agreements established important benchmarks and rules of interaction that locked the ANC and 
South African government into an interdependent bargaining relationship. 
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7.8.1.2. Consideration of Alternative Negotiating Scenarios 
 
Consistent with Tomlin’s expectations, the parties also considered various alternative scenarios 
and, in the process, reflecting varying degrees of scope, issues and points for the potential 
negotiation. Two issues stand out: the parties’ positions on issues and strategies; and the format 
that the settlement negotiations would take. Both parties had opposing views on these points.  
 
With regards to the position on issues and strategies, the government’s initial views were based 
on the 1989 Broederbond Guidelines: “[each] ‘component unit’ of the population would control 
its ‘own affairs’, with ‘general affairs’ decided by consensus between the majority of each such 
unit in the national legislature.”954 Four principles formed the basis of their envisioned 
constitutional dispensation. First, the ‘group’ rather than the individual would provide the basis 
for political representation, and would be the primary repository of constitutional rights and 
protections.
955
 Second, South Africa was understood to be a country of minority groups with no 
majority. Third, a system of minority protection was fundamental. And fourth, all racial groups 
should be allocated separate legislative institutions to decide their ‘own’ affairs. For the NP any 
negotiation for a system guaranteeing full political participation would move from the premise of 
group rights, and the protection of minorities, which was argued to be a move away from rigid 
race classification. 
 
The NP thus saw the process of negotiations as an extension of the old ‘consociation’ approach: 
through a process of bargaining, trade-offs and compromise, representative racial and ethnic 
elites would come to a ‘pact’ about South Africa’s future.   
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By contrast, the ANC views were contained in the Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic 
South Africa. This document stated that a future South African constitution would have a Bill of 
Rights that would guarantee fundamental human rights, freedom of association, expression, 
thought, worship and the press. The Bill of Rights would also guarantee social and economic 
rights.  
 
During the unfolding political process, the parties sharpened their views considerably. Public 
debate between the parties narrowed on three questions: whether an interim government was 
necessary to oversee an election before drafting a new constitution; whether the new constitution 
should be drafted by a constituent assembly, in particularly whether it should happen before or 
after an election; and whether the notion of group rights had a place in a new constitution. This 
debate drew the battle lines for future talks. There were two competing scenarios.   
 
The perspective of the NP government was that the present government would remain intact 
while a conference representing different parties would negotiate a new constitution.”956 The 
Tricameral Parliament would then pass this constitution. The ANC wanted an elected constituent 
assembly first, which would then decide who should sit together to draw up a new 
constitution.
957
 
 
By early 1991, the parties had formalised their negotiating scenarios. In January, Mandela 
proposed a political solution; the convening of an All-Party Congress on constitutional 
negotiations. The proposed All-Party Congress would constitute the first step in the process 
leading to the adoption of [a] new constitution.
958
 This would only be convened after all 
obstacles to negotiations had been removed. 
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While the NP welcomed the idea of a multiparty conference, their interpretation of its role was 
that the conference “would work out ‘common ground’ and ‘basic principles’ before deciding the 
composition of the ‘more formal body’ to draw up the new constitution.”959 This position offered 
the prospect of a semantic compromise on the ANC’s preference for a Constituent Assembly.  
 
7.8.1.3. Preconditions as a Barrier 
 
The South African pre-negotiation process highlights the importance of preconditions as a barrier 
to passage to stage four, a factor that Tomlin does not consider in his framework. Conditions 
applicable to the opening of settlement negotiations usually cover three broad areas: the 
negotiation itself, including details such as the site and the level of representation, the political 
climate while official negotiations are in progress, and the substance of the negotiated 
settlement.
960
 These subjects influence the shape of the negotiated settlement that emerges, 
influence each side’s bargaining position, and help determine how long it will take to reach a 
negotiated agreement.
961
 In the South African case, preconditions related to the political climate 
which the settlement negotiation would be in progress. For the ANC, these preconditions were 
contained in the Harare Declaration and primarily related to issues of indemnity. For the South 
African government, the main precondition was that the ANC renounce the armed struggle. 
When political violence accompanied political liberalization, a peace process was identified as 
an important precondition to the opening of settlement negotiations.  
 
Overcoming these preconditions was a key feature of stage three and defined the bargaining 
relationship between the ANC and the government during the process. While the Pretoria Minute 
and DF Malan Accord met the government’s precondition on the suspension of the armed 
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struggle, the issues of indemnity and political violence were the most controversial; the 
government failed to meet the expectations of the ANC on both issues.  
 
Therefore, despite the fact that the ANC communicated the desire to negotiate in the January 8 
Statement i.e. the call for an All-Party Congress, this did not mark the turning point to stage four. 
What accompanied this communication was not a turning point, as suggested by Tomlin, but a 
crisis i.e. a breakdown and threat to talks.
962
 Progression to stage four would depend on how the 
ANC and South African government overcame the problem of the ANC’s preconditions. In 
scenarios where preconditions become barriers to official talks, two methods usually break the 
logjam. One is to initiate settlement negotiations with an ostensibly limited agenda. The other is 
to “reach an agreement that is subtle or ambiguous enough for neither side to have to admit that 
it backed down.”963 However, if both sides are willing to negotiate, then a pre-negotiation 
process can acquire sufficient momentum to survive many of the hazards that are capable of 
preventing the opening of settlement negotiations. Disagreements over conditions that previously 
appeared as formidable obstacles can be shoved aside.
964
  
 
7.8.2. Implications for Ripeness 
 
Zartman provides us with a set of indicators to look for: a sense of a hurting stalemate; a sense of 
a moment in the future that will worsen if negotiations fail; a sense that the tide of the combat 
has changed; the mediators’ need for leverage; and the development of a political solution. 
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7.8.2.1. Major Actors   
 
Who are the major actors in stage three and what are their goals?  
 
The major actors and decision units in stage three are in contrast to stages one and two. Whereas 
in the first two stages the major actors and decision units were predominant leaders with 
advisory groups, in stage three, participation and decision-making was broadened; the major 
actors and decision units were single groups on both sides.  
 
For the South African government, the single group that was tasked with managing the process 
in stage three was the cabinet. De Klerk was the principal. The Department of Constitutional 
Development was transformed into a structure that would initiate, direct and support the 
government negotiations team and strategy.
965
 Three people were important; Gerrit Viljoen (the 
Minister of Constitutional Development), Roelf Meyer (the deputy Minister of Constitutional 
Development) and Niel Barnard (the director general of the Department of Constitutional 
Development). Viljoen, Meyer and Barnard developed the government’s negotiation policy into 
detailed concepts in order to put proposals and positions on the table in preparation for official 
negotiations. Other cabinet ministers played supporting roles in the process.  
 
For the ANC, the single group tasked with managing the process did not reside within an 
institution, but was accountable to the national executive. The principal was Mandela, the ANC 
deputy president. Additional members were Thabo Mbeki (the Director of International Affairs), 
Jacob Zuma (the deputy director of NAT), and Penuell Maduna and Mathews Phosa (attorneys in 
the ANC’s Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs). Mandela’s team were all members 
of the Steering Committee formed in Berne, Switzerland.  
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7.8.2.2. Third Parties 
 
The only period in the third stage where mediation played an important role was in May 1991 
when talks breakdown and the pre-negotiation process reaches crisis. During most of the stage, 
interventions of the major principals, i.e. the rapport between Mandela and De Klerk, and 
interventions by Mandela in particular, were sufficient in turning crises into breakthrough.  
 
For example, the 5 April 1990 meeting in Tuynhuys between Mandela and De Klerk after the 
Sebokeng killings resolved the subsequent deadlock and ensured that the Groote Schuur meeting 
went ahead. On the eve of the Pretoria Minute, Mandela was able to persuade the national 
executive to suspend the armed struggle in order to create a positive climate to move pre-
negotiation forward. Mandela was also to convince a hostile and critical consultative conference 
on the merits of continuing negotiation, despite the ANC imposing important conditions for their 
support. And at the point of breakdown and crisis, an in an attempt to avert a complete 
breakdown in pre-negotiation after the failed intervention by the South African Council of 
Churches, the ANC did not severe all contact with the government despite the ultimatum; the 
ANC and government had met in a top-level summit on the day of the ultimatum deadline.
966
  
 
7.8.2.3. Hurting Stalemate and Way Out 
 
Do the actors perceive the situation to be a hurting stalemate?  
 
Yes, the parties still believed they were in a hurting stalemate, and still believed that there was a 
moment in future where they would be worse off if negotiations failed. What sustained this 
perception was the escalation of political violence, and the parties’ response to this confirmed 
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this perception. It was the fear and presence of political violence that kept the pre-negotiation on 
track. The escalating levels of political violence showed that the unthinkable was at the doorstep, 
and this was reflected in the parties’ responses to it. The violence kept the two main parties 
together. The moments of breakdown and crisis were crucial to the dynamic of continuity; after 
each crisis, the ANC and the government came back, taking a new step forward, and they came 
back because they appreciated the constraints and opportunities of the situation.
967
 Both sides 
were in a hurting stalemate and realised that only a negotiated agreement could resolve the 
conflict. The Mandela-De Klerk meeting in Tuynhuys on 5 April 1990, the Groote Schuur 
Minute, the Pretoria Minute, the Royal Hotel Minute, the DF Malan Accord, and the top-level 
summit on the eve of the ultimatum expiry date all illustrate this commitment to negotiated 
solutions as a result of perceptions of a stalemate. This perception would continue through stages 
four and five and during the progression of official negotiations.   
 
During this period, there was no reversal of fortune among the players. The perceived balance, 
however, was in favour of the government which controlled the process during this stage to a 
large extent. The bargaining process over preconditions is a good illustration of this balance of 
power. The series of agreements and pacts left an important ANC precondition (the definition of 
political offenses, crucial for the identification and release of political prisoners and return of 
exiles) unresolved. While the Groote Schuur Minute committed the parties to working towards a 
common definition of political crimes, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Minute restricted the numbers 
of ANC members to be indemnified. Further, the Indemnity Act only provided for temporary 
indemnity; the government reserved the right to prosecute at a later stage. While the act did 
provide provisions for a permanent indemnity, this was at the sole discretion of the president. 
The indemnity provisions also expired after a year, unless they were renewed annually by the 
president by proclamation, and following the second renewal, only if all three houses of 
parliament consented. The slow and bureaucratic nature of the process further drew the ire of the 
ANC; by the time of the ultimatum, over 1,000 political prisoners were still in prison.  
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This perceived balance of power, however, would change considerably. Most importantly, it 
would be changes in this perceived power balance that would create the environment in which 
disagreements over preconditions that appeared formidable at the point of the ultimatum would 
be overcome.  
 
7.9. Implications for the South African Literature 
 
The analysis of the South African case thus far, using ripeness and pre-negotiation as theoretical 
frameworks, highlights the shortcomings of, and fills an important gap in, the scholarship about 
why multiparty negotiations began in South Africa. As discussed in Chapter Two, this literature 
ahs important strengths and weaknesses.  
 
The strength of this literature is that it provides invaluable insights on the complexity of the end 
of apartheid. Multivariable analyses highlight the importance of macro-political and macro-
economic factors. The argument is that multiple pressures of great intensity were brought to bear 
on the apartheid state until such time that the pressures became too great, leading to the 
beginning of negotiations. The start of negotiations is either seen as an elite response to pressure 
or an elite initiative in anticipation of changing circumstances.  
 
Dominant-variable approaches acknowledge many factors as important subsidiary pressures, but 
highlight one variable as crucial. Important works that fall into this category emphasise the role 
played by the civil society and social movements, especially trade union, arguing that they were 
at the heart of the political changes that led to the beginning of negotiations. 
 
Single variable approaches analyse a particular factor; but that factor is not necessarily claimed 
to be the most important. They seek not to replace other explanations but rather compliment 
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them by giving weight to one factor. For the beginning of negotiations, literature tends to 
highlight the impact of the end of the cold war, and the role of secret talks.  
 
Theoretical explanations use political and sociological theories to explain the beginning of 
negotiations. Important accounts use institutional rational choice theory, draw on comparative 
studies of democratisation in Latin America and Southern Europe, and use Marxist analysis to 
explain the beginning of negotiation.  
 
The literature, however, has important shortcomings; the argument on ‘why negotiate at all’ is 
stronger than the argument  on ‘why the NP government ended up negotiating with the ANC’. 
They are two reasons for this.  
 
First, the literature dates the beginning of negotiation as 2 February 1990 and identifies De Klerk 
as the central actor for the beginning of the process. While the literature acknowledges the 
importance of political changes and events in the 1970s and 1980s, the important pre-
negotiations that happen during this period are not sufficiently discussed. The dissertation has 
shown that the first stage of the negotiation process begins in the mid-1980s and involved 
confidential conversations between the ANC leadership in exile and the South African 
government’s National Intelligence Service (first indirectly and then directly), and a second set 
of confidential conversations between Nelson Mandela and a team of senior government 
officials. The dissertation has demonstrated that some of these conversations were not just secret 
or informal chats, as depicted by the literature; they represented the first stage of the negotiation 
process and set the stage for De Klerk’s announcements of 2 February 1990.  
 
Second, of those studies that do consider the conversations mentioned in the dissertation, 
particularly those that highlight the importance of secret talks, there is no critical analysis of pre-
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negotiation as a process; the studies simply highlight the important role played by select 
individuals and the bonds that developed between them. 
 
With regard to the theoretical literature, particularly the arguments put forward by Sisk, Sisk 
does not deduce explanations from his theoretical framework despite providing an excellent 
chronology and description of the beginning of negotiations. This is most evident in his 
explanation on why negotiations begin. David Howarth’s critique of Sisk in this regard is 
important: “Sisk presupposes what he must demonstrate, as he provides no explanation of the 
‘shared common destiny’ and ‘interrelatedness’ which he posits as the (necessary) conditions 
from a zero-sum to a positive-sum perception.”968 The dissertation has shown that a balance of 
power between the main political forces, and a mutually hurting stalemate, does not 
automatically translate into recognition of a shared destiny, and is not, therefore a sufficient 
condition for the beginning of negotiations. Moreover, Sisk does not show how, and in what 
form these conditions resulted in altered perceptions amongst the major actors. While Sisk does 
mention ripeness and pre-negotiation as important for his study of the South African 
negotiations, these are not sufficiently developed.   
 
The dissertation has thus filled the gap in the literature by drawing attention to the nature and 
importance of pre-negotiation. It examined the conditions conducive for the beginning of pre-
negotiation and outlined the different stages and functions. Ripeness was a function of this 
political process.  
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7.10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed how the NP government and the ANC produced a commitment to a 
negotiated solution. The chapter used the third stage of Tomlin’s model on pre-negotiation. 
Tomlin writes that the third stage is the transition from ‘whether’ to negotiate to ‘what’ will be 
negotiated. The policy focus is initially inner-directed as parties consider alternative negotiating 
scenarios, reflecting varying degrees of scope for the potential negotiation, and successive steps 
towards increasing commitment toward a negotiated solution. The focus of policy makers then 
becomes outer-directed as the preoccupation with internal decision dynamics gives way to 
increased concern for the other parties to the problem. The communication of a desire to 
negotiate from one party to another is the turning point to stage four. This stage is the first phase 
of preliminary talks towards settlement negotiations. 
 
The chapter showed that the third stage of pre-negotiation in South Africa to a certain extent 
features factors analogous to Tomlin’s third stage. Consistent with Tomlin’s expectations, the 
ANC and South African government took successive steps towards increasing commitment 
towards a negotiated solution. De Klerk’s 2 February speech was a clear intention to open 
official negotiations. The Groote Schuur Minute committed the ANC and the South African 
government towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation, to 
political stability, and to a peaceful process of negotiations.  In the Pretoria Minute, the ANC 
suspended the armed struggle and contained specific target dates with regard to resolving the 
contentious indemnity issue. And in the DF Malan Accord, the ANC undertook not to carry out 
armed attacks or infiltrate men or weapons inside South Africa, the creation of underground 
structures and training of fighters inside South Africa would cease and statements inciting 
violence and threatening armed action would cease. The parties institutionalized their 
commitment to a negotiated solution through a series of pacts and agreement aimed at assuring 
the protection of their interests. These pacts and agreements established important benchmarks 
and rules of interaction that locked the ANC and South African government into an 
interdependent bargaining relationship. 
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The South African pre-negotiation process however highlights the importance of preconditions 
as a barrier to the opening of official negotiations, a factor that Tomlin does not consider in his 
framework. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
The Final Stages of Pre-negotiation 
Overcoming Preconditions 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the final stages of pre-negotiation. The chapter will use stage 
four and five of Tomlin’s pre-negotiation model. Tomlin writes that in the fourth stage, the 
parties agree to pursue a negotiated solution to the problem. The focus is outer-directed as they 
come to terms on the desirability of negotiation as an approach to the problem while reserving 
any commitment as to the scope of the negotiation itself. The achievement of an agreement to 
negotiate marks the turning point to the final stage of the pre-negotiation process. In the fifth 
stage, parties define the scope of the proposed official negotiation and establish parameters for 
the negotiation process to follow. This stage provides parties with an important opportunity to 
assess the extent of congruence in their perspective agendas. Even though parties may not reach 
an agreement on appropriate parameters, their agreement to proceed with settlement talks will 
mean that this final stage of the pre-negotiation phase imply merges into settlement negotiations. 
  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the conditions that led to 
the turning point that facilitated the process of overcoming the problem of preconditions, which 
was brought about by a crisis of legitimacy for the government. The second section discusses 
how the government’s crisis of legitimacy led to a process of convergence between the 
government and the ANC. The third section discusses the issues involved in the preparations for 
settlement negotiations.  
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8.1. Breakthrough: The June 1991 ANC National Conference  
 
The discussion thus far has shown that the decision to open settlement negotiations is complex. 
While the decision in part depends on the balance of power in the conflict, this is not in any 
simple and easily describable way. Moreover, since agreement of both sides is required to begin 
settlement negotiation, each side must consider when the other would be receptive, and this adds 
a new dimension.
969
  
 
The ANC and NP government had conflicting interests in determining exactly when to open 
settlement negotiations. But because both were enduring the continuing costs of the conflict, 
albeit from different vantage points, both had a common interest in seeing that settlement 
negotiations do open. The presence of these elements meant that the opening of settlement 
negotiations was essentially a bargaining problem. The difficulty was that preconditions had 
become a barrier to their opening. The Inkathagate Scandal that irreparably damaged the 
credibility of the NP government provided sufficient conditions for overcoming the problem of 
preconditions.  
 
As the planned ANC National Conference approached without the ultimatum demands met, the 
ANC faced critical choices. Mandela and his team came to the realisation that to keep postponing 
talks because of rising levels of political violence and De Klerk’s failure to meet ANC 
preconditions was futile. Postponements simply gave veto powers to those who were opposed to 
constitutional negotiations. From this perspective, the ultimatum was counter-productive.  
 
The July National Conference was the first inside South Africa in 30 years and was attended by 
over 2,000 delegates representing 760,000 members. These included returned exiles from foreign 
ANC missions, fighters from MK camps, UDF activists, and old guard political prisoners. 
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Because it was the first major conference in decades, and widely believed that another 
conference would not be held until a new South African constitution had been negotiated, the 
conference had to consider a number of important decisions, including leadership elections, 
negotiations, constitutional questions, and a proposed alliance with the PAC. All these issues 
would have a bearing on the negotiation process i.e. who sits at the table and under what brief, 
the agenda, the procedure, the strategy, and what happens after.  
 
Mandela’s opening address signalled an important shift in the ANC’s thinking. Given that the 
ultimatum had gone unmet, and with considerable anxiety for a return to pre-negotiations, he 
argued that the ANC needed to reconsider its attitude toward negotiations; “negotiations 
constitute a victory of our struggle and a defeat for the ruling group which thought it could 
exercise a monopoly of political power forever.”970 Because the government was not defeated 
militarily such negotiations were a new theatre, and the most appropriate continuation, of 
struggle toward the primary objective, the transfer of power. Thus, Mandela continued, the 
political violence that was being perpetuated by security forces was opposed to negotiations, 
precisely because the theatre of negotiations presented the ANC with an opportunity to gain a 
strategic advantage. Consequently, the slowing down of the pre-negotiation process by 
perpetrators of political violence simply prolonged the apartheid system.
971
   
 
The ANC needed to provide a comprehensive strategy toward negotiation. It would not hold 
back on negotiations; rather, it would seek to expedite it: 
 
“[The ANC] must evolve a clearer idea on such questions as the composition of [the All-Party Congress], its agenda, 
and the manner of its functioning and the length of time we should propose that it should sit. Conference should bear 
in mind the fact that we ourselves said that the All-Party Congress should convene when the obstacles to 
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negotiations have been removed. Accordingly, we must calculate on the congress taking place sooner rather than 
later and therefore approach all preparations for our own participation with some urgency.”972 
 
Mandela’s address set the tone of the conference. This was also the beginning of a tactical shift 
in the ANC’s thinking on negotiations. The ANC’s short term objective would be the 
replacement of the De Klerk government by a multiracial interim government of national unity: 
 
“The importance of the matter cannot be overemphasised. Among ourselves we are agreed that it would be incorrect 
and unacceptable that during this transitional period one of the parties to the negotiations, in this case the National 
Party should continue to govern the country on its own. An interim government would have to be formed and 
constituted in such a manner that it is broadly acceptable to the various political formations in our country. To that 
extent, it will take on the character of a transitional government of national unity. Once this government is formed, 
we will have reached a situation whereby, for the first time this century, South Africa will seize to be ruled by a 
white minority regime. In this regard we must provide the lead on all major questions that will affect the constitution 
of an Interim Government as well as its lifespan.”973 
 
Mandela rearranged the ANC’s priorities and converted perceptions of negotiations from being a 
‘defeat’ into a ‘victory’. Negotiations were the most effective path towards the primary 
objective, the transfer of power. Mandela’s reasoning was that “the mere fact the government 
was engaged in negotiations at all was a sign that they did not have the strength to sustain 
apartheid.”974 The ANC therefore needed to start viewing negotiations as a ‘moment of 
opportunity’ and not a compromise strategy.   
 
Mandela’s ideas were put to the test on the first item for the conference: leadership elections. 
This process would define the team to represent the ANC at the official negotiations. Tambo 
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stood down as president and Mandela was elected unanimously as his successor.
975
 Walter Sisulu 
was elected as the deputy president after an unusually tense stand-off between Mbeki and 
Hani.
976
 UDF activists, the SACP, and COSATU secured the election of the trade union leader, 
Cyril Ramaphosa.
977
  
 
The conference witnessed the ascension of an important group of SACP and MK leaders also 
joined by ‘Young Turks’ in the national executive. Chris Hani, Joe Slovo, Ronnie Kasrils and 
Harry Gwala (the core of the militant SACP and MK leaders) received more than 80% support. 
The national executive now included important senior UDF activists close to Ramaphosa, such 
as Mosioua Lekota (UDF publicity secretary), Popo Molefe (UDF general-secretary), and 
Mohammed Valli Moosa (UDF Transvaal secretary).     
 
The conference then turned to policy issues. Among the resolutions adopted was an endorsement 
of the strategy of negotiations and a commitment to a negotiated settlement: 
 
“[The] speedily realisation of a democratic settlement requires that negotiations which constitute an additional 
terrain of struggle should be linked to a continuing mass struggle and international pressure. This is because the 
gains made in the mass struggle will be reflected at the negotiating table. Negotiations do not win our freedom, but 
represent the recognition of the victories we win on the ground.”978  
 
Consequent to the “removal of all obstacles”, the conference “reaffirmed the crucial importance 
of the following steps:  the convening of the All-Party Congress; the installation of an Interim 
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Government; the election of a democratic Constituent Assembly; and the adoption of a 
democratic constitution and the election of a parliament representative of all the people of South 
Africa.”979 The new NEC was instructed to “take immediate steps to ensure that a comprehensive 
and representative team comprising all chief negotiators, working groups and researchers, which 
shall function under the supervision and direction of the NEC, is established.”980 The NEC was 
mandated to “continue with the process of talks-about-talks”, and invested with discretionary 
powers.
981
  
 
Butler points out that these resolutions were indicative of a seismic shift where Mandela’s 
negotiators were in the process of having their powers removed.
982
 As the UDF, SACP and trade 
union leaders took up their leadership positions in the ANC, internal competition became inter-
generational; the central issue was whether the old guard or the ‘Young Turks’ would be in 
overall charge of the negotiation process, in all its envisaged stages.  
 
8.2. Turning Point: Inkathagate and the Moment of Convergence 
 
The new ANC strategy was put to the test immediately. Barely two weeks after the conference 
the Weekly Mail published an explosive series of articles revealing the existence of a secret state 
project for funding the IFP. The articles revealed that, with the knowledge of senior cabinet 
ministers, the security police in Natal had provided R250,000 to the IFP to help it organise and 
finance mass rallies. The informant, Brian Morrow, was a disillusioned security branch warrant 
officer who by chance was able to get his hands on the most secret police documents contained 
in the ‘Stratcom’ (Strategic Communications) files in a heavily protected room. Citing top-secret 
memorandums, bank receipts, and internal police communications, the Weekly Mail showed 
how the security branch in Natal “funnelled cash from a secret slush fund for massive rallies… to 
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show the international community that Buthelezi, who opposed sanctions, had a strong base.”983 
Controversially, one of the rallies on 25 March 1990 had sparked the Seven Day War in the 
Edendale Valley. The documentary evidence also revealed the arming and training of IFP 
members in offensive actions against ANC activists, and the SADF Special Forces’ involvement 
in death squads. 
 
The smoking gun of police collusion with Inkatha had been discovered and details spread 
through the domestic and international press with lightning speed.
984
 What made matters worse 
for the government and the IFP was that Adriaan Vlok, the Minister of Law and Order, 
acknowledged the payments, and Buthelezi, De Klerk and Vlok didn’t make it clear whether or 
not the funding had ceased.
985
  
 
The documents leaked decisively altered the balance of power perception in favour of the ANC 
in the final stages of pre-negotiation. It presented the NP government with a legitimacy crisis 
with perceptions that they were not honest negotiators. The ANC viewed Inkathagate as the 
decisive moment in pre-negotiations, and led to a strategic shift on their part. According to Cyril 
Ramaphosa, “prior to Inkathagate” the ANC’s approach had been to “remove all obstacles” prior 
to the opening of formal multiparty talks as per the Harare Declaration i.e. “prisoners must be 
released, exiles must come back, violence must be eliminated, stop trials, remove repressive 
legislation.” Inkathagate changed all that: 
 
“So after Inkathagate it became clear to us that that was the obstacle, the main obstacle is the government and 
you’ve got to remove the government because once you remove the government then all the other obstacles are 
removed. It’s like a jigsaw puzzle, so you solve one and everything else falls into place… Inkathagate has actually 
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given much more proof… that this government is so corrupt, so much more illegitimate that it can never hope to 
continue, it shouldn’t be allowed to continue governing even through the period of transition.”986                
 
The issue for the ANC were the twin questions of sovereignty and legitimacy of the government 
i.e. they had to be taken away before the commencement of constitutional negotiations: 
 
“We are saying we must have a sovereign government that will be charged with the responsibility of ushering us 
peacefully, neutrally through the period of transition because transition, this big wide road that we see in front of us, 
has a lot of potholes and we want to be steered properly on this road and avoid potholes… We believe that if we are 
going to have fundamental changes in this country as the government argues we are, this is the time when the 
government should entrust the future of this country not in one political party and trust it in itself, the ANC and 
Inkatha and the whole other organisations so that we all take joint responsibility.”987 
 
The government’s chief negotiator, Gerrit Viljoen, also conceded that the balance of power had 
shifted: “I think the main beneficiaries [of Inkathagate] are the ANC and the main losers are the 
government, and particularly because the thing has been structured to reflect on the personal 
integrity of the President, which is one of the strongest building blocks.”988 Viljoen did not think 
the revelations would halt the pre-negotiation process:  
 
“The alternative was tried out by both sides. The ANC tried it out by way of the armed conflict. We tried it out by 
way of armed and legal repression. Both sides acknowledge that the other side is not a complete devil and 
completely wrong. You cannot have negotiations unless you accept that the other side also has a point 
somewhere.”989  
 
Buthelezi gave the revelations a cynical shrug: 
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“Do you know that, the argument, of course, was that, because the budget of KwaZulu comes from the central 
government I was therefore a puppet of the government. So when they turn around now and say that because it was 
250,000 rands, I’m a puppet of the government. I mean, it’s ridiculous without saying, what is new? I mean, all 
along, I was labelled long ago as a puppet of the government but I say to them, what are the established standards? I 
mean they themselves have been funded, most substantially by the government.”990 
 
The ANC was certain that the Inkathagate revelations would make the government more eager to 
give concessions. Subsequently, the NWC held an emergency session and released a statement. 
Echoing Ramaphosa’s hard bargain, the NWC stated that “the expose underscores the pressing 
need for an Interim Government so structured as to enjoy the confidence of the majority of South 
Africans. It is clear the incumbent regime cannot be trusted to preside over the transition from 
apartheid to democracy.”991 The ANC put forward a list of six demands: the dismissal of 
ministers Vlok and Malan; the establishment of a multi-party commission of enquiry to 
investigate the full extent of government involvement in the violence; the dismantling of the 
SADF and SAP counter-insurgency forces; the opening to public scrutiny of the secret fund; to 
encourage public servants to reveal all about covert operations in exchange for immunity from 
prosecution; and the prosecution of police officers and SADF personnel involved in political 
violence.
992
    
 
A full plenary of the NEC convened shortly after to discuss the full implications of the 
Inkathagate revelations. The NEC endorsed the demands put forward by the NWC.
993
 Sensing a 
strategic advantage, the ANC sought to capitalise on Inkathagate by speeding up the process 
toward an All-Party Congress, and extracting as many concessions from the government to 
ensure a favourable balance of power at the congress. To this end, there was a shift in focus from 
the obstacles identified in the Harare Declaration and the demands contained in the April 
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Ultimatum to the issue at hand.
994
 For the ANC, the Inkathagate revelations shifted the order of 
the ANC’s preferences and “moved the issue of an interim government to the top of the 
agenda.”995  
 
Ramaphosa stated that the government was the obstacle that “stands between us and the 
resolution of South Africa’s problems”, and the best way to remove that obstacle was “the 
removal of the government itself.”996 Signalling a change in ANC thinking, Slovo further added 
that there were now no longer any obstacles to the ANC’s participation in an All-Party Congress: 
“we will be faced with obstacles until the end of time. Subject to consultation with our allies, we 
are clearly prepared to move towards an all-party conference and that all-party conference must 
discuss the creation of an interim government.”997  
 
De Klerk realised that he could no longer keep Ministers Malan and Vlok in their high profile 
security portfolios – the revelations “had made their removal unavoidable.”998 Instead of firing 
the ministers, De Klerk chose to reshuffle his cabinet. Roelf Meyer, the deputy minister of 
constitutional development, replaced Malan, and Hernus Kriel, the minister of planning, replaced 
Vlok. There were two reasons for this. First, De Klerk wished to avoid any impression that he 
was “surrendering to the ANC’s demands.” And second, the cabinet reshuffle “helped clear the 
decks” for his response to the Inkathagate revelations.999  
 
De Klerk’s response to Inkathagate was presented at a press conference on 30 July 1991 at the 
Presidency in Pretoria. In what he described as “one of the most difficult press conferences I 
have ever had to face”, De Klerk justified the government’s covert programmes against the ANC 
before 1990 arguing that they had been implemented while the ANC and PAC “were the enemy 
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which had to be fought.”1000 However, after 2 February 1990, he had “taken action to normalise 
the role of the security forces and had ordered a review of secret projects.”1001 De Klerk didn’t 
make it clear whether such funding of secret projects had ceased: 
 
“As we moved into a new era attention was given by the cabinet in the same spirit to covert state activities. The 
decision was taken to review these activities with a view to limiting them. Steps were also taken to ensure better 
control and management of these covert in addition to the ordered control measures which were already in place. In 
this context I remind you of my speech in parliament on 1
st
 March 1990 when I disclosed information about an 
investigation of secret projects which I had instituted in November 1989. As a result of it numerous secret projects 
were cancelled.”1002  
 
In his biography, he is also less clear: 
 
“As a result, numerous secret projects had, by the second half of 1990, been terminated, including assistance to 
Inkatha’s trade union movement, UWUSA, and many of our projects to circumvent international sanctions.”1003 
 
However, De Klerk committed the government to levelling the political playing fields, and 
confirmed that the government had no desire to be both player and referee. Significantly, he gave 
the clearest indication that the government was willing to make concessions on the ANC’s 
position on an interim government thus clearing the path to settlement talks. To this end, he 
endorsed the need for “transitional measures”: 
 
“Tonight I wish to commit myself once again to transitional arrangements which will ensure in a constitutionally 
acceptable manner that the government is unable to misuse its position of power to the detriment of its discussion 
partners in the negotiation process. I have an open mind on alternative methods. However, any steps in this 
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connection have to result from negotiation. As far as I am concerned the subject of transitional arrangements may be 
the first item on the agenda of a multi-party conference.”1004 
 
De Klerk also supported the ANC’s position on a speedy path toward a multi-party congress: 
 
“I therefore conclude with an appeal to every leader to help us get the multi-party conference started expeditiously. I 
appeal to them, stop the perpetual positioning and abandon the politics of confrontation and ultimatums. Let us 
begin with real negotiations. That is what [South Africa] asks of us. The government is ready and able and willing to 
start tomorrow.”1005 
 
Inkathagate had important consequences for pre-negotiations.  
 
First, Inkathagate was the beginning of the parting of ways between the government and IFP. In 
the process, the government “lost its only possible black partner with significant support and 
thereby its chances of building a substantive conservative alliance”, an important strategic 
goal.
1006
   
 
Second, for the ANC, the revelations were proof why an interim multi-party government should 
preside over the constitutional negotiation process and not the NP government; as Ramaphosa 
pointed out, it “confirmed the ANC’s suspicion that the [government] was prone to abusing state 
resources to bolster its position [for the roundtable talks].” Consequently, ANC pressure for an 
interim government grew immensely.
1007
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Third, Inkathagate undercut the government’s ability to control the pre-negotiation process; it 
could no longer claim that it could negotiate a transition away from apartheid while “keeping its 
hands firmly on the tiller of the ship of state.” While it had to a large extent drove the pre-
negotiation process since 2 February 1990, its strategy was now fully exposed; “it could not be a 
player in the process and a legitimate referee too. An interim government framework, which the 
ANC had been demanding, became an imperative.”1008 
 
As the power balance rapidly changed, the ANC took the initiative. First, Mandela sensed, 
particularly after De Klerk’s press conference, that the ANC and the government were 
converging and began to apply the pressure: 
 
“We are happy if the government is optimistic about the all-party conference, because despite all the problems that 
have arisen, we still feel that negotiation is the correct solution for South Africa. But we are not going to go into 
negotiation blindly. The government must carry out its responsibility and it must agree to a mechanism which will 
ensure that we’ll not have a similar scandal to the Inkathagate scandal. And the only mechanism we see which will 
give this assurance is the immediate installation of an interim government… De Klerk has said he is prepared to 
discuss interim arrangements along the lines of a government which embraces the major parties in the negotiation 
process. We are not satisfied with that. We want him to go further. The idea of an interim government with 
sovereign powers over all organs of the government and not co-opting certain individuals is our demand… We want 
a transfer of power from this government to an interim government.”1009  
 
Second, and in response to the new circumstances, the NWC resolved the issue of whether 
Mandela (the old guard) or Ramaphosa (the young Turks) was best suited to be in charge of 
overall negotiations and which collective was most appropriate to see the process to the All-Party 
Congress. Smelling blood, the NWC capitalised on the government’s weakness and selected a 
strong UDF team with SACP influence.
1010
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The key decision involved the conference’s mandate for a new negotiation commission, which 
would be the ANC’s formal negotiating team. Ramaphosa was selected as head of the new 
Negotiation Commission, making him the ANC’s new chief negotiator. The new team would 
include Thabo Mbeki (who was also reappointed as the DIA director), Joe Slovo and 
Mohammed Valli Moosa (the former UDF Transvaal secretary).
1011
  
 
These changes were motivated by a number of interwoven factors. First, as evident in the Durban 
Consultative Conference, there was a growing frustration at the limited achievements of the 
ANC negotiating team after 1990. The Pretoria Minute and the DF Malan Accord all involved 
ANC concessions without extracting comparable concessions from the government. As a result, 
they compromised the chances of reaching a larger overall, and acceptable, settlement to the 
South African conflict.  
 
Second, Mandela and Mbeki were seen as obstacles to the speedily progress of pre-negotiation. 
The younger generation reasoned that Mandela’s personality “was not suited to the compromise 
and detailed work that negotiations required.” He was better used as a big gun held in reserve; a 
crisis manager and power-broker brought in to resolve deadlocks and stalemates.
1012
 While 
Mbeki was very able in managing the logistical and technical side of negotiations, “he lacked the 
negotiating experience and human skills the task demanded; … [his] approach was to dominate 
his team intellectually rather than encourage and energise autonomous working groups.”1013 
However, Mbeki was the only old guard survivor. As the ANC’s chief diplomat and ‘point 
negotiations man’ for over half a decade, he had invaluable skills as an ideas man, and was a 
master backroom operator. Mbeki had the right contacts in the right places in the most influential 
capitals in the Western world. 
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The wider implication of the constitution of the new negotiating team was that in the changed 
circumstances after Inkathagate, there was a belief that it would give the pre-negotiation process 
fresh impetus, and exploit the ANC’s new favourable power balance. The reading of the situation 
by senior government strategists was accurate: “They thought Thabo Mbeki was too subtle… 
They thought, ‘Perhaps the way to tackle these Boers is through an abrasive labour man’.”1014  
 
Valli Moosa explained that there was a significant paradigm shift in the way in which the team 
assessed the government’s role in the pre-negotiations. Valli Moosa stated that the new ANC 
leadership had “lost confidence in De Klerk” and accused him of pursuing a double agenda.1015 
The new strategy, Valli Moosa continued, was to “mobilise the strength we have to bring [the 
government] to the point where they would have no choice but to adhere to agreements arrived 
at. That is the point at which we think negotiations can make sense.”1016 De Klerk, in their eyes, 
was not a man of integrity, and they never had trust in the government. However, Ramaphosa 
added, that did not mean that negotiations were impossible: 
 
“Negotiations are usually between adversaries, people who have two interests that are conflicting and when you 
contest for state power you always find that negotiations are between enemies. Enemies don’t usually trust each 
other and they don’t really respect each other but you see that grows out of the process. As you go on you build 
relationships, you cut deals on small little issues that may be insignificant and as you both deliver, as your stature 
grows in the eyes of the other then you become more trustful of the other.”1017    
 
Hani also added that mistrust in pre-negotiations is inconsequential, and it was not their concern: 
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“We are negotiating with this government because we want a new government in this country. And we are 
convinced that their schemes to undermine and weaken us will fail, they will fail definitely, and we know that we 
have got the strength to push them to the negotiating table.”1018 
 
These responses to Inkathagate revealed how great the pressures for a settlement were. Some, but 
not all, of the ANC’s demands were met, but it nevertheless returned to pre-negotiations. The 
ANC’s core power-brokers, Mandela and Ramaphosa, implied that returning to pre-negotiation 
towards an All-Party Congress was necessary because violence and mayhem would persist for as 
long as the NP government remained in power. Therefore, “only an interim government, in 
which the ruling [NP] would be forced to share power, could address the problem, and only 
negotiation could achieve that.”1019 For its part, the government conceded that such “transitional 
arrangements [would have to] result from negotiations.”1020 The government and the ANC had 
reached a point of convergence. This is the point when the ANC and the government commit to 
begin settlement negotiations. This marks the end of stage three.   
 
8.3. Stage Four: Agreement to Negotiate 
 
Stage four was characterised by a process of convergence. Three developments consolidated this 
process of convergence: consensus on the issue of political prisoners and exiles; the resolution of 
the agenda for the All-Party Congress; and the political dynamics of participation at the 
roundtable talks.  
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8.3.1. Consensus: The Political Prisoner and Exile Matter 
 
As a stated precondition in the Harare Declaration, the procedures for the release and 
indemnification of political prisoners, and the return of exiles, had always been contentious. 
Releases in the first five months of 1991 had occurred at a slow pace. The individual indemnity 
application process had received criticism due to the composition and operation of the indemnity 
committees. The committees had “the mandate to investigate matters raised in indemnity 
applications and submit written reports to the president.”1021 The controversy with these bodies is 
that they were unaccountable; they “consisted of government-appointed judges acting in great 
secrecy.”1022 ANC nominees intended to serve on the committees had withdrawn in protest 
“because the next meeting on ‘borderline cases’ was scheduled for 11 June, some 40 days after 
some of the prisoners had begun their hunger strike.”1023 Further, the legal guidelines and 
deliberations of these bodies were not clear or transparent. Keightley writes that when their 
guidelines no longer satisfied political powers locked in negotiations, “they were simply swept 
away and replaced by new definitions.” Thus, from a legal point of view, the indemnity process 
was arbitrary in its implementation.
1024
    
 
The situation was complicated by De Klerk granting “a one third remission of sentence to all 
first-time offenders other than sex offenders, child abusers and those with life sentences.”1025 
Between December 1990 and 31 July 1991, the government took “‘extraordinary’ measures to 
release 57,000 prisoners, unconditionally or on parole.”1026 This included two policemen who 
were convicted of murder. De Klerk’s rationale was that “the release of non-political first 
offenders would redress the imbalance created by the release of political prisoners.”1027 These 
remissions were not negotiated with the ANC. Lawyers for Human Rights argued that “the 
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government was attempting to hide the release of political prisoners whose status was disputed 
among the thousands of other releases.”1028 It therefore became impossible to determine the 
number of political prisoners released by the government during this early period.
1029
   
 
By March 1991, 4,804 people had been granted indemnity, and despite this large number, only 
270 prisoners had been released with a further 760 being “at an advanced stage.”1030 By the end 
of April 1991, 933 political prisoners had been released and by May 1991 “all but a few 
prisoners had been released from Robben Island.”1031 Despite these releases, by mid-July 1991, 
the ANC and Lawyers for Human Rights claimed that there were still over 800 political 
prisoners still in incarceration.
1032
 The Human Rights Commission put the number at 972 
political prisoners. De Klerk put the number at below 200, and in May he stated that he was 
satisfied all prisoners who “clearly qualified for release” had been released.1033 The complicating 
factor was the political prisoners incarcerated in the homelands; by July 1991, there were over 
166 political prisoners in homeland jails.
1034
 And the ANC at the time had continued to stress 
that their incarceration was an obstacle to negotiation as per the Harare Declaration.  
 
Inkathagate changed all of this. Responding to the revelations, the ANC departed from the 
Harare Declaration and, as discussed, identified the government as the primary obstacle to 
negotiations.
1035
 As emphasised by Ramaphosa, the ANC’s efforts in this regard would be 
focused on the installation of an interim government of national unity through an All-Party 
Congress, and the removal of the remaining obstacles to negotiation would be expedited by such 
an interim government.
1036
 By the end of July 1991, and as the guard changed, ANC lawyer 
Penuell Maduna stated that the ANC was re-examining several hundred political prisoner cases 
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to determine whether they could be classified as political.
1037
 While the ANC still regarded the 
release of all political prisoners as an obstacle to negotiations, Maduna continued, the ANC did 
not want negotiations further delayed by cases that were found to be non-political on closer 
scrutiny.
1038
 On 29 July 1991, Maduna told Business Day that that almost all the clearly 
identifiable political cases had been resolved.
1039
 The preferences of the ANC had changed; the 
All-Party Congress could not wait for the removal of the other obstacles to negotiations. The two 
processes could proceed at the same time.  
 
The issue of the return of political exiles reached resolution. The resolution of this matter 
involved the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as it was the 
appropriate international agency to perform this task, and had also worked extensively with the 
ANC in Southern Africa in the administration of its various exiled communities. According to 
the High Commissioner, Sakado Ogata, a UNHCR working group had estimated that there were 
some 30,000 South African exiles in Southern Africa alone. The main countries of asylum in the 
region were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. As 
for the rest of the continent, Tanzania and Uganda were the main countries of refuge. MK 
fighters were concentrated in Angola, Tanzania and Uganda, while the remainder were mostly 
civilian populated and used as transit areas for MK. West African countries such as Ghana, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria also hosted South African exiles, as have a number of other 
countries outside Africa such the United States, Canada and India.  
 
Initially, the repatriation of exiles did not involve the UNHCR; the organisation was 
unacceptable to the South African government, largely because of the hostility towards the 
United Nations and its agencies. As a result, the return of exiles happened at a slow pace; by the 
end of January 1991, Kobie Coetsee revealed that 2,974 people who had left the country illegally 
had been granted indemnity.
1040
 By the end of February 1991, 1,092 had been admitted into the 
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country. Given the slowness of the process, enormity of the task, and pressure applied by ANC-
aligned civic organisations, the government conceded in later March 1991 and announced that it 
would allow the UNHCR to assist in the repatriation process.
1041
 Negotiations ensued between 
the government and the UNHCR but deadlocked on a number of issues. First, the UNHCR 
disagreed with the government’s indemnity procedure arguing that it should be comparable to 
UN norms. Second, many exiles “did not wish to return to South Africa without strong 
guarantees that they would not be prosecuted.” The UNHCR as a result put enormous pressure 
on South Africa to gain assurances that indemnity would be “unequivocal and unconditional.”1042 
Third, the whole issue was complicated by the fact that the government refused to be responsible 
for people returning to the homelands arguing that the UNHCR would have to negotiate directly 
with relative homeland government departments to manage repatriation.
1043
 
 
Several months of behind the scenes negotiations ensued. Meanwhile, anxious exiles slowly 
trickled in. By the beginning of June 1991, the Minister of Home Affairs, Gene Louw, stated that 
the government had issued 8,658 special travel documents to exiles out of a total of 8,837 
applications. However, only 720 people returned using these documents.
1044
 By July only 958 
people returned and the UNHCR applied more pressure on the government to grant returning 
exiles a general amnesty.  
 
The breakthrough happened in the changed political climate of 16 August 1991, when the 
government and UNHCR reached agreement. In terms of the agreement, the UNHCR was to 
facilitate the “voluntary repatriation” of returnees. Each person seeking to return was to be 
interviewed by the UNHCR to ensure that their return was voluntary. The UNHCR would then 
forward their details to the South African government to establish whether they would be granted 
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indemnity against prosecution.
1045
 The South African government would then issue travel 
documents for those persons cleared to return.  
 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the government and UNHCR applied to unarmed 
civilians only.
1046
 The government was willing to grant a conditional amnesty: 
 
“The Government is willing, in the interest of the process of reconciliation and in order to expedite the rate of 
repatriation, to grant amnesty to returnees in respect of political offences they may have committed before 12.00 on 
8 October 1990 and which qualify for indemnity in terms of the guidelines published.”1047       
 
These guidelines were in terms of political offences, and defined ‘political offences’ in 
accordance with the principles of extradition law i.e. they took into account the motive of the 
offender, the context in which the offence was committed, the nature of the political objective, 
the legal and factual nature of the offence, the objective of the offence, the relationship between 
the offence and the political objective, and whether the act was committed in the execution of an 
order.
1048
 In order to ensure that the UNHCR’s repatriation and reintegration of returnees to the 
homelands was not viewed as implied recognition, the preamble declared that nothing was “to be 
construed as constituting recognition in any way, on the part of the UNHCR, of any state of 
affairs not recognised by the United Nations or as constituting a derogation from any United 
Nations resolutions.”1049 The government in turn undertook “to use its best endeavours to ensure 
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that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding” would be applied in these homelands 
territories.
1050
  
 
The ANC called on its remaining exiles to come home. The repatriation process started at the 
end of October 1991, and by the end of the year 6,000 to 7,000 of the projected 30,000 
repatriates had returned. By 6 March 1992, the UNHCR had repatriated a further 2,228 
persons.
1051
 
 
8.3.2. The Parties’ Positions: Structuring the Constitutional Negotiating Forum 
  
As mentioned, the necessity of choosing transitional or interim structures during the pre-
negotiations transition became an imperative in the wake of Inkathagate. This was reinforced by 
the fact that the international community played no assertive role, yet South Africa’s political 
institutions were no longer perceived as legitimate by a major negotiating actor. Debates on how 
to structure constitutional negotiating forum became central in the final stages of pre-
negotiations. They revolved around two questions: who was to govern during the transition, and 
by what means would parties get to the negotiating table. At the heart of the debate was the 
division between legal continuity (the government position) and the creation of interim structures 
(the ANC position).  
 
In the government’s view, all parties “with a proven basis of support” were entitled to participate 
in the negotiations, and that during the transition period the existing Tricameral Parliament was 
to remain sovereign. In addition, Gerrit Viljoen told parliament that the leaders of the 
organizations most likely to participate would have to reach an understanding on the criteria for 
qualifying, the guidelines for assessing proven support, methods to persuade unwilling parties to 
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participate, the host calling for the first meeting, and the logistics of the conference.
1052
 Roelf 
Meyer expanded on this view, telling parliament that “the definition of political parties and 
organisations ‘with proven support’ would have to be worked out during the run-up to the 
conference, since Africans did not participate in parliamentary structures.” Thus, an election “on 
the basis of participation would create problems as it would require positions being adopted 
before the talks, making negotiations virtually impossible.”1053    
 
The ANC rejected this formula, demanding instead that an interim government replace the 
existing one for the duration of the transition. Comprising the major players in the negotiation 
process, the interim government would oversee that process and ensure that the next phase, the 
election of a constituent assembly, is conducted fairly.
1054
 The constituent assembly was at the 
heart of the ANC’s proposals for transition; it was to be elected by universal adult suffrage, and 
the assembly’s main task was to adopt a new constitution under which elections for a new 
government would be held.
1055
 This view was consistent with the Harare Declaration which 
stated that “[the] parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the 
process of drawing up and adoption of a new Constitution; govern and administer the country, as 
well as effect the transition to a democratic order including the holding of elections.”1056 
 
Mandela made this demand most forcefully in the aftermath of Inkathagate: 
 
“The idea of an interim government with sovereign powers over all the organs of government and not co-opting 
certain individuals is our demand. We are not prepared to be co-opted into the existing structures of government. We 
want a transfer of power from this government to an interim government.”1057 
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The NP responded that the ANC proposal was “putting the political cart before the constitutional 
horse.” Viljoen argued that the election of a constituent assembly “would leapfrog the whole 
negotiation process, would predetermine its outcome. The elected majority will decide and that is 
where negotiations will end.”1058 This would eliminate broad multiparty participation in the 
drafting of a new constitution. According to Viljoen, all parties had to be “treated as having an 
equally legitimate stake in participation and in the outcome, and dominance of one or a few 
parties over others was to be avoided.”1059  
 
However, as the ANC counter-argued, the government had failed to appreciate the political 
consequences of Inkathagate; it had created a legitimacy crisis. Zola Skweyiya stated that in the 
wake of the revelations the government could no longer be trusted to “oversee the whole process 
of transition” nor “govern alone.” An interim government, as the essential ingredient of 
transition, was crucial: “It should be a process, a government of national unity.”1060 Skweyiya, 
however, stated that the ANC approached this issue with flexibility: “We might not necessarily 
call it an interim government but a government in which everybody participates.”1061There was 
no consensus in the ANC and power-brokers refused to be moved. Raymond Suttner, the ANC’s 
head of political education, said that an interim government “was an essential precondition for 
the election of a constituent assembly and the overseeing of the transitional phase.” Echoing 
Ramaphosa, he argued that “the government would have to resign.” The interim government, 
however, should be “representative even though not elected.”1062 
 
Despite divergent views on the type and nature of the institutions to debate, draft and implement 
a new constitution, the government and the ANC agreed in principle to an exploratory All-Party 
Congress to pave the way to official negotiation. Their agendas for this body, however, differed. 
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For the ANC, the task of the All-Party Congress was to draw up the broad principles of a 
constitutional framework, to determine the make-up of a constituent assembly and to establish in 
interim government. According to Skweyiya: 
 
“In this congress we expect at least the acceptance of the broad principles that are supposed to be in the constitution. 
We expect some discussion of how security should be continued during the period of transition and we expect a 
deeper analysis generally on the electoral process of a Constituent Assembly. Ofcourse we expect that some 
agreement out of that, some agreement in which there would be a government of national unity that would come out 
of the All-Party Congress which will administer South Africa during the time of the whole process of constitution 
writing.”1063  
 
The ANC’s core preference was for the election of a constituent assembly on a proportional 
representation list basis in a single national constituency. This constituent assembly would 
negotiate and draft a new constitution.
1064
 Their primary interest was to “prevent minority 
powers from producing deadlock in the constituent assembly.” As the constituent assembly 
would provide legitimacy to the new constitution, the assembly would be transformed into a new 
legislature.
1065
 Bulelani Ngcuka, a member of the ANC constitutional committee, confirmed that 
the ANC saw the election of a new constituent assembly as a framework for the first 
parliament.
1066
  
 
According to the ANC, the All-Party Congress went beyond the agenda items. They saw it as a 
process that would “seek the broadest possible consensus within society around the transitional 
process [i.e. the constituent assembly] and the broad outcome of negotiations [i.e. a new 
constitution].” The All-Party Congress had to therefore be as inclusive as possible: 
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“All bona fide political parties and organizations should take part. This will help ensure that the overwhelming 
majority of political forces pay allegiance to the process. By helping to shape it, they will carry their constituencies 
along.”1067 
 
The government envisaged a more open-ended process where De Klerk would issue initial 
invitations, and thereafter the All-Party Congress would be “free to elect its own chairman and 
determine its own agenda and working procedures.”1068 They anticipated that the Congress 
would deliberate on two critical issues: “the composition, functioning and decision-making 
process of the actual constitutional negotiation conference, and the broad principles to be 
contained in a new constitution.”1069 According to Viljoen: 
 
“These principles could be defined by the conference, because if common ground has been identified beforehand, 
the actual negotiation process could get started with more confidence and in a more favourable psychological 
climate in the knowledge that there are not only differences but also a significant degree of consensus.”1070 
 
The government’s core preference was that the All-Party Congress be transformed into a forum 
for the negotiation of a new constitution. These negotiations would include leaders of all other 
political parties. The new constitution would then be placed “before the electorate with full 
enfranchisement in a yes-or-no referendum.” If approved, the constitution “would be enacted by 
the Tricameral Parliament in order to give it legal force.”1071 Only after this process could a 
founding election take place. The primary interests for the government were that the transitional 
process had to operate within the prevailing constitutional framework.  
 
There were thus some important points of general agreement. Both sides were ready and willing 
to formally negotiate in an All-Party Congress. It was agreed that an interim authority had to be 
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in place while the constitution was negotiated. There was also tacit agreement that the 
government “could not be both referee and player at the same time.”1072 The differences, 
however, were more substantial. Three questions had to be addressed: “the constitutional 
framework within which the interim authority would operate; whether it was necessary for such 
an interim authority to be elected at all; and what authority such an interim authority would have 
– whether it should act as a government with effective authority, or only have limited 
responsibility.”1073 These issues were to dominate the agenda of the first phase of official 
negotiation. 
 
8.3.3. Mutual Security Agreement: The National Peace Accord 
 
With pre-negotiation gathering apace, the focus shifted to the Preparatory Committee of the 
National Peace Initiative. As discussed, De Klerk had convened a two-day conference on 24-25 
May on violence. The conference, however, was not a success; the ANC, COSATU, the PAC, 
AZAPO, the SACC and other civil society organisations refused to attend. They viewed De 
Klerk as partisan on the issue of violence, regarded his conference as inappropriate as a result, 
and would have preferred the conference be convened by an independent mediator. Given the 
centrality of the ANC in the politics of violence, their non-attendance hampered the conference’s 
ability to constructively deal with the issue of violence. This was a major impediment; the 
conference’s decisions could not be binding on those not attending.  
 
During discussions on the first day of the peace conference, Professor Johan Heys, a former 
moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, proposed that Dr Louw Alberts, a prominent scientist 
and former chairman of the Atomic Energy Board, and Reverend Frank Chikane, the general 
secretary of the SACC, act as facilitators for an all-party peace conference to follow the peace 
summit. The conference agreed to appoint Alberts as a ‘one-man facilitation committee’ for a 
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second peace conference with the power to include other members.
1074
 The ANC welcomed the 
appointment of Alberts. 
 
Alberts set about establishing the facilitation committee the very next day. He recruited Chikane 
to assist him in identifying individuals whom the relevant participants in a peace conference 
would have confidence. Chikane, who had access to influential power-brokers in the resistance 
organisations, “undertook to find names that would be acceptable to the ANC, the PAC, 
COSATU, AZAPO, the [SACP], and other like-minded civil society organisations while Alberts 
sought representatives who would garner the trust of the government and the IFP.”1075 Alberts 
was particularly interested in involving the church and business leaders “because they interacted 
with a large proportion of the population.”1076 A facilitation committee of thirteen individuals 
from church and business was constituted, and decided to work under a rotating chairperson.
1077
  
 
A turning point happened when the facilitation committee successfully convened a meeting on 
22 June at the Barlow Rand headquarters in Johannesburg. The meeting included the ANC, 
AZAPO, the NP government, the IFP, the SACP, COSATU, the IFP affiliated United Workers 
Union of South Africa, representatives of parliamentary parties, and various church and business 
organisations. The meeting decided that Roelf Meyer, Thabo Mbeki and Frank Mdlalose 
(representatives of the NP government, the ANC, and the IFP respectively), together with 
representatives of the facilitation committee, “would form a ‘preparatory committee’ which in 
turn would form working groups to draft proposals on issues identified as necessary to end the 
violence.”1078 Under the chairmanship of John Hall, the preparatory committee met two days 
later on 24 June, and formed five working groups to look at the following identified issues: 
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working group 1 would look at codes of conduct for political parties; working group 2 would 
look at codes of conduct for security forces; working group 3 at socioeconomic development; 
working group 4 at implementation and monitoring; and working group 5 at the peace process, 
the establishment of a secretariat and the media.
1079
 
 
Each working group consisted of three members from the NP government, three from the IFP, 
and three from the ANC, one religious leader, and one business representative from the 
preparatory committee.
1080
 Each working group subsequently met on numerous occasions in 
order to produce a draft consensus document on the issue assigned. These draft documents were 
then “referred to the various principals for approval before being referred back to the negotiators 
to seek fresh consensus for a next draft.”1081  
 
In the changed political environment after Inkathagate, the work of the preparatory committee 
gathered pace. In August 1991, the working groups all presented their reports to a meeting of the 
preparatory committee. The meeting reached consensus on a draft peace accord arising from 
these reports.
1082
 The preparatory committee decided to fix 14 September 1991 as the target date 
by which the five working group reports had to be completed. On that day, a national peace 
conference would be convened to ratify and sign the combined working group reports, and these 
would form the basis of a peace agreement.
1083
 
 
The reports from the working groups were agreed to only a few hours before the national peace 
conference was to commence. The reports were collated to form a draft text of a peace 
agreement. 
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The peace conference was held at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg on 14 September 1991. The 
outcome was the signing of the first ever multi-party agreement in South Africa, the National 
Peace Accord, which was formally adopted on 16 September at an occasion attended by all the 
major players and political organizations, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, church and 
business groupings, and trade unions. As the first ever multiparty agreement, it laid the 
foundation for the All-Party Congress. This was most evident in its preamble and chapter one, 
which related the accord to the process of democratization: “The establishment of a multi-party 
democracy in South Africa is our common goal. Democracy is impossible in a climate of 
violence, intimidation and fear.”1084   
 
The accord was built around “legally enforceable codes of conduct” for political organizations 
and security forces. These legally enforceable codes of conduct were located within a 
hierarchical set of committees from national to regional to local. A national peace committee 
assisted by a national peace secretariat stood at the apex of a pyramid based on local dispute 
resolution committees.
1085
 The peace accord thus attempted “to make the obligations under the 
accord enforceable either in terms of legally enforceable obligations or in terms of the political 
process that violation of the accord would occasion.”1086 The strategy was based on the belief 
that “a multilateral accord would prove more effective than previous bilateral agreements 
between the ANC and Inkatha.”1087 A multilateral accord would bind all political players in 
South Africa into a common agreement, thus increasing the political costs for parties who wished 
to move in and out of the accord as and when in suited them.
1088
 
 
The important impact of the National Peace Accord was that it allowed violence to be managed. 
While this management was not perfect, it created conditions for non-violent peaceful protest to 
continue but not to escalate or otherwise threaten negotiations. This illustrates that pre-
negotiation cannot develop into settlement negotiations if violence is simultaneously escalating 
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or becoming widespread. The management of violence is therefore a crucial issue. This 
responsibility cannot be left to the main actors; each will have too many incentives to use 
violence to advance their interests. 
 
The signing of the National Peace Accord was a turning point; it signaled the establishment of a 
detailed set of multiparty transitional arrangements. Most importantly, it signaled the end of the 
phase of negotiation over preconditions, which had dominated stages three and four. This phase 
had been drawn out considerably, exposed important weaknesses in the ANC’s negotiation 
strategy, and had confirmed the pre-eminence of the ANC and the NP government as the 
principal players in the negotiation process.
1089
 The negotiation process would now primarily be 
a multiparty process, with the ANC and NP government serving as important anchors of the 
process. 
 
8.4. Stage Five: Setting Parameters 
 
8.4.1. Political Alliances for the Roundtable: The Patriotic Front and Aftermath   
 
With the peace accord signed, the pre-negotiation phase moved to stage five and the focus 
shifted to the building of political alliances for the round-table talks. The ANC in particular was 
keen to bolster its bargaining power. It sought to cobble together a tactical alliance of ‘pro-
constituent assembly’ organisations called the ‘Patriotic Front’. The PAC and AZAPO were 
important for this initiative. The problem was that both these organisations were traditionally 
opposed to negotiations with the government. The turning point for the PAC occurred with the 
election of Dikgang Moseneke as the organisations deputy president. Moseneke, a charismatic 
and articulate Robben Islander, was arguably the most accomplished black senior advocate in 
South Africa, and represented the moderate and largely intellectual group in the PAC. For 
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Moseneke, multiparty negotiations were inevitable and the PAC could do more inside rather than 
outside the roundtable. 
 
In mid-1991, Moseneke’s views prevailed. In interviews in mid-July and August, Moseneke 
stated that the PAC was in favour of an All-Party Congress as a means towards an elected 
constituent assembly.
1090
 In particular, Moseneke attached great importance to the idea of 
holding a patriotic front of liberation movements and had been involved in extensive bilateral 
talks with Mandela over the issue since April 1991.
1091
 In August 1991, Moseneke held another 
bilateral with Mandela and agreed on a transitional authority as an essential part of the transition 
process.
1092
 This position brought the PAC closer to the government and the ANC; although they 
attached different meanings to the names, they were essentially referring to similar sets of 
institutional arrangements.
1093
 AZAPO was in a similar situation. The rise of Pandelani 
Nefolovhodwe and Aubrey Mokoape, associates of revered Black Consciousness leader Steve 
Biko, led to a rethink of the new political terrain of negotiations. As leaders of a moderate 
tendency, they did not see any viable alternative to negotiations; while AZAPO’s armed wing, 
the Azanian National Liberation Army, could threaten to plunge the country into a reign of 
terror, it was never in any position to move beyond the rhetorical.
1094
 
 
In September 1991, after a successful Mandela-Moseneke bilateral, the ANC and PAC’s national 
executives engaged in high-level talks in Harare, Zimbabwe. The PAC agreed to join the ANC at 
the All-Party Congress, and both organisations committed themselves to the formation of a 
Patriotic Front. The main condition for membership of the Patriotic Front was endorsement of 
the demand for a democratically elected constituent assembly. According to Maharaj, the PAC 
and ANC “arrived at a consensus with regard to the All-Party Congress… with regard to the 
modalities of transition, [and] the agenda, which would include the items: interim government or 
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transitional authority, modalities for constituting a constituent assembly and principles that 
would underpin a constitution.”1095      
 
Between 25 and 27 October, “more than 400 delegates representing some ninety-two 
organisations converged in Durban to launch the Patriotic Front, a loose alliance of parties which 
had held an anti-apartheid position.”1096 The Patriotic Front’s point of departure was that “an 
interim government was a necessary element in this transfer of power, as the government, it was 
argued, did not qualify to oversee the process of democratizing South Africa.” The Patriotic 
Front confirmed that “only a constituent assembly, elected on a one-person-one-vote basis in a 
united South Africa, could draft and adopt a democratic constitution.” In committing themselves 
to speedily convene an All-Party Congress, delegates determined the conduct of Patriotic Front 
members attending: “on issues that enjoyed support by all members, they would act in 
accordance with the principles of ‘unity in action’ and ‘unity of purpose’, but when there was no 
consensus, each member would act independently.”1097  
 
In a paper presented to the meeting, the ANC argued that the All-Party Congress was necessary 
because “neither parliament nor the government could legitimately make decisions ‘about such 
critical questions as the body to negotiate the new constitution, and how the country should be 
governed during the transitional period.’”1098 The All-Party Congress was thus the only way to 
achieve a constituent assembly.
1099
 It seemed that unprecedented unity had been achieved and 
that a solid block of organisations would be setting their sights on attending the roundtable 
negotiations with agreed key objectives.
1100
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To build on the success of the conference, the ANC engaged in intensive bilateral diplomacy 
with organisations which had a direct stake in multiparty negotiations. Meetings were held with 
MDM organisations, the NP, PAC, AZAPO, the DP and homelands leaders. It was agreed that 
preparatory multiparty talks be held on 29 and 30 November. The agenda for the talks would 
include “a climate for free political participation, general constitutional principles, the 
constitution-making body, an interim government, the future of the [homelands], the role of the 
international community, if any, and relevant time-frames.”1101 
 
The formation of the Patriotic Front had an important impact on the pre-negotiations; in further 
tilting the political balance of forces in favour of the ANC, it changed the shape of the 
negotiation roundtable. There were two consequences. First, the government made more 
concessions; it “was obliged to concede the need for joint control over the transition” and was 
prepared to consider the amendment of the constitution to make this possible.
1102
 This, however, 
would need a referendum. Second, confronted with the reality that it may have to relinquish 
power it had enjoyed for over forty years, the government “feared that the Patriotic Front would 
seize the initiative in negotiations.”1103 Viljoen described the Patriotic Front as “a ‘ganging up’ 
of parties against the government shortly before the talks”.1104  
 
8.4.2. Defining the Agenda: The Road to the All-Party Congress 
 
Following the Patriotic Front conference, preparations for the All-Party Congress began in 
earnest. Three issues initially dominated. First, by the end of October 1991, the debate shifted to 
which parties should be invited to the All-Party Congress. The consensus was that all parties 
represented in parliament, political parties that controlled homeland government and 
‘independent’ territories, and the extra-parliamentary structures (i.e. the ANC, PAC, AZAPO, 
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SACP and the Indian Congresses) had to be invited.
1105
 Second, the government began to 
consider the idea of an interim constitution that would ensure a ten-year government of national 
unity. This proposal revealed an anxiety in government thinking; while a democratically elected 
constituent assembly “might have denied the NP the ability to secure constitutionally entrenched 
guarantees to safeguard its interests” a ten-year interim government of national unity “would 
secure a role for the NP as well.”1106 By contrast, the Patriotic Front wanted the drafting of the 
constitution in six months, and an interim government of no longer than eighteen months. 
 
Third, the treatment of constitutional principles dominated the debate over defining the agenda. 
The Patriotic Front argued that multiparty talks “should only negotiate broad, internationally 
accepted principles of democracy”, whereas the government “insisted on greater detail.” For the 
NP-government, “it was necessary to secure guarantees should it not enjoy sufficient influence in 
a democratically elected constituent assembly. While the [NP-government] tentatively accepted 
the possibility of an interim government and an elected constituent assembly, the battle was not 
lost, for it was still possible for the party to achieve objectives it has set for itself.”1107    
 
Following the signing of the National Peace Accord, a steering committee chaired by Chief 
Justice Michael Corbett was established, through which details of the All-Party Congress would 
be negotiated. The committee agreed that the NP-government, the ANC and the IFP convene a 
preparatory meeting of all parties to discuss the All-Party Congress. Set for 29 and 30 
November, some twenty political parties, including homeland government representatives, 
attended. The parties and organisations included the PAC, the government and the NP (as 
separate delegations; the former as non-voting), ANC, IFP, Labour Party, Inyadza National 
Movement (KaNgwane), Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses (joint delegation), Venda 
government, Bophuthatswana government, United People’s Front (Lebowa), Solidarity, DP, 
Transkei government, National People’s Party (opposition party in the Indian House of 
Delegates), Ciskei government, Kikwankwetla Party (QwaQwa), Itando Yesizwe Party 
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(KwaNdebele), Ximoko Progressive Party (Gazankulu), and the SACP.
1108
 In prior NP-ANC 
bilateral talks, agreement was reached on the decision-making rules for the All-Party Congress: 
the principle of ‘sufficient consensus’. This meant that if the NP-government and ANC reached 
agreement, sufficient consensus existed.
1109
 
 
The preparatory meeting agreed that the All-Party Congress would be called the ‘Convention for 
a Democratic South Africa’ (CODESA). The meeting also agreed upon CODESA’s nine-point 
agenda: “the creation of a climate for free political participation; definition of general 
constitutional principles; agreement on a ‘constitution-making body/process’; creation of 
‘transitional arrangements’; decision about the future of ‘independent’ (TBVC) homelands; 
agreement on the role of the international community in negotiation; selection of a time frame; 
creation of mechanisms for implementation; and discussion of other issues.”1110 
 
On the second day of the preparatory meeting, the PAC walked out of the talks over the issue of 
sufficient consensus. The PAC argued that a clear pattern had emerged in which proposals made 
by either the NP-government or the ANC would be supported by either party, while homeland 
and Tricameral parliamentary leaders would without question give support to either the ANC or 
the NP government. This decision-making arrangement, the PAC continued, where it only 
required agreement between the NP government and the ANC to reach decision was not real 
multiparty negotiation. The PAC pointed out that a secret pact had been made between the NP 
government and ANC where every point of importance had been agreed in advance.
1111
 The 
PAC’s grievance was based on leaked minutes of a confidential meeting between the ANC and 
the Front Line States. The minutes showed that the ANC and NP government had finally reached 
convergence, and had agreed for rapid progress in formal and substantive negotiation: “Both 
planned to participate in an interim authority which would have control over elections, security, 
the electronic media, finance and foreign affairs, [and both] were anxious for such an interim 
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administration to be established as soon as possible.”1112 Further, the ANC and NP government 
had made significant concessions on their preferences: the ANC “accepted that it might have to 
defer its demand for an elected constituent assembly if this would delay agreement on an interim 
administration”, and the NP government was “willing to agree to such a constitution-making 
process, provided agreement could be reached on a set of constitutional principles laying down 
the parameters for the new text.”1113   
 
Despite the convergence, important points of disagreement remained unresolved. First, the NP 
government was adamant that MK disband, while the ANC was determined to retain MK. 
Second, the NP government wanted a transitional administration to remain in place for a number 
of years while CODESA draw up a constitution. Alternatively, “if the task of writing a final 
constitution were to be given to an elected constituent assembly, the NP government wanted the 
deliberations of this body to be subject to guiding principles so firm and so precise” as to ensure 
the inclusion of guarantees of power-sharing, minority protection and respect for free 
enterprise.
1114
 By contrast, the ANC “wanted the interim administration to hold power for a brief 
period only, for no longer than was necessary to give this body decisive influence over security 
forces, the electronic media, financial transfers to the homelands, and the overall electoral 
process.”1115 The election of a constituent assembly would follow the completion of this process. 
The ANC wanted the guiding principles the constituent assembly to comply with the spirit of the 
Harare Declaration, but otherwise wanted it left free to write a constitution as it saw fit. 
 
 8.4.3. Multiparty Negotiations Begin: The Declaration of Intent 
 
The first plenary session of CODESA took place on 20 and 21 December 1991 and was chaired 
by Justices Ismail Mohamed and Piet Schabort. There were three important outcomes to this first 
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historic formal round-table. The first was the Declaration of Intent. The Declaration is an 
exceptionally important and historic document in South Africa’s political history. The 
Declaration established a set of principles and purposes to guide CODESA, and all signatories 
declared and committed themselves to be bound by the agreements of CODESA. The parties and 
organizations declared their “solemn commitment” to “bring about an undivided South Africa 
with one nation sharing a common citizenship”, to establish “a free and open society based on 
democratic values”, to ensure “equal opportunities and social justice for all”, to “create a climate 
conducive to peaceful constitutional change”, and to “set in motion the process of drawing up 
and establishing a constitution.”1116  
 
All the parties present endorsed the Declaration except for the IFP and the homeland 
governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. The IFP believed that the use of the words 
‘undivided South Africa’ precluded them from raising the federal option during the constitution-
making process.
1117
 However, after an amendment was secured confirming that the offending 
term ‘undivided’ did not commit CODESA to a unitary state, both the IFP and the Ciskei 
government signed.
1118
 As for the government of Bophuthatswana, its leader, Lucas Mangope, 
argued that CODESA “could not enter into any agreements affecting its territory without the 
formal agreement of the government of Bophuthatswana.”1119 
 
The second important outcome was the creation of five working groups to negotiate broad sets of 
issues: “the principles and structures of a new constitution; the creation of a climate conducive to 
peaceful political participation; the form of transitional or interim government and the future 
path of the transition; the constitutional future of the four homelands that had accepted nominal 
independence; and the implementation of agreements.”1120 The working groups served as the 
engines of the substantive and formal negotiation process. Working Group 1 considered the 
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creation of a climate for free political participation and the role of the international community in 
the transition process. The ANC and like-minded groups “were concerned to raise the issue of 
the ongoing violence, the role of the security forces, and the role of the international community 
in the transition process.” For its part, the government “was concerned to raise the continuing 
existence of MK, and trade and other sanctions as barriers to the creation of an appropriate 
climate.”1121 
 
Working Group 2 was mandated to explore constitutional principles and the constitution-making 
body. There was agreement in regard to the basic principles governing any conventional 
democratic state including “a bill of rights, independent judiciary, universal adult suffrage, and 
common voters roll etc.”1122 The most important points of disagreement were on proposals for 
federalism, property protection, and the participation by political minorities in executive and 
legislative structures (i.e. proposals for enforced coalitions and proportional representation in the 
executive, legislature, and ‘disguised’ minority vetoes in a second legislative chamber). The NP-
government had replaced its notion of ‘group’ rights with the notion of ‘political minorities’. For 
its part, the ANC “framed its position as a proposal for strong regional government” but stopped 
short of federalism.
1123
 
 
Working Group 3 dealt with an interim government. The NP government gave a major 
concession discussed below; it was in favour of a democratically-elected interim government 
which would also be charged with drafting the new constitution. Working Group 4 was tasked to 
debate the future of the homelands. All parties, save Bophuthatswana, the South African 
government and KwaZulu delegations, supported reincorporation. And Working Group 5 dealt 
with time frames. 
 
                                                          
1121
 Haysom, “Negotiating a Political Settlement”, 41 
1122
 Ibid.  
1123
 Ibid.  
347 
 
The third important outcome, as mentioned, was a major concession by the NP government. In 
what was described as a ‘breath-taking policy switch’, De Klerk proposed that the government 
“would be prepared to consider a compromise to bridge the fundamental differences between the 
ANC’s position that the new constitution should be drawn up by an elected constitutional 
assembly, and [the NP government] that it should be written by a multiparty constitutional 
convention.”1124 De Klerk proposed 
 
“[A] two-phased process of constitutional writing: a new interim constitution would be drafted by the CODESA 
process, in terms of which the first fully representative Parliament would be elected, which would in turn draft and 
adopt the final constitution… The negotiating parties would reach agreement on an interim constitution which would 
be adopted by the Tricameral Parliament, with its National Party majority. A new fully representative Parliament 
would be elected under the new constitution, which would also act as a constitutional assembly. It would write and 
adopt a final constitution that would have to comply with pre-agreed immutable constitutional principles. Before the 
final constitution could come into effect a new Constitutional Court would have to certify that it complied with the 
constitutional principles. During this period the country would be ruled by an elected transitional multiparty 
government under the interim constitution.”1125   
 
De Klerk’s acceptance of an elected constituent assembly drafting the final constitution 
amounted to the NP government effectively ceding its power to exercise control over the final 
negotiations as the ruling party. This was the political solution that signalled the end of pre-
negotiation.  
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8.5. Theoretical Implications: Pre-negotiation and Ripeness  
 
8.5.1. Implications for Pre-negotiation 
 
As discussed, the communication of a desire to negotiate from one party to another is the turning 
point to stage four. In the fourth stage, parties agree to pursue a negotiated solution to the 
problem. The focus is outer-directed as they come to terms on the desirability of negotiation as 
an approach to the problem while reserving any commitment as to the scope of the negotiation 
itself.  The achievement of an agreement to negotiate marks the turning point to the final stage of 
the pre-negotiation process. In the fifth stage, parties define the scope of the proposed official 
negotiation and establish parameters for the negotiation process to follow. This stage “provides 
parties with an important opportunity to assess the extent of congruence in their perspective 
agendas prior to formal negotiation.” Even though parties may not reach an agreement on 
appropriate parameters, “their agreement to proceed with formal talks will mean that this final 
stage of the pre-negotiation phase imply merges into the first stage of negotiation proper as 
formal negotiating sessions begin.”1126 
 
While negotiating activity in final stages of the South African case is consistent with Tomlin’s 
depiction, the sequence differs. In the South African case, the agreement to negotiate and the 
definition of the scope and agenda for settlement negotiations (stages four and five) happen 
simultaneously. Further, the communication of the desire to negotiate was not a turning point, 
marking passage to the final stages. The important issue was the problem of preconditions as a 
barrier to the opening of settlement negotiations, and how they were to be overcome.  
 
It is important to briefly discuss the closing stages of stage three. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, despite the ANC’s call for an All-Party Congress i.e. the 
communication of the desire to negotiate, which according to Tomlin should mark the turning 
point to the final stages, the process deadlocked. The problem was that the government had 
failed to meet the ANC’s preconditions as spelt out in the Harare Declaration and December 
Consultative Conference. Therefore, as the political process reached the expiry date of the ANC 
demands, preconditions were still perceived as a barrier. Consequently, a crisis accompanied the 
end of stage three as the desire to negotiate was accompanied by unmet preconditions. 
Progression to stage four would then depend on how preconditions as a barrier were to be 
resolved.  
 
Three issues provided the means for overcoming the problem of preconditions as a barrier for the 
opening of settlement negotiations.  
 
The first was Mandela’s ultimatum which listed the meeting of seven demands as a condition for 
the continuation of talks. This ultimatum provided a way out; a positive response to these 
demands would have ensured continuity and buy-in from ANC hardliners especially since the 
government was not going to meet the 30 April deadline set by the ANC. While De Klerk’s 
response to the ultimatum (unilateral strategy to end violence) was not met positively by the 
ANC, it did introduce a peace process that maintained momentum generated by over a year of 
bargaining. The government and ANC high-level summit on the day of the expiry of the 
ultimatum fed into this momentum. At this summit, the parties agreed to continue talking 
through the working groups about the return of exiles and political prisoners, and armed action. 
Thus working groups were firmly in place through which pre-negotiation would continue. Both 
sides were committed and willing to negotiate; consequently, by the middle of 1991, the pre-
negotiation process had developed sufficient commitment from the parties to survive many of the 
hazards capable of subverting them. The series of official agreements between the ANC and 
South African government had established important rules of interaction, defined peace, and 
locked the parties into an interdependent bargaining relationship. Ripeness was sustained.  
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The second factor was the agency of Mandela. Mandela’s opening address at the ANC national 
conference is important. He successfully generated consensus in the ANC that they were indeed 
in a stalemate and as a result, had to expedite the process towards multiparty negotiations. Thus 
heckling over preconditions was counter-productive; the most important goal was to develop a 
comprehensive strategy in preparation for an inevitable settlement negotiation process, and push 
for the installation of an interim government of national unity to oversee a constitutional writing 
process.  
    
The third factor was Inkathagate, the turning point marking passage to the final stages. Once the 
government faced its second legitimacy crisis, a window of opportunity opened for the ANC to 
extract government concessions on the scope, parameters, agenda and procedure of the 
settlement negotiation process; it could no longer afford to stall the pre-negotiation process over 
preconditions. Concessions over an interim government became an imperative as settlement 
negotiations were inevitable.  
 
After Inkathagate De Klerk committed the government to levelling the political playing fields, 
giving the clearest indication that the government was willing to make concessions on the ANC’s 
position on an interim government thus clearing the path to settlement talks. To this end, he 
endorsed the need for “transitional measures.”1127 De Klerk also supported the ANC’s position 
on a speedy path toward a multi-party congress: “I therefore conclude with an appeal to every 
leader to help us get the multi-party conference started expeditiously. The government is ready 
and able and willing to start tomorrow.”1128 Both parties thus begin to define the scope of the 
negotiation and establish its parameters.  
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8.5.2. Implications for Ripeness 
 
As discussed, Zartman provides us with a set of indicators to look for: a sense of a hurting 
stalemate; a sense of a moment in the future that will worsen if negotiations fail; a sense that the 
tide of the combat has changed; the mediators’ need for leverage; and the development of a 
political solution. 
 
8.5.2.1. Major Actors 
 
Who are the major actors and what are their goals?  
 
The major actors in the final stages are similar to stage three i.e. the major actors and decision 
units were single groups on both sides. There was no important shift in the composition of the 
government team. The ANC however formed a new Negotiation Commission. Ramaphosa was 
selected as head of the new Negotiation Commission, making him the ANC’s new chief 
negotiator. The new team would include Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo and Mohammed Valli Moosa 
and Mac Maharaj also joined the team. Their core objectives were the convening of the All-Party 
Congress, the installation of an interim government; the election of a democratic Constituent 
Assembly, and the adoption of a democratic constitution and the election of a parliament 
representative of all the people of South Africa.  
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8.5.2.2. Third Parties 
 
Mediation in the final stages happened within the context of the unfolding peace process. De 
Klerk’s failed peace conference led to the emergence of Alberts and Chikane as facilitators of a 
new peace process. Alberts and Chikane type of mediation was mediation as ‘communication’.  
 
A facilitation committee of thirteen individuals from church and business was central to this 
process. The unfolding and mediated peace process was inclusive; each working group formed 
by the preparatory committee consisted of three members from the NP government, three from 
the IFP, and three from the ANC, one religious leader, and one business representative from the 
preparatory committee. They would meet on numerous occasions in order to produce a draft 
consensus document on the issue assigned. These draft documents were then referred to the 
various principals for approval before being referred back to the negotiators to seek fresh 
consensus for a next draft. 
 
The National Peace Accord, the outcome of this process, was important in that it was the first 
multiparty agreement and laid the foundation for the All-Party Congress. The signing of the 
National Peace Accord was a turning point; it signaled the establishment of a detailed set of 
multiparty transitional arrangements and the end of the phase of negotiations over preconditions. 
This phase had confirmed the pre-eminence of the ANC and the NP government as the principal 
players in the negotiation process. 
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8.5.2.3. Hurting Stalemate and Way Out 
 
 Do the actors perceive the situation to be a hurting stalemate?  
 
As discussed, above, the sense of a hurting stalemate was maintained throughout the process. 
Inkathagate, however, signalled a reversal of fortunes for the South African government i.e. the 
perception in power relations in the positions of the ANC and South African government were 
changing and becoming symmetrical. According to Zartman, differences in power relations make 
an important difference in the way negotiations progress. Seminal scholarship in negotiation 
theory, in particular the work of Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown, and Zartman and Berman, 
maintain that power symmetry is the condition most propitious for mutually satisfying 
negotiations.
1129
 These perspectives found their way into Zartman’s original formulation of 
ripeness theory. The third dimension of the ripe moment, Zartman contends, is when “the upper 
hand starts slipping and the underdog starts rising [i.e.] when the ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ start to shift 
their relative power positions.”1130 According to this proposition, perceptions of equal power 
among belligerents tend to result in more effective negotiation than unequal power. Years later, 
Zartman and Rubin investigated this dimension further, and researched more intensively 
perceived power symmetry and asymmetry as they related to the process of negotiations.
1131
 
Their somewhat surprising conclusion was contrary to the dominant school; mutually recognised 
power asymmetry between partners, they concluded, tends to produce the most effective 
negotiated agreements, whereas situations of symmetry, or ‘near-symmetry’, parties were too 
busy engaging in tough posturing to seek creative but effective ways to increase the value of 
agreement for them.
1132
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At the heart of the analysis is that changes in domestic power relations influence the decision of 
both sides to come to the negotiating table. Further, the focus is on power as a perceived relation. 
Perception in any social interaction affects objective reality: “the symmetry or asymmetry of 
perception is related not only to such elements as force and resources but also reputation and 
prospects of a party to produce past and future movements on the part of its targets.”1133 Given 
the structural dynamics of internal conflicts, issues of power and legitimacy are important in 
perceptions of, and in the relations between, negotiations and symmetry. Druckman and Green, 
in their ripeness theory informed analysis of negotiations in the Philippines between the National 
Democratic Front insurgency and the government of Corazon Aquino argue that the decision to 
negotiate is located in the changing relationship and intersection between power and 
legitimacy.
1134
 From their analysis, three situations are favourable to negotiations: “when the 
insurgents’ power and legitimacy are decreasing and the government’s legitimacy is increasing, 
when the reverse obtains, and when the legitimacy of both is stable but the insurgent’s power is 
increasing.”1135 
 
The South African case is a combination of the second and third. Inkathagate represented the 
transition towards the symmetrical moment. The government’s power and legitimacy were 
decreasing and the ANC’s legitimacy was increasing. The government was on the ropes and the 
ANC was on a roll, and the pre-negotiation process had swung favourably towards the ANC. 
However, despite the symmetrical moment, both sides were strong and legitimate enough to 
come to an agreement satisfying to the minimal or reduced demands of both sides i.e. both sides 
had legitimacy and strength to come to an agreement to begin settlement negotiations.  
 
Inkathagate had a profound impact on the perceived balance of power and legitimacy between 
the ANC and the government during the pre-negotiations. For the government, Inkathagate led to 
                                                          
1133
 Jeffrey Rubin and I. William Zartman, “Asymmetrical Negotiations: Some Survey Results that may Surprise”, 
Negotiation Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1995), 350 
1134
 Daniel Druckman and Justin Green, “Playing Two Games: Internal Negotiations in the Philippines”, in I. 
William Zartman (ed.) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995) 
1135
 I. William Zartman, “Conclusion: The Last Mile”, in I. William Zartman (ed.) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an 
End to Civil Wars (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995), 334  
355 
 
the parting of ways with the IFP. In this process, the government lost a partner with credible 
support and with this, any chance of building a substantive conservative coalition. For the ANC, 
Inkathagate was proof of the necessity of an interim government presiding over negotiations 
instead of the NP; Inkathagate “confirmed the ANC’s suspicion that the NP was prone to abusing 
state resources to bolster its position. ANC pressure for an interim government, a proposal the 
NP had dismissed, grew immensely.”1136  
 
As a consequence of Inkathagate, and a clear illustration of the legitimacy crisis facing the 
government, De Klerk tried desperately to repair and the rebuild the government’s image as a 
legitimate political actor and negotiating partner. First, he moved to placate the ANC. Adriaan 
Vlok and Magnus Malan were demoted to lower-ranking cabinet portfolios. Second, on the first 
day of CODESA, De Klerk yielded to the ANC’s demand that a democratically elected 
government should draft the final constitution. This amounted to the government ceding its 
power to exercise control over the final negotiations making. The government had lost the 
initiative.  
 
The process of convergence that was the consequence of Inkathagate, culminating into De 
Klerk’s “breathtaking policy switch”, should be understood within the context of three important 
realities. First, Inkathagate “was a political embarrassment, a rude interruption of the NP’s 
attempt to hold on to some veneer of respectability.”1137 NP leaders did not regard violence as 
viable and wanted to retain legitimacy and respectability with a view to building the party’s 
future in the context of a democratic South Africa.  
 
Second, as the government’s crisis of legitimacy persisted, it began to suffer isolation from both 
the left and right flanks. On its left flank, the ANC began to find and collect partners. The 
Patriotic Front did not only include the PAC; it also included some Bantustan governments and 
                                                          
1136
 Van der Westhuizen, 191 
1137
 Ibid., 192 
356 
 
the Democratic Party, organisations that the NP government could have aligned itself with. On 
its right flank, the Conservative Party continued to shun negotiations.  
 
Third, by July 1991, the ANC had settled into its legal post-exile role; its leadership was now 
more susceptible to influence from its ordinary and more radical membership. As a result, 
government leaders became “concerned that this would cause a delay during which the more 
radical viewpoints of the rank and file could sway the ANC leadership.” After the ANC’s 
ultimatum and Inkathagate, pressure was on the government to save the working relationship 
with their ANC counterparts “before they drifted too far apart.”1138 Therefore, while the NP 
government had more power than the ANC by virtue of the fact that they were the governing 
party and had their hands on the levers of state, “state power became a paradoxical asset.” 
Inkathagate illustrated that the NP had more to lose than the ANC: “If the NP had hardened its 
stance and wielded the state apparatus to hold on to political power, it would have had to return 
to Botha-style militarisation. The levels of social insurrection would have increasingly demanded 
outright military force.”1139 This was not an option for the government; the decision was to adopt 
a strategy to attain political legitimacy. As a result, Inkathagate provided sufficient conditions to 
overcome the problem of preconditions. This cleared the path to settlement negotiations.    
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8.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the final stages of pre-negotiation. The chapter used stages four and five 
of Tomlin’s pre-negotiation model. Tomlin writes that in the fourth stage, the parties agree to 
pursue a negotiated solution to the problem. The focus is outer-directed as they come to terms on 
the desirability of negotiation as an approach to the problem while reserving any commitment as 
to the scope of the negotiation itself. The achievement of an agreement to negotiate marks the 
turning point to the final stage of the pre-negotiation process. In the fifth stage, parties define the 
scope of the proposed official negotiation and establish parameters for the negotiation process to 
follow. This stage provides parties with an important opportunity to assess the extent of 
congruence in their perspective agendas. Even though parties may not reach an agreement on 
appropriate parameters, their agreement to proceed with settlement talks will mean that this final 
stage of the pre-negotiation phase imply merges into settlement negotiations. 
 
While negotiating activity in final stages of the South African case is consistent with Tomlin’s 
depiction, the sequence differs. In the South African case, the agreement to negotiate and the 
definition of the scope and agenda for official negotiation (stages four and five) happen 
simultaneously. Further, the communication of the desire to negotiate was not a turning point, 
marking passage to the final stages. The important issue was the problem of preconditions as a 
barrier to the opening of settlement negotiations, and how they were to be overcome. 
Overcoming preconditions as a barrier was central to the transition to the final stages and to the 
beginning of official negotiations. This chapter argued that overcoming the problem of 
preconditions as a barrier is the point when multiparty negotiations begin. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
Why Negotiations Begin 
Ripeness and Pre-negotiation  
  
The central question in this dissertation is why did the South African multiparty negotiations 
begin? This question has two sub-questions: (1) why did the South African government and the 
ANC negotiate at all; and (2) why did the South African government end up negotiating with the 
ANC. The dissertation used ripeness theory and Tomlin’s analytical framework on pre-
negotiation as a guide in answering these questions. In light of the central questions the 
dissertation raises, the aim of this chapter is to present how the South African case contributes to 
ripeness and pre-negotiation theorising and suggest new questions for investigation and specific 
hypotheses for testing. The chapter will use the discussion of the South African case to qualify 
specific components of ripeness, and then put forward additional changes based on Tomlin’s 
analytical framework within which the South African pre-negotiation process was explained.  
 
The chapter will argue that the ripe moment is better explained as a period within the pre-
negotiation process itself. The case reveals that the ripe moment is when parties reach a shared 
understanding that negotiated solutions are possible, and that this condition is necessary for 
producing a commitment to a negotiated solution, but not sufficient for the beginning of 
settlement negotiations. For settlement negotiations to begin, parties have to overcome the 
problem of preconditions as a barrier. Therefore, multiparty negotiations in South Africa began 
because adversaries reached a shared understanding that the South African conflict could be 
solved through a negotiated solution, produced a commitment to a negotiated solution, and in the 
process, overcame the problem of preconditions as a barrier to opening of settlement 
negotiations. Ripeness indicators can assist in explaining why the South African government and 
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the ANC negotiated at all, and why the South African government ended up negotiating with the 
ANC.  
 
9.1. Why Negotiations Begin at All: The Shared Understanding  
 
Tomlin writes that the onset of the first stage of pre-negotiation is brought about by an event or 
change in conditions that “causes a restructuring of values attached to alternative outcomes by 
one or more parties in a relationship and results in the addition of a negotiated solution to the 
array of outcomes under consideration by at least one of the parties.” The stage is “characterised 
by an assessment of the problem produced by changing conditions and a preliminary evaluation 
of alternative responses that may or may not add negotiation to the range of policy options.” A 
turning point is reached if the addition does occur, and the process moves to the second stage. In 
the second stage, parties actively consider a negotiated solution to the problem. If the possibility 
for negotiation is a subject of controversy, “then this stage might be characterised as ‘thinking 
the unthinkable’ as some parties attempt to come to terms with the need to negotiate.”  Another 
turning point is reached if negotiation is chosen as the preferred and necessary policy alternative, 
moving the process to the third stage.
1140
 
 
Tomlin’s detailed description of the first two stages of pre-negotiation is useful. The processes of 
defining a problem (stage one) and searching for options to resolve the problem (stage two) are 
crucial. How one defines a problem “begins to determine what he or she will do about it. The 
definition of the problem begins to determine policy.”1141 Once parties define a problem, actively 
search for alternative ways of solving it, and reach a shared understanding of the problem, and a 
shared understanding that a negotiated solution to the problem is possible, then an important 
turning point in reached. This turning point need not necessarily occur simultaneously for both 
sides, and it does not have to correspond to any formal moment in the train of events.
1142
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Ripeness is better explained using this analytical framework, and these concepts. The South 
African case illustrates this.   
 
In South Africa, the ANC and South African government chose to negotiate with each other 
because they reached a shared understanding of the conflict, and a shared understanding that a 
negotiated solution was possible. This was the result of their political circumstances in the early 
1980s. For the ANC, the process of exploring negotiation possibilities begins in late 1983 and is 
consistent with the first and second stages of pre-negotiation as described by Tomlin. A turning 
point happens in the 1983-1984 period where the ANC, anticipating political pressure from the 
Front Line States, examines potential scenarios for negotiations.  
 
The ANC’s predictions were on point; the consequences of the Nkomati Accord (i.e. the closure 
of MK’s eastern front), and the Front Line States pressure for a negotiated settlement at the 
summit in Arusha on 29 April 1984, were the events and change in conditions that brought about 
the onset of the first stage of pre-negotiation for the ANC. Stage one begins in June 1985 when 
the Kabwe Conference endorses Tambo’s alternative diplomatic option on talks and negotiation. 
After research and deliberations by the negotiation commission and constitutional committee 
(between 1985 and 1987), the ANC adds negotiation to the range of policy options in its 
statement on negotiation on 9 October 1987. Stage one ends with the release of this statement on 
negotiation. 
     
The second stage begins with the meetings on Henley-on-Thames in England, and ends in 
August 1989 with the formal tabling of the Harare Declaration at the OAU. The meetings in 
England involved the active consideration of a negotiated solution. These conversations, even 
though confidential, were semi-official and involved the ANC putting forward their 
preconditions for settlement talks to brokers with access to the NIS and government.  
 
361 
 
The turning point happens in December 1988 with the signing of the New York Accords, 
bringing a temporary end to the Angolan civil war. These accords effectively served as a 
resolving formula for the conflicts in Southern Africa: UNITA would lose its South African 
allies at the moment when the MPLA was losing the Cubans. The ANC would lose its last 
remaining sanctuary within reach of South Africa just when SWAPO would become free to 
return home and seek power through elections. South African would put Namibia on the path to 
independence and begin shedding its interventionist military role in Southern Africa.  
 
This had important consequences for MK.  
 
First, MK lost its Angolan bases and relocated to Zambia. Second, the resulting uncertainty led 
to a process of implosion in MK, and MK is consequently relocated to East Africa, making it 
impossible to pursue the armed struggle in any meaningful way. The ANC reaches a stalemate at 
this point. The drafting of the Harare Declaration occurs during this process, and its presentation 
to the OAU on 21 August 1988 is the moment when the ANC chooses negotiation as the 
preferred and necessary policy alternative. This marks the end of the second stage.  
 
The government exploration of negotiation possibilities emerges as part of the process of 
constitutional reform. Constitutional reform begins in 1973 with the appointment of the Theron 
Commission. An important turning point in the process happens in September 1984 with the 
inauguration of the Tricameral Parliament. The government faced two important challenges in 
this process: to get the support of urban black leaders to accept the exclusion of Africans from 
the Tricameral Parliament and to persuade them to participate in a negotiating forum on black 
political rights. The subsequent Black Local Authorities Act, and accompanying legislation, was 
designed to compensate urban blacks from their exclusion from parliament. 
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On 3 September 1984 the government loses control of the reform process. The ensuing uprising 
creates a legitimacy crisis for the government. Important conditions facilitate the restructuring of 
the values attached to alternative outcomes and the addition of a negotiated solution to the array 
of outcomes under consideration. Between 1985 and 1987, the government gives major 
concessions. Two events are of particular importance. First, in September 1985, Botha accepted 
that some Africans who lived and worked permanently inside South African could be granted 
citizenship. This was Botha’s crucial concession as voting rights follow from citizenship rights.  
 
Second, in 1987, and in a confidential document (Ons Skrik Vir Niks) the Department of 
Constitutional Development proposes constitutional negotiations and the dismantling of 
apartheid. Senior cabinet ministers’ interpretation of the May 1987 NP electoral victory is 
consistent with the views expressed in this document; the government’s official policy in 1987 
was constitutional reform which would bring about political power-sharing with blacks at central 
government level. This is the message that Professor Willie Breytenbach transmits to the ANC 
representatives in Henley-on-Thames in England in October-November 1987.  
 
By mid-1987 there was a consensus in the government that meaningful constitutional reform 
needed to provide for all the races at the level of central government. In the face of the de-
legitimation of Botha’s reform proposals and concessions, negotiation with the ANC was the 
only feasible alternative method to devise how such representation would occur. Possibility for 
negotiations with the ANC arose because the second state of emergency had effectively 
diminished the ANC’s options. While the ANC could continue to prosecute the armed struggle, it 
would be deploying its weakest arm against the government’s strongest point – the military. 
They reasoned that the ANC would have to negotiate. 
 
The release of political prisoners was central to this process and crucial for the viability of a 
political solution to legitimise constitutional reform. The government’s logic was that without 
the release of political prisoners, the stability created by the second state of emergency was 
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unsustainable. By releasing political prisoners, space would ensure buy-in from the black 
population, and legitimise constitutional reform, especially if the ANC was an important part of 
this process. The strategy of negotiation, therefore, was understood as a continuation of 
constitutional reform and not the consequence of its failure; negotiation with the ANC was a 
bilateral solution to their goal of constitutional reform. The release of Nelson Mandela and his 
political role in taking constitutional reform to its logical conclusion is the crucial government 
strategy. The first stage of pre-negotiations thus ends after the 1987 election for the government. 
This is the point where negotiation is added to the range of policy options. 
 
For the government, the second stage begins in early 1988 where Botha instructs Barnard to 
begin more structured discussions with Mandela. Conversations with Mandela begin on 25 May 
1988 and end in December 1989. In this process, the government actively considered a 
negotiated solution. The period May 1988 to mid-1989 was characterised by confidential 
discussions between Mandela and a government team led by Barnard. Four major issues 
characterised these discussions: the armed struggle, the ANC’s relationship with the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), and the meaning of majority rule. The period ends with the 
formal tabling of positions between Mandela and Barnard. While both parties disagreed on the 
abovementioned issues, both agreed on the need to pursue a negotiated settlement, and on the 
format that such a process would take i.e. a two-staged negotiation process, where intensive 
talks-about-talks on preconditions would precede settlement negotiations. It is at this point i.e. on 
the eve of the Mandela-Botha meeting, where the government and Mandela choose negotiation 
as the preferred and necessary policy alternative. Mandela’s meetings with Botha and De Klerk 
represent the official acknowledgement of this mutual decision and the end of stage two.  
 
Between January and August 1989 the parties reached a shared understanding that a negotiated 
solution can solve the South African conflict. The three important official documents i.e. the 
Government Team Document, Mandela Document and Harare Declaration, and meetings in 
Tuynhuys (between Mandela and Botha, and then Mandela and De Klerk) and Lucerne and 
Berne in Switzerland (between the ANC and NIS) indicate that the South African government 
364 
 
and the ANC had reached this shared understanding. This turning point did not occur 
simultaneously for both sides and did not necessarily correspond to any formal moment in the 
train of events. By December 1989 both the South African government and the ANC were 
convinced that a mutually acceptable resolution through negotiation to the end of apartheid was 
possible.  
 
The crucial condition in 1989 was the mutual sense of hurting stalemate – both sides felt that 
they could not win and all would be worse if apartheid was not ended. The mutually hurting 
stalemate was not conceptualised in military terms, but rather in political terms. South African 
government leaders, faced with a legitimacy crisis, and lack of black popular acceptance of 
constitutional reform measures, saw negotiations as a way out.
1143
 The ANC, faced with losing 
control of the unfolding political process inside South Africa, and under pressure from Front 
Line States leaders to negotiate the end of apartheid, saw negotiations as a way of regaining the 
initiative.  
 
The actors agreed that a negotiated settlement would meet their basic needs. To this end, they 
agreed on the basic format through which such a settlement would be reached i.e. a two-staged 
process, first involving a period of bargaining over preconditions, and then the opening of 
settlement negotiations. The government saw a two-staged negotiation process, where intensive 
talks-about-talks on stumbling blocks and obstacles (i.e. preconditions) would precede a formal 
phase where “participants in the negotiation process [would] be empowered to enter into an 
agreement if they reach a consensus” (i.e. settlement negotiations). One possibility, the argued, 
would be “for a democratic process to empower people to really become formally involved in a 
more structured negotiation situation.”1144 This mirrored Mandela’s format who wrote in the first 
stage, the ANC and the government would need to work out preconditions for a proper climate 
for negotiations; and the second stage would be the actual negotiations themselves that would 
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occur when the climate is ripe for doing so.”1145 The Harare Declaration was also in agreement. 
It stated that it was essential for a necessary climate of negotiations to be created before any 
negotiations can take place and placed the responsibility on the South African government to 
create this climate. 
 
Agency was an important variable in driving this process. Once can classify the major actors and 
decision unit model for both the ANC and the South African government as predominant leader 
decision units with an advisory groups i.e. the pre-negotiation process was driven by senior 
political leaders who used advisors as consultants to provide information and expertise but 
reserved the right to make the decision.  
 
The dissertation thus agrees with two of Stedman’s refinements on ripeness: (1) neither 
governments nor revolutionary movements behave as unitary actors; and (2) the perception of a 
mutually hurting stalemate can be manifested at patron level and be efficacious.     
 
There was one influential mediation attempt; Consolidated Goldfields. Consolidated Goldfield’s 
mediation through Michael Young happens in stage two after the ANC adds negotiation to its 
range of policy options. This was an example of the mediator as ‘communicator’, addressing the 
conflict as a breakdown in the ability of the ANC and South African government to 
communicate with each other. Young acted as a telephone wire i.e. creating an environment in 
which the ANC and South African government could establish contact and carry messages. 
Michael Young’s role was thus completely procedural, with no substantive contribution, and 
completely passive, and only involved carrying out the parties’ orders for the facilitation of 
dialogue and delivery of messages. It was successful in that it created a channel of 
communication between both parties, which was crucial in developing a shared understanding of 
the issues.  
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In this light, the dissertation’s approach to the role of mediation is crucial and is in agreement 
with Lederach’s critique of ripeness. As discussed, Lederach identified two problematic 
assumptions on the role of mediation in ripeness theory. First, ripeness assumes that mediation 
lies in the person and personality of the mediator “as-the-actor” rather than the mediator “as-
process” with multiple roles, functions, and activities carried out by a wide array of people.  
Ripeness stresses the idea that the mediator comes from outside the setting and outside the 
relationships in conflict and is therefore neutral. 
 
Second, ripeness is based on the belief that the success of mediation is primarily judged by 
whether it produced an agreement rather than whether it helped create a space for constructive 
change in people, perceptions and relationships that are not always captured in the confines of a 
written negotiated document. Thus, ripeness overemphasises content and agreement in conflict 
resolution at the expense of the building of relationships and process. It consequently places 
greater emphasis on the mediators and belligerent’s actions and perceptions rather than on 
mediation and conflict resolution as a political process with multiple sets of actions and people. 
 
The dissertation’s conceptual approach to the role of mediation i.e. the distinction between 
mediation as ‘communication’, ‘formulation’ and ‘manipulation’, has resolved this. The 
dissertation has approached mediation as a long term political process that provides for the 
building and sustaining of relationships and the multiplicity of roles, activities and functions that 
are necessary to make a sustained dialogue and change in the relationships possible. The 
dissertation thus emphasises process, relationships and sustainability in mediation rather than a 
momentary action.  
 
While the idea of a shared understanding meets some of the requirements of ripeness as 
articulated by Zartman, there are some qualifications; the parties in South Africa were not ready 
to begin settlement negotiations at that point. Rather, ripeness as articulated by Zartman is better 
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understood as that period where parties are convinced that a mutually acceptable resolution of 
their disagreement is possible. The next step is to find ways of arriving at an agreement to begin 
settlement negotiations.  
 
Ripeness is therefore the moment when parties reach the perception that the other is serious 
about finding a negotiated solution. This is a condition necessary but not sufficient for the 
opening of settlement negotiations.      
 
This theoretical refinement and development of ripeness is the major contribution to the theory 
and resolves one if it’s most important limitations and contradictions. As discussed, a major 
limitation in the ripeness literature is that the dependent variable is unclear. On the one hand, 
ripeness is implied to be a condition for successful negotiation. Zartman, Mooradian and 
Druckman, Haas, Stedman, and Lieberfeld explain ripeness in terms of the beginning of 
negotiations, and in so doing, conflate the decision to negotiate with the outcome i.e. if 
negotiations begin, a ripe moment was present by definition; if negotiations did not begin a ripe 
moment was not present or not perceived. On the other hand, the literature explains this as a 
condition for the initiation of negotiations. Crocker, De Soto and Lederach explain ripeness as 
key to a settlement with an already established ‘negotiation process’. And Bercovitch explains 
ripeness in terms of the sustainability of a mediation effort in an already established negotiation 
process. 
 
This is an important lack of consensus; the process of bringing about negotiations presents one 
sets of variables, conditions and strategies, whereas the successful conclusion of a negotiations 
process presents a different type of endeavour. By focusing exclusively on the pre-negotiation 
phase, and pointing out that the shared understanding is necessary but not sufficient for the 
opening of settlement negotiations, the dissertation has redefined ripeness in a way that it cannot 
be tautological, and in the process provided clarity on the dependent variable.  
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The discussion on stages one and two of South Africa’s pre-negotiation process suggests that the 
notion of ripeness be enhanced as follows: 
 
1. The ripe moment is a function of a pre-negotiation process when parties reach a shared 
understanding of the problem and a shared understanding about finding a negotiated 
solution. This means that parties agree on what the problem is, and that the problem can 
be solved through negotiation. It does not mean that negotiations towards a political 
settlement will begin.    
2. The ripe moment is necessary but not sufficient for the opening of negotiations towards a 
political settlement.  
3. Mediation is primarily a long-term political process with multiple roles, functions, and 
activities carried out by a wide array of people. 
4. Mediation can assisting parties in developing a shared understanding of the problem, and 
shared understanding about finding a negotiated solution. But mediators are not the most 
important actors. Rather, political leadership is most important in initiating and driving 
the process of pre-negotiation in the early stages, and in developing the shared 
understanding. 
5. It is not necessary for all actors in a conflict to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate, but 
it is necessary for political leaders to perceive it so. A mutually hurting stalemate can be 
conceptualised in political terms, and this political conceptualisation is more powerful in 
developing the shared understanding.  
 
9.2. Why Multiparty Negotiations Began 
 
Reaching a shared understanding of the problem and a shared understanding that negotiated 
solutions are possible was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the beginning of multiparty 
negotiations. For multiparty negotiations to begin, the South African government and the ANC 
had to produce a commitment to a negotiated solution and overcome preconditions as a barrier to 
negotiations towards a settlement. Two issues facilitated this: political pact-making that 
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institutionalised this commitment; and a peace process that managed political violence and 
facilitated the transition from bilateral to multiparty negotiations.   
 
9.2.1. Producing a Commitment to a Negotiated Solution  
 
Once the South African government and ANC reach a shared understanding of a problem, and a 
shared understanding that a negotiated solution is possible, they had to produce a commitment to 
a negotiated solution. The parties went from “it can be solved through negotiation” to “we are 
committed to a negotiated solution to the problem”. For Tomlin, this is stage three of pre-
negotiation which is the transition from ‘whether’ to negotiate to ‘what’ will be negotiated. The 
policy focus is initially inner-directed as parties consider alternative negotiating scenarios, 
reflecting varying degrees of scope for the potential negotiation, and successive steps towards 
increasing commitment toward a negotiated solution. It is in this stage that the focus of policy 
makers becomes outer-directed “as the preoccupation with internal decision dynamics gives way 
to increased concern for the other parties to the problem.” Druckman’s framework emphasised 
the monitoring activity undertaken, involving determining the interests of various parties. There 
is a point in stage three when attention shifts to a consideration of the interests of other parties, 
mainly because the desire to undertake negotiation is likely to be communicated at this stage. 
The communication of a desire to negotiate from one party to another is the turning point to 
stage four.
1146
   
 
This phase was the most complex as it involved a series of interrelated judgments; parties had to 
judge whether a negotiated solution would be better than continuing the present situation, 
whether a fair settlement could be fashioned, whether the other side would accept, and whether 
the balance of forces would permit to a negotiated settlement. Dealing with preconditions and 
related uncertainties and anxieties is an important part of producing a commitment to a 
negotiated solution.  
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In the South African case, the ANC and South African government took successive steps 
towards increasing commitment towards a negotiated solution. Events beyond their control also 
helped immensely especially the role of civil society in constructing a peace process to manage 
political violence. The parties institutionalized their commitment to a negotiated solution through 
a series of pacts and agreements aimed at assuring the protection of their interests. These pacts 
and agreements established important benchmarks and rules of interaction that locked the ANC 
and South African government into an interdependent bargaining relationship.  
 
The South African pre-negotiation process highlights the importance of preconditions as a barrier 
to the opening of settlement negotiations, a point that Tomlin doesn’t consider in his framework. 
Conditions applicable to the opening of settlement negotiations usually cover three broad areas: 
the negotiation itself, including details such as the site and the level of representation, the 
political climate while negotiations are in progress, and the substance of the negotiated 
settlement.
1147
 These issues influence the shape of the negotiated settlement that emerges, 
influence each side’s bargaining position, and help determine how long it will take to reach a 
negotiated agreement.
1148
  
 
In the South African case, preconditions were with regard to the political climate within which 
the settlement negotiations would be in progress. For the ANC, these preconditions were 
contained in the Harare Declaration and primarily related to issues of indemnity. For the South 
African government, the main precondition was that the ANC renounce the armed struggle. 
When political violence accompanied public pre-negotiations, a peace process was identified as 
an important precondition to the opening of settlement negotiations.  
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Overcoming these preconditions was the main preoccupation with the parties and defined the 
bargaining relationship between the ANC and the government during the process. While the 
Pretoria Minute and DF Malan Accord provided a dignified closure of MK, meeting the 
government’s precondition on the suspension of the armed struggle, the issues of indemnity and 
political violence were the most controversial; the government had failed to meet the 
expectations of the ANC on both issues. Therefore, despite the fact that the ANC communicated 
the desire to negotiate in the January 8 Statement i.e. the call for an All-Party Congress, this did 
not mark the turning point to stage four as Tomlin would expect. What accompanied this 
communication was not a turning point, as suggested by Tomlin, but a crisis i.e. a breakdown 
and threat to talks.
1149
 Progression to stage four would depend on how the ANC and South 
African government overcame the problem of the ANC’s preconditions.  
 
Where preconditions become barriers to official talks, two methods usually break the logjam. 
One is to initiate official negotiations with an ostensibly limited agenda. The other is to “reach an 
agreement that is subtle or ambiguous enough for neither side to have to admit that it backed 
down.”1150 However, if both sides are willing to negotiate, disagreements over conditions that 
previously appeared as formidable obstacles can be shoved aside. 
 
The continued perceptions of a hurting stalemate (especially at the level of political leadership) 
were crucial in sustaining the pre-negotiation process and keeping the parties on track. What 
sustained this perception in South Africa was the escalation of political violence, and the parties’ 
response to this confirmed this perception. It was the fear and presence of political violence that 
kept the pre-negotiation on track. Through escalating levels of political violence, the major 
actors felt that they would lose control over the political process. The violence kept the two main 
parties together. The moments of breakdown and crisis were crucial to the dynamic of 
continuity; after each crisis, the ANC and the government came back, taking a new step forward, 
and they came back because they appreciated the constraints and opportunities of the 
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situation.
1151
 Both sides were in a hurting stalemate and political leadership on both sides 
continued to believe that negotiated solutions were possible. The Mandela-De Klerk meeting in 
Tuynhuys on 5 April 1990, the Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute, the Royal Hotel 
Minute, the DF Malan Accord, the top-level summit on the eve of the ultimatum expiry date, and 
De Klerk’s concessions upon the revelation of Inkathagate all illustrate this commitment to 
negotiated solutions as a result of perceptions of a stalemate.   
 
During this period, there was no reversal of fortune among the players. The balance, however, 
was in favour of the government which controlled the process during the third stage to a large 
extent. The bargaining process over preconditions is a good illustration of this balance of power. 
The series of agreements and pacts left an important ANC precondition (the definition of 
political offenses, crucial for the identification and release of political prisoners and return of 
exiles) unresolved. While the Groote Schuur Minute committed the parties to working towards a 
common definition of political crimes, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Minute restricted the numbers 
of ANC members to be indemnified. Further, the Indemnity Act only provided for temporary 
indemnity; the government reserved the right to prosecute at a later stage. While the act did 
provide provisions for a permanent indemnity, this was at the sole discretion of the president. 
The indemnity provisions also expired after a year, unless they were renewed annually by the 
president by proclamation, and following the second renewal, only if all three houses of 
parliament consented. The slow and bureaucratic nature of the process further drew the ire of the 
ANC; by the time of the ultimatum, over 1,000 political prisoners were still in prison.  
 
This balance of power, however, would change considerably. Most importantly, it would be 
changes in the perception of this power balance that would create the environment in which 
disagreements over preconditions that appeared formidable at the point of the ultimatum would 
be overcome.   
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The empirical discussion of stage three of the pre-negotiation phase reached an important 
theoretical conclusion; political pacts institutionalise belligerent parties’ commitment to 
negotiated solutions, and assure the protection of their interests. They establish important 
benchmarks and rules of interaction that lock these parties into an interdependent bargaining 
relationship. The dissertation thus confirms the theoretical conclusions reached by the 
democratization scholars such as Terry Karl, Caroline Hartzell, Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Philippe Schmitter, Omar Encarnación, Frances Hagopian, and Adam Przeworski. 
 
The discussion on stage three of South Africa’s pre-negotiation process suggests that the notion 
of ripeness can be enhanced as follows: 
 
1. Continued perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate are a necessary condition for the 
sustainability of a pre-negotiation process. 
2. Political pact-making produces and sustains the commitment to a negotiated solution. 
3. Disagreement over preconditions is a barrier for the opening of settlement negotiations. 
 
9.2.2. Overcoming Preconditions   
 
In the fourth stage, the parties agree to pursue a negotiated solution to the problem. The focus is 
outer-directed as they “come to terms on the desirability of negotiation as an approach to the 
problem while reserving any commitment as to the scope of the negotiation itself.”1152 The 
achievement of an agreement to negotiate marks the turning point to the final stage of the pre-
negotiation process. In the final stage, parties define the scope of the proposed official 
negotiation and establish parameters for the negotiation process to follow. This stage “provides 
parties with an important opportunity to assess the extent of congruence in their perspective 
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agendas prior to formal negotiation.” Even though parties may not reach an agreement on 
appropriate parameters, “their agreement to proceed with formal talks will mean that this final 
stage of the pre-negotiation phase imply merges into the first stage of negotiation proper as 
formal negotiating sessions begin.”1153 
 
While negotiating activity in final stages of the South African case is consistent with Tomlin’s 
depiction, the sequence differs. In the South African case, the agreement to negotiate and the 
definition of the scope and agenda for official negotiation (stages four and five) happen 
simultaneously. Further, the communication of the desire to negotiate was not a turning point, 
marking passage to the final stages. The important issue was the problem of preconditions as a 
barrier to the opening of official negotiations, and how they were to be overcome.  
 
Despite the ANC’s call for an All-Party Congress, which according to Tomlin should mark the 
turning point to the final stages, the process deadlocked. The problem was that the government 
had failed to meet the ANC’s preconditions as spelt out in the Harare Declaration and December 
Consultative Conference. As the political process reached the expiry date of the ANC demands, 
preconditions were still perceived as a barrier. Consequently, a crisis accompanied the end of 
stage three as the desire to negotiate was accompanied by unmet preconditions. Progression to 
stage four would then depend on how preconditions as a barrier were to be resolved.  
 
Three issues provided the means for overcoming the problem of preconditions.  
 
The first was Mandela’s ultimatum which listed the meeting of seven demands as a condition for 
the continuation of talks. This ultimatum provided for a political solution; a positive response to 
these demands would have ensured continuity and buy-in from ANC hardliners especially since 
the government was not going to meet the 30 April deadline set by the ANC. While De Klerk’s 
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unilateral response to the ultimatum was not met positively by the ANC, it did introduce a peace 
process that maintained momentum generated by over a year of bargaining. The government and 
ANC high-level summit on the day of the expiry of the ultimatum fed into this momentum. At 
this summit, the parties agreed to continue talking through the working groups about the return 
of exiles and political prisoners, and armed action. Thus working groups were firmly in place 
through which pre-negotiation would continue.  
 
The second factor was the agency of Mandela. Mandela’s opening address at the ANC national 
conference is important. He successfully generated consensus in the ANC that they were indeed 
in a hurting stalemate and as a result, had to expedite the process towards settlement 
negotiations. Debating over preconditions was counter-productive; the most important goal was 
to develop a comprehensive strategy in preparation for an inevitable negotiation process, and 
push for the installation of an interim government of national unity to oversee a constitutional 
writing process. 
 
The third factor was Inkathagate (a crisis of legitimacy), the turning point marking passage to the 
final stages. Once the government faced its second legitimacy crisis, a window of opportunity 
opened for the ANC to go ahead with Mandela’s proposal. Thus, the goal was to get government 
concessions on the scope, parameters, agenda and procedure of the multiparty negotiation 
process; it could no longer afford to stall the pre-negotiation process over preconditions. 
Concessions over an interim government became an imperative.  
 
After Inkathagate De Klerk committed the government to levelling the political playing fields, 
giving the clearest indication that the government was willing to make concessions on the ANC’s 
position on an interim government thus clearing the path to official talks. To this end, he 
endorsed the need for “transitional measures.”1154 De Klerk also supported the ANC’s position 
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on a speedy path toward a multi-party congress. Both parties thus begin to define the scope of the 
negotiation and establish its parameters.  
 
As discussed, above, the sense of a mutually hurting stalemate was maintained throughout the 
process. Inkathagate, however, signalled a reversal of fortunes for the South African government 
i.e. the power relations in the positions of the ANC and South African government were 
changing and becoming symmetrical. According to the third dimension of the ripe moment, 
ripeness occurs when “the upper hand starts slipping and the underdog starts rising [i.e.] when 
the ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ start to shift their relative power positions.”1155 At the heart of the analysis 
is that changes in domestic power relations influence the decision of both sides to come to the 
negotiating table. The South African case represented the transition towards the symmetrical 
moment; the government’s power and legitimacy were decreasing and the ANC’s legitimacy was 
increasing. Despite the symmetrical moment, both sides were strong and legitimate enough to 
come to an agreement satisfying to the minimal or reduced demands of both sides i.e. both sides 
had legitimacy and strength to come to an agreement to begin negotiations.  
 
Inkathagate had a profound impact on the balance of power and legitimacy between the ANC 
and the government during the pre-negotiations. For the government, Inkathagate led to the 
parting of ways with the IFP. In this process, the government lost a partner with credible support 
and with this, any chance of building a substantive conservative coalition. For the ANC, 
Inkathagate was proof of the necessity of an interim government presiding over negotiations 
instead of the NP.
1156
  
 
As a consequence of Inkathagate, and a clear illustration of the legitimacy crisis facing the 
government, De Klerk tried desperately to repair and the rebuild the government’s image as a 
legitimate political actor and negotiating partner. First, he moved to placate the ANC. Adriaan 
                                                          
1155
 Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, 272 
1156
 Van der Westhuizen, 191 
377 
 
Vlok and Magnus Malan were demoted to lower-ranking cabinet portfolios. Second, on the first 
day of CODESA, De Klerk yielded to the ANC’s demand that a democratically elected 
government should draft the final constitution.  
 
The empirical discussion of the final stages of pre-negotiation reached important theoretical 
conclusions. First, if there is political will, then a pre-negotiation process can acquire sufficient 
momentum to survive many of the hazards that are capable of preventing the opening of 
settlement negotiations. The dissertation is thus in agreement with Zartman and Berman’s 
contention on the importance of political will for the opening of negotiations; “adversaries 
explore the possibility of negotiations when they see that a problem can only be resolved jointly 
and when they have the will to end an existing situation that they consider unacceptable, while 
admitting the other party’s or parties’ claim to participate in that solution.”1157 Political will is all 
important; without the will to reach agreement there will be none, even if the other party’s claim 
to participate in a solution is admitted.  Will applies to a number of specific elements such as the 
unacceptability of the situation, inability to improve the situation alone, and acceptance of the 
other party.
1158
  
 
Second, changes in power relations influence the decision of both sides to come to the settlement 
negotiations table. The dissertation, however, emphasised power as a perceived relation i.e. that 
perception affects objective reality, and that issues of power and legitimacy are important in 
perceptions of, and in the relations between, negotiation and symmetry. This is thus in agreement 
with Zartman’s third dimension of the ripe moment that settlement negotiation possibilities open 
when “the upper hand starts slipping and the underdog starts rising – when the ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ 
start to shift their relative power positions.”1159 
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The discussion on stages four and five of the South African pre-negotiation process suggests that 
the notion of ripeness can be enhanced as follows: 
 
1. Changes in the perception of domestic power relations influence the decision on both 
sides to begin settlement negotiations. 
2. Preconditions are overcome, and parties are ready to begin settlement negotiations, when 
parties perceive their power relations as changing and becoming symmetrical, but feel 
both strong and legitimate enough to come to an agreement to begin settlement 
negotiations. The point is that parties think their relations are symmetrical – not that they 
are symmetrical. This may involve miscalculations, a lack of realism and self-deception. 
3. Agency, particularly political leadership, is a crucial variable in resolving deadlock, and 
sustaining momentum toward the opening of settlement negotiations.  
 
Therefore, negotiations in South Africa began because the major parties reached a shared 
understanding of the conflict, and a shared understanding that a negotiated solution was possible. 
This means that the South African government and ANC agreed on what the problem was 
(although they had different views) and that it could be solved through negotiations. How they 
reached this point, and why they choose to negotiate with each other initially, is a result of the 
political circumstances of their pre-negotiation experiences i.e. their exploration of negotiated 
possibilities made possible by their political circumstances. 
 
Multiparty negotiations began when the South African government and the ANC, through pact-
making, produced a commitment to a negotiated solution, and overcame the problem of 
preconditions as a barrier to the opening of multiparty negotiations. What made the latter 
possible was when both parties perceived their power relations as changing and becoming 
symmetrical, but felt strong and legitimate enough to come to an agreement to begin multiparty 
negotiations.  
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9.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented how the South African case contributes to ripeness and pre-negotiation 
theorising and suggested new questions for investigation and specific hypotheses for testing. The 
chapter used the discussion of the South African case to qualify specific components of ripeness, 
and put forward additional changes based on Tomlin’s analytical framework within which the 
South African pre-negotiation process was explained.  
 
The chapter argued that the ripe moment is better explained as a period within the pre-
negotiation process itself. The case reveals that the ripe moment is when parties reach a shared 
understanding that negotiated solutions are possible, and that this condition is necessary for 
producing a commitment to a negotiated solution, but not sufficient for the beginning of 
settlement negotiations. For settlement negotiations to begin, parties have to overcome the 
problem of preconditions as a barrier. Therefore, multiparty negotiations in South Africa began 
because adversaries reached a shared understanding that the South African conflict could be 
solved through a negotiated solution, and consequently produced a commitment to a negotiated 
solution, and in the process, overcame the problem of preconditions as a barrier to opening of 
settlement negotiations. Ripeness indicators can assist in explaining why the South African 
government and the ANC negotiated at all, and why the South African government ended up 
negotiating with the ANC. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
Conclusion 
 
The subject of this dissertation has been the pre-negotiation stage of the negotiation process in 
South Africa leading to the first plenary session of CODESA. This was that period in the South 
African conflict when negotiated solutions were considered, and negotiation towards a political 
settlement was adopted as an option by the major parties, namely the South African government 
and the ANC. While the CODESA process included other political organisations, the South 
African government and the ANC were central to the pre-negotiation process. During this period, 
the respective parties explored the possibility of negotiated solutions, reached a common 
understanding on the important issues in the South African conflict, developed a commitment to 
a negotiated settlement, and chose to negotiate a formula for a political settlement. 
 
The central question this dissertation answered was why the South African multiparty 
negotiations began. This question is important because De Klerk’s seminal address to the 
Tricameral Parliament in 2 February 1990, and the subsequent release of Mandela on 11 
February 1990, is often considered as the beginning of the negotiation process in South Africa. 
This however is not true. As has been shown, negotiations did take place before this date and 
they were crucial in shaping the path towards multiparty negotiations. The important question 
therefore is what prepared the ground for 2 February 1990, and the resulting political process that 
led to multiparty negotiations.  
 
The dissertation thus had two sub-questions: (1) why the South African government and ANC 
negotiated at all; and (2) why the South African government ended up negotiating with the ANC. 
To answer these questions, the dissertation used Zartman’s theory of ripeness as a guide, and 
Tomlin’s five-staged model of pre-negotiation as an analytical framework. In this respect, the 
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dissertation is a theoretical single-case study. Using an analytical framework, the dissertation 
applied an established theory to a case and examined its utility. In the process, the dissertation 
improved ripeness theory on the basis of its application to the South African case, and used the 
ripeness theoretical guidelines within the context of Tomlin’s analytical framework to better 
understand the South African case. 
 
The goals of the dissertation were thus three-fold: (1) to contribute to a gap in the South African 
negotiations literature that has not given sufficient attention to the pre-negotiation stage and its 
impact in the process of getting to CODESA; (2) to contribute to the very small literature on pre-
negotiation whose scholarship has not moved beyond the seminal approaches of Zartman, 
Saunders, Stein and Tomlin; and (3) to contribute to ripeness theory, which is the most fitting to 
use as a theoretical guide for the question asked, but also by no means a complete theory.    
 
The dissertation began by reviewing the scholarship that has sought to explain why negotiations 
in South Africa began. The dissertation organized this literature into four broad categories: 
multivariable explanations, dominant variable explanations, single-variable explanations and 
theoretical approaches. The dissertation identified the seminal scholarship within these 
approaches.  
 
The dissertation identified important strengths and weaknesses in the seminal literature. 
 
The strength of this literature is that it provides invaluable insights on the complexity of the end 
of apartheid. Multivariable analyses highlight the importance of macro-political and macro-
economic factors. They point out that multiple pressures of great intensity were brought to bear 
on the apartheid state until such time that the pressures became too great, leading to the 
beginning of negotiations. The start of negotiations is either viewed as an elite response to 
pressure or an elite initiative in anticipation of changing circumstances.  
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Dominant-variable approaches acknowledge many factors as important subsidiary pressures, but 
highlight one variable as crucial. Important works that fall into this category emphasise the role 
played by the civil society and social movements, especially trade unions, arguing that they were 
at the heart of the political changes that led to the beginning of negotiations. 
 
Single variable approaches analyse a particular factor; but that factor is not necessarily claimed 
to be the most important. They seek not to replace other explanations but rather compliment 
them by giving weight to one factor. For the beginning of negotiations, literature tends to 
highlight the impact of the end of the cold war, and the role of secret talks.  
 
Theoretical explanations use political and sociological theories to explain the beginning of 
negotiations. Important accounts use institutional rational choice theory, draw on comparative 
studies of democratisation in Latin America and Southern Europe, and use Marxist analysis to 
explain the beginning of negotiation.  
 
Despite these important contributions, the literature has important shortcomings.  
 
First, the literature dates the beginning of negotiation as 2 February 1990 and identifies De Klerk 
as the central actor for the beginning of the process. While the literature acknowledges the 
importance of political changes and events in the 1970s and 1980s, the important pre-
negotiations that happen during this period are not given sufficient weight.  
 
Second, the literature on ‘why negotiate at all’ is stronger than the literature on ‘why did the NP 
government end up negotiating with the ANC’. In answering ‘why negotiate at all’, multivariable 
approaches highlight the role of macro-processes. Dominant-variable approaches emphasise the 
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role of the trade union movement in applying pressure. Single-variable approaches identify the 
end of the cold war and the role of secret talks, and theoretical approaches use political and 
sociological theories.  
 
None of the approaches, however, explain why the NP government ended up negotiating with the 
ANC. There are two reasons for this.  
 
First, the beginning of the negotiation process is dated as 2 February 1990. Consequently, the 
politics of pre-negotiation involving why and how parties explore negotiation possibilities is 
excluded altogether.  
 
The second is that of those studies that do consider pre-negotiation, particularly those that 
highlight the importance of secret talks, there is no critical analysis of pre-negotiation as a 
process; the studies simply highlight the important role played by select individuals and the 
bonds that developed between them.  
 
In order to fill the gap in the literature, the dissertation drew attention to the nature and 
importance of the pre-negotiation stage, and its contextual conditions i.e. the notion of ripeness. 
The dissertation examined the conditions conducive for the beginning of pre-negotiation and 
outlined the different stages and functions. In the process, the dissertation used ripeness theory to 
answer the central question on why did multiparty negotiations begin in South Africa.  Drawing 
attention to the nature and importance of pre-negotiation and ripeness theory enabled the 
dissertation to provide a good answer to why the South African multiparty negotiations began. It 
also provided a good explanation why the parties negotiated at all, and why the NP government 
ended up negotiating with the ANC. 
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In this endeavour, the dissertation began with the work of Zartman and his notion of ripeness. 
This condition is brought about by the perception of two essential elements: a mutually hurting 
stalemate between the parties, coupled with a formula for a way out. The concept proposes that 
when parties find themselves on a ‘pain-producing path’, they begin to look for negotiated 
alternatives that are less painful and more advantageous. Ripeness is based on two core motives 
and elements: pain and opportunities to escape from pain. It is portrayed as a state that may or 
may not exist objectively, but that must be perceived to mutually exist by parties in order for it to 
motivate. This can occur either naturally, as the result of external events, or be induced, as by 
active intervention from parties or third parties. 
 
The dissertation identified two important limitations of ripeness.  
 
First, ripeness theory is unclear about the dependent variable. On the one hand, ripeness is 
implied to be a condition for successful negotiation. On the other hand, the literature explains 
this as a condition for the initiation of negotiations. This is an important lack of consensus in the 
literature as the process of bringing about negotiations presents one sets of variables, whereas the 
successful conclusion of a negotiations process presents a different type.   
 
Second, ripeness theory is unclear about the composition, role and significance of the major 
actors in the conflict, and views actors as unitary. This is problematic as processes fostering de-
escalation occur within each adversary, in the relations between the adversaries, and also among 
other parties in the social environment.  Thus it is both the parties themselves as well as parties 
with interests in the conflict i.e. third parties who have the potential to take an effective role. 
 
In order to improve ripeness theory as a guide to answer the central question, the dissertation 
employed two strategies.  
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First, the dissertation focused exclusively on the role of ripeness in the pre-negotiation stage. In 
this regard the dissertation used Tomlin’s analytical framework on pre-negotiation to structure 
the South African discussion and ripeness theoretical guidelines.  
 
Second, the dissertation highlighted the important role that political leaders and strategically 
placed individuals play in the process of bringing about negotiation. To this end, the dissertation 
was guided Hermann’s useful classification of political representatives in decision-making units. 
 
Tomlin’s staged-model was crucial in providing for an appropriate analytical framework to 
answer the central question. The analysis of the South African pre-negotiation process using 
stages and turning points permitted a reconstruction of the sequence of decisions and interactions 
that led the South African government and the ANC to negotiate joint solutions. This framework 
provided for an organising set of concepts for the examination of the pre-negotiation process, 
and highlighted important stages and events indicating behavioural patterns. The application of 
the framework to the South African pre-negotiation process permitted the superimposition of 
these general concepts on the case-specific details. The result will was a detailed, comprehensive 
and systematic description of the processes and behaviour of the government and ANC actors 
during the pre-negotiation process as well as the pattern of relations between the two.  
 
The dissertation has shown that the notion of ripeness as a function of pre-negotiation, using 
Tomlin’s staged-model on pre-negotiation provides for a comprehensive and sufficient answer as 
to why multiparty negotiations began in South Africa. It also provides for a comprehensive 
answer why negotiations began at all, and why the South African government ended up 
negotiating with the ANC.  
 
Using Tomlin’s stage-model on pre-negotiation, and ripeness as a theoretical guide, the 
dissertation argued that negotiations in South Africa began, and the South African government 
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ended up negotiating with the ANC, because they reached a shared understanding of the conflict, 
and a shared understanding that a negotiated solution was possible. They agreed on what the 
problem was (although they had different views) and that it could be solved through 
negotiations. How they reached this point, and why they choose to negotiate with each other, is a 
result of the political circumstances of their pre-negotiation experiences i.e. their exploration of 
negotiated possibilities made possible by their political circumstances. Tomlin’s first two stages 
of pre-negotiation successfully assist in explaining how the parties reach this shared 
understanding.  
 
Once the South African government and ANC reach a shared understanding of a problem, and a 
shared understanding that a negotiated solution is possible, they had to produce a commitment to 
a negotiated solution. The parties went from “it can be solved through negotiation” to “we are 
committed to a negotiated solution to the problem”. Multiparty negotiations began because the 
South African government and the ANC, through pact-making, produced a commitment to a 
negotiated solution, and overcame the problem of preconditions as a barrier to the opening of 
multiparty negotiations. What made the latter possible was when both parties perceived their 
power relations as changing and becoming symmetrical, but felt strong and legitimate enough to 
come to an agreement to begin multiparty negotiations. 
 
Ripeness indicators were a useful theoretical guide in this endeavour. The idea of a shared 
understanding meets some of the requirements of ripeness as articulated by Zartman, but with 
some qualifications; the parties in South Africa were not ready to begin settlement negotiations 
at that point. Thus, ripeness is better understood as that period where parties are convinced that a 
mutually acceptable resolution of their disagreement is possible. The next step is to find ways of 
arriving at an agreement to begin settlement negotiations. Thus ripeness can be enhanced by 
viewing it as the moment when parties reach the perception that the other is serious about 
finding a negotiated solution. This is a condition necessary but not sufficient for the opening of 
settlement negotiations.  
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There are some important implications raised by the argument in this dissertation. I will organize 
these implications into three categories: those that relate to the South African case; those that 
relate to pre-negotiation; and those that relate to ripeness. I will then conclude by placing the 
South African case in a comparative context and suggest the lessons for other pre-negotiations. 
 
10.1. Implications for Why Negotiations in South Africa Began 
 
The dissertation has made an important contribution to the study of why negotiations in South 
Africa began. 
 
First, the dissertation fills the gap in the South African literature that fails to explain why the 
South African government ended up negotiating with the ANC. By using Tomlin’s stage-model 
on pre-negotiation, the dissertation highlights the importance of the political dynamics of 
exploring negotiation possibilities. Thus, the beginning period of pre-negotiation is dated to the 
early 1980s and the analysis consequently shows how and why the South African government 
ends up negotiating with the ANC, and sufficiently explains why negotiations began in South 
Africa.  
 
Second, the dissertation acknowledges the role of important actors rarely identified as shaping 
the process of negotiation in South Africa. For the South African government, these include 
former president PW Botha, Mike Louw and Niel Barnard. From this perspective, De Klerk 
assumes an important role in the negotiation process only after the South African government 
and ANC have reached a shared understanding of the conflict, and a shared understanding that 
negotiated solutions are possible. For the ANC, these include Oliver Tambo, Pallo Jordan and 
Zola Skweyiya. While Mandela’s role is generally considered the most significant, the thinking 
on negotiation for the ANC was considerably shaped by these individuals.  
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Third, the dissertation points out that the ANC was by no means the only anti-apartheid 
organization. The dissertation explains why and how the ANC assumed such importance, 
pointing out that it was the result of political circumstances in the 1980s, and the agency of 
Oliver Tambo developing a diplomatic alternative as a priority. 
 
Fourth, the answers to the central questions raised in the dissertation highlight the importance of 
the pre-negotiation stage of the South African negotiation process. This stage shaped the 
negotiation process in four ways. First, it specifies the boundaries multiparty negotiation. During 
the process, parties agreed on a comprehensive framework for multiparty negotiation, and 
committed themselves to a comprehensive strategy. Second, it identified the major actors who 
played the central roles in the multiparty negotiation process. Third, it set the agenda for 
multiparty negotiations. Fourth, it built a central pro-negotiation coalition in the South African 
government and the ANC.  
 
Thus, the dissertation demonstrated that the pre-negotiation stage was the most important and 
complex stage of the South African negotiation process.     
 
10.2. Implications for Ripeness 
 
The dissertation has made an important contribution to ripeness theory. Five can be concluded 
from the dissertation. 
 
1. Ripeness as articulated by Zartman is better understood as that period where parties are 
convinced that a mutually acceptable resolution of their disagreement is possible. 
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Ripeness is therefore the moment when parties reach the perception that the other is serious 
about finding a negotiated solution. This is a condition necessary but not sufficient for the 
opening of settlement negotiations. The ripe moment thus has better utility when viewed as a 
function of a pre-negotiation process when parties reach a shared understanding of the problem 
and a shared understanding about finding a negotiated solution. This means that parties agree on 
what the problem is, and that the problem can be solved through negotiation. It does not mean 
that negotiations towards a political settlement will begin. This thus removes the potential 
tautology of the concept. 
 
2. Mediation can assisting parties in developing a shared understanding of the problem, and 
shared understanding about finding a negotiated solution. 
 
But mediators are not the most important actors. Rather, political leadership is most important in 
initiating and driving the process of pre-negotiation in the early stages, and in developing the 
shared understanding.  
 
3. It is not necessary for all actors in a conflict to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate, but 
it is necessary for political leaders to perceive it so.  
 
This mutually hurting stalemate can be conceptualized in political terms, and this political 
conceptualization is more powerful in developing the shared understanding. The continued 
perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate amongst political leadership are also a necessary 
condition for the sustainability of a pre-negotiation process. Political leadership is also a crucial 
variable in resolving deadlock, and sustaining momentum toward the opening of settlement 
negotiations. 
 
4. Political pact-making produces and sustains the commitment to a negotiated solution. 
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5. Disagreement over preconditions is a barrier for the opening of settlement negotiations. 
 
Preconditions are overcome, and parties are ready to begin settlement negotiations, when parties 
perceive their power relations as changing and becoming symmetrical, but feel both strong and 
legitimate enough to come to an agreement to begin settlement negotiations. The point is that 
parties think their relations are symmetrical – not that they are symmetrical. This may involve 
miscalculations, a lack of realism and self-deception. 
 
10.3. Lessons for other Pre-Negotiations  
 
The empirical discussion in this dissertation raises important questions and practical lessons for 
other pre-negotiations. Two are important: the international context of South Africa’s pre-
negotiations and implications for placing South Africa in a comparative context; and the role of 
agency in the negotiation process.  
 
10.3.1. The South African Case in Comparative Context 
 
The South African pre-negotiations coincided with unprecedented international structural 
change, most of which supported the ending of conflicts. The second half of the 1980s was an 
era of dynamic change in international politics, primarily as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
ascension to the Soviet leadership in March 1985. Gorbachev’s reform programs of perestroika, 
glasnost and ‘new thinking’ in Soviet foreign policy had a profound impact on Southern Africa. 
Gorbachev’s ‘new political thinking’ was based on the belief that because nuclear warfare 
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possessed such a global threat, any conflict with the potential to escalate should be settled 
through negotiation.
1160
  
 
In order for Gorbachev’s reform to succeed a stable international environment was necessary. 
For this, relations with the United States had to change and be restructured. Regional conflicts 
were an obstacle to this; new attitudes and approaches were needed.  
 
The Reykjavik Summit between Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev in October 1986 was the most 
important for Southern Africa. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed on non-US intervention in Eastern 
Europe, and the Soviet Union renounced its aspirations to hegemony in Africa.
1161
 This indicated 
a new approach to the Angolan civil war. The Soviet Union, however, would not abandon the 
MPLA and Cuba; rather, the new emphasis would be diplomatic rather than military. This 
considerably enhanced the importance of the US mediation through Crocker and his team.   
 
These international developments coincided with Crocker’s mediation in the Angolan peace 
process. This peace process in turn coincided with the famous Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, a 
military confrontation between South Africa and UNITA one side, and the Cuban and Angolan 
national armies on the other. US mediation and the loss of prestige of the SADF produced a new 
regional conjuncture, and a resolving formula for the conflicts in Southern Africa, leading 
directly to the independence of Namibia. It is rare to have such coincidence and conjuncture that 
would support and accelerate pre-negotiation towards settlement negotiations.  
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 Roni du Preez, The Impact of the End of the Cold War on Transition in South Africa, Masters Dissertation 
(Rhodes University: Grahamstown, 1994) 
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10.3.2. The Role of Agency in the Negotiation Process 
 
The empirical discussion in the dissertation also highlights the role of agency in pre-negotiation. 
The dissertation emphasized how political events and the actions of leaders with a hand in these 
events shaped and reshaped people’s preferences and beliefs about the conflict.1162 The 
dissertation pointed out how risk embracing acts of political leadership can produce positive-sum 
outcomes from zero-sum conflicts.
1163
 Four leaders took calculated gambles: Mandela and Mbeki 
(under the tutorship of Tambo) for the ANC, and PW Botha and De Klerk for the South African 
government. These political leaders reached two important realisations.  
 
First, they realized that the South African conflict was unsustainable and that all sides stood to 
gain from a political settlement. There were important differences, however, on the terms and 
conditions of that settlement.  
 
Second, the leaders realized that to resolve the impasse they would have to take calculated risks 
and move off into a new direction, hoping that in time it will enable both followers and 
opponents to perceive and act on new political alternatives. Mandela and Botha in particular 
internalized much of the risk, and in the process, diminished it from their constituencies. They 
realized that their initial actions could have backfired.  
 
The political leadership thus realized the interdependent nature of pre-negotiation; neither could 
succeed without the co-operation of the other. All believed that they and their respective 
constituencies stood to gain or lose together but each also hoped to gain more or less than the 
other. The empirical discussion in the dissertation this shows how leaders accountable to one 
constituency can initiate cooperation across the divide and then “persuade their own constituency 
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to start crossing a bridge that is still under construction.”1164 Therefore, strategic action by 
leaders who take such calculated risks is necessary for the beginning of negotiation. The 
dissertation, however, does not claim that strategic calculated risks are sufficient; factors outside 
their control, such as accidents, may cause even carefully calculated efforts to fail. 
 
10.4. Recommendation for Future Research about the Pre-negotiation Stage 
 
This dissertation has examined the conditions conducive for pre-negotiation to begin in South 
Africa, and outlined the different stages and functions of pre-negotiation. The dissertation has 
suggested that pre-negotiation plays a central role in helping parties reach multiparty 
negotiations i.e. in providing a foundation for a shared understanding of issues in the conflict, 
committing belligerent parties to a negotiated solution, shaping the process once they get to 
multiparty negotiations, defining the parameters, setting the agenda, and selecting participants 
for the multiparty talks. It has enabled for a better understanding of the political process (i.e. the 
ripening process) that brings parties in conflict to the negotiating table. 
 
Given the paucity of research on pre-negotiation, and given the importance of the process for 
settlement negotiations, future research should build on this and treat pre-negotiation as the 
foundation of the entire negotiation process. One way would be to view the pre-negotiation 
process as an independent variable that impacts the final negotiation outcome. For the South 
African case, it would mean investigating the extent to which the process of reaching a shared 
understanding that negotiated solutions are possible, producing a commitment to a negotiated 
solution, and overcoming preconditions as a barrier for the opening of multiparty negotiations 
shaped the outcome of the multiparty negotiating process.   
                                                          
1164
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